THE 


LIMITS  OF  RELIGIOUS  THOUGHT- 

EXAMINED 


I  N 


EIGHT  LECTURES  DELIVERED  BEFORE  THE  UNIVERSITY  OF 
OXFORD,  IN  THE  YEAR  MDCCCLVIIL, 


B  Y 


HENRY  LONGUEVILLE  MANSEL,  B.  D., 

READER  IN  MORAL  AND  METAPHYSICAL  PHILOSOPHY  AT  MAGDALEN  COLLEGE; 
TUTOR  AND   LATE  FELLOW  OF  ST.  JOHN'S  COLLEGE. 


FIRST  AMERICAN,  FROM  THE  THIRD  LONDON.  EDITION. 
WITH  THE   NOTES   TRANSLATED. 


BOSTON: 

GOULD     AND     LINCOLN, 

59    WASHINGTON    STREET. 

NEW   YORK:    SHELDON   AND    COMPANY.    * 
CINCINNATI:   GEORGE   S.  BLANCHARD. 
1859. 


Entered  according  to  Act  of  Congress,  in  the  year  1859,  by 

GOULD    AND    LINCOLN, 
In  the  Clerk's  Office  of  the  District  Court  for  the  District  of  Massachusetts. 


ELECTEOTYPED     AND     PRINTED 
BY     W.    F.    DRAPER,     ANDOVER,    MASS 


THE  OBJECTIONS  MADE  TO  FAITH  ARE  BY  NO  MEANS  AN 
EFFECT  OF  KNOWLEDGE,  BUT  PROCEED  RATHER  FROM 
IGNORANCE  OF  WHAT  KNOWLEDGE  18. 

BISHOP    BERKELEY. 

NO  DIFFICULTY  EMERGES  IN  THEOLOGY,  WHICH  HAD  NOT 
PREVIOUSLY  EMERGED  IN  PHILOSOPHY. 

SIB,    W.    HAMILTON. 


EXTRACT 

FROM 

THE  LAST  WILL  AND  TESTAMENT 

O  F    TH  E 

REV.    JOHN    BAMPTON, 

CANON     OF     SALISBURY. 


.  ..."  I  give  and  bequeath  my  Lands  and  Estates  to  the  Chancellor, 
Masters,  and  Scholars  of  the  University  of  Oxford  for  ever,  to  have  and 
to  hold  all  and  singular  the  said  Lands  or  Estates  upon  trust,  and  to  the 
intents  and  purposes  hereinafter  mentioned;  that  is  to  say,  I  will  and 
appoint  that  the  Vice-Chancellor  of  the  University  of  Oxford  for  the  time 
being  shall  take  and  receive  all  the  rents,  issues,  and  profits  thereof,  and 
(after  all  taxes,  reparations,  and  necessary  deductions  made)  that  he  pay 
all  the  remainder  to  the  endowment  of  eight  Divinity  Lecture  Sermons, 
to  be  established  for  ever  in  the  said  University,  and  to  be  performed  in 

the  manner  following : 

• 

"  I  direct  and  appoint,  that,  upon  the  first  Tuesday  in  Easter  Term,  a 
Lecturer  be  yearly  chosen  by  the  Heads  of  Colleges  only,  and  by  no 
others,  in  the  room  adjoining  to  the  Printing-House,  between  the  hours 
of  ten  in  the  morning  and  two  in  the  afternoon,  to  preach  eight  Divinity 
Lecture  Sermons,  the  year  following,  at  St.  Mary's  in  Oxford,  between 


VI  EXTRACT    FROM    CANON    BAMPTON'S    WILL. 

the  commencement  of  the  last  month  in  Lent  Term,  and  the  end  of  the 
third  week  in  Act  Term. 

"  Also  I  direct  and  appoint,  that  the  eight  Divinity  Lecture  Sermons 
shall  be  preached  upon  either  of  the  following  Subjects  —  to  confirm  and 
establish  the  Christian  Faith,  and  to  confute  all  heretics  and  schismatics 
—  upon  the  divine  authority  of  the  holy  Scriptures  —  upon  the  authority 
of  the  writings  of  the  primitive  Fathers,  as  to  the  faith  and  practice  of 
the  primitive  Church  —  upon  the  Divinity  of  our  Lord  and  Saviour  Jesus 
Christ  —  upon  the  Divinity  of  the  Holy  Ghost  —  upon  the  Articles  of  the 
Christian  Faith,  as  comprehended  in  the  Apostles'  and  Nicene  Creeds. 

"  Also  I  direct,  that  thirty  copies  of  the  eight  Divinity  Lecture  Sermons 
shall  be  always  printed,  within  two  months  after  they  are  preached,  and 
one  copy  shall  be  given  to  the  Chancellor  of  the  University,  and  one  copy 
to  the  Head  of  every  College,  and  one  copy  to  the  Mayor  of  the  city  of 
Oxford,  and  one  copy  to  be  put  into  the  Bodleian  Library;  and  the 
expense  of  printing  them  shall  be  paid  out  of  the  revenue  of  the  Land  or 
Estates  given  for  establishing  the  Divinity  Lecture  Sermons;  and  the 
Preacher  shall  not  be  paid,  nor  be  entitled  to  the  revenue,  before  they  are 
printed. 

"  Also  I  direct  and  appoint,  that  no  person  shall  be  qualified  to  preach 
the  Divinity  Lecture  Sermons,  unless  he  hath  taken  the  degree  of  Master 
of  Arts  at  least,  in  one  of  the  two  Universities  of  Oxford  or  Cambridge ; 
and  that  the  same  person  shall  never  preach  the  Divinity  Lecture  Ser 
mons  twice." 


PUBLISHERS'  ADVERTISEMENT 

TO 

THE     AMERICAN     EDITION. 


The  work,  here  offered  to  the  American  public,  has  been  received  with 
the  most  marked  attention  in  England,  and  has  already  reached  a  third 
edition,  though  but  few  months  have  elapsed  since  the  issue  of  the  first. 
It  is  believed  that  its  great  merits  will  command  for  it  a  like  attention 
wherever  it  is  known;  the  rare  learning  and  metaphysical  ability  with 
which  it  discusses  problems,  no  less  profound  in  their  philosophical 
nature  than  practical  in  their  religious  applications;  the  devout  rever 
ence  for  the  authority  of  the  Bible,  and  the  truly  Christian  spirit  with 
which  it  is  imbued,  must  gain  for  it  a  cherished  place  in  the  minds  and 
hearts  of  all  who  wish  well  to  a  sound  philosophy,  and  a  pure,  and  we 
may  add,  a  real,  Christianity.  In  its  more  immediate  aspect,  it  is  emi 
nently  a  work  for  the  present  times;  so  closely  is  it  connected  with  the 
higher  thinking  of  the  present  generation,  and  so  boldly  and  triumphantly 
does  it  carry  the  Christian  argument  through  the  entire  course  of  recent, 
and  especially  German,  speculation.  But  rightly  viewed,  these  Lectures  of 
Mr.  Mansel  have  a  far  wider  scope  than  this;  for,  in  unfolding  his  great 
theme,  the  author  aims  to  lay  the  foundations  of  a  sound  religious  philos 
ophy  in  the  laws  of  the  human  mind,  and  in  the  general  conditions  to 
which  it  is  thereby  necessarily  subject  in  the  attainment  of  all  truth  and 
knowledge;  his  work  therefore  belongs,  in  its  principles  and  applications, 


VITI  ADVERTISEMENT. 

to  all  periods  of  human  inquiry,  and  is  thus  invested  with  a  universal 
interest  and  a  permanent  value. 

But  without  enlarging  upon  the  general  merits  of  this  work,  the  Pub 
lishers  have  only  to  mention  the  single  change  of  any  importance,  which 
it  has  undergone  in  the  present  reprint.  This  change  is  the  translation  in 
the  author's  learned  NOTES  —  a  most  valuable  portion  of  his  work  —  of 
the  numerous  passages  from  foreign  writers,  Greek,  Latin,  French,  and 
German,  which  in  the  English  edition  appear  in  the  original  languages. 
It  has  been  thought  best  to  translate  these  passages,  in  order  to  bring 
them  within  the  reach  of  all  general  readers;  and  it  is  hoped  that  this 
proceeding  will  be  regarded  by  scholars  with  indulgence  at  least,  if  not 
with  entire  approval. 

The  translations  have  been  made  by  PROF.  JOHN  L.  LINCOLN,  of 
Brown  University,  whose  reputation  as  a  scholar  is  deemed  by  the  Pub 
lishers  a  sufficient  guaranty  for  the  execution  of  the  work.  It  has  been 
the  translator's  endeavor  to  reproduce  the  original  with  as  much  fidelity 
as  possible;  and  to  make  only  such  departures,  even  in  the  form  of  the 
thought,  as  the  English  idiom  seemed  to  require.  The  difficulties  belong 
ing  to  the  task  of  translating  isolated  passages  from  so  many  and  so 
different  writers,  will  doubtless  be  best  understood  by  those  who  are 
most  familiar  with  the  languages  in  which  they  are  written,  and  with  the 
abstruse  subjects  which  they  discuss. 

An  INDEX  of  THE  AUTHORS,  quoted  in  the  work,  has  been  also  pre 
pared  for  the  American  edition,  which  will  be  of  great  service  to  readers, 
and  will  indicate  the  wide  and  various  range  of  Mr.  Hansel's  studies. 

BOSTON,  April  20,  1859. 


PREFACE 

TO 

THE    THIRD    EDITION. 


THE  various  Criticisms  to  which  these  Lectures  have  been 
subjected  since  the  publication  of  the  last  Edition,  seem  to  call 
for  a  few  explanatory  remarks  on  the  positions  principally  con 
troverted.  Such  remarks  may,  it  is  hoped,  contribute  to  the 
clearer  perception  of  the  argument  in  places  where  it  has 
been  misunderstood,  and  are  also  required  in  order  to  justify 
the  republication,  with  little  more  than  a  few  verbal  alterations, 
of  the  entire  work  in  its  original  form. 

On  the  whole,  I  have  no  reason  to  complain  of  my  Critics. 
With  one  or  two  exceptions,  the  tone  of  their  observations  has 
been  candid,  liberal,  and  intelligent,  arid  in  some  instances 
more  favorable  than  I  could  have  ventured  to  expect.  An 
argument  so  abstruse,  and  in  some  respects  so  controversial, 
must  almost  inevitably  call  forth  a  considerable  amount  of 
opposition ;  and  such  criticism  is  at  least  useful  in  stimulating 
further  inquiry,  and  in  pointing  out  to  an  author  those  among 


10  PREFACE. 

his  statements  which  appear  most  to  require  explanation  or 
defence.  If  it  has  not  done  more  than  this,  it  is  because  the 
original  argument  was  not  put  forth  without  much  previous 
consideration,  nor  without  anticipation  of  many  of  the  objec 
tions  to  which  it  was  likely  to  be  exposed. 

At  present,  I  must  confine  myself  to  those  explanations 
which  appear  to  be  necessary  to  the  right  appreciation  of  the 
main  purposes  of  the  work,  on  the  supposition  that  its  funda 
mental  principles  may  be  admitted  as  tenable.  To  reargue  the 
whole  question  on  first  principles,  or  to  reply  minutely  to  the 
criticisms  on  subordinate  details,  would  require  a  larger  space 
than  can  be  allotted  to  a  preface,  and  would  be  at  least  prema 
ture  at  the  present  stage  of  the  controversy,  while  the  work 
has  in  all  probability  not  yet  completed  the  entire  course  of 
criticism  which  a  new  book  is  destined  to  undergo  if  it  succeeds 
in  attracting  any  amount  of  public  attention. 

In  the  first  place,  it  may  be  desirable  to  obviate  some  mis 
apprehensions  concerning  the  design  of  the  work  as  a  whole. 
It  should  be  remembered,  that  to  answer  the  objections  which 
have  been  urged  against  Christianity,  or  against  any  religion, 
is  not  to  prove  the  religion  to  be  true.  It  only  clears  the 
ground  for  the  production  of  the  proper  evidences.  It  shows, 
so  far  as  it  is  successful,  that  the  religion  may  be  true,  notwith 
standing  the  objections  by  which  it  has  been  assailed ;  but  it 


PREFACE.  11 

cannot  by  itself  convert  this  admission  into  a  positive  belief.  It 
only  calls  for  an  impartial  hearing  of  the  other  grounds  on 
which  the  question  must  be  decided. 

When,  therefore,  a  critic  objects  to  the  present  argument, 
that  "  the  presence  of  contradictions  is  no  proof  of  the  truth  of 
a  system ; "  that  "we  are  not  entitled  to  erect  on  this  ethereal 
basis  a  superstructure  of  theological  doctrine,  only  because  it, 
too,  possesses  the  same  self-contradictions ; "  that  "  the  argument 
places  all  religions  and  philosophies  on  precisely  the  same 
level;"  —  he  merely  charges  it  with  accomplishing  the  very 
purpose  which  it  was  intended  to  accomplish.  So  far  as  cer 
tain  difficulties  are  inherent  in  the  constitution  of  the  human 
mind  itself,  they  must  of  necessity  occupy  the  same  position 
with  respect  to  all  religions, — the  false  no  less  than  the  true.  It 
is  sufficient  if  it  can  be  shown  that  they  have  not,  as  is  too  often 
supposed,  any  peculiar  force  against  Christianity  alone.  No 
sane  man  dreams  of  maintaining  that  a  religion  is  true  because 
of  the  difficulties  which  it  involves :  the  utmost  that  can  rea 
sonably  be  maintained  is  that  it  may  be  true  in  spite  of  them. 
Such  an  argument  of  course  requires,  as  its  supplement,  a 
further  consideration  of  the  direct  evidences  of  Christianity; 
and  this  requirement  is  pointed  out  in  the  concluding  Lecture. 
But  it  formed  no  part  of  my  design  to  exhibit  in  detail  the 
evidences  themselves ;  —  a  task  which  the  many  excellent 
works  already  existing  on  that  subject  would  have  rendered 


12  PREFACE. 

wholly  unnecessary,  even  if  it  could  have  been  satisfactorily 
accomplished  within  the  limits  of  the  single  Lecture  which 
alone  could  have  been  given  to  it. 

But  granting  for  the  present  the  main  position  of  these  Lec 
tures,  namely,  that  the  human  mind  inevitably  and  by  virtue 
of  its  essential  constitution,  finds  itself  involved  in  self-contra 
dictions  whenever  it  ventures  on  certain  courses  of  speculation ; 
it  may  be  asked,  in  the  next  place,  what  conclusion  does  this 
admission  warrant,  as  regards  the  respective  positions  of  Faith 
and  Reason  in  determining  the  religious  convictions  of  men. 
These  Lectures  have  been  charged  with  condemning,  under 
the  name  of  Dogmatism,  all  Dogmatic  Theology;  with  cen 
suring  "  the  exercise  of  Reason  in  defence  and  illustration  of 
the  truths  of  Revelation ;  "  with  including  '•'  schoolmen  and 
saints  and  infidels  alike  "  in  one  and  the  same  condemnation. 
Such  sweeping  assertions  are  surely  not  warranted  by  anything 
that  is  maintained  in  the  Lectures  themselves.  Dogmatism 
and  Rationalism  are  contrasted  with  each  other,  not  as  em 
ploying  reason  for  opposite  purposes,  but  as  employing  it  in 
extremes.  The  contrast  was  naturally  suggested  by  the  his 
torical  connection  between  the  Wolfian  philosophy  and  the 
Kantian,  the  one  as  the  stronghold  of  Dogmatism,  the  other  of 
Rationalism.  The  religious  philosophy  of  Wolf  and  his  fol 
lowers,  whose  system,  and  not  that  of  either  "  schoolmen  or 
saints,"  is  cited  as  the  chief  specimen  of  Dogmatism,  was 


PREFACE.  13 

founded  on  the  assumption  that  philosophical  proofs  of  theolog 
ical  doctrines  were  absolutely  necessary  in  all  cases.  "He 
maintained,"  says  a  writer  quoted  in  the  Notes,  "  that  philos 
ophy  was  indispensable  to  theology,  and  that,  together  with 
biblical  proofs,  a  mathematical  or  strictly  demonstrative  dog 
matical  system,  according  to  the  principles  of  reason,  was 
absolutely  necessary."  Dogmatism,  as  thus  exemplified,  is 
surely  not  the  use  of  reason  in  theology,  but  its  abuse.  Unless 
a  critic  is  prepared  to  accept,  as  legitimate  reasoning,  Canz's 
demonstration  of  the  Trinity,  cited  at  p.  232  of  the  present 
volume,  or  the  more  modern  specimen  of  the  same  method 
noticed  at  p.  51,  he  must  surely  admit  the  conclusion  which 
these  instances  were  adduced  to  prove ;  namely,  that  the 
methods  of  the  Dogmatist  and  the  Rationalist  are  alike  open  to 
criticism,  "  in  so  far  as  they  keep  within  or  go  beyond  those 
limits  of  sound  thought  which  the  laws  of  man's  mind,  or  the 
circumstances  in  which  he  is  placed,  have  imposed  upon  him." 

All  Dogmatic  Theology  is  not  Dogmatism,  nor  all  use  of 
Reason  Rationalism,  any  more  than  all  drinking  is  drunken 
ness.  The  dogmatic  or  the  rational  method  may  be  rightly  or 
wrongly  employed,  and  the  question  is  to  determine  the  limits 
of  the  legitimate  or  illegitimate  use  of  each.  It  is  expressly  as 
extremes  that  jhe  two  systems  are  contrasted:  each  is  described 
as  leading  to  error  in  its  exclusive  employment,  yet  as  being,  in 
its  utmost  error,  only  a  truth  abused.  If  reason  may  not  be 


14  PREFACE. 

used  without  restriction  in  the  defence  any  more  than  in  the 
refutation  of  religious  doctrines ;  if  there  are  any  mysteries 
of  revelation  which  it  is  our  duty  to  believe,  though  we 
cannot  demonstrate  them  from  philosophical  premises,  —  this 
is  sufficient  to  show  that  the  provinces  of  Faith  and  Reason 
are  not  coextensive.  But  to  assert  this  is  surely  not  to  deny 
that  the  dogmatic  method  may  be  and  has  been  rightly  used 
within  certain  limits.  The  dogmatism  which  is  condemned 
is  not  system,  but  the  extravagance  of  system.  If  syste 
matic  completeness  is  made  the  end  which  the  theologian  is 
bound  to  pursue,  at  every  cost;  if  whatever  is  left  obscure 
and  partial  in  revealed  truth  is,  as  a  matter  of  necessity,  to 
be  cleared  and  completed  by  definitions  and  inferences,  cer 
tain  or  uncertain ;  if  the  declarations  of  Scripture  are  in 
all  cases  to  be  treated  as  conclusions  to  be  supported  by 
philosophical  premises,  or  as  principles  to  be  developed  into 
philosophical  conclusions,  —  then  indeed  Dogmatic  Theology 
is  in  danger  of  degenerating  into  mere  Dogmatism.  But 
it  is  only  the  indiscriminate  use  of  the  method  which  is 
condemned,  and  that  not  simply  as  an  employment  of  reason 
in  religious  questions,  but  as  an  employment  beyond  its  just 
limits.  And  if,  in  citing  instances  of  this  misuse,  it  has 
been  occasionally  necessary  to  point  out  the  errors  of  writers 
whose  names  are  justly  honored  in  the  Church,  and  whose 
labors,  as  a  whole,  are  entitled  to  the  reverence  and  grati 
tude  of  posterity,  I  wish  distinctly  to  state,  that  the  censure, 


PREFACE.  15 

such  as  it  is,  reaches  only  to  the    points  directly  indicated, 
by  reference  or  quotation,  and  is  not  intended  to  apply  further. 

What,  then,  is  the  practical  lesson  which  these  Lectures 
are  designed  to  teach  concerning  the  right  use  of  reason  in 
religious  questions?  and  what  are  the  just  claims  of  a  rea 
sonable  faith,  as  distinguished  from  a  blind  credulity?  In 
the  first  place,  it  is  obvious  that,  if  there  is  any  object 
whatever  of  which  the  human  mind  is  unable  to  form  a 
clear  and  distinct  conception,  the  inability  equally  disquali 
fies  us  for  proving  or  disproving  a  given  doctrine,  in  all 
cases  in  which  such  a  conception  is  an  indispensable  condi 
tion  of  the  argument.  If,  for  example,  we  can  form  no 
positive  notion  of  the  Nature  of  God  as  an  Infinite  Being, 
we  are  not  entitled  either  to  demonstrate  the  mystery  of 
the  Trinity  as  a  necessary  property  of  that  Nature,  or  to 
reject  it  as  necessarily  inconsistent  therewith.  Such  mys 
teries  clearly  belong,  not  to  Reason,  but  to  Faith;  and  the 
preliminary  inquiry  which  distinguishes  a  reasonable  from 
an  unreasonable  belief,  must  be  directed,  not  to  the  premises 
by  which  the  doctrine  can  be  proved  or  disproved  as  rea 
sonable  or  unreasonable,  but  to  the  nature  of  the  authority 
on  which  it  rests,  as  revealed  or  unrevealed.  The  brief 
summary  of  Christian  Evidences  contained  in  my  conclud 
ing  Lecture,1  and  others  which  might  be  added  to  them,  are 

i  See  below,  p.  214. 


16  PREFACE. 

surely  sufficient  to  form  an  ample  field  for  the  use  of  Reason, 
even  in  regard  to  those  mysteries  which  it  cannot  directly 
examine.  If  to  submit  to  an  authority  which  can  stand  the 
test  of  such  investigations,  and  to  believe  it  when  it  tells 
us  of  things  which  we  are  unable  to  investigate,  —  if  this 
be  censured  as  a  blind  credulity,  it  is  a  blindness  which  in 
these  things  is  a  better  guide  than  the  opposite  quality  so 
justly  described  by  the  philosopher  as  "  the  sharp-sightedness 
of  little  souls." 

In  the  second  place,  a  caution  is  needed  concerning  the 
kind  of  evidence  which  reason  is  competent  to  furnish  within 
the  legitimate  sphere  of  its  employment.  If  we  have  not 
such  a  conception  of  the  Divine  Nature  as  is  sufficient  for 
the  a  priori  demonstration  of  religious  truth,  our  rational 
conviction  in  any  particular  case  must  be  regarded,  not  as  a 
certainty,  but  as  a  probability.  We  must  remember  the  Aris 
totelian  rule,  to  be  content  with  such  evidence  as  the  nature 
of  the  object-matter  allows.  A  single  infallible  criterion  of 
all  religious  truth  can  be  obtained  only  by  the  possession  of 
a  perfect  Philosophy  of  the  Infinite.  If  such  a  philosophy 
is  unattainable ;  if  the  infinite  can  only  be  apprehended  under 
finite  symbols,  and  the  authority  of  those  symbols  tested  by 
finite  evidences,  —  there  is  always  room  for  error,  in  conse 
quence  of  the  inadequacy  of  the  conception  to  express  com 
pletely  the  nature  of  the  object.  In  other  words,  we  must 


PREFACE.  17 

admit  that  human  reason,  though  not  worthless,  is  at  least 
fallible,  in  dealing  with  religious  questions ;  and  that  the 
probability  of  error  is  always  increased  in  proportion  to  the 
partial  nature  of  the  evidence  with  which  it  deals.  Those 
who  set  up  some  one  supreme  criterion  of  religious  truth, 
their  "  Christian  consciousness/'  their  "  religious  intuitions," 
their  "moral  reason,"  or  any  other  of  the  favorite  idols  of 
the  subjective  school  of  theologians,  and  who  treat  with 
contempt  every  kind  of  evidence  which  does  not  harmonize 
with  this,  are  especially  liable  to  be  led  into  error.  They 
use  the  weight  without  the  counterpoise,  to  the  imminent 
peril  of  their  mental  equilibrium.  This  is  the  caution  which 
it  was  the  object  of  my  concluding  Lecture  to  enforce,  prin 
cipally  by  means  of  two  practical  rules;  namely,  first,  that 
the  true  evidence,  for  or  against  a  religion,  is  not  to  be  found 
in  any  single  criterion,  but  in  the  result  of  many  presump 
tions  examined  and  compared  together;  and,  secondly,  that 
in  proportion  to  the  weight  of  the  counter-evidence  in  favor 
of  a  religion,  is  the  probability  that  we  may  be  mistaken  in 
supposing  a  particular  class  of  objections  to  have  any  real 
weight  at  all. 

These  considerations  are  no  less  applicable  to  moral  than 
to  speculative  reasonings.  The  moral  faculty,  though  fur 
nishing  undoubtedly  some  of  the  most  important  elements 
for  the  solution  of  the  religious  problem,  is  no  more  entitled 

2* 


18  PKEFACE. 

than  any  other  single  principle  of  the  human  mind  to  be 
accepted  as  a  sole  and  sufficient  criterion.  It  is  true  that  to 
our  sense  of  moral  obligation  we  owe  our  primary  concep 
tion  of  God  as  a  moral  Governor;  and  it  is  also  true  that, 
were  man  left  solely  to  a  priori  presumptions  in  forming 
his  estimate  of  the  nature  and  attributes  of  God,  the  moral 
sense,  as  being  that  one  of  all  human  faculties  whose  judg 
ments  are  least  dependent  on  experience,  would  furnish  the 
principal,  if  not  the  only  characteristics  of  his  highest  con 
ception  of  God.  But  here,  as  elsewhere,  the  original  pre 
sumption  is  modified  and  corrected  by  subsequent  experience. 
It  is  a  fact  which  experience  forces  upon  us,  and  which  it  is 
useless,  were  it  possible,  to  disguise,  that  the  representation 
of  God  after  the  model  of  the  highest  human  morality  which 
we  are  capable  of  conceiving,  is  not  sufficient  to  account  for 
all  the  phenomena  exhibited  by  the  course  of  His  natural 
Providence.  The  infliction  of  physical  suffering,  the  per 
mission  of  moral  evil,  the  adversity  of  the  good,  the  prosperity 
of  the  wicked,  the  crimes  of  the  guilty  involving  the  misery 
of  the  innocent,  the  tardy  appearance  and  partial  distribution 
of  moral  and  religious  knowledge  in  the  world,  —  these  are 
facts  which  no  doubt  are  reconcilable,  we  know  not  how,  with 
the  Infinite  Goodness  of  God;  but  which  certainly  are  not 
to  be  explained  on  the  supposition  that  its  sole  and  sufficient 
type  is  to  be  found  in  the  finite  goodness  of  man.  What 
right,  then,  has  the  philosopher  to  assume  that  a  criterion 


PREFACE.  19 

which  admits  of  so  many  exceptions  in  the  facts  of  nature 
may  be  applied,  without  qualification  or  exception,  to  the 
statements  of  revelation? 

The  assertion  that  human  morality  contains  in  it  a  tem 
poral  and  relative  element,  and  cannot,  in  its  highest  mani 
festation,  be  regarded  as  a  complete  measure  of  the  absolute 
Goodness  of  God,  has  been  condemned  by  one  critic  as 
"  rank  Occamism," l  and  contrasted  with  the  teaching  of 
"  that  marvellously  profound,  cautious,  and  temperate  thinker," 
Bishop  Butler ;  it  has  been  denounced  by  another,  of  a  very 
different  school,  as  "destructive  of  healthful  moral  percep 
tion."  That  the  doctrine  in  question,  instead  of  being  op 
posed  to  Butler,  is  directly  taken  from  him,  may  be  seen  by 
any  one  who  will  take  the  trouble  to  read  the  extract  from 
the  Analogy  quoted  at  p.  211.  But  it  is  of  little  importance 


1  It  is  in  fact  the  very  reverse  of  the  doctrine  usually  attributed  to 
Occam,  which  admits  of  no  distinction  between  absolute  and  relative 
morality,  but  maintains  that,  as  all  distinction  of  right  and  wrong 
depends  upon  obedience  or  disobedience  to  a  higher  authority,  there 
fore  the  Divine  Nature  must  be  morally  indifferent,  and  all  good  and 
evil  the  result  of  God's  arbiti-ary  Will.  The  above  assertion,  on  the 
other  hand,  expressly  distinguishes  absolute  from  relative  morality, 
and  regards  human  virtue  and  vice  as  combining  an  eternal  and  a 
temporal  element,  —  the  one  an  absolute  principle  grounded  in  the  im 
mutable  nature  of  God;  the  other  a  relative  application,  dependent 
upon  the  created  constitution  of  human  nature.  But  I  am  by  no  means 
sure  that  the  "Invincible  Doctor"  has  been  quite  fairly  dealt  with  in 
this  matter. 


20  PREFACE. 

by  what  authority  an  opinion  is  sanctioned,  if  it  will  not 
itself  stand  the  test  of  sound  criticism.  The  admission,  that 
a  divine  command  may,  under  certain  circumstances,  justify 
an  act  which  would  not  be  justifiable  without  it,  is  con 
demned  by  some  critics  as  holding  out  an  available  excuse 
for  any  crime  committed  under  any  circumstances.  If  God 
can  suspend,  on  any  one  occasion,  the  ordinary  obligations 
of  morality,  how,  it  is  asked,  are  we  to  know  whether 
any  criminal  may  not  equally  claim  a  divine  sanction  for  his 
crimes?  Now  where,  as  in  the  present  instance,  the  sup 
posed  exceptions  are  expressly  stated  as  supernatural  ones, 
analogous  to  the  miraculous  suspension  of  the  ordinary  laws 
of  nature,  this  objection  either  proves  too  much,  or  proves 
nothing  at  all.  If  we  believe  in  the  possibility  of  a  super 
natural  Providence  at  all,  we  may  also  believe  that  God  is 
able  to  authenticate  His  own  mission  by  proper  evidences. 
The  objection  has  no  special  relation  to  questions  of  moral 
duty.  It  may  be  asked,  in  like  manner,  how  we  are  to 
distinguish  a  true  from  a  false  prophet,  or  a  preacher  sent 
by  God  from  one  acting  on  his  own  responsibility.  The 
possibility  of  a  special  divine  mission  of  any  kind  will  of 
course  be  denied  by  those  who  reject  the  supernatural  alto 
gether  ;  but  this  denial  removes  the  question  into  an  entirely 
different  province  of  inquiry,  where  it  has  no  relation  to  any 
peculiar  infallibility  supposed  to  attach  to  the  moral  reason, 
above  the  other  faculties  of  the  human  mind. 


PREFACE.  21 

Those  who  believe,  with  the  Scriptures,  that  the  Almighty 
has,  at  certain  times  in  the  world's  history,  manifested  Him 
self  to  certain  nations  or  individuals  in  a  supernatural  man 
ner,  distinct  from  His  ordinary  government  of  the  world  by 
the  institutions  of  society,  will  scarcely  be  disposed  to  admit 
the  assumption,  that  God  could  not  on  such  occasions  justify 
by  His  own  authority  such  acts  as  are  every  day  justified 
by  the  authority  of  the  civil  magistrate  whose  power  is  dele 
gated  from  Him.  To  assert,  with  one  of  my  critics,  that 
upon  this  principle,  "  the  deed  which  is  criminal  on  earth  may 
be  praiseworthy  in  heaven,"  is  to  distort  the  whole  doctrine 
and  to  beg  the  whole  question.  For  we  must  first  answer 
the  previous  inquiry :  Does  not  a  deed  performed  under  such 
circumstances  cease  to  be  criminal  at  all,  even  upon  earth? 
The  question,  so  far  as  moral  philosophy  is  concerned,  is 
simply  this :  Is  the  moral  quality  of  right  or  wrong  an  attri 
bute  so  essentially  adhering  to  acts  as  acts,  that  the  same  act 
can  never  vary  in  its  character  according  to  the  motives  by 
which  it  is  prompted,  or  the  circumstances  under  which  it 
is  committed?  If  we  are  compelled,  as  every  moralist  is 
compelled,  to  answer  this  question  in  the  negative,  we  must 
then  ask,  in  the  second  place,  whether  the  existence  of  a 
direct  command  from  the  supreme  Governor  of  the  world, 
supposing  such  a  command  ever  to  have  been  given,  is  one 
of  the  circumstances  which  can  in  any  degree  affect  the  char 
acter  of  an  act.  On  this  question,  to  judge  merely  by  the 


22  RE  FACE. 

conflicting  statements  on  opposite  sides,  men  whose  moral  judg 
ments  are  equally  trustworthy  may  differ  one  from  another ; 
but  that  very  difference  is  enough  to  show  that  the  moral 
reason  is  not  by  itself  a  sufficient  and  infallible  oracle  on 
such  questions.  The  further  inquiry,  whether  such  a  com 
mand  has  ever,  as  a  matter  of  fact,  been  given;  and  how, 
if  given,  it  can  be  distinguished  from  counterfeits,  is  one 
which  does  not  fall  within  the  province  of  moral  philosophy, 
in  itself  or  in  its  relation  to  theology.  The  philosopher,  as 
such,  can  at  most  only  prepare  the  way  for  this  inquiry,  if 
he  can  succeed  in  showing  that  there  is  nothing  in  the  moral 
reason  of  man  which  entitles  it  to  pronounce  on  a  priori 
grounds,  that  such  a  command  is  absolutely  impossible. 

It  remains  to  make  some  remarks  on  another  of  the  opin 
ions  maintained  in  the  following  Lectures,  on  which,  to  judge 
by  the  criticisms  to  which  it  has  been  subjected,  a  few  words 
of  explanation  may  be  desirable.  It  has  been  objected  by 
reviewers  of  very  opposite  schools,  that  to  deny  to  man  a 
knowledge  of  the  Infinite  is  to  make  Revelation  itself  impos 
sible,  and  to  leave  no  room  for  evidences  on  which  reason 
can  be  legitimately  employed.  The  objection  would  be  per 
tinent,  if  I  had  ever  maintained  that  Revelation  is  or  can 
be  a  direct  manifestation  of  the  Infinite  Nature  of  God. 
But  I  have  constantly  asserted  the  very  reverse.  In  Rev 
elation,  as  in  Natural  Religion,  God  is  represented  under 


PREFACE.  23 

finite  conceptions,  adapted  to  finite  minds ;  and  the  evidences 
on  which  the  authority  of  Revelation  rests  are  finite  and 
comprehensible  also.  It  is  true  that  in  Revelation,  no  less 
than  in  the  exercise  of  our  natural  faculties,  there  is  indi 
rectly  indicated  the  existence  of  a  higher  and  more  abso 
lute  truth,  which,  as  it  cannot  be  grasped  by  any  effort  of 
human  thought,  cannot  be  made  the  vehicle  of  any  valid  phil 
osophical  criticism.  But  the  comprehension  of  this  higher 
truth  is  no  more  necessary,  either  to  a  belief  in  the  contents 
of  Revelation  or  to  a  reasonable  examination  of  its  evi 
dences,  than  a  conception  of  the  infinite  divisibility  of  mat 
ter  is  necessary  to  the  child  before  it  can  learn  to  walk. 

But  it  is  a  great  mistake  to  suppose,  as  some  of  my  critics 
have  supposed,  that  if  the  Infinite,  as  an  object,  is  inconceiva 
ble,  therefore  the  language  which  denotes  it  is  wholly  without 
meaning,  and  the  corresponding  state  of  mind  one  of  com 
plete  quiescence.  A  negative  idea  by  no  means  implies  a  ne 
gation  of  all  mental  activity.1  It  implies  an  attempt  to  think, 
and  a  failure  in  accomplishing  the  attempt.  The  language 
by  which  such  ideas  are  indicated  is  not  like  a  word  in  an 
unknown  tongue,  which  excites  no  corresponding  affection  in 
the  mind  of  the  hearer.  It  indicates  a  relation,  if  only  of 
difference,  to  that  of  which  we  are  positively  conscious,  and 
a  consequent  effort  to  pass  from  the  one  to  the  other.  This 

1  See  Sir  W.  Hamilton's  Discussions,  p.  602. 


24  PREFACE. 

is  the  case  even  with  those  more  obvious  negations  of  thought 
which  arise  from  the  union  of  two  incongruous  finite  notions. 
We  may  attempt  to  conceive  a  space  enclosed  by  two  straight 
lines;  and  it  is  not  till  after  the  effort  has  been  made  that 
we  become  aware  of  the  impossibility  of  the  conception.  And 
it  may  frequently  happen,  owing  to  the  use  of  language  as 
a  substitute  for  thought,  that  a  process  of  reasoning  may  be 
carried  on  to  a  considerable  length,  without  the  reasoner  being 
aware  of  the  essentially  inconceivable  character  of  the  ob 
jects  denoted  by  his  terms.  This  is  especially  likely  when 
the  negative  character  of  the  notion  depends,  not,  as  in  the 
above  instance,  on  the  union  of  two  attributes  which  can 
not  be  conceived  in  conjunction,  but  on  the  separation  of 
those  which  cannot  be  conceived  apart.  We  can  analyze  in 
language  what  we  cannot  analyze  in  thought;  and  the  pres 
ence  of  the  language  often  serves  to  conceal  the  absence 
of  the  thought.  Thus,  for  example,  it  is  impossible  to  con 
ceive  color  apart  from  extension ;  an  unextended  color  is 
therefore  a  purely  negative  notion.  Yet  many  distinguished 
philosophers  have  maintained  that  the  connection  between 
these  two  ideas  is  one  merely  of  association,  and  have  argued 
concerning  color  apart  from  extension,  with  as  much  confi 
dence  as  if  their  language  represented  positive  thought.  The 
speculations  concerning  the  seat  of  the  immaterial  soul  may 
be  cited  as  another  instance  of  the  same  kind.  Forgetting 
that,  to  human  thought,  position  in  space  and  occupation  of 


PREFACE.  25 

space  are  notions  essentially  bound  together,  and  that  neither 
can  be  conceived  apart  from  the  other,  men  have  carried  on 
various  elaborate  reasonings,  and  constructed  various  plausi 
ble  theories,  on  the  tacit  assumption  that  it  is  possible  to 
assign  a  local  position  to  an  un extended  substance.  Yet, 
considering  that  extension  itself  is  necessarily  conceived  as 
a  relation  between  parts  exterior  to  each  other,  and  that  no 
such  relation  can  be  conceived  as  an  ultimate  and  simple 
element  of  things,  it  would  be  the  mere  dogmatism  of  igno 
rance  to  assert  that  a  relation  between  the  extended  and  the 
unextended  is  in  itself  impossible;  though  assuredly  we  are 
unable  to  conceive  how  it  is  possible. 

It  is  thus  manifest  that,  even  granting  that  all  our  posi 
tive  consciousness  is  of  the  Finite  only,  it  may  still  be  pos 
sible  for  men  to  speculate  and  reason  concerning  the  Infinite, 
without  being  aware  that  their  language  represents,  not 
thought,  but  its  negation.  They  attempt  to  separate  the 
condition  of  finiteness  from  their  conception  of  a  given  object ; 
and  it  is  not  till  criticism  has  detected  the  self-contradiction 
involved  in  the  attempt,  that  we  learn  at  last  that  all  human 
efforts  to  conceive  the  infinite  are  derived  from  the  conscious 
ness,  not  of  what  it  is,  but  only  of  what  it  is  not.1 

1  A  critic  in  the  National  Review  is  of  opinion  that  "relative  appre 
hension  is  always  and  necessarily  of  two  terms  together;"  and  "if 
of  the  finite,  then  also  of  the  infinite."  This  is  true  as  regards  the 


26  PREFACE. 

Whatever  value  may  be  attached,  in  different  psycholog 
ical  theories,  to  that  instinct  or  feeling  of  our  nature  which 
compels  us  to  believe  in  the  existence  of  the  Infinite,  it  is 
clear  that,  so  long  as  it  remains  a  mere  instinct  or  feeling, 
it  cannot  be  employed  for  the  purpose  of  theological  criti 
cism.  The  communication  of  mental  phenomena  from  man 
to  man  must  always  be  made  in  the  form  of  thoughts  con 
veyed  through  the  medium  of  language.  So  long  as  the 
unbeliever  can  only  say,  "I  feel  that  this  doctrine  is  false, 
but  I  cannot  say  why ; "  so  long  as  the  believer  can  only 
retort,  "I  feel  that  it  is  true,  but  I  can  give  no  reason  for 
my  feeling," — there  is  no  common  ground  on  which  either 
can  hope  to  influence  the  other.  So  long  as  a  man's  religion 
is  a  matter  of  feeling  only,  the  feeling,  whatever  may  be  its 
influence  on  himself,  forms  no  basis  of  argument  for  or  against 
the  truth  of  what  he  believes.  But  as  soon  as  he  inter 
prets  his  feelings  into  thoughts,  and  proceeds  to  make  those 
thoughts  the  instruments  of  criticism  constructive  or  destruc 
tive,  he  is  bound  to  submit  them  to  the  same  logical  criteria 
to  which  he  himself  subjects  the  religion  on  which  he  is 
commenting.  In  this  relation,  it  matters  not  what  may  be 

meaning  of  the  words;  but  by  no  means  as  regards  the  conception  of 
the  corresponding  objects.  If  extended  to  the  latter,  it  should  in  con 
sistency  be  asserted  that  the  conception  of  that  which  is  conceivable 
involves  also  the  conception  of  that  which  is  inconceivable;  that  the 
consciousness  of  anything  is  also  a  consciousness  of  nothing;  that  the 
intuition  of  space  and  time  is  likewise  an  intuition  of  the  absence  of  both- 


PREFACE.  27 

the  character  of  our  feeling  of  the  infinite,  provided  our 
conception  cannot  be  exhibited  without  betraying  its  own 
inherent  weakness  by  its  own  self-contradictions.  That  such 
is  the  case  with  that  philosophical  conception  of  the  Absolute 
and  Infinite  which  has  prevailed  in  almost  every  philosophy 
of  note,  from  Parmenides  to  Hegel,  it  has  been  the  aim  of 
these  Lectures  to  show.  If  a  critic  maintains  that  philos 
ophy,  notwithstanding  its  past  failures,  may  possibly  here 
after  succeed  in  bringing  the  infinite  within  the  grasp  of 
reason,  we  may  be  permitted  to  doubt  the  assertion  until 
the  task  has  been  actually  accomplished.  * 

The  distinction  between  speculative  and  regulative  truths, 
which  has  also  been  a  good  deal  misapprehended,  is  one 
which  follows  inevitably  from  the  abandonment  of  the  phi 
losophy  of  the  Absolute.  If  human  thought  cannot  be 
traced  up  to  an  absolutely  first  principle  of  all  knowledge 
and  all  existence ;  if  our  highest  attainable  truths  bear  the 
marks  of  subordination  to  something  higher  and  unattaina 
ble, —  it  follows,  if  we  are  to  act  or  believe  at  all,  that  our 
practice  and  belief  must  be  based  on  principles  which  do 
not  satisfy  all  the  requirements  of  the  speculative  reason. 
But  it  should  be  remembered  that  this  distinction  is  not 
peculiar  to  the  evidences  of  religion.  It  is  shown  that  in 
all  departments  of  human  knowledge  alike,  —  in  the  laws 
of  thought,  in  the  movement  of  our  limbs,  in  the  perception 


28  PREFACE. 

of  our  senses,  the  truths  which  guide  our  practice  cannot  be 
reduced  to  principles  which  satisfy  our  reason ;  and  that,  if 
religious  thought  is  placed  under  the  same  restrictions,  this 
is  but  in  strict  analogy  to  the  general  conditions  to  which 
God  has  subjected  man  in  his  search  after  truth.  One  half 
of  the  rationalist's  objections  against  revealed  religion  would 
fall  to  the  ground,  if  men  would  not  commit  the  very  irra 
tional  error  of  expecting  clearer  conceptions  and  more  rigid 
demonstrations  of  the  invisible  things  of  God,  than  those 
which  they  are  content  to  accept  and  act  upon  in  all  the 
Concerns  of  their  earthly  life. 

The  above  are  all  the  explanations  which,  so  far  as  I  can 
at  present  judge,  appear  to  be  desirable,  to  obviate  probable 
misapprehensions  regarding  the  general  principles  advocated 
in  these  pages.  Had  I  thought  it  worth  while  to  enter  into 
controversy  on  minute  questions  of  detail,  or  to  reply  to 
misapprehensions  which  are  due  solely  to  the  inadvertence 
of  individual  readers,1 1  might  have  extended  these  remarks 


1A  writer  in  the  Christian  Observer  has  actually  mistaken  the  posi 
tions  against  which  the  author  is  contending  for  those  which  he  main 
tains,  and  on  the  strength  of  this  mistake  has  blundered  through  several 
pages  of  vehement  denunciation  of  the  monstrous  consequences  which 
follow  from  the  assumption  that  the  philosophical  conception  of  the 
absolute  is  the  true  conception  of  God.  The  absolute  and  the  infinite, 
he  tells  us  (in  opposition  to  the  Lecturer!!!),  "are  names  of  God 
unknown  to  the  Scriptures : "  "  The  conception  of  infinity  is  plainly 
negative:"  "the  absolute  and  infinite,  as  defined  in  the  Lectures  after 


PKEFACE.  29 

to  a  considerably  greater  length.  For  the  present  I  shall 
content  myself  with  only  two  further  observations;  one  on 
a  single  sentence,  the  language  of  which,  having  been  mis 
interpreted  in  more  than  one  quarter,  may  perhaps  need 
a  brief  explanation ;  the  other  on  a  matter  affecting,  not 
the  literary  merit  of  these  Lectures,  but  the  personal  hon 
esty  of  their  author. 

The  sentence  occurs  at  p.  76,  in  the  following  words : 
"'What  kind  of  an  Absolute  Being  is  that,'  says  Hegel, 
'  which  does  not  contain  in  itself  all  that  is  actual,  even  evil 
included  ? '  We  may  repudiate  the  conclusion  with  indig 
nation;  but  the  reasoning  is  unassailable.  If  the  Absolute 


the  leaders  of  German  metaphysics,  is  no  synonym  for  the  true  and 
living  God:"  and  "a  philosophy  of  the  so-called  absolute  is  a  spuri 
ous  theology."  Est  il  possible  ? 

The  same  critic  denounces,  as  "  radically  and  thoroughly  untrue,"  the 
distinction  between  speculative  and  regulative  truths,  and  the  conse 
quent  assertion  that  action,  and  not  knowledge,  is  man's  destiny  and 
duty  in  this  life,  and  that  his  highest  principles,  both  in  philosophy  and 
in  religion,  have  reference  to  this  end.  "On  the  contrary,"  he  says, 
"all  right  action  depends  on  right  knowledge."  As  if  this  were  not 
the  very  meaning  of  a  regulative  truth,  — knowledge  for  the  sake  of 
action. 

Another  critic  asserts  that  the  author  "  sweeps  down  schoolmen  and 
saints  and  infidels  alike,  with  the  assertion  that  dogmatism  and  ration 
alism  equally  assign  to  some  superior  tribunal  the  right  of  determining 
what  is  essential  to  religion  and  what  is  not."  Had  he  looked  a  second 
time  at  the  page  which  he  quotes,  he  would  have  seen  that  this  is  said 
of  rationalism  alone. 

3* 


SO  PREFACE. 

and   Infinite  is  an   object  of  human  conception  at   all,  this, 
and  none  other,  is  the  conception  required." 

This  passage  has  been  censured  by  more  than  one  critic, 
as  involving  the  skeptical  admission  that  a  false  conclusion 
can  be  logically  deduced  from  true  premises.  The  conclud 
ing  words  may  explain  the  real  meaning.  The  whole  argu 
ment  is  designed  to  show  that  to  speak  of  a  conception  of 
the  Absolute  implies  a  self-contradiction  at  the  outset,  and 
that  to  reason  upon  such  a  conception  involves  ab  initio  a 
violation  of  the  laws  of  human  thought,  That  reasoning 
based  on  this  assumption  must  end  by  annihilating  itself,  is 
surely  no  very  dangerous  concession  to  the  skeptic.  Suppose 
that  an  author  had  written  such  a  sentence  as  the  following : 

"A  circular  parallelogram  must  have  its  opposite  sides 
and  angles  equal,  and  must  also  be  such  that  all  lines  drawn 
from  the  centre  to  the  circumference  shall  be  equal  to  each 
other.  The  conclusion  is  absurd ;  but  the  reasoning  is  unas 
sailable,  supposing  that  a  circular  parallelogram  can  be  con 
ceived  at  all" 

Would  such  a  statement  involve  any  formidable  conse 
quences  either  to  geometry  or  to  logic? 

It  remains  only  to  say  a  few  words  on  a  question  of  fact, 


PREFACE.  81 

involving  one  of  the  most  serious  accusations  that  can  be 
brought  against  the  character  of  an  author.  A  writer  in 
the  Rambler,  to  whom  in  other  respects  I  feel  indebted  for 
a  liberal  and  kindly  appreciation  of  my  labors,  has  qual 
ified  his  favorable  judgment  by  the  grave  charge  that  the 
"whole  gist  of  the  book"  is  borrowed  without  acknowledg 
ment  from  the  teaching  of  Dr.  Newman,  as  a  preacher  or 
as  a  writer.  Against  a  charge  of  this  kind  there  is  but  one 
possible  defence.  No  obligation  was  acknowledged,  simply 
because  none  existed.  I  say  this,  assuredly  with  no  inten 
tion  to  speak  slightingly  of  one  whose  transcendent  gifts  no 
differences  should  hinder  me  from  acknowledging;  but  be 
cause  it  is  necessary,  in  justice  to  myself,  to  state  exactly 
the  relation  in  which  I  stand  towards  him.  Dr.  Newman's 
teaching  from  the  University  pulpit  was  almost  at  its  close 
before  my  connection  with  Oxford  began:  his  parochial 
sermons  I  had  very  seldom  an  opportunity  of  hearing.  His 
published  writings  might  doubtless  have  given  me  much 
valuable  assistance ;  but  with  these  I  was  but  slightly  ac 
quainted  when  these  Lectures  were  first  published ;  and  the 
little  that  I  knew  contained  nothing  which  appeared  to  bear 
upon  my  argument.  This  is  but  one  out  of  many  deficien 
cies,  of  which  I  have  been  painfully  conscious  during  the 
progress  of  the  work,  and  which  I  would  gladly  have  endeav 
ored  to  supply,  had  circumstances  allowed  me  a  longer  time 
for  direct  preparation. 


32  PREFACE. 

The  point,  indeed,  on  which  the  Reviewer  lays  the  most 
stress,  is  one  in  which  there  was  little  room  for  originality, 
either  in  myself  or  in  my  supposed  teacher.  That  Reve 
lation  is  accommodated  to  the  limitations  of  man's  faculties, 
and  is  primarily  designed  for  the  purpose  of  practical  reli 
gion,  and  not  for  those  of  speculative  philosophy,  has  been 
said  over  and  over  again  by  writers  of  almost  every  age, 
and  is  indeed  a  truth  so  obvious  that  it  might  have  occurred 
independently  to  almost  any  number  of  thinkers.  Doubt 
less  there  is  no  truth,  however  trite  and  obvious,  which 
may  not  assume  a  new  and  striking  aspect  in  the  hands  of 
a  great  and  original  writer ;  and  in  this,  as  in  other  respects, 
a  better  acquaintance  with  Dr.  Newman's  works  might  have 
taught  me  a  better  mode  of  expressing  many  arguments  to 
which  my  own  language  may  have  done  but  imperfect  jus 
tice.  Even  at  this  late  hour,  I  am  tempted  to  subjoin,  as 
a  conclusion  to  these  observations,  one  passage  of  singular 
beauty  and  truth,  of  which,  had  I  known  it  earlier,  I  would 
gladly  have  availed  myself,  as  pointing  out  the  true  spirit 
in  which  inquiries  like  these  should  be  pursued,  and  the 
practical  lesson  which  they  are  designed  to  teach. 

"And  should  any  one  fear  lest  thoughts  such  as  these 
should  tend  to  a  dreary  and  hopeless  skepticism,  let  him 
take  into  account  the  Being  and  Providence  of  God,  the 
Merciful  and  True;  and  he  will  at  once  be  relieved  of 


PREFACE.  33 

his  anxiety.  All  is  dreary  till  we  believe,  what  our  hearts 
tell  us,  that  we  are  subjects  of  His  Governance ;  nothing 
is  dreary,  all  inspires  hope  and  trust,  directly  we  under 
stand  that  we  are  under  His  hand,  and  that  whatever 
comes  to  us  is  from  Him,  as  a  method  of  discipline  and 
guidance.  What  is  it  to  us  whether  the  knowledge  He 
gives  us  be  greater  or  less,  if  it  be  He  who  gives  it? 
What  is  it  to  us  whether  it  be  exact  or  vague,  if  He  bids 
us  trust  it  ?  What  have  we  to  care  whether  we  are  or  are 
not  given  to  divide  substance  from  shadow,  if  He  is  train 
ing  us  heavenward  by  means  of  either?  Why  should  we 
vex  ourselves  to  find  whether  our  deductions  are  philo 
sophical  or  no,  provided  they  are  religious?  If  our  senses 
supply  the  media  by  which  we  are  put  on  trial,  by  which 
we  are  all  brought  together,  and  hold  intercourse  with  each 
other,  and  are  disciplined,  and  are  taught,  and  enabled  to 
benefit  others,  it  is  enough.  We  have  an  instinct  within 
us,  impelling  us,  we  have  external  necessity  forcing  us,  to 
trust  our  senses,  and  we  may  leave  the  question  of  their 
substantial  truth  for  another  world,  'till  the  day  break,  and 
the  shadows  flee  away.'  And  what  is  true  of  reliance  on 
our  senses,  is  true  of  all  the  information  which  it  has 
pleased  God  to  vouchsafe  to  us,  whether  in  nature  or  in 
grace."  l 
OXFORD,  February  18th,  1859. 

1  University  Sermons,  p.  351. 


CONTENTS 


LECTURE    I. 

Dogmatism  and  Rationalism  as  methods  of  religious  philosophy  —  mean 
ing  of  these  terms  — errors  of  the  respective  systems  denoted  by 
each;  the  one  forcing  reason  into  agreement  with  revelation,  the  other 
forcing  revelation  into  agreement  with  reason.  — Both  methods  may 
be  regarded  as  attempts,  from  opposite  sides,  to  produce  exact  coin 
cidence  between  belief  and  thought.  —  Instances  of  each  exhibited 
and  examined.  —  Human  conceptions  are  unavoidable  in  Theology; 
but  there  is  need  of  some  principle  to  determine  their  proper  place 
in  it.  —  Such  a  principle  can  only  be  gained  by  an  investigation  of 
the  Limits  of  Human  Thought.  — The  proper  object  of  criticism  is 
not  religion,  but  the  human  mind  in  its  relation  to  religion.  —  A 
direct  criticism  of  religion  as  a  representation  of  God  can  only  be 
accomplished  by  the  construction  of  a  Philosophy  of  the  Infinite. — 
It  is  therefore  necessary  to  inquire  whether  such  a  philosophy  is  pos 
sible;  and  this  can  only  be  ascertained  by  an  examination  of  the 
laws  of  human  thought  in  general,  which  will  determine  those  of 
religious  thought  in  particular.  —  Analogous  difficulties  may  be  ex 
pected  in  philosophy  and  in  religion,  arising  from  the  limitations  of 


36  CONTENTS. 

thought  common  to  both.  —  Contrast  between  two  opposite  statements 
of  the  extent  of  human  knowledge,  in  the  words  of  St.  Paul  and 
of  Hegel.  —  Purpose  of  the  following  Lectures,  as  an  Examination 
of  the  Limits  of  Religious  Thought, 45 


LECTURE     II. 

Statement  of  the  two  opposite  methods  by  which  a  Philosophy  of  Re 
ligion  may  be  attempted;  the  Objective  or  Metaphysical,  based  on 
a  supposed  knowledge  of  the  nature  of  God,  and  the  Subjective  or 
Psychological,  based  on  a  knowledge  of  the  mental  faculties  of  man. 

—  Relation  of  these  methods  respectively  to  the  Criticism  of  Revela 
tion  —  dependence  of  the  former  method  upon  the  latter.  —  Further 
examination  of  the  Objective  or  Metaphysical  method.    Two  differ 
ent  modes  in  which  man  may  be  supposed  to  be  capable  of  attaining 
to  a  knowledge  of   God  —  specimen  of  each  —  insufficiency  of  both 
to  found  a  Rational    Theology.  —  Examination   of  the   fundamental 
ideas  of  Rational  Theology,  —  the  Absolute  —  the  Infinite  —  the  First 
Cause  —  mutual    contradictions   involved   in  these  three  ideas  —  con 
ception  of  an  eternal  Causation  incompatible  with    the   Absolute  — 
conception  of  a  temporal  Causation  incompatible  with  the  Infinite. 

—  The  Absolute  cannot  be  conceived  as  a  necessary  and  unconscious 
cause,  —  nor  as  a  voluntary  and  conscious   cause,  —  nor  as   possess 
ing  consciousness  at  all,  —  nor  as  containing  within  itself  any  kind 
of  relation,  —  nor  as  one  and  simple,  out  of  all  relation.    Effect  of 
these  counter  impossibilities   on   the  conceptions  of   Theology  —  ap 
parent  contradictions  in  the  conception  of  the  Divine  Attributes  as 
absolute  and  infinite.  —  Further  contradictions  involved  in  the  coex 
istence  of  the   Relative  with   the  Absolute,  and  of  the  Finite  with 
the  Infinite.    Pantheism  avoids  these  contradictions  by  denying  the 


CONTENTS.  37 

existence  of  the  Finite  and  Relative  —  this  solution  untenable  — 
self-contradictions  of  the  Pantheistic  hypothesis.  —  Alternative  of 
Atheism,  which  denies  the  existence  of  the  Infinite  and  Absolute 
—  contradictions  involved  in  this  hypothesis.  —  Summary  of  conclu 
sions.— Necessary  failure  of  all  attempts  to  construct  a  Metaphysi 
cal  Theology  —  alternative  necessitated  by  this  failure.  —  Practical 
result  of  the  above  inquiry, 68 


LECTURE    III. 

Recapitulation  of  the  results  of  the  last  Lecture.  —  Necessity  of  ex 
amining  the  Philosophy  of  Religion  from  the  Subjective  or  Psy 
chological  side,  as  dependent  upon  a  knowledge  of  the  laws  of  the 
human  mind.  —  General  conditions  of  all  human  Consciousness. — 
First  condition  of  Consciousness,  Distinction  between  one  Object  and 
another —  such  a  distinction  necessarily  implies  Limitation  —  conse 
quent  impossibility  of  conceiving  the  Infinite.  —  Explanation  of  the 
contradictions  involved  in  the  idea  of  the  Infinite  —  this  idea  inad 
missible  as  the  basis  of  a  scientific  Theology.  —  Second  condition  of 
Consciousness,  Relation  between  Subject  and  Object  —  consequent  impossi 
bility  of  conceiving  the  Absolute.  —  Explanation  of  the  contradic 
tions  involved  in  the  idea  of  the  Absolute.  —  Impossibility  of  a  par 
tial  knowledge  of  the  Infinite  and  Absolute. —  Third  condition  of 
Consciousness,  Succession  and  Duration  in  Time  —  hence  all  objects  are 
conceived  as  finite — consequent  impossibility  of  conceiving  Creation, 
and  counter  impossibility  of  conceiving  finite  existence  as  uncreated. 
—  Attempt  to  evade  this  limitation  in  Theology  by  the  hypothesis 
of  the  existence  of  God  out  of  Time  — this  hypothesis  untenable 
in  philosophy  and  unavailable  in  theology.  —  Fourth  condition  of  Con 
sciousness,  Personality  —  Personality  a  limitation  and  a  relation,  and 

4 


C  ONTENTS. 

hence  inadequate  to  represent  the  Infinite.  —  Theological  conse 
quences  of  this  condition.  Personality  the  source  and  type  of  our 
conception  of  Reality,  and  therefore  the  only  fitting  representation  of 
God.  —  Necessity  of  thinking  of  God  as  personal  and  yet  of  believing 
in  Him  as  infinite  —  apparent  contradiction  between  these  represen 
tations  —  hence  Thought  cannot  be  the  measure  of  Belief.  —  Conse 
quent  impossibility  of  constructing  a  Rational  Theology.  —  Attempt 
to  avoid  the  above  conclusions  by  placing  the  Philosophy  of  the 
Infinite  in  a  point  beyond  Consciousness  —  necessary  failure  of  this 
attempt. —  Summary  of  Conclusions.  —  Practical  lesson  from  the  above 
inquiry, 91 


LECTURE    IV. 

Analysis  of  the  religious  Consciousness,  reflective  and  intuitive. — 
Relation  of  the  reflective  Consciousness  to  Theology;  its  reasonings 
sufficient  to  correct  our  conception  of  a  Supreme  Being,  but  not 
to  originate  it  —  examination  of  some  current  theories  on  this  point 
—  statement  of  the  value  of  the  reflective  faculties  within  their 
proper  limits.  —  Reflection,  as  well  as  intuition  necessary  to  distinct 
consciousness;  but  intuition  is  first  in  the  order  of  nature,  though 
not  in  that  of  time.  —  Two  principal  modes  of  religious  intuition  — 
the  Feeling  of  Dependence  and  the  Conviction  of  Moral  Obligation, 
giving  rise  respectively  to  Prayer  and  Expiation.  —  Examination  of 
these  two  modes  of  Consciousness.  —  Dependence  implies  a  Personal 
Superior;  hence  our  conviction  of  the  Power  of  God  — Moral  Obli 
gation  implies  a  Moral  Lawgiver ;  hence  our  conviction  of  the 
• 

Goodness  of  God.  —  Limits  of  the  Religious  Consciousness  —  Sense 
of  Dependence  not  a  consciousness  of  the  Absolute  and  Infinite  — 
opposite  theory  of  Schleiermacher  on  this  point  —  objections  to  his 


CONTENTS.  39 

view.  —  Sense  of  Moral  Obligation  not  a  consciousness  of  the  Ab 
solute  and  Infinite.  — Yet  the  Infinite  is  indirectly  implied  by  tlie 
religious  consciousness,  though  not  apprehended  as  such;  for  the 
consciousness  of  limitation  carries  with  it  an  indirect  conviction  of 
the  existence  of  the  Infinite  beyond  consciousness.  —  Result  of  the 
above  analysis  —  our  knowledge  of  God  relative  and  not  absolute 

—  the   Infinite   an   object   of  belief,  but   not   of   thought   or   know 
ledge;    hence  we   may  know  that   an   Infinite    God   exists,  but  not 
icliat  He  is  as  Infinite.  —  Further  results  of  an  examination  of  the 
religious  consciousness.  —  God  known  as  a  Person  through  the  con 
sciousness  of  ourselves  as  Persons  —  this  consciousness  indispensable 
to  Theism;   for  the  denial  of  our  own  Personality,  whether  in  the 
form   of   Materialism  or  of   Pantheism,  logically  leads  to  Atheism. 

—  Summary  of   conclusions  —  our  religious   knowledge  is  regulative, 
but    not    speculative—  importance    of    this    distinction    in    theological 
reasoning  —  conception    of    the    Infinite    inadmissible    in    Theology. 

—  Office  of  religious  philosophy,  as  limited  to  finite  conceptions. — 
Practical  benefits  of  this  limitation.  — Conclusion,    ......    114 


LECTURE    Y. 

Distinction  between  Speculative  and  Regulative  Truth  further  pursued. 
—  In  Philosophy,  as  well  as  Religion,  our  highest  principles  of 
thought  are  regulative  and  not  speculative.  —  Instances  in  the  Ideas 
of  Liberty  and  Necessity ;  Unity  and  Plurality  as  implied  in  the  con 
ception  of  any  object;  Commerce  between  Soul  and  Body;  Exten 
sion,  as  implied  in  external  perception;  and  Succession,  as  implied 
in  the  entire  consciousness.  —Illustration  thus  afforded  for  deter 
mining  the  limits  of  thought  —  distinction  between  legitimate  and 
illegitimate  thought,  as  determined  by  their  relation  to  the  inexplicable 


40  CONTENTS. 

and  the  self-contradictory  respectively.  —  Conclusion  to  be  drawn  as 
regards  the  manner  of  the  mind's  operation  —  all  Consciousness 
implies  a  relation  between  Subject  and  Object,  dependent  on  their 
mutual  action  and  reaction;  and  thus  no  principle  of  thought  can 
be  regarded  as  absolute  and  simple,  as  an  ultimate  and  highest  truth. 

—  Analogy  in  this  respect  between  Philosophy  and  Natural  Religion 
which    apprehends    the    Infinite    under    finite    forms  —  corresponding 
difficulties  to  be  expected  in  each.  —  Provinces  of  Reason  and  Faith. 

—  Analogy  extended    to   Revealed    Religion  —  testimony  of    Revela 
tion    plain    and   intelligible  when   regarded    as    regulative,  but   ulti 
mately  incomprehensible  to  speculation  —  corresponding  errors  in  Phi 
losophy  and    Religion,  illustrating    this    analogy.  —  Regulative    con 
ceptions  not  therefore  untrue.  —  The  above  principles  confirmed  by 
the    teaching   of    Scripture.  —  Revelation    expressly  adapted    to    the 
limits  of  human  thought.  —  Relation  of  the  Infinite  to  the  Personal 
in  the  representations  of  God  in  the  Old  Testament.  —  Further  con 
firmation  from  the  New  Testament.  —  Doctrine  of  the  Incarnation; 
its  practical  position  in  Theology  as  a  regulative  truth;   its  perver 
sion  by  modern  philosophy,  in  the  attempt  to  exhibit  it  as  a  specu 
lative  truth.  —  Instances   in  Hegel,  Marheineke,  and  Strauss.  —  Con 
clusion,         .136 


LECTURE    VI. 

Result  of  the  previous  inquiries  —  religious  ideas  contain  two  elements, 
a  Form,  common  to  them  with  all  other  ideas,  as  being  human 
thoughts;  and  a  Matter,  peculiar  to  themselves,  as  thoughts  about 
religious  objects  —  hence  there  may  exist  two  possible  kinds  of 
difficulties;  the  one  formal  arising  from  the  universal  laws  of 
human  thought;  the  other  material  arising  from  the  peculiar  nature 


CONTENTS.  41 

of  religious  evidence.  —  The  principal  objections  suggested  by  Ra 
tionalism  are  of  the  former  kind;  common  to  all  human  thinking 
as  such,  and  therefore  to  Rationalism  itself.  —  Proof  of  this  posi 
tion  by  the  exhibition  of  parallel  difficulties  in  Theology  and  Phi 
losophy. —  Our  ignorance  of  the  nature  of  God  compared  with  our 
ignorance  of  the  nature  of  Causation.  —  Doctrine  of  the  Trinity 
compared  with  the  philosophical  conception  of  the  Infinite  and  the 
Absolute,  as  one  and  yet  as  many.  —  Doctrine  of  the  eternal  gen 
eration  of  the  Son  compared  with  the  relation  of  an  Infinite  Sub 
stance  to  its  Attributes.  —  Purpose  of  such  comparisons,  not  to 
prove  the  doctrines,  but  to  show  the  weakness  of  human  reason  with 
regard  to  them  —  true  evidence  of  the  doctrines  to  be  found,  not 
in  Reason,  but  in  Revelation.  —  Further  parallels.  —  Doctrine  of  the 
twofold  nature  of  Christ  compared  with  the  philosophical  concep 
tion  of  the  Infinite  as  coexisting  with  the  Finite.  —  Reason  thus 
shown  not  to  be  the  supreme  judge  of  religious  truth;  for  Religion 
must  begin  with  that  which  is  above  Reason.  —  Extension  of  the 
same  argument  to  our  conceptions  of  Divine  Providence.  —  Repre 
sentations  of  General  LaAV  and  Special  Interposition  —  supposed 
difficulty  in  the  conception  of  the  latter  shown  to  be  really  com 
mon  to  all  human  conceptions  of  the  Infinite.  —  Both  representa 
tions  equally  imperfect  as  speculative  truths,  and  both  equally  nec 
essary  as  regulative.  —  Imperfections  in  the  conception  of  General 
Law  and  mechanical  action  of  the  universe  —  this  conception  is 
neither  philosophically  necessary  nor  empirically  universal ;  and 
hence  it  is  not  entitled  to  supersede  all  other  representations  — 
it  is  inapplicable  to  the  phenomena  of  mind,  and  only  partially 
available  in  relation  to  those  of  matter.  —  Conception  of  Mirac 
ulous  Agency,  as  subordinate  to  that  of  Special  Providence  —  no 
sufficient  ground,  either  from  philosophy  or  from  experience,  for 
asserting  that  miracles  are  impossible.  —  Comparison  between  the 

opposite  conceptions  of  a  miracle,  as  an  exception  to  a  law,  or  as 

4* 


42  CONTENTS. 

the  result  of  a  higher  law  —  both  these  conceptions  are  specula- 
.  tively  imperfect,  but  the  former  is  preferable  as  a  regulative  truth. 
—  Summary  of  Conclusions  —  parallel  difficulties  must  exist  in  The 
ology  and  in  Philosophy  —  true  value  and  province  of  Reason  in  re 
lation  to  both, ,158 


LE  CTURE    VII. 

Philosophical  parallel  continued  with  regard  to  the  supposed  moral 
objections  to  Christian  doctrines.  —  Error  of  the  moral  theory  of 
Kant.  —  Moral  convictions  how  far  necessary  and  trustworthy,  how 
far  contingent  and  fallible  —  parallel  in  this  respect  between  moral 
and  mathematical  science,  as  based  on  the  formal  conditions  of  ex 
perience —  possibility  of  corresponding  errors  in  both.  —  Human  mo 
rality  not  absolute,  but  relative.  —  The  Moral  Law  cannot  be  con 
ceived  as  an  absolute  principle,  apart  from  its  temporal  manifesta 
tions—parallel  in  the  idea  of  Time  and  its  relations.  — Morality, 
as  conceived  by  us,  necessarily  contains  a  human  and  positive  ele 
ment;  and  therefore  cannot  be  the  measure  of  the  Absolute  Nature 
of  God.  —  Application  of  the  above  principles  to  Christian  Theology. 
—  The  Atonement  —  weakness  of  the  supposed  moral  objections  to 
this  doctrine  —  such  objections  equally  applicable  to  any  conceivable 
scheme  of  Divine  Providence.  —  Predestination  and  Free  Will  —  Pre 
destination,  as  a  determination  of  the  Absolute  Mind,  is  specu- 
latively  inconceivable,  and  therefore  cannot  be  known  to  be  incom 
patible  with  human  Freedom  —  parallel  in  this  respect  between  Pre 
destination  in  Theology  and  Causation  in  Philosophy.  —  Eternal  Pun 
ishment—rashness  and  ignorance  of  rationalist  criticisms  of  this 
doctrine  — the  difficulties  of  the  doctrine  are  not  peculiar  to  Theol 
ogy,  but  common  to  all  Philosophy,  and  belong  to  the  general 


CONTENTS.  43 

problem  of  the  existence  of  Evil  at  all,  which  is  itself  but  a  subor 
dinate  case  of  the  universal  impossibility  of  conceiving  the  coexist 
ence  of  the  Infinite  with  the  Finite.  —  Contrast  between  illegitimate 
and  legitimate  mode  of  reasoning  on  evil  and  its  punishment  — 
illustrations  to  be  derived  from  analogies  in  the  course  of  nature 
and  in  the  constitution  of  the  human  mind.  —  Extension  of  the 
argument  from  analogy  to  other  religious  doctrines  —  Original  Sin 
—  Justification  by  Faith  —  Operation  of  Divine  Grace.  —  Limits  of 
the  Moral  Reason.  —  Conclusion, 182 


LECTURE    VIII. 

Right  use  of  Reason  in  religious  questions  —  Reason  entitled  to  judge 
of  a  Religion  in  respect  of  its  evidences,  as  addressed  to  men,  but 
not  in  respect  of  its  correspondence  with  philosophical  conceptions 
of  the  Absolute  Nature  of  God.  —  No  one  faculty  of  the  human 
mind  is  entitled  to  exclusive  preference  as  the  criterion  of  religious 
truth  —  the  true  criterion  is  to  be  found  in  the  general  result  of 
many  and  various  Evidences  —  practical  neglect  of  this  rule  by  dif 
ferent  writers.  —  Comparative  value  of  internal  and  external  evi 
dences  of  religion,  the  former  as  negative,  the  latter  as  positive. — 
Cautions  as  requisite  in  the  use  of  the  negative  argument  from  in 
ternal  evidence  —  external  and  internal  evidence  can  only  be  esti 
mated  in  conjunction  with  each  other.  —  Distinction  between  the 
proper  and  improper  use  of  the  Moral  Sense  in  questions  of  relig 
ious  evidence.  —  Application  of  this  distinction  to  facts  recorded  in 
Sacred  History.  —  Analogy  between  physical  and  moral  laws  as  re 
gards  miraculous  interventions.  —  Probable  and  partial  character  of 
the  moral  argument ;  error  of  supposing  it  to  be  demonstrative 
and  complete  ;  possibility  of  mistakes  in  its  application.  —  General 


44  CONTENTS. 

summary  of  Christian  Evidences  —  alternative  in  the  case  of  their 
rejection  — Christ's  teaching  either  wholly  divine  or  wholly  human. 
—  Impossibility  of  an  eclectic  Christianity.  —  Value  of  the  a  priori 
presumption  against  miracles  —  nothing  gained  in  point  of  probabil 
ity  by  a  partial  rejection  of  the  supernatural.  —  Christianity  regarded 
as  a  Revelation  must  be  accepted  wholly  or  not  at  all.  —  Specu 
lative  difficulties  in  religion  form  a  part  of  our  probation  —  anal 
ogy  between  moral  and  intellectual  temptations.  —  General  result  of 
an  examination  of  the  Limits  of  Religious  Thought  —  Theology 
not  a  speculative  science,  nor  in  the  course  of  progressive  develop 
ment.  —  Cautions  needed  in  the  treatment  of  religious  knowledge 
as  regulative  —  this  view  does  not  solve  difficulties,  but  only  shows 
why  they  are  insoluble.  —  Instance  of  the  neglect  of  this  caution  in 
Archbishop  King's  rule  of  scripture  .interpretation  as  regards  the  Divine 
Attributes.  —  No  explanation  possible  of  those  difficulties  which  arise 
from  the  universal  laws  of  human  thought  —  such  difficulties  are  inher 
ent  in  our  mental  constitution,  and  form  part  of  our  training  and 
discipline  during  this  life.  —  The  office  of  Philosophy  is  not  to  give 
us  a  knowledge  of  the  absolute  nature  of  God,  but  to  teach  us  to 
know  ourselves  and  the  limits  of  our  faculties.  —  Conclusion,  .  .  20 1 


THE 


LIMITS  OF  RELIGIOUS  THOUGHT 

EXAMINED. 


LECTURE    I. 

TE     SHALL    NOT    ADD     UNTO     THE    WORD    WHICH     I     COMMAND     YOU, 
NEITHER    SHALL   YE    DIMINISH   AUGHT   FROM    IT.  —  DEUT.    IV.  2. 

DOGMATISM  and  Rationalism  are  the  two  extremes  be 
tween  which  religious  philosophy  perpetually  oscillates. 
Each  represents  a  system  from  which,  when  nakedly  and 
openly  announced,  the  well  regulated  mind  almost  instinc 
tively  shrinks  back;  yet  which,  in  some  more  or  less 
specious  disguise,  will  be  found  to  underlie  the  antagonist 
positions  of  many  a  theological  controversy.  Many  a 
man  who  rejects  isolated  portions  of  Christian  doctrine, 
on  the  ground  that  they  are  repugnant  to  his  reason, 
would  hesitate  to  avow  broadly  and  unconditionally  that 
reason  is  the  supreme  arbiter  of  all  religious  truth; 
though  at  the  same  time  he  would  find  it  hard  to  point 
out  any  particular  in  which  the  position  of  reason,  in  rela 
tion  to  the  truths  which  he  still  retains,  differs  from  that 
which  it  occupies  in  relation  to  those  which  he  rejects. 
And  on  the  other  hand,  there  are  many  who,  while  they 
would  by  no  means  construct  a  dogmatic  system  on  the 
assumption  that  the  conclusions  of  reason  may  always  be 


40  LIMITS   OF  RELIGIOUS  LECT.  I. 

made  to  coincide  with  those  of  revelation,  yet,  for  want 
of  an  accurate  distinction  between  that  which  is  within 
the  province  of  human  thought  and  that  which  is  beyond 
it,  are  accustomed  in  practice  to  demand  the  assent  of  the 
reason  to  positions  which  it  is  equally  incompetent  to 
affirm  or  to  deny.  Thus  they  not  only  lessen  the  value 
of  the  service  which  it  is  capable  of  rendering  within  its 
legitimate  sphere,  but  also  indirectly  countenance  that 
very  intrusion  of  the  human  intellect  into  sacred  things, 
which,  in  some  of  its  other  aspects,  they  so  strongly  and 
so  justly  condemn. 

In  using  the  above  terms,  it  is  necessary  to  state  at  the 
outset  the  sense  in  which  each  is  employed,  and  to  eman 
cipate  them  from  the  various  and  vague  associations  con 
nected  with  their  ordinary  use.  I  do  not  include  under 
the  name  of  Dogmatism  the  mere  enunciation  of  religious 
truths,  as  resting  upon  authority  and  not  upon  reasoning. 
The  Dogmatist,  as  well  as  the  Rationalist,  is  the  con 
structor  of  a  system;  and  in  constructing  it,  however 
much  the  materials  upon  which  he  works  may  be  given  by 
a  higher  authority,  yet  in  connecting  them  together  and 
exhibiting  their  systematic  form,  it  is  necessary  to  call  in 
the  aid  of  human  ability.  Indeed,  whatever  may  be  their 
actual  antagonism  in  the  field  of  religious  controversy,  the 
two  terms  are  in  their  proper  sense  so  little  exclusive  of 
each  other,  that  both  were  originally  employed  to  denote 
the  same  persons; — the  name  Dogmatists  or  Rationalists 
being  indifferently  given  to  those  medical  theorists  who 
insisted  on  the  necessity  of  calling  in  the  aid  of  rational 
principles,  to  support  or  correct  the  conclusions  furnished 
by  experience.  (*)  A  like  signification  is  to  be  found  in 
the  later  language  of  philosophy,  when  the  term  Dogma 
tists  was  used  to  denote  those  philosophers  who  endeav- 
(i)  Numbers  within  brackets  refer  to  Notes  at  the  close  of  the  volume. 


LECT  I.  THOUGHT   EXAMINED.  47 

ored  to  explain  the  phenomena  of  experience  by  means  of 
rational  conceptions  and  demonstrations ;  the  intelligible 
world  being  regarded  as  the  counterpart  of  the  sensible, 
and  the  necessary  relations  of  the  former  as  the  principles 
and  ground  of  the  observed  facts  of  the  latter.  (2)  It  is 
in  a  sense  analogous  to  this  that  the  term  may  be  most 
accurately  used  in  reference  to  Theology.  Scripture  is  to 
the  theological  Dogmatist  what  Experience  is  to  the  philo 
sophical.  It  supplies  him  with  the  facts  to  which  his 
system  has  to  adapt  itself.  It  contains  in  an  unsystematic 
form  the  positive  doctrines,  which  further  inquiry  has  to 
exhibit  as  supported  by  reasonable  grounds  and  connected 
into  a  scientific  whole.  Theological  Dogmatism  is  thus 
an  application  of  reason  to  the  support  and  defence  of 
preexisting  statements  of  Scripture.  <3)  Rationalism,  on 
the  other  hand,  so  far  as  it  deals  with  Scripture  at  all, 
deals  with  it  as  a  thing  to  be  adapted  to  the  independent 
conclusions  of  the  natural  reason,  and  to  be  rejected 
where  that  adaptation  cannot  conveniently  be  made.  By 
Rationalism,  without  intending  to  limit  the  name  to  any 
single  school  or  period  in  theological  controversy,  I  mean 
generally  to  designate  that  system  whose  final  test  of 
truth  is  placed  in  the  direct  assent  of  the  human  con 
sciousness,  whether  in  the  form  of  logical  deduction,  or 
moral  judgment,  or  religious  intuition ;  by  whatever  pre 
vious  process  those  faculties  may  have  been  raised  to 
their  assumed  dignity  as  arbitrators.  The  Rationalist,  as 
such,  is  not  bound  to  maintain  that  a  divine  revelation  of 
religious  truth  is  impossible,  nor  even  to  deny  that  it  has 
actually  been  given.  He  may  admit  the  existence  of  the 
revelation  as  a  fact :  he  may  acknowledge  its  utility  as  a 
temporary  means  of  instruction  for  a  ruder  age :  he  may 
even  accept  certain  portions  as  of  universal  and  permanent 


48  LIMITS   OF  RELIGIOUS  LECT.  I. 

authority.  W  But  he  assigns  to  some  superior  tribunal 
the  right  of  determining  what  is  essential  to  religion  and 
what  is  not :  he  claims  for  himself  and  his  age  the  privi 
lege  of  accepting  or  rejecting  any  given  revelation,  wholly 
or  in  part,  according  as  it  does  or  does  not  satisfy  the  con 
ditions  of  some  higher  criterion  to  be  supplied  by  the 
human  consciousness.  (5) 

In  relation  to  the  actual  condition  of  religious  truth,  as 
communicated  by  Holy  Scripture,  Dogmatism  and  Ration 
alism  may  be  considered  as  severally  representing,  the  one 
the  spirit  which  adds  to  the  word  of  God,  the  other  that 
which  diminishes  from  it.  Whether  a  complete  system  of 
scientific  Theology  could  or  could  not  have  been  given  by 
direct  revelation,  consistently  with  the  existing  laws  of 
human  thought  and  the  purposes  which  Revelation  is  de 
signed  to  answer,  it  is  at  least  certain  that  such  a  system 
is  not  given  in  the  Revelation  which  we  possess,  but,  if  it 
is  to  exist  at  all,  must  be  constructed  out  of  it  by  human 
interpretation.  And  it  is  in  attempting  such  a  construc 
tion  that  Dogmatism  and  Rationalism  exhibit  their  most 
striking  contrasts.  The  one  seeks  to  build  up  a  complete 
scheme  of  theological  doctrine  out  of  the  unsystematic 
materials  furnished  by  Scripture,  partly  by  the  more  com 
plete  development  of  certain  leading  ideas ;  partly  by  ex 
tending  the  apparent  import  of  the  Revelation  to  ground 
which  it  does  not  avowedly  occupy,  and  attempting  by 
inference  and  analogy  to  solve  problems  which  the  sacred 
volume  may  indeed  suggest,  but  which  it  does  not  directly 
answer.  The  other  aims  at  the  same  end  by  opposite 
means.  It  strives  to  attain  to  unity  and  completeness 
of  system,  not  by  filling  up  supposed  deficiencies,  but  by 
paring  down  supposed  excrescences.  Commencing  with  a 
preconceived  theory  of  the  purpose  of  a  revelation  and 


LECT.  I.  THOUGHT  EXAMINED.  49 

the  form  which  it  ought  to  assume,  it  proceeds  to  remove 
or  reduce  all  that  will  not  harmonize  with  this  leading 
idea ;  sometimes  explaining  away  in  the  interpretation  that 
which  it  accepts  as  given  in  the  letter;  sometimes  denying, 
on  a  priori  grounds,  the  genuineness  of  this  or  that  por 
tion  of  the  sacred  text ;  sometimes  pretending  to  distin 
guish  between  the  several  purposes  of  Revelation  itself, 
and  to  determine  what  portions  are  intended  to  convey 
the  elements  of  an  absolute  religion,  valid  in  all  countries 
and  for  all  ages,  and  what  must  be  regarded  as  relative 
and  accidental  features  of  the  divine  plan,  determined  by 
the  local  or  temporal  peculiarities  of  the  individuals  to 
whom  it  was  first  addressed. 

The  two  methods  thus  contrasted  may  appear  at  first 
sight  to  represent  the  respective  claims  of  Faith  and  Rea 
son,  each  extended  to  that  point  at  which  it  encroaches  on 
the  domain  of  the  other.  But  in  truth  the  contrast  be 
tween  Faith  and  Reason,  if  it  holds  good  in  this  relation 
at  all,  does  so  merely  by  accident.  It  may  be  applicable 
in  some  instances  to  the  disciples  of  the  respective  systems, 
but  not  to  the  teachers ;  and  even  as  regards  the  former, 
it  is  but  partially  and  occasionally  true.  The  disciples  of 
the  Rationalist  are  not  necessarily  the  disciples  of  reason. 
It  is  quite  as  possible  to  receive  with  unquestioning  sub 
mission  a  system  of  religion  or  philosophy  invented  by  a 
human  teacher,  as  it  is  to  believe,  upon  the  authority  of 
Revelation,  doctrines  which  no  human  reason  is  competent 
to  discover.  The  so-called  freethinker  is  as  often  as  any 
other  man  the  slave  of  some  self-chosen  master;  and  many 
who  scorn  the  imputation  of  believing  anything  merely 
because  it  is  found  in  the  Bible,  would  find  it  hard  to  give 
any  better  reason  for  their  own  unbelief  than  the  ipse  dixit 
of  some  infidel  philosopher.  But  when  we  turn  from  the 

5 


50  LIMITS   OF  RELIGIOUS  LECT.  I. 

disciples  to  the  teachers,  and  look  to  the  origin  of  Dogma 
tism  and  Rationalism  as  systems,  we  find  both  alike  to  be 
the  products  of  thought,  operating  in  different  ways  upon 
the  same  materials.  Faith,  properly  so  called,  is  not  con 
structive,  but  receptive.  It  cannot  supply  the  missing  por 
tions  of  an  incomplete  system,  though  it  may  bid  us  remain 
content  with  the  deficiency.  It  cannot  of  itself  give  har 
mony  to  the  discordant  voices  of  religious  thought ;  it 
cannot  reduce  to  a  single  focus  the  many-colored  rays  into 
which  the  light  of  God's  presence  is  refracted  in  its  passage 
through  the  human  soul ;  though  it  may  bid  us  look  for 
ward  to  a  time  when  the  eyes  of  the  blind  shall  be  opened, 
and  the  ears  of  the  deaf  shall  be  unstopped;1  when  that 
apparent  discord  shall  be  known  but  as  the  echo  of  a  half- 
heard  concert,  and  those  diverging  rays  shall  be  blended 
once  more  in  the  pure  white  light  of  heaven.  But  Faith 
alone  cannot  suggest  any  actual  solution  of  our  doubts :  it 
can  offer  no  definite  reconciliation  of  apparently  conflicting 
truths;  for  in  order  to  accomplish  that  end,  the  hostile  ele 
ments  must  be  examined-,  compared,  accommodated,  and 
joined  together,  one  with  another;  and  such  a  process  is 
an  act  of  thought,  not  of  belief.  Considered  from  this 
point  of  view,  both  Dogmatism  and  Rationalism  may  be 
regarded  as  emanating  from  the  same  source,  and  amenable 
to  the  same  principles  of  criticism ;  in  so  far  as  they  keep 
within  or  go  beyond  those  limits  of  sound  thought  which 
the  laws  of  man's  mind,  or  the  circumstances  in  which  he 
is  placed,  have  imposed  upon  him. 

In  fact  the  two  systems  may  be  considered  as  both  aim' 
ing,  though  in  different  ways,  at  the  same  end ;  that  end 
being  to  produce  a  coincidence  between  what  we  believe 
and  what  we  think ;  to  remove  the  boundary  which  sepa- 

i  Isaiah  xxxv.  5. 


LECT.  I.  THOUGHT  EXAMINED.  51 

rates  the  comprehensible  from  the  incomprehensible.  The 
Dogmatist  employs  reason  to  prove,  almost  as  much  as  the 
Rationalist  employs  it  to  disprove.  The  one,  in  the  char 
acter  of  an  advocate,  accepts  the  doctrines  of  revealed 
religion  as  conclusions,  but  appeals  to  the  reason,  enlight 
ened,  it  may  be,  by  Revelation,  to  find  premises  to  support 
them.  The  other,  in  the  character  of  a  critic,  draws  his 
premises  from  reason  in  the  first  instance ;  and,  adopting 
these  as  his  standard,  either  distorts  the  revealed  doctrine 
into  conformity  with  them,  or,  if  it  obstinately  resists  this 
treatment,  sets  it  aside  altogether.  The  one  strives  to  lift 
up  reason  to  the  point  of  view  occupied  by  Revelation : 
the  other  strives  to  bring  down  Revelation  to  the  level  of 
reason.  And  both  alike  have  prejudged  or  neglected  the 
previous  inquiry,  —  Are  there  not  definite  and  discernible 
limits  to  the  province  of  reason  itself,  whether  it  be  exer 
cised  for  advocacy  or  for  criticism  ? 

Thus,  to  select  one  example  out  of  many,  the  revealed 
doctrine  of  Christ's  Atonement  for  the  sins  of  men  has 
been  alternately  defended  and  assailed  by  some  such  argu 
ments  as  these.  We  have  been  told,  on  the  one  hand,  that 
man's  redemption  could  not  have  been  brought  about  by 
any  other  means  <6) :  —  that  God  could  not,  consistently 
with  his  own  attributes,  have  suffered  man  to  perish  unre 
deemed,  or  have  redeemed  him  by  any  inferior  sacrifice  (") : 

—  that  man,  redeemed  from  death,  must  become  the  serv 
ant  of  him  who  redeems  him ;  and  that  it  was  not  meet 
that  he  should  be  the  servant  of  any  other  than  God  <8) : 

—  that  no  other  sacrifice  could  have  satisfied  divine  jus 
tice  (9): — that  no  other  victim  could  have   endured  the 
burden  of  God's  wrath.  <10)     These  and  similar  arguments 
have  been  brought   forward,  as    one   of  the  greatest  of 
their  authors  avows,  to  defend  the  teaching  of  the  Cath- 


52  LIMITS   OF  RELIGIOUS  LECT.  I. 

olic  Faith  on  the  ground  of  a  reasonable  necessity.^1) 
While,  on  the  other  hand,  it  has  been  argued  that  the 
revealed  doctrine  itself  cannot  be  accepted  as  literally 
true ;  because  Ave  cannot  believe  that  God  was  angry,  and 
needed  to  be  propitiated  (12) : —  because  it  is  inconsistent 
with  the  Divine  Justice  that  the  innocent  should  suffer  for 
the  sins  of  the  guilty  <18) :  —  because  it  is  more  reasonable 
to  believe  that  God  freely  forgives  the  offences  of  his  crea 
tures  <14) :  —  because  we  cannot  conceive  how  the  punish 
ment  of  one  can  do  away  with  the  guilt  of  another.  (15> 

I  quote  these  arguments  only  as  specimens  of  the  method 
in  which  Christian  doctrines  have  been  handled  by  writers 
on  opposite  sides.  To  examine  them  more  in  detail  would 
detain  me  too  long  from  my  main  purpose.  I  shall  not 
therefore  at  present  consider  whether  the  conclusions  actu 
ally  arrived  at,  on  the  one  side  or  on  the  other,  are  in 
themselves  reasonable  or  unreasonable,  orthodox  or  hereti 
cal.  I  am  concerned  only  with  the  methods  respectively 
employed,  and  the  need  of  some  rule  for  their  employ 
ment.  May  reason  be  used  without  restriction  in  defence 
or  refutation  of  religious  doctrines  ?  And  if  not,  what  are 
the  conditions  of  its  legitimate  use  ?  It  may  be  that  this 
man  has  defended,  on  reasonable  grounds,  none  but  the 
most  essential  articles  of  the  Christian  Faith :  but  has  he 
pointed  out  any  rule  which  can  hinder  the  same  or  similar 
reasoning  from  being  advanced  by  another  in  support  of 
the  most  dangerous  errors  ?  It  may  be  that  that  man  has 
employed  the  test  of  reasonableness,  only  in  the  refutation 
of  opinions  concerning  which  the  church  has  pronounced 
no  positive  judgment :  but  has  he  fenced  his  method  round 
with  any  cautions  to  prevent  its  being  used  fo-r  the  over 
throw  of  Christianity  itself?  If  we  can  find  no  other 
ground  than  the  arbitrary  will  of  the  man  himself,  why  he 


LECT.  I.  THOUGHT   EXAMINED.  53 

should  stop  short  at  the  particular  point  which  he  has 
chosen,  we  may  not  perhaps  condemn  the  tenets  of  the 
individual,  but  we  may  fairly  charge  his  method  with  the 
consequences  to  which  it  logically  leads  us. 

Thus,  we  find  a  late  lamented  writer  of  our  own  day, 
and  at  that  time  of  our  own  church,  defending  the  doc 
trine  of  the  Incarnation  of  Christ,  on  the  metaphysical 
assumption  of  the  real  existence  of  an  abstract  humanity. 
"This,"  he  tells  us,  "is  why  the  existence  of  human 
nature  is  a  thing  too  precious  to  be  surrendered  to  the 
subtleties  of  logic,  because,  upon  its  existence  depends 
that  real  manhood  of  Christ,  which  renders  him  a  co 
partner  with  ourselves."  And  again :  "  To  the  reality 
of  this  work,  the  existence  of  that  common  nature  is 
indispensable,  whereby,  as  the  children  were  partakers  of 
flesh  and  blood,  He  Himself  took  part  of  the  same.  Else, 
how  would  the  perfect  assumption  of  humanity  have  con 
sisted  with  His  retaining  that  divine  personality  which 
it  was  impossible  that  He  should  surrender?  Since  it 
was  no  new  person  which  He  took,  it  can  only  have  been 
the  substratum,  in  which  personality  has  its  existence."  <16) 
In  this  case,  our  belief  in  the  undeniable  truth  of  the 
doctrine  defended  may  dispose  us  to  overlook  the  ques 
tionable  character  of  the  defence.  But  if  we  are  in 
clined  for  a  moment  to  acquiesce  in  this  unnatural  union 
of  metaphysical  premises  and  theological  conclusions,  we 
are  recalled  to  ourselves  by  the  recollection  of  the  fearful 
consequence  which  Occam  deduces  from  the  same  hypoth 
esis,  of  the  assumption  by  Christ  of  a  "  substratum  in 
which  personality  has  its  existence;"  —  a  consequence 
drawn  in  language  which  we  shudder  to  read,  even  as 
it  is  employed  by  its  author,  merely  for  the  purpose  of 

5* 


54  LIMITS   OF  RELIGIOUS  LECT.  I. 

reducing   to    an   absurdity  the   principles  of  his    antago 
nists.  <17> 

There  is  an  union  of  Philosophy  with  Religion  in  which 
each  contributes  to  the  support  of  the  other ;  and  there 
is  also  an  union  which,  under  the  appearance  of  support, 
does  but  undermine  the  foundations  and  prey  upon  the 
life  of  both.  To  which  of  these  two  the  above  argument 
belongs,  it  needs  but  a  bare  statement  of  its  assumption 
to  determine.  It  tells  us  that  our  belief  in  the  doctrine 
of  God  manifest  in  the  flesh,  indispensably  depends  upon 
our  acceptance  of  the  Realist  theory  of  the  nature  of 
universal  notions.  Philosophy  and  Theology  alike  pro 
test  against  such  an  outrage  upon  the  claims,  both  of  Rea 
son  and  of  Revelation,  as  is  implied  in  this  association 
of  one  of  the  most  fundamental  truths  of  the  Christian 
Faith  with  one  of  the  most  questionable  speculations  of 
mediaeval  metaphysics.  What  does  Theology  gain  by 
this  employment  of  a  weapon  which  may,  at  any  moment, 
be  turned  against  her?  Does  it  make  one  whit  clearer 
to  our  understandings  that  mysterious  two-fold  nature  of 
one  Christ,  very  God,  and  very  Man  ?  By  no  means.  It 
was  a  truth  above  human  comprehension  before ;  and  it 
remains  a  truth  above  human  comprehension  still.  We 
believe  that  Christ  is  both  God  and  Man;  for  this  is 
revealed  to  us.  We  know  not  how  Pie  is  so ;  for  this  is 
not  revealed  ;  and  we  can  learn  it  in  no  other  way.  The 
ology  gains  nothing ;  but  she  is  in  danger  of  losing  every 
thing.  Her  most  precious  truths  are  cut  from  the  anchor 
which  held  them  firm,  and  cast  upon  the  waters  of  philo 
sophical  speculation,  to  float  hither  and  thither  with  the 
ever-shifting  waves  of  thought.  And  what  does  Philos 
ophy  gain  ?  Her  just  domains  are  narrowed,  and  her  free 
limbs  cramped  in  their  onward  course.  The  problems 


LECT  I.          THOUGHT  EXAMINED.  55 

which  she  lias  a  native  right  to  sift  to  the  uttermost,  are 
taken  out  of  the  field  of  free  discussion,  and  fenced  about 
with  religious  doctrines  which  it  is  heresy  to  call  in  ques 
tion.  Neither  Christian  truth  nor  philosophical  inquiry  can 
be  advanced  by  such  a  system  as  this,  which  revives  and 
sanctifies,  as  essential  to  the  Catholic  Faith,  the  forgotten 
follies  of  Scholastic  Realism,  and  endangers  the  cause 
of  religion,  by  seeking  to  explain  its  greatest  mysteries 
by  the  lifeless  forms  of  a  worn-out  controversy.  "  Why 
seek  ye  the  living  among  the  dead?  Christ  is  not  here."1 

But  if  the  tendency  of  Dogmatism  is  to  endanger  the 
interests  of  religious  truth,  by  placing  that  which  is  divine 
and  unquestionable  in  too  close  an  alliance  with  that  which 
is  human  and  doubtful,  Rationalism,  on  the  other  hand, 
tends  to  destroy  revealed  religion  altogether,  by  oblit 
erating  the  whole  distinction  between  the  human  and  the 
divine.  Rationalism,  if  it  retains  any  portion  of  revealed 
truth  as  such,  does  so,  not  in  consequence  of,  but  in  defi 
ance  of,  its  fundamental  principle.  It  does  so  by  virtually 
declaring  that  it  will  follow  reason  up  to  a  certain  point, 
and  no  further  ;  though  the  conclusions  which  lie  beyond 
that  point  are  guaranteed  by  precisely  the  same  evidence 
as  those  which  fall  short  of  it.  We  may  select  a  notable 
example  from  the  writings  of  a  great  thinker,  who  has 
contributed,  perhaps,  more  than  any  other  person  to  give 
a  philosophical  sanction  to  the  rationalizing  theories  of 
his  countrymen,  yet  from  whose  speculative  principles, 
rightly  employed,  might  be  extracted  the  best  antidote 
to  his  own  conclusions,  even  as  the  body  of  the  scorpion, 
crushed  upon  the  wound,  is  said  to  be  the  best  cure  for 
its  own  venom. 

Kant's  theory  of  a  rational  religion  is  based  upon  the 

i  St.  Luke  xxiv.  5,  C. 


56  LIMITS   OF   RELIGIOUS  LECT.  I. 

assumption  that  the  sole  purpose  of  religion  must  be  to 
give  a  divine  sanction  to  man's  moral  duties.*18)  He 
maintains  that  there  can  be  no  duties  towards  God,  dis 
tinct  from  those  which  we  owe  towards  men;  but  that 
it  may  be  necessary,  at  certain  times  and  for  certain  per 
sons,  to  give  to  moral  duties  the  authority  of  divine  com 
mands.  <19)  Let  us  hear  then  the  philosopher's  rational 
explanation,  upon  this  assumption,  of  the  duty  of  Prayer. 
It  is  a  mere  superstitious  delusion,  he  tells  us,  to  consider 
prayer  as  a  service  addressed  to  God,  and  as  a  means  of 
obtaining  His  favor.  (2°)  The  true  purpose  of  the  act 
is  not  to  alter  or  affect  in  any  way  God's  relation  towards 
us;  but  only  to  quicken  our  own  moral  sentiments,  by 
keeping  alive  within  us  the  idea  of  God  as  a  moral 
Lawgiver.  <21)  He,  therefore,  neither  admits  the  duty  un 
conditionally,  nor  rejects  it  entirely;  but  leaves  it  optional 
with  men  to  adopt  that  or  any  other  means,  by  which, 
in  their  own  particular  case,  this  moral  end  may  be  best 
promoted ;  —  as  if  any  moral  benefit  could  possibly  ac 
crue  from  the  habitual  exercise  of  an  act  of  conscious  self- 
deception. 

The  origin  of  such  theories  is  of  course  to  be  traced  to 
that  morbid  horror  of  what  they  are  pleased  to  call  Anthro 
pomorphism,  which  poisons  the  speculations  of  so  many 
modern  philosophers,  when  they  attempt  to  be  wise  above 
what  is  written,  and  seek  for  a  metaphysical  exposition  of 
God's  nature  and  attributes.  <22>  They  may  not,  forsooth, 
think  of  the  unchangeable  God  as  if  He  were  their  fellow 
man,  influenced  by  human  motives,  and  moved  by  human 
supplications.  They  want  a  truer,  a  juster  idea  of  the 
Deity  as  He  is,  than  that  under  which  He  has  been  pleased 
to  reveal  Himself;  and  they  call  on  their  reason  to  furnish 
it.  Fools,  to  dream  that  man  can  escape  from  himself,  that 


LECT.  I.  THOUGHT   EXAMINED.  57 

human  reason  can  draw  aught  but  a  human  portrait  of 
God !  They  do  but  substitute  a  marred  and  mutilated 
humanity  for  one  exalted  and  entire  :  they  add  nothing 
to  their  conception  of  God  as  He  is,  but  only  take  away 
a  part  of  their  conception  of  man.  Sympathy,  and  love, 
and  fatherly  kindness,  and  forgiving  mercy,  have  evapo 
rated  in  the  crucible  of  their  philosophy ;  and  what  is  the 
caput  mortuum  that  remains,  but  only  the  sterner  features 
of  humanity  exhibited  in  repulsive  nakedness  ?  The  God 
who  listens  to  prayer,  we  are  told,  appears  in  the  likeness 
of  human  mutability.  Be  it  so.  What  is  the  God  who 
docs  not  listen,  but  the  likeness  of  human  obstinacy  ?  Do 
we  ascribe  to  him  a  fixed  purpose  ?  our  conception  of  a 
purpose  is  human.  Do  we  speak  of  Him  as  continuing 
unchanged?  our  conception  of  continuance  is  human.  Do 
we  conceive  Him  as  knowing  and  determining  ?  what  are 
knowledge  and  determination  but  modes  of  human  con 
sciousness  ?  and  what  know  we  of  consciousness  itself, 
but  as  the  contrast  between  successive  mental  states  ? 
But  our  rational  philosopher  stops  short  in  the  middle 
of  his  reasoning.  He  strips  off  from  humanity  just  so 
much  as  suits  his  purpose; — "and  the  residue  thereof 
he  nvaketh  a  god;"1  —  less  pious  in  his  idolatry  than  the 
carver  of  the  graven  image,  in  that  he  does  not  fall  down 
unto  it  and  pray  unto  it,  but  is  content  to  stand  off  and 
reason  concerning  it.  And  why  does  he  retain  any  con 
ception  of  God  at  all,  but  that  he  retains  some  portions  of 
an  imperfect  humanity?  Man  is  still  the  residue  that  is 
left;  deprived  indeed  of  all  that  is  amiable  in  humanity, 
but,  in  the  darker  features  which  remain,  still  man.  Man 
in  his  purposes  ;  man  in  his  inflexibility ;  man  in  that  re 
lation  to  time  from  which  no  philosophy,  whatever  its  pre- 

1  Isaiah  xliv.  17. 


58  LIMITS   OF  RELIGIOUS  LECT.  I. 

tensions,  can  wholly  free  itself;  pursuing  with  indomitable 
resolution  a  preconceived  design  ;  deaf  to  the  yearning 
instincts  which  compel  his  creatures  to  call  upon  him.  (23) 
Yet  this,  forsooth,  is  a  philosophical  conception  of  the 
Deity,  more  worthy  of  an  enlightened  reason  than  the 
human  imagery  of  the  Psalmist :  "  The  eyes  of  the  Lord 
are  over  the  righteous,  and  His  ears  are  open  unto  their 
prayers."  1 

Surely  downright  idolatry  is  better  than  this  rational 
worship  of  a  fragment  of  humanity.  Better  is  the  super 
stition  which  sees  the  image  of  God  in  the  wonderful 
whole  which  God  has  fashioned,  than  the  philosophy 
which  would  carve  for  itself  a  Deity  out  of  the  remnant 
which  man  has  mutilated.  Better  to  realize  the  satire  of 
the  Eleatic  philosopher,  to  make  God  in  the  likeness  of 
man,  even  as  the  ox  or  the  horse  might  conceive  gods 
in  the  form  of  oxen  or  horses,  than  to  adore  some  half- 
hewn  Hermes,  the  head  of  a  man  joined  to  a  misshapen 
block. 0**)  Better  to  fall  down  before  that  marvellous  com 
pound  of  human  consciousness  whose  elements  God  has 
joined  together,  and  no  man  can  put  asunder,  than  to  strip 
reason  of  those  cognate  elements  which  together  furnish 
all  that  we  can  conceive  or  imagine  of  conscious  or  per 
sonal  existence,  and  to  deify  the  emptiest  of  all  abstrac 
tions,  a  something  or  a  nothing,  with  just  enough  of  its 
human  original  left  to  form  a  theme  for  the  disputations 
of  philosophy,  but  not  enough  to  furnish  a  single  ground 
of  appeal  to  the  human  feelings  of  love,  of  reverence,  and 
of  fear.  Unmixed  idolatry  is  more  religious  than  this. 
Undisguised  atheism  is  more  logical. 

Throughout  every  page  of  Holy  Scripture  God  reveals 
himself,  not  as  a  Law,  but  as  a  Person.  Throughout  the 

i  Psalm  xxxiv.  15. 


LECT.  I.  THOUGHT   EXAMINED.  59 

breadth  and  height  and  depth  of  human  consciousness, 
Personality  manifests  itself  under  one  condition,  that  of  a 
Free  Will,  influenced,  though  not  coerced,  by  motives. 
And  to  this  consciousness  God  addresses  Himself,  when  he 
adopts  its  attributes  as  the  image  under  which  to  represent 
to  man  His  own  incomprehensible  and  ineffable  nature. 
Doubtless  in  this  there  is  much  of  accommodation  to  the 
weakness  of  man's  faculties ;  but  not  more  than  in  any 
other  representation  of  any  of  the  divine  attributes.  By 
what  right  do  we  say  that  the  conception  of  the  God  who 
hears  and  answers  prayer1  is  an  accommodation,  while  that 
of  Him  in  whom  is  no  variableness  nor  shadow  of  turning2 
is  not  so  ?  By  what  right  do  we  venture  to  rob  the  Deity 
of  half  His  revealed  attributes,  in  order  to  set  up  the  other 
half,  which  rests  on  precisely  the  same  evidence,  as  a  more 
absolute  revelation  of  the  truth  ?  By  what  right  do  we 
enthrone,  in  the  place  of  the  God  to  whom,  we  pray,  an 
inexorable  Fate  or  immutable  Law?  —  a  thing  with  less 
than  even  the  divinity  of  a  Fetish ;  since  that  may  be  at 
least  conceived  by  its  worshipper  as  capable  of  being 
offended  by  his  crimes  and  propitiated  by  his  supplica 
tions  ? 

Yet  surely  there  is  a  principle  of  truth  of  which  this 
philosophy  is  the  perversion.  Surely  there  is  a  sense  in 
which  we  may  not  think  of  God  as  though  He  were  man ; 
as  there  is  also  a  sense  in  which  we  cannot  help  so  thinking 
of  Him.  When  we  read  in  the  same  narrative,  and  almost 
in  two  consecutive  verses  of  Scripture,  "  The  Strength  of 
Israel  will  not  lie  nor  repent ;  for  He  is  not  a  man  that  He 
should  repent ; "  and  again,  "  The  Lord  repented  that  He 
had  made  Saul  king  over  Israel : " 3  we  are  imperfectly  con- 

1  Psalm  Ixv.  2 ;  St.  James  v.  16.     2  St.  James  i.  17.     s  i  Sam.  xv.  -29,  35. 


60  LIMITS   OF   RELIGIOUS  LECT.  I. 

scious  of  an  appeal  to  two  different  principles  of  represen 
tation,  involving  opposite  sides  of  the  same  truth  ;  we  feel 
that  there  is  a  true  foundation  for  the  system  which  denies 
human  attributes  to  God ;  though  the  superstructure,  which 
has  been  raised  upon  it,  logically  involves  the  denial  of  His 
very  existence. 

What  limits  then  can  we  find  to  determine  the  legiti 
mate  provinces  of  these  two  opposite  methods  of  religious 
thought,  each  of  which,  in  its  exclusive  employment,  leads 
to  errors  so  fatal ;  yet  each  of  which,  in  its  utmost  error, 
is  but  a  truth  abused  ?  If  we  may  not,  with  the  Dogma 
tist,  force  Philosophy  into  unnatural  union  with  Revelation, 
nor  yet,  with  the  Rationalist,  mutilate  Revelation  to  make 
it  agree  with  Philosophy,  what  guide  can  we  find  to  point 
out  the  safe  middle  course  ?  what  common  element  of  both 
systems  can  be  employed  to  mediate  between  them?  It  is 
obvious  that  no  such  element  can  be  found  by  the  mere 
contemplation  of  the  objects  on  which  religious  thought 
is  exercised.  We  can  adequately  criticize  that  only  which 
we  know  as  a  whole.  The  objects  of  Natural  Religion 
are  known  to  us  in  and  by  the  ideas  which  we  can  form 
of  them ;  and  those  ideas  do  not  of  themselves  constitute 
a  whole,  apart  from  the  remaining  phenomena  of  conscious 
ness.  We  must  not  examine  them  by  themselves  alone : 
we  must  look  to  their  origin,  their  import,  and  their  rela 
tion  to  the  mind  of  which  they  are  part.  Revealed  Relig 
ion,  again,  is  not  by  itself  a  direct  object  of  criticism :  first, 
because  it  is  but  a  part  of  a  larger  scheme,  and  that  scheme 
one  imperfectly  comprehended ;  and  secondly,  because  Rev 
elation  implies  an  accommodation  to  the  mental  constitu 
tion  of  its  human  receiver ;  and  we  must  know  what  that 
constitution  is,  before  we  can  pronounce  how  far  the  accom 
modation  extends.  But  if  partial  knowledge  must  not  be 


LECT.  I.  THOUGHT  EXAMINED.  61 

treated  as  if  it  were  complete,  neither,  on  the  other  hand, 
may  it  be  identified  with  total  ignorance.  The  false  humil 
ity  which  assumes  that  it  can  know  nothing,  is  often  as 
dangerous  as  the  false  pride  which  assumes  that  it  knows 
everything.  The  provinces  of  Reason  and  Faith,  the  limits 
of  our  knowledge  and  of  our  ignorance,  must  both  be 
clearly  determined:  otherwise  we  may  find  ourselves  dog 
matically  protesting  against  dogmatism,  and  reasoning  to 
prove  the  worthlessness  of  reason. 

There  is  one  point  from  which  all  religious  systems  must 
start,  and  to  which  all  must  finally  return ;  and  which  may 
therefore  furnish  a  common  ground  on  which  to  examine 
the  principles  and  pretensions  of  all.  The  primary  and 
proper  object  of  criticism  is  not  Religion,  natural  or  re 
vealed,  but  the  human  mind  in  its  relation  to  Religion.  If 
the  Dogmatist  and  the  Rationalist  have  heretofore  con 
tended  as  combatants,  each  beating  the  air  in  his  own 
position,  without  being  able  to  reach  his  adversary ;  if 
they  have  been  prevented  from  taking  up  a  common 
ground  of  controversy,  because  each  repudiates  the  fun 
damental  assumptions  of  the  other;  that  common  ground 
must  be  sought  in  another  quarter ;  namely,  in  those  laws 
and  processes  of  the  human  mind,  by  means  of  which  both 
alike  accept  and  elaborate  their  opposite  systems.  If  hu 
man  philosophy  is  not  a  direct  guide  to  the  attainment  of 
religious  truth  (and  its  entire  history  too  truly  testifies 
that  it  is  not),  may  it  not  serve  as  an  indirect  guide,  by 
pointing  out  the  limits  of  our  faculties,  and  the  conditions 
of  their  legitimate  exercise  ?  Witnessing,  as  it  does,  the 
melancholy  spectacle  of  the  household  of  humanity  divided 
against  itself,  the  reason  against  the  feelings  and  the  feel 
ings  against  the  reason,  and  the  dim  half-consciousness  of 
the  shadow  of  the  infinite  frowning  down  upon  both,  may 

6 


62  LIMITS   OF  RELIGIOUS  LECT.  I. 

it  not  seek,  with  the  heathen  Philosopher  of  old,  to  find 
the  reconciling  and  regulating  principle  in  that  justice,  of 
which  the  essential  character  is,  that  every  member  of  the 
system  shall  do  his  own  duty,  and  forbear  to  intrude  into 
the  office  of  his  neighbor  ?<25) 

A  criticism  of  the  human  mind,  in  relation  to  religious 
truth,  was  one  of  the  many  unrealized  possibilities  of  phi, 
losophy,  sketched  out  in  anticipation  by  the  far-seeing  ge 
nius  of  Bacon.  "  Here  therefore,"  he  writes,  "  I  note  this 
deficiency,  that  there  hath  not  been,  to  my  understanding, 
sufficiently  enquired  and  handled  the  true  limits  and  use 
of  reason  in  spiritual  things,  as  a  kind  of  divine  dialectic  : 
wrhich  for  that  it  is  not  done,  it  seemeth  to  me  a  thing 
usual,  by  pretext  of  true  conceiving  that  which  is  revealed, 
to  search  and  mine  into  that  which  is  not  revealed  ;  and  by 
pretext  of  enucleating  inferences  and  contradictories,  to 
examine  that  which  is  positive  :  the  one  sort  foiling  into 
the  error  of  Nicodemus,  demanding  to  have  things  made 
more  sensible  than  it  pleaseth  God  to  reveal  them,  '  Quo- 
modo  possit  homo  nasci  cum  sit  spnex  ?  '  the  other  sort  into 
the  error  of  the  disciples,  which  were  scandalized  at  a  show 
of  contradiction,  '  Quid  est  hoc  quod  dicit  nobis,  Modicum, 
et  non  videbitis  me;  et  iterum,  modicum,  et  videbitis 


me 


'  " 


An  examination  of  the  Limits  of  Religious  Thought  is 
an  indispensable  preliminary  to  all  Religious  Philosophy. 
And  the  limits  of  religious  thought  are  but  a  special  mani 
festation  of  the  limits  of  thought  in  general.  Thus  the 
Philosophy  of  Religion,  on  its  human  side,  must  be  subject 
to  those  universal  conditions  which  are  binding  upon  Phi 
losophy  in  general.  It  has  ever  fared  ill,  both  with  Philos 
ophy  and  with  Religion,  when  this  caution  has  been 
neglected.  It  was  an  evil  hour  for  both,  when  Fichte 


LECT.  I.  THOUGHT  EXAMINED.  63 

made  his  first  essay,  as  a  disciple  of  the  Kantian  school,  by 
an  attempted  criticism  of  all  Revelation.  <2~)  The  very 
title  of  Kant's  great  work,  and,  in  spite  of  many  inconsis 
tencies,  the  general  spirit  of  its  contents  also,  might  have 
taught  him  a  different  lesson,  —  might  have  shown  him 
that  Reason,  and  not  Revelation,  was  the  primary  object 
of  criticism.  If  Revelation  is  a  communication  from  an  infi 
nite  to  a  finite  intelligence,  the  conditions  of  a  criticism  of 
Revelation  on  philosophical  grounds  must  be  identical  with 
those  which  are  required  for  constructing  a  Philosophy  of 
the  Infinite.  For  Revelation  can  make  known  the  Infinite 
Being  only  in  one  of  two  ways;  \*y presenting  him  as  he 
is,  or  by  representing  him  under  symbols  more  or  less  ade 
quate.  A  presentative  Revelation  implies  faculties  in  man 
which  can  receive  the  presentation  ;  and  such  faculties  will 
also  furnish  the  conditions  of  constructing  a  philosophical 
theory  of  the  object  presented.  If,  on  the  other  hand. 
Revelation  is  merely  representative,  the  accuracy  of  the 
representation  can  only  be  ascertained  by  a,  knowledge  of 
the  object  represented  ;  and  this  again  implies  the  possi 
bility  of  a  philosophy  of  the  Infinite.  Whatever  impedi 
ments,  therefore,  exist  to  prevent  the  formation  of  such  a 
philosophy,  the  same  impediments  must  likewise  prevent 
the  accomplishment  of  a  complete  criticism  of  Revelation. 
Whatever  difficulties  or  contradictions  are  involved  in  the 
philosophical  idea  of  the  Infinite,  the  same  or  similar  ones 
must  naturally  be  expected  in  the  corresponding  ideas 
which  Revelation  either  exhibits  or  implies.  And  if  an 
examination  of  the  problems  of  Philosophy-  and  the  condi 
tions  of  their  solution  should  compel  us  to  admit  the  exist 
ence  of  principles  and  modes  of  thought  which  must  be 
accepted  as  true  in  practice,  though  they  cannot  be 
explained  in  theory;  the  same  practical  acceptance  may  be 


64  LIMITS   OF  RELIGIOUS  LECT.  I. 

claimed,  on  philosophical  grounds,  in  behalf  of  the  corre 
sponding  doctrines  of  Revelation. 

If  it  can  be  shown  that  the  limits  of  religious  and  phi 
losophical  thought  are  the  same ;  that  corresponding  diffi 
culties  occur  in  both,  and,  from  the  nature  of  the  case, 
must  occur,  the  chief  foundation  of  religious  Rationalism 
is  cut  away  from  under  it.  The  difficulties  which  it  pro 
fesses  to  find  in  Revelation  are  shown  to  be  not  peculiar  to 
Revelation,  but  inherent  in  the  constitution  of  the  human 
mind,  and  such  as  no  system  of  Rationalism  can  avoid  or 
overcome.  The  analogy,  which  Bishop  Butler  has  pointed 
out,  between  Religion  and  the  constitution  and  course  of 
Nature,  may  be  in  some  degree  extended  to  the  constitu 
tion  and  processes  of  the  human  mind.  The  representa 
tions  of  God  which  Scripture  presents  to  us  may  be  shown 
to  be  analogous  to  those  which  the  laws  of  our  minds 
require  us  to  form  ;  and  therefore  such  as  may  naturally  be 
supposed  to  have  emanated  from  the  same  author.  Such 
an  inquiry  occupies  indeed  but  a  subordinate  place  among 
the  direct  evidences  of  Christianity ;  nor  is  it  intended  to 
usurp  the  place  of  those  evidences.  But  indirectly  it  may 
have  its  use,  in  furnishing  an  answer  to  a  class  of  object 
ions  which  were  very  popular  a  few  years  ago,  and  are  not 
yet  entirely  extinguished.  Even  if  it  does  not  contribute 
materially  to  strengthen  the  position  occupied  by  the  de 
fenders  of  Christianity,  it  may  serve  to  expose  the  weak 
ness  of  the  assailants.  Human  reason  may,  in  some 
respects,  be  weak  as  a  supporter  of  Religion ;  but  it  is  at 
least  strong  enough  to  repel  an  attack  founded  on  the 
negation  of  reason. 

"  We  know  in  part,  and  we  prophesy  in  part.  But  when 
that  which  is  perfect  is  come,  then  that  which  is  in  part 
shall  be  done  away.  For  now  we  see  through  a  glass, 


LECT.  I.  THOUGHT   EXAMINED.  65 

darkly;  but  then  face  to  face:  now  I  know  in  part;  but 
then  shall  I  know  even  as  also  I  am  known."1  Such  is  the 
Apostle's  declaration  of  the  limits  of  human  knowledge. 
"  The  logical  conception  is  the  absolute  divine  conception 
itself;  and  the  logical  process  is  the  immediate  exhibition 
of  God's  self-determination  to  Being."  (28)  Such  is  the 
Philosopher's  declaration  of  the  extent  of  human  knowl 
edge.  On  the  first  of  these  statements  is  founded  the 
entire  Theology  of  Scripture :  on  the  second  is  founded 
the  latest  and  most  complete  exposition  of  the  Theology 
of  Rationalism.  The  one  represents  God,  not  as  He  is  in 
the  brightness  of  His  own  glory,  dwelling  in  the  light 
which  no  man  can  approach  unto;2  but  as  He  is  reflected 
faintly  in  broken  and  fitful  rays,  glancing  back  from  the 
restless  waters  of  the  human  soul.  The  other  identifies 
the  shadow  with  the  substance,  not  even  shrinking  from 
the  confession  that,  to  know  God  as  He  is,  man  must 
himself  be  God.<29)  It  turns  from  the  feeble  image  of 
God  in  the  soul  of  the  individual  man,  to  seek  the  entire 
manifestation  of  Deity  in  the  collective  consciousness  of 
mankind.  "Ye  shall  be  as  gods,"3  was  the  earliest  sugges 
tion  of  the  Tempter  to  the  parents  of  the  human  race  : 
"  Ye  are  God,"  is  the  latest  assurance  of  philosophy  to  the 
human  race  itself.  (3°)  Revelation  represents  the  infinite 
God  under  finite  symbols,  in  condescension  to  the  finite  ca 
pacity  of  man  ;  indicating  at  the  same  time  the  existence 
of  a  further  reality  beyond  the  symbol,  and  bidding  us  look 
forward  in  faith  to  the  promise  of  a  more  perfect  knowl 
edge  hereafter.  Rationalism,  in  the  hands  of  these  exposi 
tors,  adopts  an  opposite  view  of  man's  powers  and  duties. 
It  claims  to  behold  God  as  He  is  now  :  it  finds  a  common 
object  for  Religion  and  Philosophy  in  the  explanation  of 

i  1  Cor.  xiii.  9,  10,  12.        2  i  Tim.  vi.  16.        3  Genesis  iii.  5. 
6* 


66  LIMITS   OF  RELIGIOUS  LECT.  I. 

God.  (31)  It  declares  Religion  to  be  the  Divine  Spirit's 
knowledge  of  himself  through  the  mediation  of  the  finite 
Spirit.  (82) 

"  Beloved,  now  are  we  the  sons  of  God  ;  and  it  doth 
not  yet  appear  what  we  shall  be  :  but  we  know  that,  when 
He  shall  appear,  we  shall  be  like  Him;  for  we  shall  see 
Him  as  He  is.  And  every  man  that  hath  this  hope  in  him 
purifieth  himself,  even  as  He  is  pure."1  Philosophy  too 
confesses  that  like  must  be  known  by  like ;  but,  reversing 
the  hope  of  the  Apostle,  it  finds  God  in  the  forms  of  hu 
man  thought.  Its  kingdom  is  proclaimed  to  be  Truth 
absolute  and  unveiled.  It  contains  in  itself  the  exhibition 
of  God,  as  He  is  in  His  eternal  essence,  before  the  crea 
tion  of  a  finite  world.  <33)  Which  of  these  two  representa 
tions  contains  the  truer  view  of  the  capacities  of  human 
reason,  it  will  be  the  purpose  of  the  following  Lectures  to 
inquire.  Such  an  inquiry  must  necessarily,  during  a  por 
tion  at  least  of  its  course,  assume  a  philosophical,  rather 
than  a  theological  aspect ;  yet  it  will  not  perhaps  on  that 
account  be  less  ultimately  serviceable  in  theological  contro 
versy.  It  has  been  acutely  said,  that  even  if  Philosophy  is 
useless,  it  is  still  useful,  as  the  means  of  proving  its  own 
uselessness.  f34)  But  it  is  not  so  much  the  utility  as  the 
necessity  of  the  study,  which  constitutes  its  present  claim 
on  our  attention.  So  long  as  man  possesses  facts  of  con 
sciousness  and  powers  of  reflection,  so  long  he  will  continue 
to  exercise  those  powers  and  study  those  facts.  So  long  as 
human  consciousness  contains  the  idea  of  a  God  and  the 
instincts  of  worship,  so  long  mental  philosophy  will  walk 
on  common  ground  with  religious  belief.  Rightly  or 
wrongly,  men  will  think  of  these  things  ;  and  a  knowledge 
of  the  laws  under  which  they  think  is  the  only  security  for 

i  1  St.  John  iii.  2,  3. 


LECT.  I.  THOUGHT   EXAMINED.  .67 

thinking  soundly.  If  it  be  thought  no  unworthy  occupa 
tion  for  the  Christian  preacher,  to  point  out  the  evidences 
of  God's  Providence  in  the  constitution  of  the  sensible 
world  and  the  mechanism  of  the  human  body ;  or  to  dwell 
on  the  analogies  which  may  be  traced  between  the  scheme 
of  revelation  and  the  course  of  nature ;  it  is  but  a  part  of 
the  same  argument  to  pursue  the  inquiry  with  regard  to  the 
structure  and  laws  of  the  human  mind.  The  path  may  be 
one  which,  of  late  years  at  least,  has  been  less  frequently 
trodden  :  the  language  indispensable  to  such  an  investiga 
tion  may  sound  at  times  unwonted  and  uncouth ;  but  the 
end  is  one  with  that  of  those  plainer  and  more  familiar 
illustrations  which  have  taken  their  place  among  the  ac 
knowledged  evidences  of  religion ;  and  the  lesson  of  the 
whole,  if  read  aright,  will  be  but  to  teach  us  that  in  mind, 
no  less  than  in  body,  we  are  fearfully  and  wonderfully 
made1  by  Him  whose  praise  both  alike  declare  :  that  He 
who  "laid  the  foundations  of  the  earth,  and  shut  up  the  sea 
with  doors,  and  said,  Hitherto  shalt  thou  come,  but  no  fur 
ther,"  is  also  He  who  "hath  put  wisdom  in  the  inward 
parts,  and  hath  given  understanding  to  the  heart."2 

1  Psalm  cxxxix.  14.        2  job  XXxviii.  4,  8,  11,  30. 


LECTURE    II. 


KEEP    THAT    WHICH    IS    COMMITTED    TO    THY    TRUST,   AVOIDING    PRO 
FANE  AND  VAIN  BABBLINGS,  AND   OPPOSITIONS  OF  SCIENCE   FALSELY 

so  CALLED;  WHICH  SOME  PROFESSING  HAVE  ERRED  CONCERNING 

THE    FAITH.  —  I    TIMOTHY   VI.    20,21. 


A  PHILOSOPHY  of  Religion  may  be  attempted  from  two 
opposite  points  of  view,  and  by  two  opposite  modes  of  de 
velopment.  It  may  be  conceived  either  as  a  Philosophy 
of  the  Object  of  Religion  ;  that  is  to  say,  as  a  scientific 
exposition  of  the  nature  of  God  ;  or  as  a  Philosophy  of  the 
Subject  of  Religion;  that  is  to  say,  as  a  scientific  inquiry 
into  the  constitution  of  the  human  mind,  so  far  as  it  re 
ceives  and  deals  with  religious  ideas.  The  former  is  that 
branch  of  Metaphysics  which  is  commonly  known  by  the 
name  of  Rational  Theology.  Its  general  aim,  in  common 
with  all  metaphysical  inquiries,  is  to  disengage  the  real 
from  the  apparent,  the  true  from  the  false  :  its  special  aim, 
as  a -Theology,  is  to  exhibit  a  true  representation  of  the 
Nature  and  Attributes  of  God,  purified  from  foreign  accre 
tions,  and  displaying  the  exact  features  of  their  Divine 
Original.  The  latter  is  a  branch  of  Psychology,  which  at 
its  outset  at  least,  contents  itself  with  investigating  the 
phenomena  presented  to  it,  leaving  their  relation  to  further 
realities  to  be  determined  at  a  later  stage  of  the  inquiry. 
Its  primary  concern  is  with  the  operations  and  laws  of  the 
human  mind;  and  its  special  purpose  is  to  ascertain  the 
nature,  the  origin,  and  the  limits  of  the  religious  element 


LECT.  II.         THOUGHT  EXAMINED.  69 

in  man  ;  postponing,  till  after  that  question  has  been  de 
cided,  the  further  inquiry  into  the  absolute  nature  of  God. 

As  applied  to  the  criticism  of  Revelation,  the  first 
method,  supposing  its  end  to  be  attained,  would  furnish  an 
immediate  and  direct  criterion  by  which  the  claims  of  any 
supposed  Revelation  to  a  divine  origin  might  be  tested; 
while  at  the  same  time  it  would  enable  those  possessed  of 
it  to  dispense  with  the  services  of  any  Revelation  at  all. 
For  on  the  supposition  that  we  possess  an  exact  idea  of  any 
attribute  of  the  Divine  Nature,  we  are  at  liberty  to  reject 
at  once  any  portion  of  the  supposed  Revelation  which  con 
tradicts  that  idea ;  and  on  the  supposition  that  we  possess 
a  complete  idea  of  that  Nature  as  a  whole,  we  are  at  liberty 
to  reject  whatever  goes  beyond  it.  And  as,  upon  either 
supposition,  the  highest  praise  to  which  Revelation  can  as 
pire  is  that  of  coinciding,  partially  or  wholly,  with  the  in 
dependent  conclusions  of  Philosophy,  it  follows  that,  so  far 
as  Philosophy  extends,  Revelation  becomes  superfluous.  W 
On  the  other  hand,  the  second  method  of  philosophical 
inquiry  does  not  profess  to  furnish  a  direct  criticism  of 
Revelation,  but  only  of  the  instruments  by  which  Revela 
tion  is  to  be  criticized.  It  looks  to  the  human,  not  to  the 
^divine,  and  aspires  to  teach  us  no  more  than  the  limits  of 
our  own  powers  of  thought,  and  the  consequent  distinction 
between  what  we  may  and  what  we  may  not  seek  to  com 
prehend.  And  if,  upon  examination,  it  should  appear  that 
any  portion  of  the  contents  of  Revelation  belongs  to  the 
latter  class  of  truths,  this  method  will  enable  us  to  recon 
cile  with  each  other  the  conflicting  claims  of  Reason  and 
Faith,  by  showing  that  Reason  itself,  rightly  interpreted, 
teaches  the  existence  of  truths  that  are  above  Reason. 

Whatever  may  be  the  ultimate  use  of  the  first  of  these 
methods  of  criticism,  it  is  obvious  that  the  previous  ques- 


70  LIMITS    OF   RELIGIOUS  L.KCT.   II. 

tion,  concerning  our  right  to  use  it  at  all,  can  only  be  sat 
isfactorily  answered  by  the  employment  of  the  second 
method.  The  possibility  of  criticism  at  all  implies  that 
human  reason  is  liable  to  error :  the  possibility  of  a  valid 
criticism  implies  that  the  means  of  distinguishing  between 
its  truth  and  its  error  may  be  ascertained  by  a  previous 
criticism.  Let  it  be  granted,  for  the  moment,  that  a  relig 
ion  whose  contents  are  irreconcilable  with  human  reason  is 
thereby  proved  not  to  have  come  from  God,  but  from  man, 
—  still  the  reason  which  judges  is  at  least  as  human  as  the 
religion  which  is  judged;  and  if  the  human  representation 
of  God  is  erroneous  in  the  latter,  how  can  we  assume  its 
infallibility  in  the  former  ?  If  we  grant  for  the  present  the 
fundamental  position  of  Rationalism,  namely,  that  man  by 
his  own  reason  can  attain  to  a  right  conception  of  God, 
we  must  at  any  rate  grant  also,  what  every  attempt  at 
criticism  implies,  that  he  may  also  attain  to  a  wrong  one. 
We  have  therefore  still  to  ask  by  what  marks  the  one  is  to 
be  distinguished  from  the  other;  by  what  method  we  are 
to  seek  the  truth ;  and  how  we  are  to  assume  ourselves 
that  we  have  found  it.  And  to  answer  this  question,  we 
need  a  preliminary  examination  of  the  conditions  and  limits 
of  human  thought.  Religious  criticism  is  itself  an  act  of 
thought;  and  its  immediate  instruments  must, -under  any 
circumstances,  be  thoughts  also.  We  are  thus  compelled 
in  the  iirst  instance  to  inquire  into  the  origin  and  value  of 
those  thoughts  themselves. 

A  Philosophy  which  professes  to  elicit  from  its  own 
conceptions  all  the  essential  portions  of  religious  belief,  is 
bound  to  justify  its  profession,  by  showing  that  those  con 
ceptions  themselves  are  above  suspicion.  The  ideas  thus 
exalted  to  the  supreme  criteria  of  truth  must  bear  on  their 
front  unquestionable  evidence  that  they  are  true  and  suffi- 


LECT.  II.          THOUGHT  EXAMINED.  71 

cient  representations  of  the  Divine  Nature,  such  as  may 
serve  all  the  needs  of  human  thought  and  human  feeling, 
adequate  alike  for  contemplation  and  for  worship.  They 
must  manifest  the  clearness  and  distinctness  which  mark 
the  strong  vision  of  an  eye  gazing  undazzled  on  the  glory 
of  Heaven,  not  the  obscurity  and  confusion  of  one  that 
turns  away  blinded  from  the  glare,  and  gropes  in  its  own 
darkness  after  the  fleeting  spectrum.  The  conviction 
which  boasts  itself  to  be  superior  to  all  external  evidence 
must  carry  in  its  own  inward  constitution  some  sure  indi 
cation  of  its  truth  and  value. 

Such  a  conviction  may  be  possible  in  two  different  ways. 
It  may  be  the  result  of  a  direct  intuition  of  the  Divine 
Nature ;  or  it  may  be  gained  by  inference  from  certain 
attributes  of  human  nature,  which,  though  on  a  smaller 
scale,  are  known  to  be  sufficiently  representative  of  the 
corresponding  properties  of  the  Deity.  We  may  suppose 
the  existence  in  man  of  a  special  faculty  of  knowledge,  of 
which  God  is  the  immediate  object,  —  a  kind  of  religious 
sense  or  reason,  by  which  the  Divine  attributes  are  appre 
hended  in  their  own  nature :  <2>  or  we  may  maintain  that 
the  attributes  of  God  differ  from  those  of  man  in  degree 
only,  not  in  kind ;  and  hence  that  certain  mental  and 
moral  qualities,  of  which  we  are  immediately  conscious  in 
ourselves,  furnish  at  the  same  time  a  true  and  adequate 
image  of  the  infinite  perfections  of  God.  <3)  The  first  of 
these  suppositions  professes  to  convey  a  knowledge  of 
God  by  direct  apprehension,  in  a  manner  similar  to  the 
evidence  of  the  senses:  the  second  professes  to  convey 
the  same  knowledge  by  a  logical  process,  similar  to  the 
demonstrations  of  science.  The  former  is  the  method  of 
Mysticism,  and  of  that  Rationalism  which  agrees  with 
Mysticism,  in  referring  the  knowledge  of  divine  things  to 


72  LIMITS   OF  RELIGIOUS  LECT.  II. 

an  extraordinary  and  abnormal  process  of  intuition  or 
thought.  <4)  The  latter  is  the  method  of  the  vulgar  Ra 
tionalism,  which  regards  the  reason  of  man,  in  its  ordinary 
and  normal  operation,  as  the  supreme  criterion  of  religious 
truth. 

On  the  former  supposition,  a  system  of  religious  philos 
ophy  or  criticism  may  be  constructed  by  starting  from  the 
divine  and  reasoning  down  to  the  human :  on  the  latter, 
by  starting  from  the  human  and  reasoning  up  to  the  divine. 
The  first  commences  with  a  supposed  immediate  knowl 
edge  of  God  as  He  is  in  his  absolute  nature,  and  proceeds 
to  exhibit  the  process  by  which  that  nature,  acting  accord 
ing  to  its  own  laws,  will  manifest  itself  in  operation,  and 
become  known  to  man.  The  second  commences  with  an 
immediate  knowledge  of  the  mental  and  moral  attributes 

O 

of  man,  and  proceeds  to  exhibit  the  manner  in  which  those 
attributes  will  manifest  themselves,  when  exalted  to  the 
degree  in  which  they  form  part  of  the  nature  of  God. 
If,  for  example,  the  two  systems  severally  undertake  to 
give  a  representation  of  the  infinite  power  and  wisdom  of 
God,  the  former  will  profess  to  explain  how  the  nature  of 
the  infinite  manifests  itself  in  the  forms  of  power  and  wis 
dom;  while  the  latter  will  attempt  to  show  how  power 
and  wisdom  must  manifest  themselves  when  existing  in 
an  infinite  degree.  In  their  criticisms  of  Revelation,  in 
like  manner,  the  former  will  rather  take  as  its  standard 
that  absolute  and  essential  nature  of  God,  which  must 
remain  unchanged  in  every  manifestation ;  the  latter  will 
judge  by  reference  to  those  intellectual  and  moral  qual 
ities,  which  must  exist  in  all  their  essential  features  in  the 
divine  nature  as  well  as  in  the  human. 

Thus,  for  example,  it  has  been  maintained  by  a  modern 
philosopher,  that  the  absolute  nature  of  God  is  that  of  a 


LECT.  II.  THOUGHT   EXAMINED.  73 

pure  Will,  determining  itself  solely  by  a  moral  law,  and 
subject  to  no  affections  which  can  operate  as  motives. 
Hence  it  is  inferred  that  the  same  law  of  action  must  form 
the  rule  of  God's  manifestation  to  mankind  as  a  moral 
Governor;  and  therefore  that  no  revelation  can  be  of 
divine  origin,  which  attempts  to  influence  men's  actions 
by  the  prospect  of  reward  or  punishment.  (5>  In  this 
mode  of  reasoning,  an  abstract  conception  of  the  nature 
of  God  is  made  the  criterion  to  determine  the  mode  in 
which  He  must  reveal  Himself  to  man.  On  the  other 
hand,  we  meet  with  an  opposite  style  of  criticism,  which 
reasons  somewhat  as  follows :  All  the  excellences,  it  con 
tends,  of  which  we  are  conscious  in  the  creature,  must 
necessarily  exist  in  the  same  manner,  though  in  a  higher 
degree,  in  the  Creator.  God  is  indeed  more  wise,  more 
just,  more  merciful  than  man ;  but  for  that  very  reason, 
His  wisdom  and  justice  arid  mercy  must  contain  nothing 
that  is  incompatible  with  the  corresponding  attributes  in 
their  human  character.  <6)  Hence,  if  the  certainty  of 
man's  knowledge  implies  the  necessity  .of  the  events 
which  he  knows,  the  certainty  of  God's  omniscience  im 
plies  a  like  necessity  of  all  things :  <7)  if  man's  justice 
requires  that  he  should  punish  the  guilty  alone,  it  is  incon 
sistent  with  God's  justice  to  inflict  the  chastisement  of  sin 
upon  the  innocent  :<8)  if  man's  mercy  finds  its  natural 
exercise  in  the  free  forgiveness  of  oifences,  God's  mer 
cy,  too,  must  freely  forgive  the  sins  of  His  creatures.  (y) 
From  the  same  premises  it  is  consistently  concluded  that 
no  act  which  would  be  wrong,  if  performed  by  a  man 
upon  his  own  responsibility,  can  be  justified  by  the  plea 
of  a  direct  command  from  God.(10)  Abraham  may  not 
be  praised  for  his  readiness  to  slay  his  son  in  obedience  to 
God's  command ;  for  the  internal  prohibition  must  always 

7 


74  LIMITS   OF  RELIGIOUS  LECT.  II. 

be  more  certain   than   the  external  precept.  <u>     Joshua 
cannot  be  warranted  in  obeying  the  Divine  injunction  to 
exterminate  the  Canaanites,  unless  he  would  be  equally 
warranted  in  destroying  them  of  his  own  accord.  (12>    And, 
as  the  issuing  of  such  commands  is  contrary  to  the  moral 
nature  of  God,  therefore  the  Book  which  represents  them 
as  so  issued  is  convicted  of  falsehood,  and  cannot  be  re 
garded  as  a  Divine  Revelation.  (13>     In  this  mode  of  rea 
soning,  the  moral  or  intellectual  nature  of  man  is  made 
the  rule  to  determine  what  ought  to  be  the  revealed  attri 
butes  of  God,  and  in  what  manner  they  must  be  exercised. 
Within  certain  limits,  both  these  arguments  may  have 
their  value ;  but  each  is  chiefly  useful  as  a  check  upon  the 
exclusive  authority  of  the  other.     The  philosophy  which 
reasons  downwards  from  the  infinite,  is  but  an  exaggera 
tion  of  the  true  conviction  that  God's  thoughts  are  not 
our  thoughts,  nor  His  ways  our  ways:1   the  philosophy 
which  reasons  upwards  from  the   human,  bears  witness, 
even  in  its  perversion,  to  the  unextinguishable  conscious 
ness,  that  man,  however  fallen,  was  created  in  the  image 
of  God.2    But  this  admission  tends  rather  to  weaken  than 
to  strengthen  the  claims  of  either  to  be  received  as  the 
supreme  criterion  of  religious  truth.     The  criticisms  of 
rationalism  exhibit  the  weakness  as  well  as  the  strength 
of  reason  ;  for  the  representations  which  it  rejects,  as  dis 
honoring  to  God,  are,  on  its  own  showing,  the  product  of 
human  thought,  no  less  than  the  principle  by  which  thej 
are  judged   and   condemned.     If  the   human   mind   ha; 
passed  through  successive  stages  of  religious  cultivation 
from  the  grovelling  superstition  of  the  savage  to  the  intel 
lectual  elevation  of  the  critic  of  all  possible   revelations 
who  shall  assure  the  critic  that  the  level  on  which  he 
i  Isaiah  Iv.  8.  2  Genesis  1.  27. 


LKCT.  II.  THOUGHT  EXAMINED.  To 

stands  is  the  last  and  highest  that  can  be  attained?  If 
reason  is  to  be  the  last  court  of  appeal  in  religious  ques 
tions,  it  must  find  some  better  proof  of  its  own  infalli 
bility  than  is  to  be  found  in  its  own  progressive  enlighten 
ment.  Its  preeminence  must  be  shown,  not  by  successive 
approximations  to  the  truth,  but  by  the  possession  of  the 
truth  itself.  Of  the  limits  within  which  reason  may  be 
legitimately  employed,  I  shall  have  occasion  to  speak 
hereafter.  At  present,  I  am  concerned  only  with  its  pre 
tensions  to  such  a  knowledge  of  the  Divine  Nature,  as 
can  constitute  the  foundation  of  a  Rational  Theology. 

There  are  three  terms,  familiar  as  household  words,  in 
the  vocabulary  of  Philosophy,  which  must  be  taken  into 
account  in  every  system  of  Metaphysical  Theology.  To 
conceive  the  Deity  as  He  is,  we  must  conceive  Him  as 
First  Cause,  as  Absolute,  and  as  Infinite.  By  the  First 
Cause,  is  meant  that  which  produces  all  things,  and  is 
itself  produced  of  none.  By  the  Absolute,  is  meant  that 
which  exists  in  and  by  itself,  having  no  necessary  relation 
to  any  other  Being.  (14)  By  the  Infinite,  is  meant  that 
which  is  free  from  all  possible  limitation ;  that  than  which 
a  greater  is  inconceivable;  and  which,  consequently,  can 
receive  no  additional  attribute  or  mode  of  existence,  which 
it  had  not  from  all  eternity. 

The  Infinite,  as  contemplated  by  this  philosophy,  can 
not  be  regarded  as  consisting  of  a  limited  number  of  attri 
butes,  each  unlimited  in  its  kind.  It  cannot  be  conceived, 
for  example,  after  the  analogy  of  a  line,  infinite  in  length, 
but  not  in  breadth ;  or  of  a  surface,  infinite  in  two  dimen 
sions  of  space,  but  bounded  in  the  third ;  or  of  an  intel 
ligent  being,  possessing  some  one  or  more  modes  of  con 
sciousness  in  an  infinite  degree,  but  devoid  of  others. 
Even  if  it  be  granted,  which  is  not  the  case,  that  such  a- 


76  LIMITS   OP  RELIGIOUS  LECT.  II. 

partial  infinite  may  without  contradiction  bo  conceived, 
still  it  will  have  a  relative  infinity  only,  and  be  altogether 
incompatible  with  the  idea  of  the  Absolute.  (15)  The 
line  limited  in  breadth  is  thereby  necessarily  related  to 
the  space  that  limits  it :  the  intelligence  endowed  with  a 
limited  number  of  attributes,  coexists  with  others  which 
are  thereby  related  to  it,  as  cognate  or  opposite  modes  of 
consciousness.  <16)  The  metaphysical  representation  of  the 
Deity,  as  absolute  and  infinite,  must  necessarily,  as  the 
profoundest  metaphysicians  have  acknowledged,  amount 
to  nothing  less  than  the  sum  of  all  reality,  t1")  "What 
kind  of  an  Absolute  Being  is  that,"  says  Hegel,  "  which 
does  not  contain  in  itself  all  that  is  actual,  even  evil 
included? "(is)  }yQ  may  repudiate  the  conclusion  with 
indignation ;  but  the  reasoning  is  unassailable.  If  the 
Absolute  and  Infinite  is  an  object  of  human  conception 
at  all,  this,  and  none  other,  is  the  conception  required. 
That  which  is  conceived  as  absolute  and  infinite  must  bo 
conceived  as  containing  within  itself  the  sum,  not  only  of 
all  actual,  but  of  all  possible,  modes  of  being.  For  if  any 
actual  mode  can  be  denied  of  it,  it  is  related  to  that  mode, 
and  limited  by  it ;  <19)  and  if  any  possible  mode  can  be 
denied  of  it,  it  is  capable  of  becoming  more  than  it  now 
is,  and  such  a  capability  is  a  limitation.  Indeed,  it  is  obvi 
ous  that  the  entire  distinction  between  the  possible  and 
the  actual  can  have  no  existence  as  regards  the  absolutely 
infinite ;  for  an  unrealized  possibility  is  necessarily  a  rela 
tion  and  a  limit.  The  scholastic  saying,  Deus  est  actus 
picrus^C1^  ridiculed  as  it  has  been  by  modern  critics,  is 
in  truth  but  the  expression,  in  technical  language,  of  the 
almost  unanimous  voice  of  philosophy,  both  in  earlier  and 
later  times.  <21> 

But  these  three  conceptions,  the  Cause,  the  Absolute, 


LECT.  II.          THOUGHT  EXAMINED.  77 

the  Infinite,  all  equally  indispensable,  do  they  not  imply 
contradiction  to  each  other,  when  viewed  in  conjunction, 
as  attributes  of  one  and  the  same  Being  ?  A  Cause  can 
not,  as  such,  be  absolute :  the  Absolute  cannot,  as  such,  be 
a  cause.  The  cause,  as  such,  exists  only  in  relation  to  its 
effect :  the  cause  is  a  cause  of  the  effect ;  the  effect  is  an 
effect  of  the  cause.  On  the  other  hand,  the  conception 
of  the  Absolute  implies  a  possible  existence  out  of  all  rela 
tion^22)  We  attempt  to  escape  from  this  apparent  con 
tradiction,  by  introducing  the  idea  of  succession  in  time. 
The  Absolute  exists  first  by  itself,  and  afterwards  becomes 
a  Cause.  But  here  we  are  checked  by  the  third  concep 
tion,  that  of  the  Infinite.  How  can  the  Infinite  become 
that  which  it  was  not  from  the  first?  If  Causation  is  a 
possible  mode  of  existence,  that  which  exists  without 
causing  is  not  infinite;  that  which  becomes  a  cause  has 
passed  beyond  its  former  limits.  Creation  at  any  particu 
lar  moment  of  time  being  thus  inconceivable,  the  philoso 
pher  is  reduced  to  the  alternative  of  Pantheism,  which 
pronounces  the  effect  to  be  mere  appearance,  and  merges 
all  real  existence  in  the  caused23)  The  validity  of  this 
alternative  will  be  examined  presently. 

Meanwhile,  to  return  for  a  moment  to  the  supposition 
of  a  true  causation.  Supposing  the  Absolute  to  become 
a  cause,  it  will  follow  that  it  operates  by  means  of  free 
will  and  consciousness.  For  a  necessary  cause  cannot  be 
conceived  as  absolute  and  infinite.  If  necessitated  by 
something  beyond  itself,  it  is  thereby  limited  by  a  supe 
rior  power ;  and  if  necessitated  by  itself,  it  has  in  its  own 
nature  a  necessary  relation  to  its  effect.  The  act  of  causa 
tion  must,  therefore,  be  voluntary ;  and  volition  is  only 
possible  in  a  conscious  being.  But  consciousness,  again, 
is  only  conceivable  as  a  relation.  There  must  be  a  con- 

7* 


78  LIMITS    OF    RELIGIOUS  LECT.  II. 

scious  subject,  and  an  object  of  which  he  is  conscious. 
The  subject  is  a  subject  to  the  object;  the  object  is  an 
object  to  the  subject ;  and  neither  can  exist  by  itself  as 
the  absolute.  This  difficulty,  again,  may  be  for  the  mo 
ment  evaded,  by  distinguishing  between  the  absolute  as 
related  to  another,  and  the  absolute  as  related  to  itself. 
The  Absolute,  it  may  be  said,  may  possibly  be  conscious, 
provided  it  is  only  conscious  of  itself.  <24)  But  this  alter 
native  is,  in  ultimate  analysis,  no  less  self-destructive  than 
the  other.  For  "the  object  of  consciousness,  whether  a 
mode  of  the  subject's  existence  or  not,  is  either  created 
in  and  by  the  act  of  consciousness,  or  has  an  existence 
independent  of  it.  In  the  former  case,  the  object  depends 
upon  the  subject,  and  the  subject  alone  is  the  true  abso 
lute.  In  the  latter  case,  the  subject  depends  upon  the 
object,  and  the  object  alone  is  the  true  absolute.  Or,  if 
we  attempt  a  third  hypothesis,  and  maintain  that  each 
exists  independently  of  the  other,  we  have  no  absolute  at 
all,  but  only  a  pair  of  relatives  ;  for  coexistence,  whether 
in  consciousness  or  not,  is  itself  a  relation,  t23) 

The  corollary  from  this  reasoning  is  obvious.  Not  only 
is  the  Absolute,  as  conceived,  incapable  of  a  necessary  re 
lation  to  anything  else ;  but  it  is  also  incapable  of  contain 
ing,  by  the  constitution  of  its  own  nature,  an  essential  re 
lation  within  itself;  as  a  whole,  for  instance,  composed  of 
parts,  or  as  a  substance  consisting  of  attributes,  or  as  a 
conscious  subject  in  antithesis  to  an  object.  (26>  For  if 
there  is  in  the  absolute  any  principle  of  unity,  distinct 
from  the  mere  accumulation  of  parts  or  attributes,  this 
principle  alone  is  the  true  absolute.  If,  on  the  other  hand, 
there  is  no  such  principle,  then  there  is  no  absolute  at  all, 
but  only  a  plurality  of  relatives.  (2~)  The  almost  unani 
mous  voice  of  philosophy,  in  pronouncing  that  the  absolute 


LECT.  II.  THOUGIIT   EXAMINED.  79 

is  both  one  and  simple,  must  be  accepted  as  the  voice  of 
reason  also,  so  far  as  reason  has  any  voice  in  the  matter,  t28) 
But  this  absolute  unity,  as  indifferent  and  containing  no 
attributes,  can  neither  be  distinguished  from  the  multiplic 
ity  of  finite  beings  by  any  characteristic  feature,  nor  be 
identified  with  them  in  their  multiplicity.  <29)  Thus  we 
are  landed  in  an  inextricable  dilemma.  The  Absolute 
cannot  be  conceived  as  conscious,  neither  can  it  be  con 
ceived  as  unconscious :  it  cannot  be  conceived  as  com 
plex,  neither  can  it  be  conceived  as  simple :  it  cannot  be 
conceived  by  difference,  neither  can  it  be  conceived  by  the 
absence  of  difference  :  it  cannot  be  identified  with  the  uni 
verse,  neither  can  it  be  distinguished  from  it.  The  One 
and  the  Many,  regarded  as  the  beginning  of  existence,  are 
thus  alike  incomprehensible. 

The  fundamental  conceptions  of  Rational  Theology  be 
ing  thus  self-destructive,  we  may  naturally  expect  to  find 
the  same  antagonism  manifested  in  their  special  applica 
tions.  These  naturally  inherit  the  infirmities  of  the  prin 
ciple  from  which  they  spring.  If  an  absolute  and  infinite 
consciousness  is  a  conception  which  contradicts  itself,  we 
need  not  wonder  if  its  several  modifications  mutually  ex 
clude  each  other.  A  mental  attribute,  to  be  conceived  as 
infinite,  must  be  in  actual  exercise  on  every  possible  ob 
ject  :  otherwise  it  is  potential  only  with  regard  to  those 
on  which  it  is  not  exercised ;  and  an  unrealized  potenti 
ality  is  a  limitation.  Hence  every  infinite  mode  of  con 
sciousness  must  be  regarded  as  extending  over  the  field  of 
every  other ;  and  their  common  action  involves  a  perpetual 
antagonism.  How,  for  example,  can  Infinite  Power  be 
able  to  do  all  things,  and  yet  Infinite  Goodness  be  unable 
to  do  evil?  How  can  infinite  Justice  exact  the  utmost 
penalty  for  every  sin,  and  yet  Infinite  Mercy  pardon  the 


80  LIMITS    OF   IIELIGIOU3  LECT.  II. 

sinner  ?  How  can  Infinite  Wisdom  know  all  that  is  to 
come,  and  yet  Infinite  Freedom  be  at  liberty  to  do  or 
to  forbear? (8°)  How  is  the  existence  of  Evil  compatible 
with  that  of  an  infinitely  perfect  Being ;  for  if  he  wills  it, 
he  is  not  infinitely  good  ;  and  if  he  wills  it  not,  his  will  is 
thwarted  and  his  sphere  of  action  limited  ?  Here,  again, 
the  Pantheist  is  ready  with  his  solution.  There  is  in  re 
ality  no  such  thing  as  evil :  there  is  no  such  thing  as  pun 
ishment  :  there  is  no  real  relation  between  God  and  man 
at  all.  God  is  all  that  really  exists  :  He  does,  by  the  ne 
cessity  of  His  nature,  all  that  is  done :  all  acts  are  equally 
necessary  and  equally  divine:  all  diversity  is  but  a  dis 
torted  representation  of  unity :  all  evil  is  but  a  delusive 
appearance  of  good.  (31)  Unfortunately,  the  Pantheist  does 
not  tell  us  whence  all  this  delusion  derives  its  seeming 
existence. 

Let  us  however  suppose  for  an  instant  that  these  diffi 
culties  are  surmounted,  and  the  existence  of  the  Absolute 
securely  established  on  the  testimony  of  reason.  Still  we 
have  not  succeeded  in  reconciling  this  idea  with  that  of  a 
Cause :  we  have  done  nothing  towards  explaining  how  the 
absolute  can  give  rise  to  the  relative,  the  infinite  to  the 
finite.  If  the  condition  of  causal  activity  is  a  higher  state 
than  that  of  quiescence,  the  absolute,  whether  acting  vol 
untarily  or  involuntarily,  has  passed  from  a  condition  of 
comparative  imperfection  to  one  of  comparative  perfec 
tion  ;  and  therefore  was  not  originally  perfect.  If  the 
state  of  activity  is  an  inferior  state  to  that  of  quiescence, 
the  Absolute,  in  becoming  a  cause,  has  lost  its  original  per 
fection.  <32)  There  remains  only  the  supposition  that  the 
two  states  are  equal,  and  the  act  of  creation  one  of  com 
plete  indifference.  But  this  supposition  annihilates  the 
unity  of  the  absolute,  or  it  annihilates  itself.  If  the  act  of 


LECT.  II.  THOUGHT    EXAMINED.  81 

creation  is  real,  and  yet  indifferent,  we  must  admit  the 
possibility  of  two  conceptions  of  the  absolute,  the  one  as 
productive,  the  other  as  non-productive.  If  the  act  is  not 
real,  the  supposition  itself  vanishes,  and  we  are  thrown 
once  more  on  the  alternative  of  Pantheism. 

Again,  how  can  the  Relative  be  conceived  as  coming  into 
being?  If  it  is  a  distinct  reality  from  the  absolute,  it  must 
be  conceived  as  passing  from  non-existence  into  existence. 
But  to  conceive  an  object  as  non-existent,  is  again  a  self- 
contradiction  ;  for  that  which  is  conceived  exists,  as  an 
object  of  thought,  in  and  by  that  conception.  We  may 
abstain  from  thinking  of  an  object  at  all;  but,  if  we  think 
of  it,  we  cannot  but  think  of  it  as  existing.  It  is  possible 
at  one  time  not  to  think  of  an  object  at  all,  and  at  another 
to  think  of  it  as  already  in  being ;  but  to  think  of  it  in  the 
act  of  becoming,  in  the  progress  from  not  being  into  being, 
is  to  think  that  which,  in  the  very  thought,  annihilates 
itself.  Here  again  the  Pantheistic  hypothesis  seems  forced 
upon  us.  We  can  think  of  creation  only  as  a  change  in 
the  condition  of  that  which  already  exists;  and  thus  the 
creature  is  conceivable  only  as  a  phenomenal  mode  of  the 
being  of  the  Creator,  t33) 

The  whole  of  this  web  of  contradictions  (and  it  might 
be  extended,  if  necessary,  to  a  far  greater  length)  is  woven 
from  one  original  warp  and  woof ;  —  namely,  the  impossi 
bility  of  conceiving  the  coexistence  of  the  infinite  and  the 
finite,  and  the  cognate  impossibility  of  conceiving  a  first 
commencement  of  phenomena,  or  the  absolute  giving  birth 
to  the  relative.  The  laws  of  thought  appear  to  admit  of 
no  possible  escape  from  the  meshes  in  which  thought  is 
entangled,  save  by  destroying  one  or  the  other  of  the  cords 
of  which  they  are  composed.  Pantheism  or  Atheism  are 


82  LIMITS    OF   RELIGIOUS  LECT.  II. 

thus  the  alternatives  offered  to  us,  according  as  we  prefer 
to  save  the  infinite  by  the  sacrifice  of  the  finite,  or  to  main 
tain  the  finite  by  denying  the  existence  of  the  infinite. 
Pantheism  thus  presents  itself,  as  to  all  appearance  the  only 
logical  conclusion,  if  we  believe  in  the  possibility  of  a  Phi 
losophy  of  the  Infinite.  But  Pantheism,  if  it  avoids  self- 
contradiction  in  the  course  of  its  reasonings,  does  so  only 
by  an  act  of  suicide  at  the  outset.  It  escapes  from  some 
of  the  minor  incongruities  of  thought,  only  by  the  annihi 
lation  of  thought  and  thinker  alike.  It  is  saved  from  the 
necessity  of  demonstrating  its  own  falsehood,  by  abolish 
ing  the  only  conditions  under  which  truth  and  falsehood 
can  be  distinguished  from  each  other.  The  only  concep 
tion  which  I  can  frame  of  substantive  existence  at  all,  as 
distinguished  from  the  transient  accidents  which  are  merely 
modes  of  the  being  of  something  else,  is  derived  from  the 
immediate  knowledge  of  my  own  personal  unity,  amidst 
the  various  affections  which  form  the  successive  modes 
of  my  consciousness.  The  Pantheist  tells  me  that  this 
knowledge  is  a  delusion;  that  I  am  no  substance,  but  a 
mode  of  the  absolute  substance,  even  as  my  thoughts  and 
passions  are  modes  of  me ;  and  that  in  order  to  attain 
to  a  true  philosophy  of  being,  I  must  begin  by  denying 
my  own  being.  And  for  what  purpose  is  this  act  of  self- 
destruction  needed?  In  order  to  preserve  inviolate  cer 
tain  philosophical  conclusions,  which  I,  the  non-existent 
thinker,  have  drawn  by  virtue  of  my  non-existent  powers 
of  thought.  But  if  my  personal  existence,  the  great  pri 
mary  fact  of  all  consciousness,  is  a  delusion,  what  claim 
have  the  reasonings  of  the  Pantheist  himself  to  be  consid 
ered  as  anything  better  than  a  part  of  the  universal  false 
hood?  If  I  am  mistaken  in  supposing  myself  to  have  a 
substantial  existence  at  all,  why  is  that  existence  more  true 


LKCT.  II.          THOUGHT  EXAMINED.  83 

when  it  is  presented  to  me  under  the  particular  form  of 
apprehending  and  accepting  the  arguments  of  the  panthe 
istic  philosophy  ?  Nay,  how  do  I  know  that  there  is  any 
argument  at  all  ?  For  if  rny  consciousness  is  mistaken  in 
testifying  to  the  fact  of  my  own  existence,  it  may  surely 
be  no  less  mistaken  in  testifying  to  my  apparent  apprehen 
sion  of  an  apparent  reasoning.  Nay,  the  very  arguments 
which  appear  to  prove  the  Pantheist's  conclusion  to  be 
true,  may  in  reality,  for  aught  I  know,  prove  it  to  be  false. 
Or  rather,  no  Pantheist,  if  he  is  consistent  with  himself, 
can  admit  the  existence  of  a  distinction  between  truth  and 
falsehood  at  all.  For  if  God  alone  exists,  in  whatever  way 
that  existence  may  be  explained,  He  alone  is  the  immedi 
ate  cause  of  all  that  takes  place.  He  thinks  all  that  is 
thought,  He  does  all  that  is  done.  There  can  be  no  differ 
ence  between  truth  and  falsehood;  for  God  is  the  only 
thinker ;  and  all  thoughts  are  equally  necessary  and  equally 
divine.  There  can  be  no  difference  between  right  and 
wrong ;  for  God  is  the  only  agent ;  and  all  acts  are  equally 
necessary  and  equally  divine.  (34>  How  error  and  evil, 
even  in  appearance,  are  possible,  —  how  the  finite  and  the 
relative  can  appear  to  exist,  even  as  a  delusion,  —  is  a  prob 
lem  which  no  system  of  Pantheism  has  made  the  slightest 
approach  towards  solving.  (r35) 

Pantheism  thus  failing  us,  the  last  resource  of  Ration* 
alism  is  to  take  refuge  in  that  which,  with  reference  to  the 
highest  idea  of  God,  is  speculative  Atheism,  and  to  deny 
that  the  Infinite  exists  at  all.  (36>  And  it  must  be  admit 
ted  that,  so  long  as  we  confine  ourselves  to  one  side  only 
of  the  problem,  that  of  the  inconceivability  of  the  Infinite, 
this  is  the  only  position  logically  tenable  by  those  who 
would  make  man's  power  of  thought  the  exact  measure  of 
his  duty  of  belief.  For  the  infinite,  as  inconceivable,  is 


84  LIMITS    OF   RELIGIOUS  LECT.  II. 

necessarily  shown  to  be  non-existent ;  unless  we  renounce 
the  claim  ol  reason  to  supreme  authority  in  matters  of  faith, 
by  admitting  that  it  is  our  duty  to  believe  what  we  are 
altogether  unable  to  comprehend.  But  the  logical  advan 
tage  of  the  atheistic  alternative  vanishes,  as  soon  as  we 
view  the  question  from  the  other  side,  and  endeavor  posi 
tively  to  represent  in  thought  the  sum  total  of  existence  as 
a  limited  quantity.  A  limit  is  itself  a  relation  ;  and  to  con 
ceive  a  limit  as  such,  is  virtually  to  acknowledge  the  exist 
ence  of  a  correlative  on  the  other  side  of  it.  (3T)  By  a  law 
of  thought,  the  significance  of  which  has  perhaps  not  yet 
been  fully  investigated,  it  is  impossible  to  conceive  a  finite 
object  of  any  kind,  without  conceiving  it  as  one  out  of 
many,  —  as  related  to  other  objects,  coexistent  and  ante 
cedent.  A  first  moment  of  time,  a  first  unit  of  space,  a  def 
inite  sum  of  all  existence,  are  thus  as  inconceivable  as  the 
opposite  suppositions  of  an  infinity  of  each.  (38>  While 
it  is  impossible  to  represent  in  thought  any  object,  except 
as  finite,  it  is  equally  impossible  to  represent  any  finite 
object,  or  any  aggregate  of  finite  objects,  as  exhausting  the 
universe  of  being.  Thus  the  hypothesis  which  would 
annihilate  the  Infinite  is  itself  shattered  to  pieces  against 
the  rock  of  the  Absolute ;  and  we  are  involved  in  the  self- 
contradictory  assumption  of  a  limited  universe,  which  yet 
can  neither  contain  a  limit  in  itself,  nor  be  limited  by  any 
thing  beyond  itself.  For  if  it  contains  a  limit  in  itself,  it  is 
both  limiting  and  limited,  both  beyond  the  limit,  and 
within  it ;  and  if  it  is  limited  by  anything  else,  it  is  not  the 
universe.  (8!)) 

To  sum  up  briefly  this  portion  of  my  argument.  The 
conception  of  the  Absolute  and  Infinite,  from  whatever 
side  we  view  it,  appears  encompassed  with  contradictions. 
There  is  a  contradiction  in  supposing  such  an  object  to 


LECT  II.          THOUGHT  EXAMINED.  85 

exist,  whether  alone  or  in  conjunction  with  others;  and 
there  is  a  contradiction  in  supposing  it  not  to  exist.  There 
is  a  contradiction  in  conceiving  it  as  one ;  and  there  is  a 
contradiction  in  conceiving  it  as  many.  There  is  a  contra 
diction  in  conceiving  it  as  personal ;  and  there  is  a  contra 
diction  in  conceiving  it  as  impersonal.  It  cannot  without 
contradiction  be  represented  as  active ;  nor.,  without  equal 
contradiction,  be  represented  as  inactive.  It  cannot  be  con 
ceived  as  the  sum  of  all  existence ;  nor  yet  can  it  be  con 
ceived  as  a  part  only  of  that  sum.  A  contradiction  thus 
thoroughgoing,  while  it  sufficiently  shows  the  impotence  of 
human  reason  as  an  a  priori  judge  of  all  truth,  yet  is  not 
in  itself  inconsistent  with  any  form  of  religious  belief.  For 
it  tells  with  equal  force  against  all  belief  and  all  unbelief, 
and  therefore  necessitates  the  conclusion  that  belief  cannot 
be  determined  solely  by  reason.  Ko  conclusion  can  be 
drawn  from  it  in  favor  of  universal  skepticism ;  first, 
because  universal  skepticism  equally  destroys  itself;  and 
secondly,  because  the  contradictions  thus  detected  belong 
not  to  the  use  of  reason  in  general,  but  only  to  its  exer 
cise  on  one  particular  object  of  thought.  It  may  teach  us 
that  it  is  our  duty,  in  some  instances,  to  believe  that  which 
we  cannot  conceive;  but  it  does  not  require  us  to  disbe 
lieve  anything  which  we  are  capable  of  conceiving. 

What  we  have  hitherto  been  examining,  be  it  remem 
bered,  is  not  the  nature  of  the  Absolute  in  itself,  but  only 
our  own  conception  of  that  nature.  The  distortions  of 
the  image  reflected  may  arise  only  from  the  inequalities 
of  the  mirror  reflecting  it.  And  this  consideration  leads 
us  naturally  back  to  the  second  of  the  two  methods  of 
religious  philosophy  which  were  mentioned  at  the  begin 
ning  of  the  present  Lecture.  If  the  attempt  to  grasp  the 
absolute  nature  of  the  Divine  Object  of  religious  thought 

8 


86  LIMITS   OF  RELIGIOUS  LECT.  II. 

thus  fails  us  on  every  side,  we  have  no  resource  but  to 
recommence  our  inquiry  by  the  opposite  process,  that  of 
investigating  the  nature  of  the  human  Subject.  S-uch  an 
investigation  will  not,  indeed,  solve  the  contradictions 
which  our  previous  attempt  has  elicited;  but  it  may  serve 
to  show  us  why  they  are  insoluble.  If  it  cannot  satisfy  to 
the  full  the  demands  of  reason,  it  may  at  least  enable  us 
to  lay  a  reasonable  foundation  for  the  rightful  claims  of 
belief.  If,  from  an  examination  of  the  laws  and  limits  of 
human  consciousness,  we  can  show  that  thought  is  not, 
and  cannot  be,  the  measure  of  existence ;  if  it  can  be 
shown  that  the  contradictions  which  arise  in  the  attempt 
to  conceive  the  infinite,  have  their  origin,  not  in  the  nature 
of  that  which  we  would  conceive,  but  in  the  constitution 
of  the  mind  conceiving ;  that  they  are  such  as  must  nec 
essarily  accompany  every  form  of  religion,  and  every  re 
nunciation  of  religion ;  we  may  thus  prepare  the  way  for  a 
recognition  of  the  separate  provinces  of  Reason  and  Faith. 
This  task  I  shall  endeavor  to  accomplish  in  my  next  Lec 
ture.  Meanwhile,  I  would  add  but  a  few  words,  to  point 
out  the  practical  lesson  to  be  drawn  from  our  previous 
inquiry.  It  is  this :  that  so  far  is  human  reason  from  being 
able  to  construct  a  scientific  Theology,  independent  of 
and  superior  to  Revelation,  that  it  cannot  even  read  the 
alphabet  out  of  which  that  Theology  must  be  framed.  It 
has  not  been  without  much  hesitation  that  I  have  ventured 
to  address  you  in  language  seldom  heard  in  this  place,  — 
to  transport  to  the  preacher's  pulpit  the  vocabulary  of 
metaphysical  speculation.  But  it  was  only  by  such  a 
course  that  I  could  hope  to  bring  the  antagonist  princi-> 
pies  of  true  and  false  religious  philosophy  face  to  face 
with  each  other.  It  needs  but  a  slight  acquaintance  with 
the  history  of  opinions,  to  show  how  intimately,  in  various 


LECT.  U.  THOUGHT  EXAMINED.  87 

ages,  the  current  forms  of  religious  belief  or  unbelief 
have,  been  connected  with  the  prevailing  systems  of  spec 
ulative  philosophy.  It  was  in  no  small  degree  because 
the  philosophy  of  Kant  identified  religion  with  morality, 
and  maintained  that  the  supernatural  and  the  historical 
were  not  necessary  to  belief  j*40)  that  Paulus  explained 
away  the  miracles  of  Christ,  as  misrepresentations  of  nat 
ural  events ;  (41)  and  Wegscheider  claimed  for  the  moral 
reason  supreme  authority  in  the  interpretation  of  Scrip 
ture  ;  <42)  and  Rohr  promulgated  a  new  Creed,  from  which 
all  the  facts  of  Christianity  are  rejected,  to  make  way  for 
ethical  precepts,  t43)  It  was  in  like  manner  because  the 
philosophy  of  Hegel  was  felt  to  be  incompatible  with  the 
belief  in  a  personal  God,  and  a  personal  Christ,  and  a 
supernatural  revelation^44)  that  Vatke  rejected  the  Old 
Testament  history,  as  irreconcilable  with  the  philosophi 
cal  law  of  religious  development ;  (45)  and  Strauss  endeav 
ored  by  minute  cavils  to  invalidate  the  Gospel  narrative, 
in  order  to  make  way  for  the  theory  of  an  ideal  Christ, 
manifested  in  the  whole  human  race;(46)  and  Feuerbach 
maintained  that  the  Supreme  Being  is  but  humanity  dei 
fied,  and  that  the  belief  in  a  superhuman  God  is  contra 
dictory  in  itself,  and  pernicious  in  its  consequences.  (4") 
And  if,  by  wandering  for  a  little  while  in  the  tangled 
mazes  of  metaphysical  speculation,  we  can  test  the  worth 
of  the  substitute  which  this  philosophy  offers  us  in  the 
place  of  the  faith  which  it  rejects ;  if  we  can  show  how 
little  such  a  substitute  can  satisfy  even  the  intellect  of 
man  (to  the  heart  it  does  not  pretend  to  appeal),  the 
inquiry  may  do  some  service,  slight  and  indirect  though 
it  be,  to  the  cause  of  Christian  Truth,  by  suggesting  to 
the  wavering  disciple,  ere  he  quits  the  Master  with  whom 
he  has  hitherto  walked,  the  pregnant  question  of  the 


88  LIMITS   OP  RELIGIOUS  LECT.  II. 

Apostle,  "Lord,  to  whom  shall  we  go?"1  When  Phi 
losophy  succeeds  in  exhibiting  in  a  clear  and  consistent 
form  the  Infinite  Being  of  God;  when  her  opposing  schools 
are  agreed  among  themselves  as  to  the  manner  in  which  a 
knowledge  of  the  Infinite  takes  place,  or  the  marks  by 
which  it  is  to  be  discerned  when  known  ;  then,  and  not  till 
then,  may  she  claim  to  speak  as  one  having  authority  in 
controversies  of  Faith.  But  while  she  speaks  with  stam 
mering  lips,  and  a  double  tongue ;  while  she  gropes  her 
way  in  darkness,  and  stumbles  at  every  step ;  while  she 
has  nothing  to  offer  us  but  the  alternative  of  principles 
which  abjure  consciousness,  or  a  consciousness  which  con 
tradicts  itself,  we  may  well  pause  before  we  appeal  to  her 
decisions  as  the  gauge  and  measure  of  religious  truth. 

In  one  respect,  indeed,  I  have  perhaps  departed  from 
the  customary  language  of  the  pulpit,  to  a  greater  extent 
than  was  absolutely  necessary  ;  —  namely,  in  dealing  with 
the  ideas  common  to  Theology  and  Metaphysics  in  the 
terms  of  the  latter,  rather  than  in  those  of  the  former. 
But  there  is  a  line  of  argument,  in  which  the  vague  gen 
eralities  of  the  Absolute  and  the  Infinite  may  be  more 
reverently  and  appropriately  employed  than  the  sacred 
names  and  titles  of  God.  For  we  almost  instinctively 
shrink  back  from  the  recklessness  which  thrusts  forward, 
on  every  occasion,  the  holiest  names  and  things,  to  be 
tossed  to  and  fro,  and  trampled  under  foot,  in  the  excite 
ment  of  controversy.  We  feel  that  the  name  of  Him 
whom  we  worship  may  not  lightly  be  held  up  as  a  riddle 
for  prying  curiosity  to  puzzle  over :  we  feel  that  the  Di 
vine  Personality  of  our  Father  in  Heaven  is  not  a  thing 
to  be  pitted  in  the  arena  of  disputation,  against  the  lifeless 
abstractions  and  sophistical  word-jugglings  of  Pantheism. 

i  St.  John  vi.  68. 


LECT.  II.  THOUGHT   EXAMINED.  89 

We  feel  that,  though  God  is  indeed,  in  His  incomprehen 
sible  Essence,  absolute  and  infinite,  it  is  not  as  the  Abso 
lute  and  Infinite  that  He  appeals  to  the  love  and  the  fear 
and  the  reverence  of  His  creatures.  We  feel  that  the  life 
of  religion  lies  in  the  human  relations  in  which  God  re 
veals  Himself  to  man,  not  in  the  divine  perfection  which 
those  relations  veil  and  modify,  though  without  wholly 
concealing.  We  feel  that  the  God  to  whom  we  pray,  and 
in  whom  we  trust,  is  not  so  much  the  God  eternal  and 
infinite,  without  body,  parts,  or  passions  (though  we 
acknowledge  that  He  is  all  these),  as  the  God  who  is 
"  gracious  and  merciful,  slow  to  anger,  and  of  great  kind 
ness,  and  repenteth  Him  of  the  evil."1  (48)  Those  who 
have  observed  the  prevailing  character  of  certain  schools 
of  religious  thought,  in  that  country  which,  more  than  any 
other,  has  made  Religion  speak  the  language  of  Meta 
physics;  those  who  have  observed  how  often,  in  modern 
literature,  both  at  home  and  abroad,  the  most  sacred 
names  are  played  with,  in  familiar,  almost  in  contemptuous 
intimacy,  will  need  no  other  proof  to  convince  them  that 
wre  cannot  attach  too  much  importance  to  the  duty  of 
separating,  as  far  as  it  can  be  effected,  the  language  of 
prayer  and  praise  from  the  definitions  and  distinctions  of 
philosophy. 

The  metaphysical  difficulties  which  have  been  exhibited 
in  the  course  of  this  Lecture  almost  suggest  of  themselves 
the  manner  in  which  they  should  be  treated.  We  must 
begin  with  that  which  is  within  us,  not  with  that  which  is 
above  us ;  with  the  philosophy  of  Man,  not  with  that  of 
God.  Instead  of  asking,  what  are  the  facts  and  laws  in 
the  constitution  of  the  universe,  or  in  the  Divine  Xature, 
by  virtue  of  which  certain  conceptions  present  certain 

i  Joel  ii.  13. 
8* 


90  LIMITS    OF  RELIGIOUS  L.ECT.  II. 

anomalies  to  the  human  mind,  we  should  rather  ask,  what 
are  the  facts  and  laws  in  the  constitution  of  the  human 
mind,  by  virtue  of  which  it  finds  itself  involved  in  contra 
dictions,  whenever  it  ventures  on  certain  courses  of  specu 
lation.  Philosophy,  as  well  as  Scripture,  rightly  employed, 
will  teach  a  lesson  of  humility  to  its  disciple ;  exhibiting, 
as  it  does,  the  spectacle  of  a  creature  of  finite  intuitions, 
surrounded  by  partial  indications  of  the  Unlimited ;  of 
finite  conceptions,  in  the  midst  of  partial  manifestations 
of  the  Incomprehensible.  Questioned  in  this  spirit,  the 
voice  of  Philosophy  will  be  but  an  echo  of  the  inspired 
language  of  the  Psalmist :  "  Thou  hast  beset  me  behind 
and  before,  and  laid  thine  hand  upon  me.  Such  knowl 
edge  is  too  wonderful  for  me :  it  is  high ;  I  cannot  attain 
unto  it."  l 

1  Psalm  cxxxix.  5,  6. 


LECTUHE    III. 

AND  HE  SAID,  THOU  CANST  NOT  SEE  MY  FACE  J  FOR  THERE  SHALL  NO 
MAX  SEE  ME,  AND  LIVE.  AND  THE  LORD  SAID,  BEHOLD,  THERE  IS 
A  PLACE  BY  ME,  AND  THOU  SHALT  STAND  UPON  A  ROCK:  AM)  IT 
SHALL  COME  TO  PASS,  WHILE  MY  GLORY  PASSETH  BY,  THAT  I  WILL 
PUT  THEE  IN  A  CLEFT  OF  THE  ROCK,  AND  WILL  COVER  THEE  WITH 
MY  HAND  AVHILE  I  PASS  BY:  AND  I  WILL  TAKE  AWAY  MINE  HAND, 
AND  THOU  SHALT  SEE  MY  BACK  PARTS J  BUT  MY  FACE  SHALL  NOT 
BE  SEEN.  —  EXODUS  XXXIII.  20-23. 

MY  last  Lecture  was  chiefly  occupied  with  an  examina 
tion  of  the  ideas  of  the  Absolute  and  the  Infinite,  —  ideas 
which  are  indispensable  to  the  foundation  of  a  metaphys 
ical  Theology,  and  of  which  a  clear  and  distinct  conscious 
ness  must  be  acquired,  if  such  a  Theology  is  to  exist  at  all. 
I  attempted  to  show  the  inadequacy  of  these  ideas  for 
such  a  purpose,  by  reason  of  the  contradictions  which  to 
our  apprehension  they  necessarily  involve  from  every 
point  of  view.  The  result  of  that  attempt  may  be  briefly 
summed  up  as  follows.  We  are  compelled,  by  the  consti 
tution  of  our  minds,  to  believe  in  the  existence  of  an  Ab 
solute  and  Infinite  Being,  —  a  belief  which  appears  forced 
upon  us,  as  the  complement  of  our  consciousness  of  the 
relative  and  the  finite.  But  the  instant  we  attempt  to 
analyze  the  ideas  thus  suggested  to  us,  in  the  hope  of 
attaining  to  an  intelligible  conception  of  them,  we  are  on 
every  side  involved  in  inextricable  confusion  and  contra 
diction.  It  is  no  matter  from  what  point  of  view  we  com 
mence  our  examination;  —  whether,  with  the  Theist,  we 


92  LIMITS   OF  RELIGIOUS  LECT.  III. 

admit  the  coexistence  of  the  Infinite  and  the  Finite,  as 
distinct  realities;  or,  with  the  Pantheist,  deny  the  real 
existence  of  the  Finite;  or,  with  the  Atheist,  deny  the 
real  existence  of  the  Infinite ;  —  on  each  of  these  supposi 
tions  alike,  our  reason  appears  divided  against  itself,  com 
pelled  to  admit  the  truth  of  one  hypothesis,  and  yet 
unable  to  overcome  the  apparent  impossibilities  of  each. 
The  philosophy  of  Rationalism,  thus  traced  upwards  to 
its  highest  principles,  finds  no  legitimate  resting-place, 
from  which  to  commence  its  deduction  of  religious  con 
sequences. 

In  the  present  Lecture,  it  will  be  my  endeavor  to  oifer 
some  explanation  of  the  singular  phenomenon  of  human 
thought,  which  is  exhibited  in  these  results.  I  propose  to 
examine  the  same  ideas  of  the  Absolute  and  the  Infinite 
from  the  opposite  side,  in  order  to  see  if  any  light  can 
be  thrown  on  the  anomalies  which  they  present  to  us,  by 
a  reference  to  the  mental  laws  under  which  they  are 
formed.  Contradiction,  whatever  may  be  its  ultimate 
import,  is  in  itself  not  a  quality  of  things,  but  a  mode  in 
which  they  are  viewed  by  the  mind;  and  the  inquiry 
which  it  most  immediately  suggests  is,  not  an  investiga 
tion  of  the  nature  of  things  in  themselves,  but  an  exam 
ination  of  those  mental  conditions  under  which  it  is 
elicited  in  thought.  Such  an  examination,  if  it  does  not 
enable  us  to  extend  the  sphere  of  thought  beyond  a  cer 
tain  point,  may  at  least  serve  to  make  us  more  distinctly 
conscious  of  its  true  boundaries. 

The  much-disputed  question,  to  what  class  of  mental 
phenomena  the  religious  consciousness  belongs,  must  be 
postponed  to  a  later  stage  of  our  inquiry.  At  present,  we 
are  concerned  with  a  more  general  investigation,  which  the 
answer  to  that  question  will  in  nowise  affect.  Whether 


LECT.  III.  THOUGHT   EXAMINED.  93 

the  relation  of  man  to  God  be  primarily  presented  to  tlie 
human  mind  in  the  form  of  knowledge,  or  of  feeling,  or 
of  practical  impulse,  it  can  be  given  only  as  a  mode  of 
consciousness,  subject  to  those  conditions  under  which 
alone  consciousness  is  possible.  Whatever  knowledge  is 
imparted,  whatever  impulse  is  communicated,  whatever 
feeling  is  excited,  in  man's  mind,  must  take  place  in  a 
manner  adapted  to  the  constitution  of  its  human  recipient, 
and  must  exhibit  such  characteristics  as  the  laws  of  that 
constitution  impose  upon  it.  A  brief  examination  of  the 
conditions  of  human  consciousness  in  general  will  thus 
form  a  proper  preliminary  to  any  inquiry  concerning  the 
religious  consciousness  in  particular. 

Now,  in  the  first  place,  the  very  conception  of  Con 
sciousness,  in  whatever  mode  it  may  be  manifested,  neces 
sarily  implies  distinction  between  one  object  and  another. 
To  be  conscious,  we  must  be  conscious  of  something;  and 
that  something  can  only  be  known  as  that  which  it  is,  by 
being  distinguished  from  that  which  it  is  not.  W  But 
distinction  is  necessarily  limitation;  for,  if  one  object  is  to 
be  distinguished  from  another,  it  must  possess  some  form 
of  existence  which  the  other  has  not,  or  it  must  not  pos 
sess  some  form  which  the  other  has.  But  it  is  obvious 
that  the  Infinite  'cannot  be  distinguished,  as  such,  from  the 
Finite,  by  the  absence  of  any  quality  which  the  Finite 
possesses;  for  such  absence  would  be  a  limitation.  Nor 
yet  can  it  be  distinguished  by  the  presence  of  an  attribute 
which  the  Finite  has  not ;  for,  as  no  finite  part  can  be  a 
constituent  of  an  infinite  whole,  this  differential  charac 
teristic  must  itself  be  infinite ;  and  must  at  the  same  time 
have  nothing  in  common  with  the  finite.  We  are  thus 
thrown  back  upon  our  former  impossibility;  for  this  sec 
ond  infinite  will  be  distinguished  from  the  finite  by  the 


94  LIMITS   OP  RELIGIOUS  LECT.  III. 

absence  of  qualities  which  the  latter  possesses.  A  con 
sciousness  of  the  Infinite  as  such  thus  necessarily  involves 
a  self-contradiction;  for  it  implies  the  recognition,  by 
limitation  and  difference,  of  that  which  can  only  be  given 
as  unlimited  and  indifferent.  (2> 

That  man  can  be  conscious  of  the  Infinite,  is  thus  a  sup 
position  which,  in  the  very  terms  in.  which  it  is  expressed, 
annihilates  itself.  Consciousness  is  essentially  a  limita 
tion  ;  for  it  is  the  determination  of  the  mind  to  one  ac 
tual  out  of  many  possible  modifications.  But  the  Infinite, 
if  it  is  to  be  conceived  at  all,  must  be  conceived  as  poten 
tially  everything  and  actually  nothing  ;  for  if  there  is  any 
thing  in  general  which  it  cannot  become,  it  is  thereby 
limited ;  and  if  there  is  anything  in  particular  which  it 
actually  is,  it  is  thereby  excluded  from  being  any  other 
thing.  But  again,  it  must  also  be  conceived  as  actually 
everything  and  potentially  nothing ;  for  an  unrealized  po 
tentiality  is  likewise  a  limitation.  <3)  If  the  infinite  can  be 
that  which  it  is  not,  it  is  by  that  very  possibility  marked 
out  as  incomplete,  and  capable  of  a  higher  perfection.  If 
it  is  actually  everything,  it  possesses  no  characteristic  fea 
ture,  by  which  it  can  be  distinguished  from  anything  else, 
and  discerned  as  an  object  of  consciousness. 

This  contradiction,  which  is  utterly  inexplicable  on  the 
supposition  that  the  infinite  is  a  positive  object  of  human 
thought,  is  at  once  accounted  for,  when  it  is  regarded  as 
the  mere  negation  of  thought.  If  all  thought  is  limita 
tion, —  if  whatever  we  conceive  .is,  by  the  very  act  of  con 
ception,  regarded  as  finite,  —  the  infinite^  from  a  human 
point  of  view,  is  merely  a  name  for  the  absence  of  those 
conditions  under  which  thought  is  possible.  To  speak  of 
a  Conception  of  the  Infinite  is,  therefore,  at  once  to  affirm 
those  conditions  and  to  deny  them.  The  contradiction, 


LECT.  III.  THOUGHT  EXAMINED.  95 

which  we  discover  in  such  a  conception,  is  only  that  which 
we  have  ourselves  placed  there,  by  tacitly  assuming  the 
conceivability  of  the  inconceivable.  The  condition  of  con 
sciousness  is  distinction ;  and  the  condition  of  distinction 
is  limitation.  We  have  no  consciousness  of  Being  in  gen 
eral  which  is  not  some  Being  in  particular;  a  thing,  in  con 
sciousness,  is  one  thing  out  of  many.  In  assuming  the 
possibility  of  an  infinite  object  of  consciousness,  I  assume, 
therefore,  that  it  is  at  the  same  time  limited  and  unlimited; 
—  actually  something,  without  which  it  could  not  be  an 
object  of  consciousness,  and  actually  nothing,  without 
which  it  could  not  be  infinite.  <4) 

Rationalism  is  thus  only  consistent  with  itself,  when  it 
refuses  to  attribute  consciousness  to  God.  Consciousness, 
in  the  only  form  in  which  we  can  conceive  it,  implies  limi 
tation  and  change,  —  the  perception  of  one  object  out  of 
many,  and  a  comparison  of  that  object  with  others.  To  be 
always  conscious  of  the  same  object,  is,  humanly  speaking, 
not  to  be  conscious  at  all ;  <5)  and,  beyond  its  human  mani 
festation,  we  can  have  no  conception  of  what  conscious 
ness  is.  Viewed  on  the  side  of  the  object  of  consciousness, 
the  same  principle  will  carry  us  further  still.  Existence 
itself,  that  so-called  highest  category  of  thought,  is  only 
conceivable  in  the  form  of  existence  modified  in  some  par 
ticular  manner.  Strip  off  its  modification,  and  the  ap 
parent  paradox  of  the  German  philosopher  becomes  liter 
ally  true  ;  —  pure  being  is  pure  nothing.  (6)  We  have  no 
conception  of  existence  which  is  not  existence  in  some 
particular  manner ;  and  if  we  abstract  from  the  manner, 
we  have  nothing  left  to  constitute  the  existence.  Those 
who,  in  their  horror  of  what  they  call  anthropomorphism, 
or  anthropopathy,  refuse  to  represent  the  Deity  under 
symbols  borrowed  from  the  limitations  of  human  con- 


96  LIMITS   OF  RELIGIOUS  LECT.  III. 

sciousness,  are  bound,  in  consistency,  to  deny  that  God 
exists;  for  the  conception  of  existence  is  as  human  and  as 
limited  as  any  other.  The  conclusion  which  Fichte  boldly 
announces,  awful  as  it  is,  is  but  the  legitimate  consequence 
of  his  premises.  "  The  moral  order  of  the  universe  is  it 
self  God:  we  need  no  other,  and  we  can  comprehend  no 
other."  (< ) 

A  second  characteristic  of  Consciousness  is,  that  it  is 
only  possible  in  the  form  of  a  relation.  There  must  be  a 
Subject,  or  person  conscious,  and  an  Object,  or  thing  of 
which  he  is  conscious.  There  can  be  no  consciousness 
without  the  union  of  these  two  factors;  and,  in  that  union, 
each  exists  only  as  it  is  related  to  the  other.  <8>  The  sub 
ject  is  a  subject,  only  in  so  for  as  it  is  conscious  of  an  ob 
ject  :  the  object  is  an  object,  only  in  so  far  as  it  is  appre 
hended  by  a  subject :  and  the  destruction  of  either  is  the 
destruction  of  consciousness  itself.  It  is  thus  manifest 
that  a  consciousness  of  the  Absolute  is  equally  self-con 
tradictory  with  that  of  the  Infinite.  To  be  conscious  of 
the  Absolute  as  such,  we  must  know  that  an  object,  which 
is  given  in  relation  to  our  consciousness,  is  identical  with 
one  which  exists  in  its  own  nature,  out  of  all  relation  to 
consciousness.  But  to  know  this  identity,  we  must  compare 
the  tvro  together  ;  and  such  a  comparison  is  itself  a  contra 
diction.  We  are  in  fact  required  to  compare  that  of  which 
we  are  conscious  with  that  of  which  we  are  not  conscious ; 
the  comparison  itself  being  an  act  of  consciousness,  and 
only  possible  through  the  consciousness  of  both  its  objects. 
It  is  thus  manifest  that,  even  if  we  could  be  conscious  of 
the  absolute,  we  could  not  possibly  know  that  it  is  the  ab 
solute  :  and,  as  we  can  be  conscious  of  an  object  as  such, 
only  by  knowing  it  to  be  what  it  is,  this  is  equivalent  to  an 
admission  that  we  cannot  be  conscious  of  the  absolute  at 


LECT.  III.  THOUGHT  EXAMINED.  97 

all.  As  an  object  of  consciousness,  everything  is  necessarily 
relative  ;  and  what  a  thing  may  be  out  of  consciousness,  no 
mode  of  consciousness  can  tell  us. 

This  contradiction,  again,  admits  of  the  same  explanation 
as  the  former.  Our  whole  notion  of  existence  is  necessarily 
relative ;  for  it  is  existence  as  conceived  by  us.  But  Ex 
istence^  as  we  conceive  it,  is  but  a  name  for  the  several  ways 
in  which  objects  are  presented  to  our  consciousness, — a 
general  term,  embracing  a  variety  of  relations.  The  Abso 
lute,  on  the  other  hand,  is  a  term  expressing  no  object  of 
thought,  but  only  a  denial  of  the  relation  by  which  thought 
is  constituted.  To  assume  absolute  existence  as  an  object 
of  thought,  is  thus  to  suppose  a  relation  existing  when  the 
related  terms  exist  no  longer.  An  object  of  thought  ex 
ists,  as  such,  in  and  through  its  relation  to  a  thinker ;  while 
the  Absolute,  as  such,  is  independent  of  all  relation.  The 
Conception  of  the  Absolute  thus  implies  at  the  same  time 
the  presence  and  the  absence  of  the  relation  by  which 
thought  is  constituted ;  and  our  various  endeavors  to  rep 
resent  it  are  only  so  many  modified  forms  of  the  contra 
diction  involved  in  our  original  assumption.  Here,  too,  the 
contradiction  is  one  which  we  ourselves  have  made.  It 
does  not  imply  that  the  Absolute  cannot  exist ;  but  it  im 
plies,  most  certainly,  that  we  cannot  conceive  it  as  exist 
ing.  (9) 

Philosophers  who  are  anxious  to  avoid  this  conclusion 
have  sometimes  attempted  to  evade  it,  by  asserting  that  we 
may  have  in  consciousness  a  partial,  but  not  a  total  knowl 
edge  of  the  infinite  and  the  absolute.  (10)  But  here  again 
the  supposition  refutes  itself.  To  have  a  partial  knowledge 
of  an  object,  is  to  know  a  part  of  it,  but  not  the  whole. 
But  the  part  of  the  infinite  which  is  supposed  to  be  known 
must  be  itself  either  infinite  or  finite.  If  it  is  infinite,  it 

9 


98  LIMITS  OF  RELIGIOUS  LECT.  III. 

presents  the  same  difficulties  as  before.  If  it  is  finite,  the 
point  in  question  is  conceded,  and  our  consciousness  is  al 
lowed  to  be  limited  to  finite  objects.  But  in  truth  it  is  ob 
vious,  on  a  moment's  reflection,  that  neither  the  Absolute 
nor  the  Infinite  can  be  represented  in  the  form  of  a  whole 
composed  of  parts.  Not  the  Absolute ;  for  the  existence 
of  a  whole  is  dependent  on  the  existence  of  its  parts.  Not 
the  Infinite  ;  for  if  any  part  is  infinite,  it  cannot  be  distin 
guished  from  the  whole  ;  and  if  each  part  is  finite,  no  num 
ber  of  such  parts  can  constitute  the  Infinite. 

It  would  be  possible,  did  my  limits  allow,  to  pursue  the 
argument  at  length,  through  the  various  special  modifica 
tions  which  constitute  the  subordinate  forms  of  conscious 
ness.  But  with  reference  to  the  present  inquiry,  it  will  be 
sufficient  to  notice  two  other  conditions,  under  which  all 
consciousness  is  necessarily  manifested ;  both  of  which 
have  a  special  bearing  on  the  relation  of  philosophy  to 
theological  controversy. 

All  human  consciousness,  as  being  a  change  in  our  men 
tal  state,  is  necessarily  subject  to  the  law  of  Time,  in  its 
two  manifestations  of  Succession  and  Duration.  Every 
object,  of  whose  existence  we  can  be  in  any  way  conscious, 
is  necessarily  apprehended  by  us  as  succeeding  in  time  to 
some  former  object  of  consciousness,  and  as  itself  occupy 
ing  a  certain  portion  of  time.  In  the  former  point  of  view, 
it  is  manifest,  from  what  has  been  said  before,  that  whatever 
succeeds  something  else,  and  is  distinguished  from  it,  is 
necessarily  apprehended  as  finite;  for  distinction  is  itself 
a  limitation.  In  the  latter  point  of  view,  it  is  no  less  man 
ifest  that  whatever  is  conceived  as  having  a  continuous 
existence  in  time  is  equally  apprehended  as  finite.  For 
continuous  existence  is  necessarily  conceived  as  divisible 
into  successive  moments.  One  portion  has  already  gone 


LECT.  III.  THOUGHT   EXAMINED.  99 

by;  another  is  yet  to  come;  each  successive  moment  is 
related  to  something  which  has  preceded,  and  to  something 
which  is  to  follow :  and  out  of  such  relations  the  entire 
existence  is  made  up.  The  acts,  by  which  such  exist 
ence  is  manifested,  being  continuous  in  time,  have,  at  any 
given  moment,  a  further  activity  still  to  come :  the  object 
so  existing  must  therefore  always  be  regarded  as  capable 
of  becoming  something  which  it  is  not  yet  actually,  —  as 
having  an  existence  incomplete,  and  receiving  at  each  in 
stant  a  further  completion.  It  is  manifest  therefore  that, 
if  all  objects  of  human  thought  exist  in  time,  no  such  ob 
ject  can  be  regarded  as  exhibiting  or  representing  the  true 
nature  of  an  Infinite  Being. 

As  a  necessary  consequence  of  this  limitation,  it  follows, 
that  an  act  of  Creation,  in  the  highest  sense  of  the  term, 
—  that  is  to  say,  an  absolutely  first  link  in  the  chain  of 
phenomena,  preceded  by  no  temporal  antecedent,  —  is  to 
human  thought  inconceivable.  To  represent  in  thought 
the  first  act  of  the  first  cause  of  all  things,  I  must  conceive 
myself  as  placed  in  imagination  at  the  point  at  which  tem 
poral  succession  commences,  and  as  thus  conscious  of  the 
relation  between  a  phenomenon  in  time  and  a  reality  out 
of  time.  But  the  consciousness  of  such  a  relation  implies 
a  consciousness  of  both  the  related  members ;  to  realize 
which,  the  mind  must  be  in  and  out  of  time  at  the  same 
moment.  Time,  therefore,  cannot  be  regarded  as  limited ; 
for  to  conceive  a  first  or  last  moment  of  time  would  be  to 
conceive  a  consciousness  into  which  time  enters,  preceded 
or  followed  by  one  from  which  it  is  absent.  But,  on  the 
other  hand,  an  infinite  succession  in  time  is  equally  incon 
ceivable  ;  for  this  succession  also  cannot  be  bounded  by 
time,  and  therefore  can  only  be  apprehended  by  one  who 
is  himself  free  from  the  law  of  conceiving  in  time.  From 


100  LIMITS   OF  RELIGIOUS  LECT.  III. 

a  human  point  of  view,  such  a  conception  could  only  be 
formed  by  thrusting  back  the  boundary  forever ;  —  a  pro 
cess  which  itself  would  require  an  infinite  time  for  its 
accomplishment.  (n)  Clogged  by  these  counter  impossi 
bilities  of  thought,  two  opposite  speculations  have  in  vain 
struggled  to  find  articulate  utterance,  the  one  for  the  hy 
pothesis  of  an  endless  duration  of  finite  changes,  the  other 
for  that  of  an  existence  prior  to  duration  itself.  It  is  per 
haps  another  aspect  of  the  same  difficulty,  that,  among 
various  theories  of  the  generation  of  the  world,  the  idea 
of  a  creation  out  of  nothing  seems  to  have  been  altogether 
foreign  to  ancient  philosophy.  <12) 

The  limited  character  of  all  existence  which  can  be  con 
ceived  as  having  a  continuous  duration,  or  as  made  up  of 
successive  moments,  is  so  far  manifest,  that  it  has  been 
assumed,  almost  as  an  axiom,  by  philosophical  theologians, 
that  in  the  existence  of  God  there  is  no  distinction  between 
past,  present,  and  future.  "  In  the  changes  of  things,"  says 
Augustine,  there  is  a  past  and  a  future :  in  God  there  is 
a  present,  in  which  neither  past  nor  future  can  be."<13) 
"  Eternity,"  says  Boethius,  "  is  the  perfect  possession  of 
interminable  life,  and  of  all  that  life  at  once:"(14)  and 
Aquinas,  accepting  the  definition,  adds,  "Eternity  has 
no  succession,  but  exists  all  together. "  (15)  But,  whether 
this  assertion  be  literally  true  or  not  (and  this  we  have  no 
means  of  ascertaining),  it  is  clear  that  such  a  mode  of 
existence  is  altogether  inconceivable  by  us,  and  that  the 
words  in  which  it  is  described  represent  not  thought,  but 
the  refusal  to  think  at  all.  It  is  impossible  that  man,  so 
long  as  he  exists  in  time,  should  contemplate  an  object  in 
whose  existence  there  is  no  time.  For  the  thought  by 
which  he  contemplates  it  must  be  one  of  his  own  mental 
states :  it  must  have  a  beginning  and  an  end :  it  must 


LECT.  III.  THOUGHT   EXAIMNED.  101 

occupy  a  certain  portion  of  duration,  as  a  fact  of  human 
consciousness.  There  is  therefore  no  manner  of  resem 
blance  or  community  of  nature  between  the  representative 
thought  and  that  which  it  is  supposed  to  represent ;  for  the 
one  cannot  exist  out  of  time,  and  the  other  cannot  exist  in 
it.  (1G>  Nay,  more :  even  were  a  mode  of  representation 
out  of  time  possible  to  a  man,  it  is  utterly  impossible  that 
he  should  know  it  to  be  so,  or  make  any  subsequent  use  of 
the  knowledge  thus  conveyed  to  him.  To  be  conscious 
of  a  thought  as  mine,  I  must  know  it  as  a  present  condi 
tion  of  my  consciousness :  to  know  that  it  has  been  mine, 
I  must  remember  it  as  a  past  condition ;  and  past  and  pres 
ent  are  alike  modes  of  time.  It  is  manifest,  therefore,  that 
a  knowledge  of  the  infinite,  as  existing  out  of  time,  even 
supposing  it  to  take  place  at  all,  cannot  be  known  to  be 
taking  place,  cannot  be  remembered  to  have  taken  place, 
and  cannot  be  made  available  for  any  purpose  at  any  period 
of  our  temporal  life.  (17> 

The  command,  so  often  urged  upon  man  by  philosophers 
and  theologians  of  various  ages  and  schools,  "  In  contem 
plating  God,  transcend  time,"  (18)  if  meant  for  anything 
more  than  a  figure  of  rhetoric,  is  equivalent  to  saying,  "  Be 
man  no  more ;  be  thyself  God."  It  amounts  to  the  admis 
sion  that,  to  know  the  infinite,  the  human  mind  must  itself 
be  infinite;  because  an  object  of  consciousness,  which  is  in 
any  way  limited  by  the  conditions  of  human  thought,  can 
not  be  accepted  as  a  representation  of  the  unlimited.  But 
two  infinites  cannot  be  conceived  as  existing  together ;  and 
if  the  mind  of  man  must  become  infinite  to  know  God,  it 
must  itself  be  God.  <19)  Pantheism,  or  self-acknowledged 
falsehood,  are  thus  the  only  alternatives  possible  under  this 
precept.  If  the  human  mind,  remaining  in  reality  finite, 
merely  fancies  itself  to  be  infinite  in  its  contemplation  of 

9* 


102  LIMITS   OF  RELIGIOUS  LECT.  III. 

God,  the  knowledge  of  God  is  itself  based  on  a  falsehood. 
If,  on  the  other  hand,  it  not  merely  imagines  itself  to  be, 
but  actually  is,  infinite,  its  personality  is  swallowed  up  in 
the  infinity  of  the  Deity ;  its  human  existence  is  a  delu 
sion  :  God  is,  literally  and  properly,  all  that  exists ;  and 
the  Finite,  which  appears  to  be,  but  is  not,  vanishes  before 
the  single  existence  of  the  One  and  All. 

Subordinate  to  the  general  law  of  Time,  to  which  all 
consciousness  is  subject,  there  are  two  inferior  conditions, 
to  which  the  two  great  divisions  of  consciousness  are  sev 
erally  subject.  Our  knowledge  of  body  is  governed  by 
the  condition  of  space  ;  our  knowledge  of  mind  by  that  of 
personality.  I  can  conceive  no  qualities  of  body,  save  as 
having  a  definite  local  position ;  arid  I  can  conceive  no 
qualities  of  mind,  save  as  modes  of  a  conscious  self.  With 
the  former  of  these  limitations  our  present  argument  is  not 
concerned ;  but  the  latter,  as  the  necessary  condition  of  the 
conception  of  spiritual  existence,  must  be  taken  into  account 
in  estimating  the  philosophical  value  of  man's  conception 
of  an  infinite  Mind. 

The  various  mental  attributes  which  we  ascribe  to  God  — 
Benevolence,  Holiness,  Justice,  Wisdom,  for  example  —  can 
be  conceived  by  us  only  as  existing  in  a  benevolent  and 
holy  and  just  and  wise  Being,  who  is  not  identical  with 
any  one  of  his  attributes,  but  the  common  subject  of  them 
all ;  in  one  word,  in  a  Person.  But  Personality,  as  we 
conceive  it,  is  essentially  a  limitation  and  a  relation.  <2°) 
Our  own  personality  is  presented  to  us  as  relative  and 
limited;  and  it  is  from  that  presentation  that  all  our 
representative  notions  of  personality  are  derived.  Person 
ality  is  presented  to  us  as  a  relation  between  the  conscious 
self  and  the  various  modes  of  his  consciousness.  There  is 
no  personality  in  abstract  thought  without  a  thinker: 


LECT.  III.          THOUGHT  EXAMINED.  103 

there  is  no  thinker,  unless  he  exercises  some  mode  of 
thought.  Personality  is  also  a  limitation  ;  for  the  thought 
and  the  thinker  are  distinguished  from  and  limit  each 
other;  and  the  several  modes  of  thought  arc  distinguished 
each  from  each  by  limitation  likewise.  If  I  am  any  one 
of  my  own  thoughts,  I  live  and  die  with  each  successive 
moment  of  my  consciousness.  If  I  am  not  any  one  of  my 
own  thoughts,  I  am  limited  by  that  very  difference,  and 
each  thought,  as  different  from  another,  is  limited  also. 
This,  too,  has  been  clearly  seen  by  philosophical  theologi 
ans  ;  and  accordingly,  they  have  maintained  that  in  God 
there  is  no  distinction  between  the  subject  of  conscious 
ness  and  its  modes,  nor  between  one  mode  and  another. 
"God,"  says  Augustine,  "is  not  a  Spirit  as  regards  sub 
stance,  and  good  as  regards  quality ;  but  both  as  regards 
substance.  The  justice  of  God  is  one  with  his  goodness 
and  with  his  blessedness ;  and  all  are  one  with  his  spirit 
uality."  (21)  But  this  assertion,  if  it  be  literally  true  (and 
of  this  we  have  no  means  of  judging),  annihilates  Person 
ality  itself,  in  the  only  form  in  which  we  can  conceive  it. 
We  cannot  transcend  our  own  personality,  as  we  cannot 
transcend  our  own  relation  to  time :  and  to  speak  of  an 
Absolute  and  Infinite  Person,  is  simply  to  use  language 
to  which,  however  true  it  may  be  in  a  superhuman  sense, 
no  mode  of  human  thought  can  possibly  attach  itself. 

But  are  we  therefore  justified,  even  on  philosophical 
grounds,  in  denying  the  Personality  of  God?  or  do  we 
gain  a  higher  or  a  truer  representation  of  Him,  by  asserting, 
with  the  ancient  or  the  modern  Pantheist,  that  God,  as 
absolute  and  infinite,  can  have  neither  intelligence  nor 
will?  (22>  Far  from  it.  We  dishonor  God  far  more  by 
identifying  Him  with  the  feeble  and  negative  impotence  of 


104  LIMITS    OF   RELIGIOUS  LKCT.  III. 

thought,  which  we  are  pleased  to  style  the  Infinite,  than 
by  remaining  content  within  those  limits  which  He  for  his 
own  good  purposes  has  imposed  upon  us,  and  confining 
ourselves  to  a  manifestation,  imperfect  indeed  and  inade 
quate,  and  acknowledged  to  be  so,  but  still  the  highest 
idea  that  we  can  form,  the  noblest  tribute  that  we  can 
offer.  Personality,  with  all  its  limitations,  though  far 
from  exhibiting  the  absolute  nature  of  God  as  Pie  is,  is  yet 
truer,  grander,  more  elevating,  more  religious,  than  those 
barren,  vague,  meaningless  abstractions  in  which  men  bab 
ble  about  nothing  under  the  name  of  the  Infinite.  Per 
sonal,  conscious  existence,  limited  though  it  be,  is  yet  the 
noblest  of  all  existences  of  which  man  can  dream  ;  for  it  is 
that  by  which  all  existence  is  revealed  to  him :  it  is 
grander  than  the  grandest  object  which  man  can  know; 
for  it  is  that  which  knows,  not  that  which  is  known.  (23) 
"Man,"  says  Pascal,  "is  but  a  reed,  the  frailest  in  nature; 
but  he  is  a  reed  that  thinks.  It  needs  not  that  the  whole 
universe  should  arm  itself  to  crush  him  ;  —  a  vapor,  a  drop 
of  water,  will  suffice  to  destroy  him.  But  should  the  uni 
verse  crush  him,  man  would  yet  be  nobler  than  that  which 
destroys  him ;  for  he  knows  that  he  dies ;  while  of  the 
advantage  which  the  universe  has  over  him,  the  universe 
knows  nothing."  <24)  It  is  by  consciousness  alone  that  we 
know  that  God  exists,  or  that  we  are  able  to  offer  Him 
any  service.  It  is  only  by  conceiving  Him  as  a  Conscious 
Being,  that  we  can  stand  in  any  religious  relation  to  Him 
at  all;  that  we  can  form  such  a  representation  of  Him  as 
is  demanded  by  our  spiritual  w^ants,  insufficient  though  it 
be  to  satisfy  our  intellectual  curiosity. 

It  is  from  the  intense   consciousness   of  our  own   real 
existence  as  Persons,  that  the  conception  of  reality  takes 


LECT.  III.  THOUGHT   EXAMINED.  105 

its  rise  in  our  minds:  it  is  through  that  consciousness 
alone  that  we  can  raise  ourselves  to  the  faintest  image  of 
the  supreme  reality  of  God.  What  is  reality,  and  what  is 
appearance,  is  the  riddle  which  Philosophy  has  put  forth 
from  the  birthday  of  human  thought;  and  the  only 
approach  to  an  answer  has  been  a  voice  from  the  depths 
of  the  personal  consciousness:  "I  think;  therefore  I 
am."  (25)  In  the  antithesis  between  the  thinker  and  the 
object  of  his  thought,  —  between  myself  and  that  which  is 
related  to  me, — we  find  the  type  and  the  source  of  the 
universal  contrast  between  the  one  and  the  many,  the  per 
manent  and  the  changeable,  the  real  and  the  apparent. 
That  which  I  see,  that  which  I  hear,  that  which  I  think, 
that  which  I  feel,  changes  and  passes  away  with  each 
moment  of  my  varied  existence.  I,  who  see,  and  hear, 
and  think,  and  feel,  am  the  one  continuous  self,  whose 
existence  gives  unity  and  connection  to  the  whole.  Per 
sonality  comprises  all  that  we  know  of  that  which  exists : 
relation  to  personality  comprises  all  that  we  know  of  that 
which  seems  to  exist.  And  when,  from  the  little  world  of 
man's  consciousness  and  its  objects,  we  would  lift  up  our 
eyes  to  the  inexhaustible  universe  beyond,  and  ask,  to. 
whom  all  this  is  related,  the  highest  existence  is  still  the 
highest  personality ;  and  the  Source  of  all  Being  reveals 
Himself  by  His  name,  I  AM.1  <26) 

If  there  is  one  dream  of  a  godless  philosophy  to  which, 
beyond  all  others,  every  moment  of  our  consciousness 
gives  the  lie,  it  is  that  which  subordinates  the  individual 
to  the  universal,  the  person  to  the  species ;  which  deifies 
kinds  and  realizes  classifications  ;  which  sees  Being  in  gen 
eralization,  and  Appearance  in  limitation ;  which  regards 
the  living  and  conscious  man  as  a  wave  on  the  ocean  of 

Exodus  iii.  14. 


106  LIMITS   OF  RELIGIOUS  LECT.  III. 

the  unconscious  infinite ;  his  life,  a  momentary  tossing  to 
and  fro  on  the  shifting  tide ;  his  destiny,  to  be  swallowed 
up  in  the  formless  and  boundless  universe.  (2~)  The  final 
conclusion  of  this  philosophy,  in  direct  antagonism  to  the 
voice  of  consciousness,  is,  "I  think;  therefore  I  am  not." 
When  men  look  around  them  in  bewilderment  for  that 
which  lies  within  them ;  when  they  talk  of  the  enduring 
species  and  the  perishing  individual,  and  would  find,  in 
the  abstractions  which  their  own  minds  have  made,  a 
higher  and  truer  existence  than  in  the  mind  which  made 
them;  —  they  seek  for  that  which  they  know,  and  know 
not  that  for  which  they  seek,  f28)  They  would  fain  lift  up 
the  curtain  of  their  own  being,  to  view  the  picture  which 
it  conceals.  Like  the  painter  of  old,  they  know  not  that 
the  curtain  is  the  picture.  <29) 

It  is  our  duty,  then,  to  think  of  God  as  personal ;  and 
it  is  our  duty  to  believe  that  He  is  infinite.  It  is  true  that 
we  cannot  reconcile  these  two  representations  with  each 
other;  as  our  conception  of  personality  involves  attributes 
apparently  contradictory  to  the  notion  of  infinity.  But 
it  does  not  follow  that  this  contradiction  exists  any  where 
but  in  our  own  minds :  it  does  not  follow  that  it  implies 
any  impossibility  in  the  absolute  nature  of  God.  The 
apparent  contradiction,  in  this  case,  as  in  those  previously 
noticed,  is  the  necessary  consequence  of  an  attempt  on 
the  part  of  the  human  thinker  to  transcend  the  bounda 
ries  of  his  own  consciousness.  It  proves  that  there  are 
limits  to  man's  power  of  thought;  and  it  proves  no  more. 

The  preceding  considerations  are  equally  conclusive 
against  both  the  methods  of  metaphysical  theology  de 
scribed  in  my  last  Lecture,  —  that  which  commences  with 
the  divine  to  reason  down  to  the  human,  and  that  which 
commences  with  the  human  to  reason  up  to  the  divine. 


LECT  III.  THOUGHT  EXAMINED.  107 

For  though  the  mere  abstract  expression  of  the  infinite, 
when  regarded  as  indicating  nothing  more  than  the  nega 
tion  of  limitation,  and,  therefore,  of  conceivability,  is  not 
contradictory  in  itself,  it  becomes  so  the  instant  we.  at 
tempt  to  apply  it  in  reasoning  to  any  object  of  thought. 
A  thing  —  an  object  —  an  attribute  —  a  person — or  any 
other  term  signifying  one  out  of  many  possible  objects  of 
consciousness,  is  by  that  very  relation  necessarily  declared 
to  be  finite.  An  infinite  thing,  or  object,  or  attribute,  or 
person,  is,  therefore,  in  the  same  moment  declared  to  be 
both  finite  and  infinite.  We  cannot,  therefore,  start  from 
any  abstract  assumption  of  the  divine  infinity,  to  reason 
downwards  to  any  object  of  human  thought.  And,  on 
the  other  hand,  if  all  human  attributes  are  conceived 
under  the  conditions  of  difference,  and  relation,  and  time, 
and  personality,  we  cannot  represent  in  thought  any  such 
attribute  magnified  to  infinity ;  for  this,  again,  is  to  con 
ceive  it  as  finite  and  infinite  at  the  same  time.  We  can 
conceive  such  attributes,  at  the  utmost,  only  indefinitely : 
that  is  to  say,  we  may  withdraw  our  thought,  for  the  mo 
ment,  from  the  fact  of  their  being  limited ;  but  we  cannot 
conceive  them  as  infinite :  that  is  to  say,  we  cannot  pos 
itively  think  of  the  absence  of  the  limit ;  for,  the  instant 
we  attempt  to  do  so,  the  antagonist  elements  of  the  con 
ception  exclude  one  another,  and  annihilate  the  whole. 

There  remains  but  one  subterfuge  to  which  Philosophy 
can  have  recourse,  before  she  is  driven  to  confess  that  the 
Absolute  and  the  Infinite  are  beyond  her  grasp.  If  con 
sciousness  is  against  her,  she  must  endeavor  to  get  rid  of 
consciousness  itself.  And,  accordingly,  the  most  distin 
guished  representatives  of  this  philosophy  in  recent  times, 
however  widely  differing  upon  other  questions,  agree  in 
maintaining  that  the  foundation  for  a  knowledge  of  the 


108  LIMITS   OF  RELIGIOUS  LECT.  III. 

infinite  must  be  laid  in  a  point  beyond  consciousness.  (3°) 
But  a  system  which  starts  from  this  assumption  postulates 
its  own  failure  at  the  outset.  It  attempts  to  prove  that 
consciousness  is  a  delusion ;  and  consciousness  itself  is 
made  the  instrument  of  proof;  for  by  consciousness  its 
reasonings  must  be  framed  and  apprehended.  It  is  by 
reasonings,  conducted  in  conformity  to  the  ordinary  laws 
of  thought,  that  the  philosopher  attempts  to  show  that  the 
highest  manifestations  of  reason  are  above  those  laws.  It 
is  by  representations,  exhibited  under  the  conditions  of 
time  and  difference,  that  the  philosopher  endeavors  to 
prove  the  existence,  and  deliver  the  results,  of  an  intuition 
in  which  time  and  difference  are  annihilated.  They  thus 
assume,  at  the  same  moment,  the  truth  and  the  falsehood 
of  the  normal  consciousness ;  they  divide  the  human  mind 
against  itself;  and  by  that  division  prove  no  more  than 
that  two  supposed  faculties  of  thought  mutually  invalidate 
each  other's  evidence.  Thus,  by  an  act  of  reason,  philos 
ophy  destroys  reason  itself:  it  passes  at  once  from  ration 
alism  to  mysticism,  and  makes  inconceivability  the  crite 
rion  of  truth.  In  dealing  with  religious  truths,  the  theory 
which  repudiates  with  scorn  the  notion  of  believing  a 
doctrine  although  it  is  incomprehensible,  springs  at  one 
desperate  bound  clear  over  faith  into  credulity,  and  pro 
claims  that  its  own  principles  must  be  believed  because 
they  are  incomprehensible.  The  rhetorical  paradox  of 
the  fervid  African  is  adopted  in  cold  blood  as  an  axiom  of 
metaphysical  speculation  :  "  It  is  certain,  because  it  is  im 
possible."  <31)  Such  a  theory  is  open  to  two  fatal  objec 
tions,  —  it  cannot  be  communicated,  and  it  cannot  be 
verified.  It  cannot  be  communicated ;  for  the  communi 
cation  must  be  made  in  words ;  and  the  meaning  of  those 
words  must  be  understood;  and  the  understanding  is  a 


LECT.  III.  THOUGHT  EXAMINED.  109 

state  of  the  normal  consciousness.  It  cannot  be  verified ; 
for,  to  verify,  we  must  compare  the  author's  experience 
with  our  own ;  and  such  a  comparison  is  again  a  state  of 
consciousness.  Let  it  be  granted  for  a  moment,  though 
the  concession  refutes  itself,  that  a  man  may  have  a  cogni 
zance  of  the  infinite  by  some  mode  of  knowledge  which 
is  above  consciousness.  He  can  never  say  that  the  idea 
thus  acquired  is  like  or  unlike  that  possessed  by  any  other 
man ;  for  likeness  implies  comparison ;  and  comparison  is 
only  possible  as  a  mode  of  consciousness,  and  between 
objects  regarded  as  limited  and  related  to  each  other. 
That  which  is  out  of  consciousness  cannot  be  pronounced 
true ;  for  truth  is  the  correspondence  between  a  conscious 
representation  and  the  object  which  it  represents.  Neither 
can  it  be  pronounced  false;  for  falsehood  consists  in  the 
disagreement  between  a  similar  representation  and  its 
object.  Here,  then,  is  the  very  suicide  of  Rationalism. 
To  prove  its  own  truth  and  the  falsehood  of  antagonistic 
systems,  it  postulates  a  condition  under  which  neither 
truth  nor  falsehood  is  possible. 

The  results,  to  which  an  examination  of  the  facts  of  con 
sciousness  has  conducted  us,  may  be  briefly  summed  up  as 
follows.  Our  whole  consciousness  manifests  itself  as  subject 
to  certain  limits,  which  we  are  unable,  in  any  act  of  thought, 
to  transgress.  That  which  falls  within  these  limits,  as  an 
object  of  thought  is  known  to  us  as  relative  and  finite.  The 
existence  of  a  limit  to  our  powers  of  thought  is  manifested 
by  the  consciousness  of  contradiction,  which  implies  at  the 
same  time  an  attempt  to  think  and  an  inability  to  accom 
plish  that  attempt.  But  a  limit  is  necessarily  conceived  as 
a  relation  between  something  within  and  something  without 
itself;  and  thus  the  consciousness  of  a  limit  of  thought 
implies,  though  it  does  not  directly  present  to  us,  the  exist- 

10 


110  LIMITS   OF  RELIGIOUS  LECT.  III. 

ence  of  something  of  which  we  do  not  and  cannot  think. 
When  we  lift  up  our  eyes  to  that  blue  vault  of  heaven, 
which  is  itself  but  the  limit  of  our  own  power  of  sight,  we 
are  compelled  to  suppose,  though  we  cannot  perceive,  the 
existence  of  space  beyond,  as  well  as  within  it ;  we  regard 
the  boundary  of  vision  as  parting  the  visible  from  the  invis 
ible.  And  when,  in  mental  contemplation,  we  are  conscious 
of  relation  and  difference,  as  the  limits  of  our  power  of 
thought,  we  regard  them,  in  like  manner,  as  the  boundary 
between  the  conceivable  and  the  inconceivable  ;  though  we 
are  unable  to  penetrate,  in  thought,  beyond  the  nether 
sphere,  to  the  unrelated  and  unlimited  which  it  hides  from 
us.  f32)  The  Absolute  and  the  Infinite  are  thus,  like  the  In 
conceivable  and  the  Imperceptible,  names  indicating,  not  an 
object  of  thought  or  of  consciousness  at  all,  but  the  mere 
absence  of  the  conditions  under  which  consciousness  is  pos 
sible.  The  attempt  to  construct  in  thought  an  object  an 
swering  to  such  names,  necessarily  results  in  contradiction  ; 
—  a  contradiction,  however,  which  we  have  ourselves  pro 
duced  by  the  attempt  to  think  ;  —  which  exists  in  the  act  of 
thought,  but  not  beyond  it ;  — which  destroys  the  concep 
tion  as  such,  but  indicates  nothing  concerning  the  existence 
or  non-existence  of  that  which  we  try  to  conceive.  It 
proves  our  own  impotence,  and  it  proves  nothing  more.  Or 
rather,  it  indirectly  leads  us  to  believe  in  the  existence  of 
that  Infinite  which  we  cannot  conceive ;  for  the  denial  of  its 
existence  involves  a  contradiction,  no  less  than  the  assertion 
of  its  conceivability.  We  thus  learn  that  the  provinces  of 
Reason  and  Faith  are  not  coextensive ;  —  that  it  is  a  duty, 
enjoined  by  Reason  itself,  to  believe  in  that  which  we  are 
unable  to  comprehend. 

I  have  now  concluded  that  portion  of  my  argument  in 
which  it  was  necessary  to  investigate  in  abstract  terms  the 


LECT.  III.  THOUGHT   EXAMINED.  1 1  I 

limits  of  human  thought  in  general,  as  a  preliminary  to  the 
examination  of  religious  thought  in  particular.  As  yet,  we 
have  viewed  only  the  negative  side  of  man's  consciousness ; 
—  we  have  seen  how  it  does  not  represent  God,  and  why  it 
does  not  so  represent  Him.  There  remains  still  to  be  at 
tempted  the  positive  side  of  the  same  inquiry,  —  namely, 
what  does  our  consciousness  actually  tell  us  concerning  the 
Divine  Existence  and  Attributes ;  and  how  does  its  testi 
mony  agree  with  that  furnished  by  Revelation.  In  prose 
cuting  this  further  inquiry,  I  hope  to  be  able  to  confine 
myself  to  topics  more  resembling  those  usually  handled  in 
this  place,  and  to  language  more  strictly  appropriate  to  the 
treatment  of  Christian  Theology.  Yet  there  are  advantages 
in  the  method  which  I  have  hitherto  pursued,  which  may,  I 
trust,  be  accepted  as  a  sufficient  cause  for  whatever  may 
have  sounded  strange  and  obscure  in  its  phraseology.  So 
long  as  the  doubts  and  difficulties  of  philosophical  specula 
tion  are  familiar  to  us  only  in  their  religious  aspect  and  lan 
guage,  so  long  we  may  be  led  to  think  that  there  is  some 
peculiar  defect  or  perplexity  in  the  evidences  of  religion,  by 
which  it  is  placed  in  apparent  antagonism  to  the  more  obvi 
ous  and  unquestionable  conclusions  of  reason.  A  very  brief 
examination  of  cognate  questions  in  their  metaphysical 
aspect,  will  suffice  to  dissipate  this  misapprehension,  and  to 
show  that  the  philosophical  difficulties,  which  rationalists 
profess  to  discover  in  Christian  doctrines,  are  in  fact  inher 
ent  in  the  lawrs  of  human  thought,  and  must  accompany 
every  attempt  at  religious  or  irreligious  speculation. 

There  is  also  another  consideration,  which  may  justify  the 
Christian  preacher  in  examining,  at  times,  the  thoughts  and 
language  of  human  philosophy,  apart  from  their  special 
application  to  religious  truths.  A  religious  association  may 
sometimes  serve  to  disguise  the  real  character  of  a  line  of 


112  LIMITS   OF  RELIGIOUS  LECT.  III. 

thought  which,  without  that  association,  would  have  little 
power  to  mislead.  Speculations  which  end  in  unbelief  are 
often  commenced  in  a  believing  spirit.  It  is  painful,  but  at 
the  same  time  instructive,  to  trace  the  gradual  progress  by 
which  an  unstable  disciple  often  tears  off  strip  by  strip  the 
wedding  garment  of  his  faith, — scarce  conscious  the  while  of 
his  own  increasing  nakedness,  —  and  to  mark  how  the  lan 
guage  of  Christian  belief  may  remain  almost  untouched, 
when  the  substance  and  the  life  have  departed  from  it. 
While  Philosophy  speaks  nothing  but  the  language  of 
Christianity,  we  may  be  tempted  to  think  that  the  two  are 
really  one  ;  that  our  own  speculations  are  but  leading  us  to 
Christ  by  another  and  a  more  excellent  way.  Many  a 
young  aspirant  after  a  philosophical  faith,  trusts  himself  to 
the  trackless  ocean  of  rationalism  in  the  spirit  of  the  too- 
confident  Apostle :  "  Lord,  bid  me  to  come  unto  thee  on  the 
water." l  And  for  a  while  he  knows  not  how  deep  he  sinks, 
till  the  treacherous  surface  on  which  he  treads  is  yielding 
on  every  side,  and  the  dark  abyss  of  utter  unbelief  is  yawn 
ing  to  swallow  him  up.  Well  is  it  indeed  with  those  who, 
even  in  that  last  fearful  hour,  can  yet  cry,  "  Lord,  save  me  !" 
and  can  feel  that  supporting  hand  stretched  out  to  grasp 
them,  and  hear  that  voice,  so  warning,  yet  so  comforting, 
"  O  thou  of  little  faith,  wherefore  didst  thou  doubt  ?  " 

But  who  that  enters  upon  this  course  of  mistrust  shall 
dare  to  say  that  such  will  be  the  end  of  it  ?  Far  better  is 
it  to  learn  at  the  outset  the  nature  of  that  unstable  surface 
on  which  we  would  tread,  without  being  tempted  by  the 
phantom  of  religious  promise,  which  shines  delusively  over 
it.  lie  who  hath  ordered  all  things  in  measure  and  number 

O 

and  weight,2  has  also  given  to  the  reason  of  man,  as  to  his 
life,  its  boundaries,  which  it  cannot  pass.3  And  if,  in  the 

i  St.  Matthew  xiv.  28.  2  ^isdom  xi.  20.  3  Job  xiv.  5. 


LF.CT.  III.  THOUGHT  EXAMINED.  113 

investigation  of  those  boundaries,  we  have  turned  for  a  little 
while,  to  speak  the  language  of  human  philosophy,  the  re 
sult  will  but  be  to  show  that  philosophy,  rightly  understood, 
teaches  one  lesson  with  the  sacred  volume  of  Revelation. 
With  that  lesson  let  us  conclude,  as  it  is  given  in  the  words 
of  our  own  judicious  divine  and  philosopher.  "Dangerous 
it  were  for  the  feeble  brain  of  man  to  wade  far  into  the 
doings  of  the  Most  High  ;  whom  although  to  know  be  life, 
and  joy  to  make  mention  of  His  name ;  yet  our  soundest 
knowledge  is  to  know  that  we  know  Him  not  as  indeed  He 
is,  neither  can  know  Him :  and  our  safest  eloquence  con 
cerning  Him  is  our  silence,  when  we  confess  without  confes 
sion  that  His  glory  is  inexplicable,  His  greatness  above  our 
capacity  and  reach.  He  is  above,  and  we  upon  earth ; 
therefore  it  behoveth  our  words  to  be  wary  and  few."  t33) 

10* 


LECTURE  IV. 

O  THOU  THAT  HEAREST  PRAYER,  UNTO  THEE  SHALL  ALL  FLESH 
COME.  — PSALM  LXV.  2. 

THAT  the  Finite  cannot  comprehend  the  Infinite,  is  a 
truth  more  frequently  admitted  in  theory  than  applied  in 
practice.  It  has  been  expressly  asserted  by  men  who,  al 
most  in  the  same  breath,  have  proceeded  to  lay  down  canons 
of  criticism,  concerning  the  purpose  of  Revelation,  and  the 
truth  or  falsehood,  importance  or  insignificance,  of  particu 
lar  doctrines,  on  grounds  which  are  tenable  only  on  the  sup 
position  of  a  perfect  and  intimate  knowledge  of  God's  lSTar 
ture  and  Counsels.  W  Hence  it  becomes  necessary  to  bring 
down  the  above  truth  from  general  to  special  statements  ; 
—  to  inquire  more  particularly  wherein  the  limitation  of 
man's  faculties  consists,  and  in  what  manner  it  exhibits 
itself  in  the  products  of  thought.  This  task  I  endeavored 
to  accomplish  in  my  last  Lecture.  To  pursue  the  conclusion 
thus  obtained  to  its  legitimate  consequences  in  relation  to 
Theology,  we  must  next  inquire  how  the  human  mind,  thus 
limited,  is  able  to  form  the  idea  of  a  relation  between  man 
and  God,  and  what  is  the  nature  of  the  conception  of  God 
which  arises  from  the  consciousness  of  this  relation.  The 
purpose  of  our  inquiry  is  to  ascertain  the  limits  of  religious 
thought ;  and,  for  this  purpose,  it  is  necessary  to  proceed 
from  the  limits  of  thought  and  of  human  consciousness  in 
general,  to  those  particular  forms  of  consciousness  which,  in 


LECT.  IV.          THOUGHT  EXAMINED.  115 

thought,  or  in  some  other  mode,  especially  constitute  the 
essence  of  Religion. 

Reasonings,  probable  or  demonstrative,  in  proof  of  the 
being  and  attributes  of  God,  have  met  with  a  very  different 
reception  at  different  periods.  Elevated  at  one  time,  by  the 
injudicious  zeal  of  their  advocates,  to  a  certainty  and  im 
portance  to  which  they  have  no  legitimate  claim,  at  another, 
by  an  equally  extravagant  reliction,  they  have  been  sacri 
ficed  in  the  mass  to  some  sweeping  principle  of  criticism,  or 
destroyed  piecemeal  by  minute  objections  in  detail.  While 
one  school  of  theologians  has  endeavored  to  raise  the  whole 
edifice  of  the  Christian  Faith  on  a  basis  of  metaphysical 
proof,  (2)  others  have  either  expressly  maintained  that  the 
understanding  has  nothing  to  do  with  religious  belief,  or 
have  indirectly  attempted  to  establish  the  same  conclusion 
by  special  refutations  of  the  particular  reasonings.  W 

An  examination  of  the  actual  state  of  the  human  mind, 
as  regards  religious  ideas,  will  lead  us  to  a  conclusion  inter 
mediate  between  these  two  extremes.  On  the  one  hand,  it 
must  be  allowed  that  it  is  not  through  reasoning  that  men 
obtain  the  first  intimation  of  their  relation  to  the  Deity  ;  and 
that,  had  they  been  left  to  the  guidance  of  their  intellectual 
faculties  alone,  it  is  possible  that  no  such  intimation  might 
have  taken  place  ;  or  at  best,  that  it  would  have  been  but 
as  one  guess,  out  of  many  equally  plausible  and  equally  nat 
ural.  Those  who  lay  exclusive  stress  on  the  proof  of  the 
existence  of  God  from  the  marks  of  design  in  the  world,  or 
from  the  necessity  of  supposing  a  first  cause  of  all  phe 
nomena,  overlook  the  fact  that  man  learns  to  pray  before  he 
learns  to  reason,  —  that  he  feels  within  him  the  conscious 
ness  of  a  Supreme  Being,  and  the  instinct  of  worship,  be 
fore  he  can  argue  from  effects  to  causes,  or  estimate  the 
traces  of  wisdom  and  benevolence  scattered  through  the 


116  LIMITS    OF   RELIGIOUS  LECT.  IV. 

creation.  But,  on  the  other  hand,  arguments  which  would 
be  insufficient  to  create  the  notion  of  a  Supreme  Being  in  a 
mind  previously  destitute  of  it,  may  have  great  force  and 
value  in  enlarging  or  correcting  a  notion  already  existing, 
and  in  justifying  to  the  reason  the  unreasoning  convictions 
of  the  heart.  The  belief  in  a  God,  once  given,  becomes  the 
nucleus  round  which  subsequent  experiences  cluster  and 
accumulate  ;  and  evidences  which  would  be  obscure  or  am 
biguous,  if  addressed  to  the  reason  only,  become  clear  and 
convincing,  when  interpreted  by  the  light  of  the  religious 
consciousness. 

We  may  therefore,  without  hesitation,  accede  to  the  argu 
ment  of  the  great  critic  of  metaphysics,  when  he  tells  us 
that  the  speculative  reason  is  unable  to  prove  the  exist 
ence  of  a  Supreme  Being,  but  can  only  correct  our  con 
ception  of  such  a  Being,  supposing  it  to  be  already  ob 
tained.  (*)  But,  at  the  same  time,  it  is  necessary  to  protest 
against  the  pernicious  extent  to  which  the  reaction  against 
the  use  of  the  reason  in  theology  has  in  too  many  instan 
ces  been  carried.  When  the  same  critic  tells  us  that  we 
cannot  legitimately  infer,  from  the  order  and  design  visible 
in  the  world,  the  omnipotence  and  omniscience  of  its  Cre 
ator,  because  a  degree  of  power  and  wisdom  short  of  the 
very  highest  might  possibly  be  sufficient  to  produce  all  the 
effects  which  we  are  able  to  discern ;  <5)  or  when  a  later 
writer,  following  in  the  same  track,  condemns  the  argu 
ment  from  final  causes,  because  it  represents  God  exclu 
sively  in  the  aspect  of  an  artist;  <6)  or  when  a  third  writer, 
of  a  different  school,  tells  us  that  the  processes  of  thought 
have  nothing  to  do  with  the  soul,  the  organ  of  religion  ;  (") 
—  we  feel  that  systems  which  condemn  the  nse  of  reason 
ing  in  sacred  things  may  be  equally  one-sided  and  extrava 
gant  with  those  which  assert  its  supreme  authority.  Rea- 


LECT.  IV.  THOUGHT    EXAMINED.  117 

soning  must  not  be  condemned  for  failing  to  accomplish 
what  no  possible  mode  of  human  consciousness  ever  does 
or  can  accomplish.  If  consciousness  itself  is  a  limitation ; 
if  every  mode  of  consciousness  is  a  determination  of  the 
mind  in  one  particular  manner  out  of  many  possible;  — it 
follows  indeed  that  the  infinite  is  beyond  the  reach  of 
man's  arguments ;  but  only  as  it  is  also  beyond  the  reach 
of  his  feelings  or  his  volitions.  We  cannot  indeed  reason 
to  the  existence  of  an  infinite  Cause  from  the  presence  of 
finite  effects,  nor  contemplate  the  infinite  in  a  finite  mode 
of  knowledge;  but  neither  can  we  feel  the  infinite  in  the 
form  of  a  finite  affection,  nor  discern  it  as  the  law  of  a 
finite  action.  If  our  whole  consciousness  of  God  is  partial 
and  incomplete,  composed  of  various  attributes  manifested 
in  various  relations,  why  should  we  condemn  the  reason 
ing  which  represents  Him  in  a  single  aspect,  so  long  as  it 
neither  asserts  nor  implies  that  that  aspect  is  the  only  one 
in  which  He  can  be  represented  ?  If  man  is  not  a  creature 
composed  solely  of  intellect,  or  solely  of  will,  why  should 
any  one  element  of  his  nature  be  excluded  from  participat 
ing  in  the  pervading  consciousness  of  Him  in  whom  we 
live,  and  move,  and  have  our  being?1  A  religion  based 
solely  on  the  reason  may  starve  on  barren  abstractions,  or 
bewilder  itself  with  inexplicable  contradictions;  but  a 
religion  which  repudiates  thought  to  take  refuge  in  feeling, 
abandons  itself  to  the  wild  follies  of  fanaticism,  or  the  dis 
eased  ecstasies  of  mysticism ;  while  one  which  acknowl 
edges  the  practical  energies  alone,  may  indeed  attain  to 
Stoicism,  but  will  fall  far  short  of  Christianity.  It  is  our 
duty  indeed  to  pray  with  the  spirit ;  but  it  is  no  less  our 
duty  to  pray  with  the  understanding  also.2 

Taking,  then,  as  the  basis  of  our  inquiry,  the  admission 

1  Acts  xvii.  28.  2  i  Corinthians  xiv.  15. 


118  LIMITS   OF  RELIGIOUS  LECT  IV. 

that  the  whole  consciousness  of  man,  whether  in  thought, 
or  in  feeling,  or  in  volition,  is  limited  in  the  manner  of  its 
operation  and  in  the  objects  to  which  it  is  related,  let  us 
endeavor,  with  regard  to  the  religious  consciousness  in  par 
ticular,  to  separate  from  each  other  the  complicated  threads 
which,  in  their  united  web,  constitute  the  conviction  of 
man's  relation  to  a  Supreme  Being.  In  distinguishing, 
however,  one  portion  of  these  as  forming  the  origin  of  this 
conviction,  and  another  portion  as  contributing  rather  to 
its  further  development  and  direction,  I  must  not  be  under 
stood  to  maintain  or  imply  that  the  former  could  have 
existed  and  been  recognized,  prior  to  and  independently  of 
the  cooperation  of  the  latter.  Consciousness,  in  its  earli 
est  discernible  form,  is  only  possible  as  the  result  of  an 
union  of  the  reflective  with  the  intuitive  faculties.  A  state 
of  mind,  to  be  known  at  all  as  existing,  must  be  distin 
guished  from  other  states ;  and,  to  make  this  distinction, 
we  must  think  of  it,  as  well  as  experience  it.  Without 
thought  as  well  as  sensation,  there  could  be  no  conscious 
ness  of  the  existence  of  an  external  world :  without 
thought  as  well  as  emotion  and  volition,  there  could  be  no 
consciousness  of  the  moral  nature  of  man.  Sensation 
without  thought  would  at  most  amount  to  no  more  than 
an  indefinite  sense  of  uneasiness  or  momentary  irritation, 
without  any  power  of  discerning  in  what  manner  we  are 
affected,  or  of  distinguishing  our  successive  affections  from 
each  other.  To  distinguish,  for  example,  in  the  visible 
world,  any  one  object  from  any  other,  to  know  the  house  as 
a  house,  or  the  tree  as  a  tree,  we  must  be  able  to  refer  them 
to  distinct  notions  ;  and  such  reference  is  an  act  of  thought. 
The  same  condition  holds  good  of  the  religious  conscious 
ness  also.  In  whatever  mental  affection  we  become  con 
scious  of  our  relation  to  a  Supreme  Being,  we  can  discern 


LECT.  IV  THOUGHT   EXAMINED.  119 

that  consciousness,  as  such,  only  by  reflecting  upon  it  as 
conceived  under  its  proper  notion.  Without  this,  we  could 
not  know  our  religious  consciousness  to  be  what  it  is ;  and, 
as  the  knowledge  of  a  fact  of  consciousness  is  identical 
with  its  existence,  —  without  this,  the  religious  conscious 
ness,  as  such,  could  not  exist. 

But,  not  withstanding  this  necessary  cooperation  of  thought 
in  every  manifestation  of  human  consciousness,  it  is  not  to 
the  reflective  faculties  that  we  must  look,  if  we  would  dis 
cover  the  origin  of  religion.  For,  to  the  exercise  of  reflec 
tion,  it  is  necessary  that  there  should  exist  an  object  on 
which  to  reflect ;  and  though,  in  the  order  of  time,  the  dis 
tinct  recognition  of  this  object  is  simultaneous  with  the  act 
of  reflecting  upon  it,  yet,  in  the  order  of  nature,  the  latter 
presupposes  the  former.  Religious  thought,  if  it  is  to  exist 
at  all,  can  only  exist  as  representative  of  some  fact  of  re 
ligious  intuition,  —  of  some  individual  state  of  mind,  in 
which  is  presented,  as  an  immediate  fact,  that  relation  of 
man  to  God,  of  which  man,  by  reflection,  may  become  dis 
tinctly  and  definitely  conscious. 

Two  such  states  may  be  specified,  as  dividing  between 
them  the  rude  material  out  of  which  Reflection  builds  up 
the  edifice  of  Religious  Consciousness.  These  are  the  Feel 
ing  of  Dependence  and  the  Conviction  of  Moral  Obli 
gation.  To  these  two  facts  of  the  inner  consciousness 
may  be  traced,  as  to  their  sources,  the  two  great  outward 
acts  by  which  religion  in  various  forms  has  been  manifested 
among  men  ;  —  Prayer,  by  which  they  seek  to  win  God's 
blessing  upon  the  future,  and  Expiation,  by  which  they 
strive  to  atone  for  the  offences  of  the  past.  <8>  The  feeling 
of  Dependence  is  the  instinct  which  urges  us  to  pray.  It 
is  the  feeling  that  our  existence  and  welfare  are  in  the 
hands  of  a  superior  Power;  —  not  of  an  inexorable  Fate  or 


120  LIMITS   OF  RELIGIOUS  LECT.  IV. 

immutable  Law ;  but  of  a  Being  having  at  least  so  far  the 
attributes  of  Personality,  that  lie  can  show  favor  or  sever 
ity  to  those  dependent  upon  Him,  and  can  be  regarded  by 
them  with  the  feelings  of  hope,  and  fear,  and  reverence, 
and  gratitude.  It  is  a  feeling  similar  in  kind,  though  higher 
in  degree,  to  that  which  is  awakened  in  the  mind  of  the 
'child  towards  his  parent,  who  is  first  manifested  to  his  mind 
as  the  giver  of  such  things  as  are  needful,  and  to  whom  the 
first  language  he  addresses  is  that  of  entreaty.  It  is  the 
feeling  so  fully  and  intensely  expressed  in  the  language 
of  the  Psalmist:  "Thou  art  he  that  took  me  out  of  my 
mother's  womb  :  thou  wast  my  hope,  when  I  hanged  yet 
upon  my  mother's  breasts.  I  have  been  left  unto  thee  ever 
since  I  was  born  :  thou  art  my  God  even  from  my  mother's 
womb.  Be  not  thou  far  from  me,  O  Lord :  thou  art  my 
succour;  haste  thee  to  help  me.  I  will  declare  thy  Xame 
unto  my  brethren  :  in  the  midst  of  the  congregation  will  I 
praise  thee." l  With  the  first  development  of  consciousness, 
there  grows  up,  as  a  part  of  it,  the  innate  feeling  that  our 
life,  natural  and  spiritual,  is  not  in  our  power  to  sustain  or 
to  prolong  ;  —  that  there  is  One  above  us,  on  whom  we  are 
dependent,  whose  existence  we  learn,  and  whose  presence 
we  realize,  by  the  sure  instinct  of  Prayer.  We  have  thus, 
in  the  Sense  of  Dependence,  the  foundation  of  one  great 
element  of  Religion,  —  the  Fear  of  God. 

But  the  mere  consciousness  of  dependence  does  not  of 
itself  exhibit  the  character  of  the  Being  on  whom  we  de 
pend.  It  is  as  consistent  with  superstition  as  with  religion  ; 
—  with  the  belief  in  a  malevolent,  as  in  a  benevolent  Deity  : 
it  is  as  much  called  into  existence  by  the  severities,  as  by 
the  mercies  of  God  ;  by  the  suffering  which  we  are  unable 
to  avert,  as  by  the  benefits  which  we  did  not  ourselves  pro- 

i  Psalm  xxii.  9,  10,  19,  22. 


LECT.  IV.  THOUGHT  EXAMINED.  121 

cure.  <9>  The  Being  on  whom  we  depend  is,  in  that  single 
relation,  manifested  in  the  infliction  of  pain,  as  well  as  in 
the  bestowal  of  happiness.  But  in  order  to  make  suffering, 
as  well  as  enjoyment,  contribute  to  the  religious  education 
of  man,  it  is  necessary  that  he  should  be  conscious,  not 
merely  of  suffering,  but  of  sin;  —  that  he  should  look 
upon  pain  not  merely  as  inflicted,  but  as  deserved ;  and 
should  recognize  in  its  Author  the  justice  that  punishes,  not 
merely  the  anger  that  harms.  In  the  feeling  of  depend 
ence,  we  are  conscious  of  the  Power  of  God,  but  not  neces 
sarily  of  His  Goodness.  This  deficiency,  however,  is  sup 
plied  by  the  other  element  of  religion, —  the  Consciousness 
of  Moral  Obligation,  —  carrying  with  it,  as  it  necessarily 
does,  the  Conviction  of  Sin.  It  is  impossible  to  establish, 
as  a  great  modern  philosopher  has  attempted  to  do,  the 
theory  of  an  absolute  Autonomy  of  the  Will ;  that  is  to  say, 
of  an  obligatory  law,  resting  on  no  basis  but  that  of  its  own 
imperative  character.  (10)  Considered  solely  in  itself,  with 
no  relation  to  any  higher  authority,  the  consciousness  of  a 
law  of  obligation  is  a  fact  of  our  mental  constitution,  and  it 
is  no  more.  The  fiction  of  an  absolute  law,  binding  on  all 
rational  beings,  has  only  an  apparent  universality  ;  because 
we  can  only  conceive  other  rational  beings  by  identifying 
their  constitution  with  our  own,  and  making  human  reason 
the  measure  and  representative  of  reason  in  general.  Why 
then  has  one  part  of  our  constitution,  merely  as  such,  an 
imperative  authority  over  the  remainder  ?  What  right  has 
one  portion  of  the  human  consciousness  to  represent  itself 
as  duty,  and  another  merely  as  inclination  ?  There  is  but 
one  answer  possible.  The  moral  Reason,  or  Will,  or  Con 
science,  of  Man,  call  it  by  what  name  we  please,  can  have 
no  authority,  save  as  implanted  in  him  by  some  higher 
Spiritual  Being,  as  a  Law  emanating  from  a  Lawgiver. 

11 


122  LIMITS   OF  RELIGIOUS  LECT.  IV. 

Man  can  bo  a  law  unto  himself,  only  on  the  supposition  that 
he  reflects  in  himself  the  Law  of  God  ;  —  that  he  shows,  as 
the  Apostle  tells  us,  the  works  of  that  law  written  in  his 
heart.1  If  he  is  absolutely  a  law  unto  himself,  his  duty  and 
his  pleasure  are  undistinguishable  from  each  other ;  for  he 
is  subject  to  no  one,  and  accountable  to  no  one.  Duty,  in 
this  case,  becomes  only  a  higher  kind  of  pleasure,  —  a  bal 
ance  between  the  present  and  the  future,  between  the  larger 
and  the  smaller  gratification.  We  are  thus  compelled,  by 
the  consciousness  of  moral  obligation,  to  assume  the  exist 
ence  of  a  moral  Deity,  and  to  regard  the  absolute  standard 
of  right  and  wrong  as  constituted  by  the  nature  of  that 
Deity.  (u)  The  conception  of  this  standard,  in  the  human 
mind,  may  indeed  be  faint  and  fluctuating,  and  must  be  im 
perfect  :  it  may  vary  with  the  intellectual  and  moral  culture 
of  the  nation  or  the  individual :  and  in  its  highest  human 
representation,  it  must  fall  far  short  of  the  reality.  But  it 
is  present  to  all  mankind,  as  a  basis  of  moral  obligation  and 
an  inducement  to  moral  progress :  it  is  present  in  the  uni 
versal  consciousness  of  sin ;  in  the  conviction  that  we  are 
offenders  against  God ;  in  the  expiatory  rites  by  which, 
whether  inspired  by  some  natural  instinct,  or  inherited 
from  some  primeval  tradition,  divers  nations  have,  in  their 
various  modes,  striven  to  atone  for  their  transgressions,  and 
to  satisfy  the  wrath  of  their  righteous  Judge.  <12)  However 
erroneously  the  particular  acts  of  religious  service  may  have 
been  understood  by  men  :  yet,  in  the  universal  conscious 
ness  of  innocence  and  guilt,  of  duty  and  disobedience,  of  an 
appeased  and  offended  God,  there  is  exhibited  the  instinc 
tive  confession  of  all  mankind,  that  the  moral  nature  of 
man,  as  subject  to  a  law  of  obligation,  reflects  and  repre 
sents,  in  some  degree,  the  moral  nature  of  a  Deity  by  whom 
that  obligation  is  imposed. 

i  Romans  ii.  15.  _ 


LECT.  IV.  THOUGHT    EXAMINED.  123 

But  these  two  elements  of  the  religious  consciousness, 
however  real  and  efficient  within  their  own  limits,  are  sub 
ject  to  the  same  restrictions  which  we  have  before  noticed 
as  binding  upon  consciousness  in  general.  Neither  in  the 
feeling  of  dependence,  nor  in  that  of  obligation,  can  we  be 
directly  conscious  of  the  Absolute  or  the  Infinite,  as  such. 
And  it  is  the  more  necessary  to  notice  this  limitation,  inas 
much  as  an  opposite  theory  has  been  maintained  by  one 
whose  writings  have  had  perhaps  more  influence  than  those 
of  any  other  man,  in  forming  the  modern  religious  philoso 
phy  of  his  own  country ;  and  whose  views,  in  all  their  essen 
tial  features,  have  been  ably  maintained  and  widely  diffused 
among  ourselves.  According  to  Schleiermacher,  the  essence 
of  Religion  is  to  be  found  in  a  feeling  of  absolute  and  entire 
dependence,  in  which  the  mutual  action  and  reaction  of  sub 
ject  and  object  upon  each  other,  which  constitutes  the  ordi 
nary  consciousness  of  mankind,  gives  way  to  a  sense  of 
utter,  passive  helplessness,  —  to  a  consciousness  that  our 
entire  personal  agency  is  annihilated  in  the  presence  of  the 
infinite  energy  of  the  Godhead.  In  our  intercourse  with 
the  world,  he  tells  us,  whether  in  relation  to  nature  or  to 
human  society,  the  feeling  of  freedom  and  that  of  depend 
ence  are  always  present  in  mutual  operation  upon  each 
other ;  sometimes  in  equilibrium ;  sometimes  with  a  vast 
preponderance  of  the  one  or  the  other  feeling ;  but  never 
to  the  entire  exclusion  of  either.  But  in  our  communion 
with  God,  there  is  always  an  accompanying  consciousness 
that  the  whole  activity  is  absolutely  and  entirely  dependent 
upon  Him ;  that,  whatever  amount  of  freedom  may  be  ap 
parent  in  the  individual  moments  of  life,  these  are  but 
detached  and  isolated  portions  of  a  passively  dependent 
whole.  <13>  The  theory  is  carried  still  further,  and  expressed 
in  more  positive  terms,  by  an  English  disciple,  who  ?nys  that, 


124  LIMITS    OP   RELIGIOUS  LECT.  IV. 

"Although  man,  while  in  the  midst  of  finite  objects,  always 
feels  himself  to  a  certain  extent  independent  and  free ;  yet 
in  the  presence  of  that  which  is  self-existent,  infinite,  and 
eternal,  he  may  feel  the  sense  of  freedom  utterly  pass  away, 
and  become  absorbed  in  the  sense  of  absolute  dependence." 
"  Let  the  relation,"  he  continues,  "  of  subject  and  object  in 
the  economy  of  our  emotions  become  such  that  the  whole 
independent  energy  of  the  former  merges  in  the  latter  as  its 
prime  cause  and  present  sustainer;  let  the  subject  become 
as  nothing,  —  not,  indeed,  from  its  intrinsic  insignificance  or 
incapacity  of  moral  action,  but  by  virtue  of  the  infinity  of 
the  object  to  which  it  stands  consciously  opposed :  and  the 
feeling  of  dependence  must  become  absolute;  for  all  finite 
power  is  as  nothing  in  relation  to  the  Infinite."  <14) 

Of  this  theory  it  may  be  observed,  in  the  first  place,  that 
it  contemplates  God  chiefly  in  the  character  of  an  object  of 
infinite  magnitude.  The  relations  of  the  object  to  the  sub 
ject,  in  our  consciousness  of  the  world,  and  in  that  of  God, 
diifer  from  each  other  in  degree  rather  than  in  kind.  The 
Deity  is  manifested  writh  no  attribute  of  personality  :  He  is 
merely  the  world  magnified  to  infinity :  and  the  feeling  of 
absolute  dependence  is  in  fact  that  of  the  annihilation  of  our 
personal  existence  in  the  Infinite  Being  of  the  Universe. 
Of  this  feeling,  the  intellectual  exponent  is  pure  Pantheism; 
and  the  infinite  object  is  but  the  indefinite  abstraction  of 
Being  in  general,  with  no  distinguishing  characteristic  to 
constitute  a  Deity.  For  the  distinctness  of  an  object  of 
consciousness  is  in  the  inverse  ratio  to  the  intensity  of  the 
passive  affection.  As  the  feeling  of  dependence  becomes 
more  powerful,  the  knowledge  of  the  character  of  the  ob 
ject  on  which  we  depend  must  necessarily  become  less  and 
less;  for  the  discernment  of  any  object  as  such  is  a  state  of 
mental  energy  and  reaction  of  thought  upon  that  object. 


LECT.  IV.  THOUGHT   EXAMINED.  125 

Hence  the  feeling  of  absolute  dependence,  supposing  it  pos 
sible,  could  convey  no  consciousness  of  God  as  God,  but 
merely  an  indefinite  impression  of  dependence  upon  some 
thing.  Towards  an  object  so  vague  and  meaningless,  no 
real  religious  relation  is  possible.  (15) 

In  the  second  place,  the  consciousness  of  an  absolute  de 
pendence  in  which  our  activity  is  annihilated,  is  a  contradic 
tion  in  terms ;  for  consciousness  itself  is  an  activity.  We 
can  be  conscious  of  a  state  of  mind  as  such,  only  by  attend 
ing  to  it ;  and  attention  is  in  all  cases  a  mode  of  our  active 
energy.  Thus  the  state  of  absolute  dependence,  supposing 
it  to  exist  at  all,  could  not  be  distinguished  from  other 
states ;  and,  as  all  consciousness  is  distinction,  it  could  not, 
by  any  mode  of  consciousness,  be  known  to  exist. 

In  the  third  place,  the  theory  is  inconsistent  with  the 
duty  of  Prayer.  Prayer  is  essentially  a  state  in  which  man 
is  in  active  relation  towards  God ;  in  which  he  is  intensely 
conscious  of  his  personal  existence  and  its  wants  ;  in  which 
he  endeavors  by  entreaty  to  prevail  with  God.  Let  any 
one  consider  for  a  moment  the  strong  energy  of  the  lan 
guage  of  the  Apostle :  "  Now  I  beseech  you,  brethren,  for 
the  Lord  Jesus  Christ's  sake,  and  for  the  love  of  the  Spirit, 
that  ye  strive  together  with  me  in  your  prayers  to  God  for 
me  ;Ml  or  the  consciousness  of  a  personal  need,  which  per 
vades  that  Psalm  in  which  David  so  emphatically  declares 
his  dependence  upon  God :  "  My  God,  my  God,  look  upon 
me ;  why  hast  thou  forsaken  me,  and  art  so  far  from  my 
health,  and  from  the  words  of  my  compM nt  ?  O  my  God, 
I  cry  in  the  day-time,  but  thou  nearest  not;  and  in  the 
night  season  also  I  take  no  rest;"2  —  let  him  ponder  the 
words  of  our  Lord  himself:  "  Shall  not  God  avenge  his  own 
elect,  wrhich  cry  day  and  night  unto  him:"3  —  and  then 

i  Romans  xv.  30.  2  Psalm  xxii.  1,2.  3  St.  Luke  xviii.  7. 

Jl* 


126  LIMITS    OP   RELIGIOUS  LECT.  IV. 

let  him  say  if  such  language  is  compatible  with  the  theory 
which  asserts  that  man's  personality  is  annihilated  in  his 
communion  with  God.  (1G) 

But,  lastly,  there  is  another  fatal  objection  to  the  above 
theory.  It  makes  our  moral  and  religious  consciousness 
subversive  of  each  other,  and  reduces  us  to  the  dilemma 
that  either  our  faith  or  our  practice  must  be  founded  on  a 
delusion.  The  actual  relation  of  man  to  God  is  the  same, 
in  whatever  degree  man  may  be  conscious  of  it.  If  man's 
dependence  on  God  is  not  really  destructive  of  his  personal 
freedom,  the  religious  consciousness,  in  denying  that  free 
dom,  is  a  false  consciousness.  If,  on  the  contrary,  man  is 
in  reality  passively  dependent  upon  God,  the  consciousness 
of  moral  responsibility,  which  bears  witness  to  his  free 
agency,  is  a  lying  witness.  Actually,  in  the  sight  of  God, 
we  are  either  totally  dependent,  or,  partially  at  least,  free. 
And  as  this  condition  must  be  always  the  same,  whether  we 
are  conscious  of  it  or  not,  it  follows,  that,  in  proportion  as 
one  of  these  modes  of  consciousness  reveals  to  us  the  truth, 
the  other  must  be  regarded  as  testifying  to  a  falsehood.  <17) 

Nor  yet  is  it  possible  to  find  in  the  consciousness  of 
moral  obligation  any  immediate  apprehension  of  the  Abso 
lute  and  Infinite.  For  the  free  agency  of  man,  which  in 
the  feeling  of  dependence  is  always  present  as  a  subordi 
nate  element,  becomes  here  the  centre  and  turning-point 
of  the  whole.  The  consciousness  of  the  Infinite  is  neces 
sarily  excluded ;  first,  by  the  mere  existence  of  a  relation 
between  two  distinct  agents;  and,  secondly,  by  the  condi 
tions  under  which  each  must  necessarily  be  conceived  in 
its  relation  to  the  other.  The  moral  consciousness  of  man, 
as  subject  to  law,  is,  by  that  subjection,  both  limited  and 
related;  and  hence  it  cannot  in  itself  be  regarded  as  a 
representation  of  the  Infinite.  Nor  yet  can  such  a  repre- 


LECT.  IV.  THOUGHT    EXAMINED.  127 

sentation  be  furnished  by  the  other  term  of  the  relation,  — 
that  of  the  Moral  Lawgiver,  by  whom  human  obligation 
is  enacted.  For,  in  the  first  place,  such  a  Lawgiver  must 
be  conceived  as  a  Person ;  and  the  only  human  conception 
of  Personality  is  that  of  limitation.  In  the  second  place, 
the  moral  consciousness  of  such  a  Lawgiver  can  only  be 
conceived  under  the  form  of  a  variety  of  attributes;  and 
different  attributes  are,  by  that  very  diversity,  conceived 
as  finite.  Nay,  the  very  conception  of  a  moral  nature  is 
in  itself  the  conception  of  a  limit ;  for  morality  is  the 
compliance  with  a  law  ;  and  a  law,  whether  imposed  from 
within  or  from  without,  can  only  be  conceived  to  operate 
by  limiting  the  range  of  possible  actions. 

Yet  along  with  all  this,  though  our  positive  religious 
consciousness  is  of  the  finite  only,  there  yet  runs  through 
the  whole  of  that  consciousness  the  accompanying  convic 
tion  that  the  Infinite  does  exist,  and  must  exist;  —  though 
of  the  manner  of  that  existence  we  can  form  no  concep 
tion;  and  that  it  exists  along  with  the  Finite;  —  though 
we  know  not  how  such  a  coexistence  is  possible.  We  can 
not  be  conscious  of  the  Infinite ;  but  we  can  be  and  are 
conscious  of  the  limits  of  our  own  powers  of  thought ;  and 
therefore  we  know  that  the  possibility  or  impossibility  of 
conception  is  no  test  of  the  possibility  or  impossibility  of 
existence.  We  know  that,  unless  we  admit  the  existence 
of  the  Infinite,  the  existence  of  the  Finite  is  inexplicable 
and  self-contradictory;  and  yet  we  know  that  the  concep 
tion  of  the  Infinite  itself  appears  to  involve  contradictions 
no  less  inexplicable.  In  this  impotence  of  Reason,  we  are 
compelled  to  take  refuge  in  Faith,  and  to  believe  that  an 
Infinite  Being  exists,  though  we  know  not  how ;  and  that 
He  is  the  same  with  that  Being  who  is  made  known  in 
consciousness  as  our  Sustainer  and  our  Lawgiver.  For 


128  LIMITS    OF   RELIGIOUS  I,ECT.  IV. 

to  deny  that  an  Infinite  Being  exists,  because  we  cannot 
comprehend  the  manner  of  His  existence,  is,  of  two  equally 
inconceivable  alternatives,  to  accept  the  one  which  renders 
that  very  inconceivability  itself  inexplicable.  If  the  Finite 
is  the  universe  of  existence,  there  is  no  reason  why  that 
universe  itself  should  not  be  as  conceivable  as  the  several 
parts  of  which  it  is  composed.  A V hence  comes  it  then 
that  our  whole  consciousness  is  compassed  about  with  re 
strictions,  which  we  are  ever  striving  to  pass,  and  ever 
failing  in  the  effort?  Whence  comes  it  that  the  Finite 
cannot  measure  the  Finite?  The  very  consciousness  of 
our  own  limitations  of  thought  bears  witness  to  the  exig 
ence  of  the  Unlimited,  who  is  beyond  thought.  The 
shadow  of  the  Infinite  still  broods  over  the  consciousness 
of  the  finite;  and  we  wake  up  at  last  from  the  dream  of 
absolute  wisdom,  to  confess,  "Surely  the  Lord  is  in  this 
place;  and  I  knew  it  not."1 

We  are  thus  compelled  to  acquiesce  in  at  least  one  por 
tion  of  Bacon's  statement  concerning  the  relation  of  human 

O 

knowledge  to  its  object:  u  Natura  percutit  intellectum  radio 
directo ;  Deus  autem,  proptcr  medium  ina3quale  (creaturas 
scilicet),  radio  refracto."(18)  To  have  sufficient  grounds  for 
believing  in  God  is  a  very  different  thing  from  having  suffi 
cient  grounds  for  reasoning  about  Him.  The  religious 
sentiment,  which  compels  men  to  believe  in  and  worship 
a  Supreme  Being,  is  an  evidence  of  His  existence,  but  not 
an  exhibition  of  His  nature.  It  proves  that  God  is,  and 
makes  known  some  of  His  relations  to  us ;  but  it  does  not 
prove  what  God  is  in  His  own  Absolute  Being.  (19)  The 
natural  senses,  it  may  be,  are  diverted  and  colored  by  the 
medium  through  which  they  pass  to  reach  the  intellect, 
and  present  to  us,  not  things  in  themselves,  but  tilings  as 

i  Genesis  xxviii.  16. 


LECT.  IV.  THOUGHT  EXAMINED.  129 

they  appear  to  us.  And  this  fs  manifestly  the  case  with 
the  religious  consciousness,  which  can  only  represent  the 
Infinite  God  under  finite  forms.  But  we  are  compelled 
to  believe,  on  the  evidence  of  our  senses,  that  a  material 
world  exists,  even  while  we  listen  to  the  arguments  of  the 
idealist,  who  reduces  it  to  an  idea  or  a  nonentity ;  and  we 
are  compelled,  by  our  religious  consciousness,  to  believe 
in  the  existence  of  a  personal  God ;  though  the  reasonings 
of  the  Rationalist,  logically  followed  out,  may  reduce  us 
to  Pantheism  or  Atheism.  But  to  preserve  this  belief 
uninjured,  we  must  acknowledge  the  true  limits  of  our 
being :  we  must  not  claim  for  any  fact  of  human  conscious 
ness  the  proud  prerogative  of  revealing  God  as  He  is ;  for 
thus  we  throw  away  the  only  weapon  which  can  be  of 
avail  in  resisting  the  assaults  of  Skepticism.  We  must  be 
content  to  admit,  with  regard  to  the  internal  consciousness 
of  man,  the  same  restrictions  which  the  great  philosopher 
just  now  quoted  has  so  excellently  expressed  with  refer 
ence  to  the  external  senses.  "For  as  all  works  do  show 
forth  the  power  and  skill  of  the  workman,  and  not  his 
ima^e ;  so  it  is  of  the  works  of  God,  which  do  show  the 
omnipotency  and  wisdom  of  the  maker,  but  not  his  image 
Wherefore  by  the  contemplation  of  nature  to  in 
duce  and  inforce  the  acknowledgment  of  God,  and  to 

demonstrate  his  power,  is   an   excellent   argument ; 

but  on  the  other  side,  out  of  the  contemplation  of  nature, 
or  ground  of  human  knowledge,  to  induce  any  verity  or 
persuasion  concerning  the  points  of  faith,  is  in  my  judg 
ment  not  safe For  the  heathens  themselves  con 
clude  as  much  in  that  excellent  and  divine  fable  of  the 
golden  chain :  That  men  and  gods  were  not  able  to  draw 
Jupiter  clown  to  the  earth ;  but  contrariwise,  Jupiter  was 
able  to  draw  them  up  to  heaven."  (2°) 


130  LIMITS   OF  RELIGIOUS  LECT.  IV. 

One  feature  deserves  especial  notice,  as  common  to  both 
of  those  modes  of  consciousness  which  primarily  exhibit 
our  relation  towards  God.  In  both,  we  are  compelled 
to  regard  ourselves  as  Persons  related  to  a  Person.  In 
the  feeling  of  dependence,  however  great  it  may  be,  the 
consciousness  of  myself,  the  dependent  element,  remains 
unextinguished ;  and,  indeed,  without  that  element  there 
could  be  no  consciousness  of  a  relation  at  all.  In  the  sense 
of  moral  obligation,  I  know  myself  as  the  agent  on  whom 
the  law  is  binding :  I  am  free  to  choose  and  to  act,  as  a 
person  whose  principle  of  action  is  in  himself.  And  it  is 
important  to  observe  that  it  is  only  through  this  conscious 
ness  of  personality  that  we  have  any  ground  of  belief  in  the 
existence  of  a  God.  If  we  admit  the  arguments  by  which 
this  personality  is  annihilated,  whether  on  the  side  of 
Materialism  or  on  that  of  Pantheism,  we  cannot  escape 
from  the  consequence  to  which  those  arguments  inevitably 
lead, — the  annihilation  of  God  himself.  If,  on  the  one 
hand,  the  spiritual  element  within  me  is  merely  dependent 
on  the  corporeal,  —  if  myself  is  a  result  of  my  bodily 
organization,  and  may  be  resolved  into  the  operation  of  a 
system  of  material  agents,  — why  should  I  suppose  it  to  be 
otherwise  in  the  great  world  beyond  me  ?  If  I,  who  deem 
myself  a  spirit  distinct  from  and  superior  to  matter,  am  but 
the  accident  and  product  of  that  which  I  seem  to  rule,  why 
may  not  all  other  spiritual  existence,  if  such  there  be,  be 
dependent  upon  the  constitution  of  the  material  uni 
verse  ?  (21)  Or  if,  on  the  other  hand,  I  am  not  a  distinct 
substance,  but  a  mode  of  the  infinite,  —  a  shadow  passing 
over  the  face  of  the  universe,  —  what  is  that  universe 
which  you  would  have  me  acknowledge  a  God  ?  It  is,  says 
the  Pantheist,  the  One  and  All.  <22)  By  no  means :  it  is 
the  Many,  in  which  is  neither  All  nor  One.  You  have 


LECT.  IV.  THOUGHT   EXAMINED.  131 

taught  me  that  within  the  little  world  of  my  own  con 
sciousness  there  is  no  relation  between  the  one  and  the 
many ;  but  that  all  is  transient  and  accidental  alike.  If  I 
accept  your  conclusion,  I  must  extend  it  to  its  legitimate 
consequence.  Why  should  the  universe  itself  contain  a 
principle  of  unity?  why  should  the  Many  imply  the  One? 
All  that  I  see,  all  that  I  know,  are  isolated  and  unconnected 
phenomena  ;  I  myself  being  one  of  them.  Why  should  the 
Universe  of  Being  be  otherwise  ?  It  cannot  be  All ;  for 
its  phenomena  are  infinite  and  innumerable;  and  all 
implies  unity  and  completeness.  It  need  not  be  One ;  for 
you  have  yourself  shown  me  that  I  am  deceived  in  the  only 
ground  which  I  have  for  believing  that  a  plurality  of 
modes  implies  an  unity  of  substance.  If  there  is  no  Per 
son  to  pray ;  if  there  is  no  Person  to  be  obedient ;  —  what 
remains  but  to  conclude  that  He  to  whom  prayer  and  obe 
dience  are  due,  —  nay,  even  the  mock-king  who  usurps  His 
name  in  the  realms  of  philosophy, — is  a  shadow  and  a 
delusion  likewise  ? 

The  result  of  the  preceding  considerations  may  be 
summed  up  as  follows.  There  are  two  modes  in  which  we 
may  endeavor  to  contemplate  the  Deity :  the  one  negative, 
based  on  a  vain  attempt  to  transcend  the  conditions  of 
human  thought,  and  to  expand  the  religious  consciousness 
to  the  infinity  of  its  Divine  Object ;  the  other  positive, 
wrhich  keeps  within  its  proper  limits,  and  views  the  object 
in  a  manner  accommodated  to  the  finite  capacities  of  the 
human  thinker.  The  first  aspires  to  behold  God  in  His 
absolute  nature  :  the  second  is  content  to  view  Him  in 
those  relations  in  which  he  has  been  pleased  to  manifest 
Himself  to  his  creatures.  The  first  aims  at  a  speculative 
knowledge  of  God  as  He  is  ;  but,  bound  by  the  conditions 
of  finite  thought,  even  in  the  attempt  to  transgress  them, 


132  LIMITS   OF  RELIGIOUS  LECT.  IV. 

obtains  nothing  more  than  a  tissue  of  ambitious  self-con 
tradictions,  which  indicate  only  what  He  is  not.  (23>  The 
second,  abandoning  the  speculative  knowledge  of  the  infi 
nite,  as  only  possible  to  the  Infinite  Intelligence  itself,  is 
content  with  those  regulative  ideas  of  the  Deity,  which  are 
sufficient  to  guide  our  practice,  but  not  to  satisfy  our  intel 
lect  ;  C24)  —  which  tell  us,  not  what  God  is  in  Himself,  but 
how  He  wills  that  we  should  think  of  Him.  (25)  In  re 
nouncing  all  knowledge  of  the  Absolute,  it  renounces  at 
the  same  time  all  attempts  to  construct  a  priori  schemes 
of  God's  Providence  as  it  ought  to  be  :  it  does  not  seek  to 
reconcile  this  or  that  phenomenon,  whether  in  nature  or  in 
revelation,  with  the  absolute  attributes  of  Deity ;  but  con 
fines  itself  to  the  actual  course  of  that  Providence  as  man 
ifested  in  the  world  ;  and  seeks  no  higher  internal  criterion 
of  the  truth  of  a  religion,  than  may  be  derived  from  its 
analogy  to  other  parts  of  the  Divine  Government.  Guided 
by  this,  the  only  true  Philosophy  of  Religion,  man  is  con 
tent  to  practise  where  he  is  unable  to  speculate.  He  acts, 
as  one  who  must  give  an  account  of  his  conduct :  he  prays, 
believing  that  his  prayer  will  be  answered.  He  does  not 
seek  to  reconcile  this  belief  with  any  theory  of  the  Infinite ; 
for  he  does  not  even  know  how  the  Infinite  and  the  Finite 
can  exist  together.  But  he  feels  that  his  several  duties 
rest  upon  the  same  basis :  he  knows  that,  if  human  action 
is  not  incompatible  with  Infinite  Power,  neither  is  human 
worship  with  Infinite  Wisdom  and  Goodness :  though  it  is 
not  as  the  Infinite  that  God  reveals  Himself  in  His  moral 
government ;  nor  is  it  as  the  Infinite  that  he  promises  to 
Answer  prayer. 

"  O  Thou  that  nearest  prayer,  unto  Thee  shall  all  flesh 
£ome."  Sacrifice,  and  offering,  and  burnt-offerings,  and 
offering  for  sin,  Thou  requirest  no  more ;  for  He  whom 


LECT.  IV.  THOUGHT    EXAMINED.  138 

these  prefigured  lias  offered  Himself  as  a  sacrifice  once  for 
all.1  But  He  who  fulfilled  the  sacrifice,  commanded  the 
prayer,  and  Himself  taught  us  how  to  pray.  He  tells  us 
that  we  are  dependent  upon  God  for  our  daily  bread,  for 
forgiveness  of  sins,  for  deliverance  from  evil;  —  and  how  is 
that  dependence  manifested  ?  Not  in  the  annihilation  of 
our  personality  ;  for  wre  appeal  to  Him  under  the  tenderest 
of  personal  relations,  as  the  children  of  Our  Father  who  is 
in  heaven.  Not  as  passive  in  contemplation,  but  as  active 
in  service ;  for  we  pray,  "  Thy  will  be  done,  as  in  heaven,  so 
in  earth."  •  In  this  manifestation  of  God  to  man,  alike  in 
Consciousness  as  in  Scripture,  under  finite  forms  to  finite 
minds,  as  a  Person  to  a  Person,  we  see  the  root  and  foun 
dation  of  that  religious  service,  without  which  belief  is  a 
speculation,  and  worship  a  delusion  ;  which,  whatever  would- 
be  philosophical  theologians  may  say  to  the  contrary,  is  the 
common  bond  which  unites  all  men  to  God.  All  are  God's 
creatures,  bound  alike  to  reverence  and  obey  their  Maker. 
All  are  God's  dependents,  bound  alike  to  ask  for  his  sustain 
ing  bounties.  All  are  God's  rebels,  needing  daily  and  hourly 
to  implore  His  forgiveness  for  their  disobedience.  All  are 
God's  redeemed,  purchased  by  the  blood  of  Christ,  invited 
to  share  in  the  benefits  of  His  passion  and  intercession.  All 
are  brought  by  one  common  channel  into  communion  with 
that  God  to  whom  they  are  related  by  so  many  common 
ties.  All  are  called  upon  to  acknowledge  their  Maker,  their 
Governor,  their  Sustainer,  their  Redeemer ;  and  the  means 
of  their  acknowledgment  is  Prayer. 

And,  apart  from  the  fact  of  its  having  been  God's  good 
pleasure  so  to  reveal  Himself,  there  are  manifest,  even  to 
human  understanding,  wise  reasons  why  this  course  should 
have  been  adopted,  benevolent  ends  to  be  answered  by  this 

i  Hebrews  x.  8,  10, 
12 


134  LIMITS    OF    RELIGIOUS  LECT.  IV. 

gracious  condescension.  We  are  not  called  upon  to  live 
two  distinct  lives  in  this  world.  It  is  not  required  of  us 
that  the  household  of  our  nature  should  be  divided  against 
itself;  —  that  those  feelings  of  love,  and  reverence,  and 
gratitude,  which  move  us  in  a  lower  degree  towards  our 
human  relatives  and  friends,  should  be  altogether  thrown 
aside,  and  exchanged  for  some  abnormal  state  of  ecstatic 
contemplation,  when  we  bring  our  prayers  and  praises  and 
thanks  before  the  footstool  of  our  Father  in  heaven.  We 
are  none  of  us  able  to  grasp  in  speculation  the  nature  of  the 
Infinite  and  Eternal ;  but  we  all  live  and  move  among  our 
fellow-men,  at  times  needing  their  assistance,  at  times  solic 
iting  their  favors,  at  times  seeking  to  turn  away  their  anger. 
We  have  all,  as  children,  felt  the  need  of  the  supporting 
care  of  parents  and  guardians  :  we  have  all,  in  the  gradual 
progress  of  education,  required  instruction  from  the  wisdom 
of  teachers :  we  have  all  offended  against  our  neighbors, 
and  known  the  blessings  of  forgiveness,  or  the  penalty  of 
unappeased  anger.  We  can  all,  therefore,  taught  by  the  in 
most  consciousness  of  our  human  feelings,  place  ourselves  in 
communion  with  God,  when  He  manifests  Himself  under 
human  images.  "  He  that  loveth  not  his  brother  whom  he 
hath  seen,"  says  the  Apostle  St.  John,  "how  can  he  love 
God  whom  he  hath  not  seen?"1  Our  heavenly  affections 
must  in  some  measure  take  their  source  and  their  form  from 
our  earthly  ones :  our  love  towards  God,  if  it  is  to  be  love 
at  all,  must  not  be  wholly  unlike  our  love  towards  our 
neighbor :  the  motives  and  influences  which  prompt  us, 
when  we  make  known  our  wants  and  pour  forth  our  suppli 
cations  to  an  earthly  parent,  are  graciously  permitted  by  our 
heavenly  Father  to  be  the  type  and  symbol  of  those  by 
wrhich  our  intercourse  with  Him  is  to  be  regulated,  —  with 

1  St.  John  iv.  20. 


LECT.  IV  THOUGHT   EXAMINED.  135 

which  He  bids  us  "  come  boldly  unto  the  throne  of  grace, 
th.it  we  may  obtain  mercy,  and  find  grace  to  help  in  time 
of  need."1 

So  should  it  be  during  this  transitory  life,  in  which  we  see 
through  a  glass,  darkly  ; 2  in  which  God  reveals  Himself  in 
types  and  shadows,  under  human  images  and  attributes,  to 
meet  graciously  and  deal  tenderly  with  the  human  sympa 
thies  of  His  creatures.  And  allhough,  even  to  the  sons  of 
God,  it  doth  not  yet  appear  what  we  shall  be,  when  we  shall 
be  like  him,  and  shall  see  Him  as  He  is  ;3  yet,  if  it  be  true 
that  our  religious  duties  in  this  life  are  a  training  and  pre 
paration  for  that  which  is  to  come  ;  —  if  we  are  encouraged 
to  look  forward  to  and  anticipate  that  future  state,  while  we 
are  still  encompassed  with  this  earthly  tabernacle ;  —  if  \ve 
are  taught  to  look,  as  to  our  great  Example,  to  One  who  in 
love  and  sympathy  towards  His  brethren  was  Very  Man  ; — 
if  we  are  bidden  not  to  sorrow  without  hope  concerning 
them  which  are  asleep,4  and  are  comforted  by  the  promise 
that  the  ties  of  love  which  are  broken  011  earth  shall  be 
united  in  heaven,  —  we  may  trust  that  not  wholly  alien  to 
such  feelings  will  be  our  communion  with  God  face  to  face, 
when  the  redeemed  of  all  flesh  shall  approach  once  more  to 
Him  that  heareth  prayer ;  —  no  longer  in  the  chamber  of 
private  devotion  ;  no  longer  in  the  temple  of  public  worship; 
but  in  that  great  City  where  no  temple  is ;  "  for  the  Lord 
God  Almighty  and  the  Lamb  are  the  temple  of  it." 5 

1  Hebrews  iv.  16.        2  i  Corinthians  xiii.  12.        3  i  st.  John  iii.  2. 
4  Thessalonians  iv.  13.  5  Revelation  xxi.  22. 


LECTURE    V. 

FOR  AFTER  THAT  IN  THE  WISDOM  OF  GOD  THE  WORLD  BY  WISDOM 
KNEW  NOT  GOD,  IT  PLEASED  GOD  BY  THE  FOOLISHNESS  OF  PREACH 
ING  TO  SAVE  THEM  THAT  BELIEVE.  FOR  THE  JEWS  REQUIRE  A 
SIGN,  AND  THE  GREEKS  SEEK  AFTER  WISDOM:  BUT  WE  PREACH 
CHRIST  CRUCIFIED,  UNTO  THE  JEWS  A  STUMBLINGBLOCK,  AND  UNTO 
THE  GREEKS  FOOLISHNESS;  BUT  UNTO  THEM  WHICH  ARE  CALLED, 
BOTH  JEWS  AND  GREEKS,  CHRIST  THE  POWER  OF  GOD,  AND  THE 
WISDOM  OF  GOD. — 1  CORINTHIANS  I.  21-24. 

"  THOUGH  it  were  admitted,"  says  Bishop  Butler,  "  that 
this  opinion  of  Necessity  were  speculatively  true  ;  yet, 
with  regard  to  practice,  it  is  as  if  it  were  false,  so  far  as 
our  experience  reaches ;  that  is,  to  the  whole  of  our  pres 
ent  life.  For  the  constitution  of  the  present  world,  and  the 
condition  in  which  we  are  actually  placed,  is  as  if  we  were 
free.  And  it  may  perhaps  justly  be  concluded  that,  since 
the  whole  process  of  action,  through  every  step  of  it,  sus 
pense,  deliberation,  inclining  one  way,  determining,  and  at 
last  doing  as  we  determine,  is  as  if  we  were  free,  therefore 
we  are  so.  But  the  thing  here  insisted  upon  is,  that  under 
the  present  natural  government  of  the  world,  we  find  we 
are  treated  and  dealt  with  as  if  we  were  free,  prior  to  all 
consideration  whether  we  are  or  not."  d) 

That  this  observation  has  in  any  degree  settled  the 
speculative  difficulties  involved  in  the  problem  of  Lib 
erty  and  Necessity,  will  not  be  maintained  by  any  one  who 
is  acquainted  with  the  history  of  the  controversy.  Nor 
was  it  intended  by  its  author  to  do  so.  But,  like  many 


LECT.   V.  THOUGHT   EXAMINED.  137 

other  pregnant  sentences  of  that  great  thinker,  it  in 
troduces  a  principle  capable  of  a  much  wider  application 
than  to  the  inquiry  which  originally  suggested  it.  The 
vexed  question  of  Liberty  and  necessity,  whose  counter-ar 
guments  have  become  a  by-word  for  endless  and  unprofit 
able  wrangling,  is  but  one  of  a  large  class  of  problems, 
some  of  which  meet  us  at  every  turn  of  our  daily  life  and 
conduct,  whenever  we  attempt  to  justify  in  theory  that 
which  we  are  compelled  to  carry  out  in  practice.  Such 
problems  arise  inevitably,  whenever  we  attempt  to  pass 
from  the  sensible  to  the  intelligible  world,  from  the  sphere 
of  action  to  that  of  thought,  from  that  which  appears  to  us 
to  that  which  is  in  itself.  In  religion,  in  morals,  in  our 
daily  business,  in  the  care  of  our  lives,  in  the  exercise  of 
our  senses,  the  rules  which  guide  our  practice  cannot  be 
reduced  to  principles  which  satisfy  our  reason.  (2) 

The  very  first  Law  of  Thought,  and,  through  Thought, 
of  all  Consciousness,  by  which  alone  we  are  able  to  discern 
objects  as  such,  or  to  distinguish  them  one  from  another, 
involves  in  its  constitution  a  mystery  and  a  doubt,  which 
no  effort  of  Philosophy  has  been  able  to  penetrate  :  —  How 
can  the  One  be  many,  or  the  Many  one  ?  (3)  We  are 
compelled  to  regard  ourselves  and  our  fellow-men  as  per 
sons,  and  the  visible  world  around  us  as  made  up  of 
things  :  but  what  is  personality,  and  what  is  reality,  are 
questions  which  the  wisest  have  tried  to  answer,  and  .have 
tried  in  vain.  Man,  as  a  Person,  is  one,  yet  composed  of 
many  elements;  —  not  identical  with  any  one  of  them, 
nor  yet  with  the  aggregate  of  them  all ;  and  yet  not  sep 
arable  from  them  by  any  effort  of  abstraction.  Man  is  one 
in  his  thoughts,  in  his  actions,  in  his  feelings,  and  in  the 
responsibilities  which  these  involve.  It  is  I  who  think,  1 
who  act,  I  who  feel ;  yet  I  am  not  thought,  nor  action, 

12* 


138  LIMITS   OF  RELIGIOUS  LECT.  V 

nor  feeling,  nor  a  combination  of  thoughts  and  actions  and 
feelings  heaped  together.  Extension,  and  resistance,  and 
shape,  and  the  various  sensible  qualities,  make  up  my  con 
ception  of  each  individual  body  as  such ;  yet  the  body  is 
not  its  extension,  nor  its  shape,  nor  its  hardness,  nor  its 
color,  nor  its  smell,  nor  its  taste  ;  nor  yet  is  it  a  mere  ag 
gregate  of  all  these  with  no  principle  of  unity  among  them. 
If  these  several  parts  constitute  a  single  whole,  the  unity, 
as  well  as  the  plurality,  must  depend  upon  some  principle 
which  that  whole  contains:  if  they  do  not  constitute  a 
whole,  the  difficulty  is  removed  but  a  single  step ;  for  the 
same  question,  —  what  constitutes  individuality  ?  —  must 
be  asked  in  relation  to  each  separate  part.  The  actual 
conception  of  every  object,  as  such,  involves  the  combina 
tion  of  the  One  and  the  Many ;  and  that  combination  is 
practically  made  every  time  we  think  at  all.  But  at  the 
same  time,  no  effort  of  reason  is  able  to  explain  how  such 
a  relation  is  possible;  or  to  satisfy  the  intellectual  doubt 
wrhich  necessarily  arises  on  the  contemplation  of  it. 

As  it  is  with  the  first  law  of  Thought,  so  it  is  with  the 
first  principle  of  Action  and  of  Feeling.  All  action, 
whether  free  or  constrained,  and  all  passion,  implies  and 
rests  upon  another  great  mystery  of  Philosophy,  —  the 
Commerce  between  Mind  and  Matter.  The  properties 
and  operations  of  matter  are  known  only  by  the  external 
senses  :  the  faculties  and  acts  of  the  mind  are  known  only 
by  the  internal  apprehension.  The  energy  of  the  one  is 
motion  :  the  energy  of  the  other  is  consciousness.  What 
is  the  middle  term  which  unites  these  two  ?  and  how  can 
their  reciprocal  action,  unquestionable  as  it  is  in  fact,  be 
conceived  as  possible  in  theory  ?  (4)  How  can  a  contact 
between  body  and  body  produce  consciousness  in  the 
immaterial  soul  ?  How  can  a  mental  self-determination 


LECT.  V.  THOUGHT   EXAMINED  139 

produce  the  motion  of  material  organs  ?  (5)  How  can 
mind,  which  is  neither  extended  nor  figured  nor  colored 
itself,  represent  by  its  ideas  the  extension  and  figure  and 
color  of  bodies  ?  How  can  the  body  be  determined  to 
a  new  position  in  space  by  an  act  of  thought,  to  which 
space  has  no  relation  ?  How  can  thought  itself  be  car 
ried  on  by  bodily  instruments,  and  yet  itself  have  noth 
ing  in  common  with  bodily  affections  ?  What  is  the 
relation  between  the  last  pulsation  of  the  material  brain 
and  the  first  awakening  of  the  mental  perception  ?  How 
does  the  spoken  word,  a  merely  material  vibration  of  the 
atmosphere,  become  echoed,  as  it  were,  in  the  silent  voice 
of  thought,  and  take  its  part  in  an  operation  wholly  spirit 
ual  ?  Here  again  we  acknowledge,  in  our  daily  practice, 
a  fact  which  we  are  unable  to  represent  in  theory;  and  the 
various  hypotheses  to  which  Philosophy  has  had  recourse, 
—  the  Divine  Assistance,  the  Preestablished  Harmony,  the 
Plastic  Medium,  and  others,  (6)  are  but  so  many  confes 
sions  of  the  existence  of  the  mystery,  and  of  the  extraor 
dinary,  yet  wholly  insufficient  efforts  made  by  human  rea 
son  to  penetrate  it.  (7> 

The  very  perception  of  our  senses  is  subject  to  the  same 
restrictions.  "  No  priestly  dogmas,"  says  Hume,  "  ever 
shocked  common  sense  more  than  the  infinite  divisibility 
of  extension,  with  its  consequences."  (8)  He  should  have 
added,  that  the  antagonist  assumption  of  a  finite  divisibil 
ity  is  equally  incomprehensible ;  it  being  as  impossible  to 
conceive  an  ultimate  unit,  or  least  possible  extension, 
as  it  is  to  conceive  the  process  of  division  carried  on  to 
infinity.  Extension  is  presented  to  the  mind  as  a  relation 
between  parts  exterior  to  each  other,  whose  reality  cannot 
consist  merely  in  their  juxtaposition.  We  are  thus  com 
pelled  to  believe  that  extension  itself  is  dependent  upon 


140  LIMITS   OF   RELIGIOUS  LECT.  V. 

some  higher  law ;  —  that  it  is  not  an  original  principle  of 
things  in  themselves,  but  a  derived  result  of  their  connec 
tion  with  each  other.  But  to  conceive  how  this  gener 
ation  of  space  is  possible,  —  how  unextended  objects  can 
by  their  conjunction  produce  extension,  —  baffles  the  ut 
most  efforts  of  the  wildest  imagination  or  the  profoundest 
reflection.  (9)  We  cannot  conceive  how  unextended  mat 
ter  can  become  extended  ;  for  of  unextended  matter  we 
know  nothing,  either  in  itself  or  in  its  relations ;  though 
we  are  apparently  compelled  to  postulate  its  existence,  as 
implied  in  the  appearances  of  which  alone  we  are  conscious. 
The  existence  of  mental  succession  in  time  is  as  inexpli 
cable  as  that  of  a  material  extension  in  space ;  —  a  first 
moment  and  an  infinite  regress  of  moments  beinsr  both 

O  O 

equally  inconceivable,  no  less  than  the  corresponding  the 
ories  of  a  first  atom  and  an  infinite  division. 

The  difficulty  which  meets  us  in  these  problems  may 
help  to  throw  some  light  on  the  purposes  for  which  human 
thought  is  designed,  and  the  limits  within  which  it  may 
be  legitimately  exercised.  The  primary  fact  of  conscious 
ness,  which  is  accepted  as  regulating  our  practice,  is  in 
itself  inexplicable,  but  not  inconceivable.  There  is  mys 
tery  •  but  there  is  not  yet  contradiction.  Thought  is 
baffled,  and  unable  to  pursue  the  track  of  investigation ; 
but  it  does  not  grapple  with  an  idea  and  destroy  itself  in 
the  struggle.  Contradiction  does  not  begin  till  we  direct 
our  thoughts,  not  to  the  fact  itself,  but  to  that  which  it 
suggests  as  beyond  itself.  This  difference  is  precisely  that 
which  exists  between  following  the  laws  of  thought,  and 
striving  to  transcend  them ;  —  between  leaving  the  mystery 
of  Knowing  and  Being  unsolved,*  and  making  unlawful  at 
tempts  to  solve  it.  The  facts,  —  that  all  objects  of  thought 
are  conceived  as  wholes  composed  of  parts ;  that  mind 


LECT.  V.  THOUGHT   EXAMINED  141 

acts  upon  matter,  and  matter  upon  mind ;  that  bodies  are 
extended  in  space,  and  thoughts  successive  in  time,  —  do 
not,  in  their  own  statement,  severally  contain  elements 
repulsive  of  each  other.  As  mere  facts,  they  are  so  far 
from  being  inconceivable,  that  they  embody  the  very  laws 
of  conception  itself,  and  are  experienced  at  every  moment 
as  true :  but  though  we  are  able,  nay,  compelled  to  con 
ceive  them  as  facts,  we  find  it  impossible  to  conceive  them 
as  ultimate  facts.  They  are  made  known  to  us  as  rela 
tions  ;  and  all  relations  are  in  themselves  complex,  and 
imply  simpler  principles;  —  objects  to  be  related,  and  a 
ground  by  which  the  relation  is  constituted.  The  con 
ception  of  any  such  relation  as  a  fact  thus  involves  a  fur 
ther  inquiry  concerning  its  existence  as  a  consequence; 
and  to  this  inquiry  no  satisfactory  answer  can  be  given. 
Thus  the  highest  principles  of  thought  and  action,  to  which 
we  can  attain,  are  regulative,  not  speculative; —  they  do 
not  serve  to  satisfy  the  reason,  but  to  guide  the  conduct ; 
they  do  not  tell  us  what  things  are  in  themselves,  but  how 
we  must  conduct  ourselves  in  relation  to  them. 

The  conclusion  which  this  condition  of  human  conscious 
ness  almost  irresistibly  forces  upon  us,  is  one  which  equally 
exhibits  the  strength  and  the  weakness  of  the  Jiuman  intel 
lect.  We  are  compelled  to  admit  that  the  mind,  in  its 
contemplation  of  objects,  is 'not  the  mere  passive  recipient 
of  the  things  presented  to  it ;  but  has  an  activity  and  a 
law  of  its  own,  by  virtue  of  which  it  reacts  upon  the  ma 
terials  existing  without,  and  moulds  them  into  that  form 
in  which  consciousness  is  capable  of  apprehending  them. 
The  existence  of  modes  of  thought,  which  we  are  com 
pelled  to  accept  as  at  the  same  time  relatively  ultimate 
and  absolutely  derived,  —  as  limits  beyond  which  we  can 
not  penetrate,  yet  which  themselves  proclaim  that  there  is 


142  LIMITS   OF  RELIGIOUS  LECT.  V. 

a  further  truth  behind  and  above  them,  —  suggests,  as  its 
obvious  explanation,  the  hypothesis  of  a  mind  cramped  by 
its  own  laws,  and  bewildered  in  the  contemplation  of  its 
own  forms.  If  the  mind,  in  the  act  of  consciousness,  were 
merely  blank  and  inert ;  —  if  the  entire  object  of  its  con 
templation  came  from  without,  and  nothing  from  within ; 
—  no  fact  of  consciousness  would  be  inexplicable;  for 
everything  would  present  itself  as  it  is.  No  reality  would 
be  suggested,  beyond  what  is  actually  given :  no  question 
would  be  asked  which  is  not  already  answered.  For  how 
can  doubt  arise,  where  there  is  no  innate  power  in  the 
mind  to  think  beyond  what  is  placed  before  it,  —  to  react 
upon  that  which  acts  upon  it?  But  upon  the  contrary 
supposition,  all  is  regular,  and  the  result  such  as  might 
naturally  be  expected.  If  thought  has  laws  of  its  own, 
it  cannot  by  its  own  act  go  beyond  them ;  yet  the  recogni 
tion  of  law,  as  a  restraint,  implies  the  existence  of  a  sphere 
of  liberty  beyond.  If  the  mind  contributes  its  own  ele 
ment  to  the  objects  of  consciousness,  it  must,  in  its  first 
recognition  of  those  objects,  necessarily  regard  them  as 
something  complex,  something  generated  partly  from  with 
out  and  partly  from  within.  Yet  in  that  very  recognition 
of  the  complex,  as  such,  is  implied  an  impossibility  of 
attaining  to  the  simple ;  for  to  resolve  the  composition  is 
to  destroy  the  very  act  of  knowledge,  and  the  relation  by 
which  consciousness  is  constituted.  The  object  of  which 
we  are  conscious  is  thus,  to  adopt  the  well-known  language 
of  the  Kantian  philosophy,  a  phenomenon,  not  a  thing  in 
itself;  —  a  product,  resulting  from  the  twofold  action  of 
the  thing  apprehended,  on  the  one  side,  and  the  faculties 
apprehending  it,  on  the  other.  The  perceiving  subject 
alone,  and  the  perceived  object  alone,  are  two  unmeaning 
elements,  which  first  acquire  a  significance  in  and  by  the 
act  of  their  conjunction.  (10) 


LECT.  V.  THOUGHT  EXAMINED.  143 

It  is  thus  strictly  in  analogy  with  the  method  of  God's 
Providence  in  the  constitution  of  man's  mental  faculties, 
if  we  believe  that,  in  Religion  also,  He  has  given  us  truths 
which  are  designed  to  be  regulative,  rather  than  specula 
tive  ;  intended,  not  to  satisfy  our  reason,  but  to  guide  our 
practice ;  not  to  tell  us  what  God  is  in  His  absolute  nature, 
but  how  He  wills  that  we  should  think  of  Him  in  our  pres 
ent  finite  state.  (n)  In  my  last  Lecture,  I  endeavored  to 
show  that  our  knowledge  of  God  is  not  a  consciousness  of 
the  Infinite  as  such,  but  that  of  the  relation  of  a  Person 
to  a  Person;  —  the  conception  of  personality  being,  hu 
manly  speaking,  one  of  limitation.  This  amounts  to  the 
admission  that,  in  natural  religion  at  least,  our  knowledge 
of  God  does  not  satisfy  the  conditions  of  speculative  phi 
losophy,  and  is  incapable  of  reduction  to  an  ultimate  and 
absolute  truth.  And  this,  as  we  now  see,  is  in  accordance 
with  the  analogy  which  the  character  of  human  philosophy 
in  other  provinces  would  naturally  lead  us  to  expect.  <12)  It 
is  reasonable  also  that  we  should  expect  to  find,  as  part 
of  the  same  analogy,  that  the  revealed  manifestation  of  the 
Divine  nature  and  attributes  should  also  carry  on  its  face 
the  marks  of  subordination  to  some  higher  truth,  of  which 
it  indicates  the  existence,  but  does  not  make  known  the 
substance.  It  is  to  be  expected  that  our  apprehension  of 
the  revealed  Deity  should  involve  mysteries  inscrutable 
and  doubts  insoluble  by  our  present  faculties:  while,  at 
the  same  time,  it  inculcates  the  true  spirit  in  which  such 
doubts  should  be  dealt  with ;  by  warning  us,  as  plainly  as 
such  a  warning  is  possible,  that  we  see  a  part  only,  and  not 
the  whole ;  that  we  behold  effects  only,  and  not  causes ; 
that  our  knowledge  of  God,  though  revealed  by  Himself, 
is  revealed  in  relation  to  human  faculties,  and  subject  to 
the  limitations  and  imperfections  inseparable  from  the  con- 


144  LIMITS   OP  RELIGIOUS  LECT.  V. 

stitution  of  the  human  mind.(13)  We  may  neglect  this 
warning  if  we  please  :  we  may  endeavor  to  supply  the 
imperfection,  and  thereby  make  it  more  imperfect  still :  we 
may  twist  and  torture  the  divine  image  on  the  rack  of 
human  philosophy,  and  call  its  mangled  relics  by  the  high- 
sounding  titles  of  the  Absolute  and  the  Infinite;  but  these 
ambitious  conceptions,  the  instant  we  attempt  to  employ 
them  in  any  act  of  thought,  manifest  at  once,  by  their 
inherent  absurdities,  that  they  are  not  that  which  they 
pretend  to  be;  —  that  in  the  place  of  the  Absolute  and 
Infinite  manifested  in  its  own  nature,  we  have  merely  the 
Relative  and  Finite  contradicting  itself. 

We  may  indeed  believe,  and  ought  to  believe,  that  the 
knowledge  which  our  Creator  has  permitted  us  to  attain  to, 
whether  by  Revelation  or  by  our  natural  faculties,  is  not 
given  to  us  as  an  instrument  of  deception.  We  may  believe, 
and  ought  to  believe,  that,  intellectually  as  well  as  morally, 
our  present  life  is  a  state  of  discipline  and  preparation  for 
another ;  and  that  the  conceptions  which  we  are  compelled 
to  adopt,  as  the  guides  of  our  thoughts  and  actions  now, 
may  indeed,  in  the  sight  of  a  higher  Intelligence,  be  but 
partial  truth,  but  cannot  be  total  falsehood.  But  in  thus 
believing,  we  desert  the  evidence  of  Reason,  to  rest  on  that 
of  Faith  ;  and  of  the  principles  on  which  Reason  itself  de 
pends,  it  is  obviously  impossible  to  have  any  other  guar 
antee.  But  such  a  Faith,  however  well  founded,  has  itself 
only  a  regulative  and  practical,  not  a  speculative  and  theo 
retical  application.  It  bids  us  rest  content  within  the  limits 
which  have  been  assigned  to  us ;  but  it  cannot  enable  us  to 
overleap  those  limits,  nor  exalt  to  a  more  absolute  character 
the  conclusions  obtained  by  finite  thinkers  under  the  con 
ditions  of  finite  thought.  But,  on  the  other  hand,  we  must 
beware  of  the  opposite  extreme,  —  that  of  mistaking  the 


LECT.   V.  THOUGHT  EXAMINED.  145 

inability  to  affirm  for  the  ability  to  deny.  We  cannot  say 
that  our  conception  of  the  Divine  Nature  exactly  resembles 
that  Nature  in  its  absolute  existence ;  for  we  know  not 
what  that  absolute  existence  is.  But,  for  the  same  reason, 
we  are  equally  unable  to  say  that  it  does  not  resemble ;  for, 
if  we  know  not  the  Absolute  and  Infinite  at  all,  we  cannot 
say  how  far  it  is  or  is  not  capable  of  likeness  or  unlikeness 
to  the  Relative  and  Finite.  We  must  remain  content  with 
the  belief  that  we  have  that  knowledge  of  God  which  is 
best  adapted  to  our  wants  and  training.  How  far  that 
knowledge  represents  God  as  He  is,  we  know  not,  and  we 
have  no  need  to  know. 

The  testimony  of  Scripture,  like  that  of  our  natural  fac 
ulties,  is  plain  and  intelligible,  when  we  are  content  to  accept 
it  as  a  fact  intended  for  our  practical  guidance  :  it  becomes 
incomprehensible,  only  when  we  attempt  to  explain  it  as  a 
theory  capable  of  speculative  analysis.  We  are  distinctly 
told  that  there  is  a  mutual  relation  between  God  and  man, 
as  distinct  agents  ;  — that  God  influences  man  by  His  grace, 
visits  him  with  rewards  or  punishments,  regards  him  with 
love  or  anger ;  —  that  man,  within  his  own  limited  sphere, 
is  likewise  capable  of  "prevailing  with  God;"1  that  his 
prayers  may  obtain  an  answer,  his  conduct  call  down  God's 
favor  or  condemnation.  There  is  nothing  self-contradictory 
or  even  unintelligible  in  this,  if  we  are  content  to  believe 
that  it  is  so,  without  striving  to  understand  how  it  is  so. 
But  the  instant  we  attempt  to  analyze  the  ideas  of  God  as 
infinite  and  man  as  finite  ;  —  to  resolve  the  scriptural  state 
ments  into  the  higher  principles  on  which  their  possibility 
apparently  depends  ;  —  we  are  surrounded  on  every  side  by 
contradictions  of  our  own  raising ;  and,  unable  to  compre 
hend  how  the  Infinite  and  the  Finite  can  exist  in  mutual 

1  Genesis  xxxii.  28. 
13 


146  LIMITS   OF  RELIGIOUS  LECT.  Y. 

relation,  we  are  tempted  to  deny  the  fact  of  that  relation 
altogether,  and  to  seek  a  refuge,  though  it  be  but  insecure 
and  momentary,  in  Pantheism,  which  denies  the  existence 
of  the  Finite,  or  in  Atheism,  which  rejects  the  Infinite. 
And  here,  again,  the  parallel  between  Religion  and  Philos 
ophy  holds :  the  same  limits  of  thought  are  discernible  in 
relation  to  both.  The  mutual  intercourse  of  mind  and  mat 
ter  has  been  explained  away  by  rival  theories  of  Idealism 
on  the  one  side  and  Materialism  on  the  other.  The  unity 
and  plurality,  which  are  combined  in  every  object  of  thought, 
have  been  assailed,  on  this  side  by  the  Eleatic,  who  main 
tains  that  all  things  are  one,  and  variety  a  delusion  ;  (14>  on 
th.it  side  by  the  Skeptic,  who  tells  us  that  there  is  no  unity, 
but  merely  a  mixture  of  differences ;  that  nothing  is,  but  all 
things  arc  ever  becoming ;  that  mind  and  body,  as  sub 
stances,  are  mere  philosophical  fictions,  invented  for  the 
support  of  isolated  impressions  and  ideas.  (15>  The  mystery 
of  Necessity  and  Liberty  has  its  philosophical  as  well  as  its 
theological  aspect :  and  a  parallel  may  be  found  to  both,  in 
the  counter-labyrinth  of  Continuity  in  Space,  whose  mazes 
are  sufficiently  bewildering  to  show  that  the  perception  of 
our  bodily  senses,  however  certain  as  a  fact,  reposes,  in  its 
ultimate  analysis,  upon  a  mystery  no  less  insoluble  than  that 
which  envelops  the  free  agency  of  man  in  its  relation  to  the 
Divine  Omniscience.  <16) 

Action,  and  not  knowledge,  is  man's  destiny  and  duty  in 
this  life ;  and  his  highest  principles,  both  in  philosophy 
and  in  religion,  have  reference  to  this  end.  But  it  does 
not  follow,  on  that  account,  that  our  representations  are 
untrue,  because  they  are  imperfect.  To  assert  that  a  rep 
resentation  is  untrue,  because  it  is  relative  to  the  mind  of 
the  receiver,  is  to  overlook  the  fact  that  truth  itself  is 
nothing  more  than  a  relation.  Truth  and  falsehood  are  not 


LECT.  V.  THOUGHT  EXAMINED.  147 

properties  of  things  in  themselves,  but  of  our  conceptions, 
and  are  tested,  not  by  the  comparison  of  conceptions  with 
things  in  themselves,  but  with  things  as  they  are  given  in 
some  other  relation.  My  conception  of  an  object  of  sense 
is  trite,  when  it  corresponds  to  the  characteristics  of  the 
object  as  I  perceive  it ;  but  the  perception  itself  is  equally 
a  relation,  and  equally  implies  the  cooperation  of  human 
faculties.  Truth  in  relation  to  no  intelligence  is  a  contra 
diction  in  terms  :  our  highest  conception  of  absolute  truth 
is  that  of  truth  in  relation  to  all  intelligences.  But  of  the 
consciousness  of  intelligences  different  from  our  own  we 
have  no  knowledge,  and  can  make  no  application.  Truth, 
therefore,  in  relation  to  man,  admits  of  no  other  test  than 
the  harmonious  consent  of  all  human  faculties ;  and,  as  no 
such  faculty  can  take  cognizance  of  the  Absolute,  it  follows 
that  correspondence  with  the  Absolute  can  never  be  re 
quired  as  a  test  of  truth.  (17)  The  utmost  deficiency  that 
can  be  charged  against  human  faculties  amounts  only  to 
this :  —  that  we  cannot  say  that  we  know  God  as  God 
knows  himself;  (18>  —  that  the  truth  of  which  our  finite 
minds  are  susceptible  may,  for  aught  we  know,  be  but  the 
passing  shadow  of  some  higher  reality,  which  exists  only 
in  the  Infinite  Intelligence. 

That  the  true  conception  of  the  Divine  Nature,  so  far  as 
we  are  able  to  receive  it,  is  to  be  found  in  those  regulative 
representations  which  exhibit  God  under  limitations  accom 
modated  to  the  constitution  of  man  :  not  in  the  unmeaning 

'  & 

abstractions  which,  aiming  at  a  higher  knowledge,  distort, 
rather  than  exhibit,  the  Absolute  and  the  Infinite  ;  is  thus 
a  conclusion  warranted,  both  deductively,  from  the  recog 
nition  of  the  limits  of  human  thought,  and  inductively,  by 
what  we  can  gather  from  experience  and  analogy  concern 
ing  God's  general  dealings  with  mankind.  There  remains 


148  LIMITS   OF   RELIGIOUS  LECT.  Y. 

yet  a  third  indispensable  probation,  to  which  the  same  con 
clusion  must  be  subjected;  namely,  how  far  does  it  agree 
with  the  teaching  of  Holy  Scripture  ? 

In  no  respect  is  the  Theology  of  the  Bible,  as  contrasted 
with  the  mythologies  of  human  invention,  more  remarkable, 
than  in  the  manner  in  which  it  recognizes  and  adapts  itself 
to  that  complex  and  self-limiting  constitution  of  the  human 
mind,  which  man's  wisdom  finds  so  difficult  to  acknowledge. 
To  human  reason,  the  personal  and  the  infinite  stand  out  in 
apparently  irreconcilable  antagonism ;  and  the  recognition 
of  the  one  in  a  religious  system  almost  inevitably  involves 
the  sacrifice  of  the  other.  The  Personality  of  God  disap 
pears  in  the  Pantheism  of  India ;  His  Infinity  is  lost  sight 
of  in  the  Polytheism  of  Greece.  <19)  In  the  Hebrew  Scrip 
tures,  on  the  contrary,  throughout  all  their  variety  of 
Books  and  Authors,  one  method  of  Divine  teaching  is  con 
stantly  manifested,  appealing  alike  to  the  intellect  and  to 
the  feelings  of  man.  From  first  to  last  we  hear  the  echo 
of  that  first  great  Commandment :  "  Hear,  O  Israel :  The 
Lord  our  God  is  one  Lord :  and  thou  shalt  love  thy  God 
with  all  thine  heart,  and  with  all  thy  soul,  and  with  all 
thy  might. " 2  God  is  plainly  and  uncompromisingly  pro 
claimed  as  the  One  and  the  Absolute  :  "I  am  the  first,  and 
I  am  the  last ;  and  beside  me  there  is  no  God :  "  2  yet  this 
sublime  conception  is  never  for  an  instant  so  exhibited  r.s 
to  furnish  food  for  that  mystical  contemplation  to  which 
the  Oriental  mind  is  naturally  so  prone.  On  the  contrary, 
in  all  that  relates  to  the  feelings  and  duties  by  which  relig 
ion  is  practically  to  be  regulated,  we  cannot  help  observ 
ing  how  the  Almighty,  in  communicating  with  His  people, 
condescends  to  place  Himself  on  what  may,  humanly  speak 
ing,  be  called  a  lower  level  than  that  on  which  the  natural 

1  Deuteronomy  vi.  4,  5.    St.  Mark  xii.  29,  30.  2  Isaiah  xliv.  6. 


LECT.  V.          THOUGHT  EXAMINED.          .    149 

reason  of  man  would  be  inclined  to  exhibit  Him.  While 
His  Personality  is  never  suffered  to  sink  to  a  merely  human 
representation ;  while  it  is  clearly  announced  that  His 
thoughts  are  not  our  thoughts,  nor  His  ways  our  ways,1  yet 
His  Infinity  is  never  for  a  moment  so  manifested  as  to  de 
stroy  or  weaken  the  ,  vivid  reality  of  those  human  attributes, 
under  which  He  appeals  to  the  human  sympathies  of  His 
creature.  "  The  Lord  spake  unto  Moses  face  to  face,  as  a 
man  speaketh  unto  his  friend."  2  He  will  listen  to  our  sup 
plications  : 3  He  will  help  those  that  cry  unto  Him : 4  He 
reserveth  wrath  for  His  enemies : 5  He  is  appeased  by 
repentance  : G  He  showeth  mercy  to  them  that  love  Him.7 
As  a  King,  He  listens  to  the  petitions  of  His  subjects  : 8  as 
a  Father,  He  pitieth  His  own  children.9  It  is  impossible  to 
contemplate  this  marvellous  union  of  the  human  and  divine, 
so  perfectly  adapted  to  the  wants  of  the  human  servant  of 
a  divine  Master,  without  feeling  that  it  is  indeed  the  work 
of  Him  who  formed  the  spirit  of  man,  and  fitted  him  for 
the  service  of  His  Maker.  "He  showeth  His  word  unto 
Jacob,  His  statutes  and  ordinances  unto  Israel.  He  hath 
not  dealt  so  with  any  nation ;  neither  have  the  heathen 
knowledge  of  His  laws."  10 

But  if  this  is  the  lesson  taught  us  by  that  earlier  mani 
festation  in  which  God  is  represented  under  the  likeness 
of  human  attributes,  what  may  we  learn  from  that  later 
and  fuller  revelation  which  tells  us  of  One  who  is  Himself 
both  God  and  Man  ?  The  Father  has  revealed  Himself  to 


l  Isaiah  Iv.  8.  2  Exodus  xxxiii.  11.  3  Psalm  cxlii.  1, 2. 

4  Psalm  cii.  17, 18;  cxlv.  19.    Isaiah  Iviii.  9.         6  Nahum  i.  2. 

6  1  Kings  xxi.  19.   Jeremiah  xviii.  8.    Ezekiel  xviii.  23,  30.    Jonah  iii.  10. 

7  Exodus  xx.  6.       8  Psalm  v.  2;  Ixxiv.  12.    Isaiah  xxxiii.  22. 

9  Psalm  ciii.  13.  w  Psalm  cxlvii.  19,  20. 

13* 


150  LIMITS    OF   RELIGIOUS  LECT.  V. 

mankind  under  human  types  and  images,  that  He  may  ap 
peal  more  earnestly  and  effectually  to  man's  consciousness 
of  the  human  spirit  within  him.  The  Son  has  done  more 
than  this  :  He  became  for  our  sakes  very  Man,  made  in  all 
things  like  unto  His  brethren ; l  the  Mediator  between  God 
and  men,2  being  both  God  and  Man.  (2°)  Herein  is  our 
justification,  if  we  refuse  to  aspire  beyond  those  limits  of 
human  thought  in  which  He  has  placed  us.  Herein  is  our 
answer,  if  any  man  would  spoil  us  through  philosophy 
and  vain  deceit.3  Is  it  irrational  to  contemplate  God  under 
symbols  drawn  from  the  human  consciousness?  Christ 
is  our  pattern  :  "  for  in  Him  dwelleth  all  the  fulness  of 
the  Godhead  bodily." 4  <21)  Is  it  unphilosophical  that  our 
thoughts  of  God  should  be  subject  to  the  law  of  time  ? 
It  was  when  the  fulness  of  the  time  was  come,  that  God 
sent  forth  his  Son.5  (22)  Does  the  philosopher  bid  us  strive 
to  transcend  the  human,  and  to  annihilate  our  own  person 
ality  in  the  presence  of  the  Infinite  ?  The  Apostle  tells 
us  to  look  forward  to  the  time  when  we  shall  "all  come  in 
the  unity  of  the  faith,  and  of  the  knowledge  of  the  Son 
of  God,  unto  a  perfect  man,  unto  the  measure  of  the  stat 
ure  of  the  fulness  of  Christ." 6  Does  human  wisdom  seek, 
by  some  transcendental  form  of  intuition,  to  behold  God 
as  He  is  in  his  infinite  nature ;  repeating  in  its  own  man 
ner  the  request  of  Philip,  "Lord,  show  us  the  Father,  and 
it  sufficeth  us  ?  "  Christ  Himself  has  given  the  rebuke 
and  the  reply :  "  He  that  hath  seen  me  hath  seen  the 
Father  ;  and  how  sayest  thou  then,  Show  us  the  Fa 
ther?"7 


i  Hebrews  ii.  17.       2  i  Timothy  ii.  5.        3  Colossians  ii.  8. 

4  Colossians  ii.  9.  5  Galadans  iv.  4.  6  Ephesians  iv.  13. 

7  St.  John  xiv.  8,  9. 


LECT.  V.          THOUGHT  EXAMINED.  .   151 

The  doctrine  of  a  personal  Christ,  very  God  and  very 
Man,  has  indeed  been  the  great  stumblingblock  in  the 
way  of  those  so-called  philosophical  theologians  who,  in 
their  contempt  for  the  historical  and  temporal,  Avould 
throw  aside  the  vivid  revelation  of  a  living  and  acting 
God,  to  take  refuge  in  the  empty  abstraction  of  an  imper 
sonal  idea.  And  accordingly,  they  have  made  various  elab 
orate  attempts  to  substitute  in  its  place  a  conception 
more  in  accordance  with  the  supposed  requirements  of 
speculative  philosophy.  Let  us  hear  on  this  point,  and  un 
derstand  as  we  best  may,  the  language  of  the  great  leader 
of  the  chief  modern  school  of  philosophical  rationalists. 
"  To  grasp  rightly  and  definitely  in  thought,"  says  Hegel, 
"  the  nature  of  God  as  a  Spirit,  demands  profound  specula 
tion.  These  propositions  are  first  of  all  contained  therein: 
God  is  God  only  in  so  far  as  He  knows  Himself:  His  own 
self-knowledge  is  moreover  His  self-consciousness  in  man, 
and  man's  knowledge  of  God,  which  is  developed  into 
man's  self-knowledge  in  God."  .  .  .  "The  Form  of  the 
Absolute  Spirit,"  he  continues,  "  separates  itself  from  the 
Substance,  and  in  it  the  different  phases  of  the  conception 
part  into  separate  spheres  or  elements,  in  each  of  which 
the  Absolute  Substance  exhibits  itself,  first  as  an  eternal 
substance,  abiding  in  its  manifestation  with  itself;  sec 
ondly,  as  a  distinguishing  of  the  eternal  Essence  from  its 
manifestation,  which  through  this  distinction  becomes  the 
world  of  appearance,  into  which  the  substance  of  the  ab 
solute  Spirit  enters  ;  thirdly,  as  an  endless  return  and 
reconciliation  of  the  world  thus  projected  with  the  eternal 
Essence,  by  which  that  Essence  goes  back  from  appear 
ance  into  the  unity  of  its  fulness. "(23)  The  remainder  of 
the  passage  carries  out  this  metaphysical  caricature  of 
Christian  doctrine  into  further  details,  bearing  on  my  pros- 


152  LIMITS   OF  RELIGIOUS  LECT.  Y. 

ent  argument,  but  with  even  additional  obscurity ;  —  an 
obscurity  so -great,  that  the  effect  of  a  literal  translation 
would  be  too  ludicrous  for  an  occasion  like  the  present. 
But  enough  has  been  quoted  to  show  that  if  rationalizing 
philosophers  have  not  made  much  progress,  since  the  days 
of  Job,  in  the  ability  to  find  out  the  Almighty  unto  perfec 
tion,1  they  have  at  least  not  gone  backwards  in  the  art  of 
darkening  counsel  by  words  without  knowledge.2 

"VYhat  is  the  exact  meaning  of  this  profound  riddle,  which 
the  author  has  repeated  in  different  forms  in  various  parts 
of  his  writings ;  (24) —  whether  he  really  means  to  assert  or 
to  deny  the  existence  of  Christ  as  a  man ;  —  whether  he 
designs  to  represent  the  Incarnation  and  earthly  life  of  the 
Son  of  God  as  a  fact,  or  only  as  the  vulgar  representation 
of  a  philosophical  idea,  —  is  a  point  which  has  been  stoutly 
disputed  among  his  disciples,  and  which  possibly  the  phi 
losopher  himself  did  not  wish  to  see  definitely  settled.  (25) 
But  there  is  another  passage,  in  which  he  has  spoken  some 
what  more  plainly,  and  which,  without  being  quite  decisive, 
may  be  quoted  as  throwing  some  light  on  the  tendency  of 
his  thought.  "  Christ,"  says  this  significant  passage,  "  has 
been  called  by  the  church  the  God-Man.  This  monstrous 
combination  is  to  the  understanding  a  direct  contradiction ; 
but  the  unity  of  the  divine  and  human  nature  is  in  this 
respect  brought  into  consciousness  and  certainty  in  man  ; 
in  that  the  Diversity,  or,  as  we  may  also  express  it,  the 
Finiteness,  Weakness,  Frailty  of  human  nature,  is  not 
incompatible  with  this  Unity,  as  in  the  eternal  Idea  Di 
versity  in  nowise  derogates  from  the  Unity  which  is  God. 
This  is  the  monstrosity  whose  necessity  we  have  seen.  It 
is  therein  implied  that  the  divine  and  human  nature  are 
not  in  themselves  different.  God  in  human  form.  The 

i  Job  xi.  7.  2  Job  xxxviii.  2. 


LECT.  V.  THOUGHT  EXAMINED.  153 

truth  is,  that  there  is  but  one  Reason,  one  Spirit ;  that  the 
Spirit  as  finite  has  no  real  existence."  (2°) 

The  dark  sentences  of  the  master  have  been,  as  might 
naturally  be  expected,  variously  developed  by  his  disciples. 
Let  us  hear  how  the  same  theory  is  expressed  in  the  lan 
guage  of  one  who  is  frequently  commended  as  representing 
the  orthodox  theology  of  this  school,  and  who  has  striven 
hard  to  reconcile  the  demands  of  his  philosophy  with  the 
belief  in  a  personal  Christ.  Marheineke  assures  us,  that 
"  the  possibility  of  God  becoming  Man  shows  in  itself  that 
the  divine  and  human  nature  are  in  themselves  not  sepa 
rate  : "  that,  "  as  the  truth  of  the  human  nature  is  the  di 
vine,  so  the  reality  of  the  divine  nature  is  the  human."  <27) 
And  towards  the  conclusion  of  a  statement  worthy  to  rank 
with  that  of  his  master  for  grandiloquent  obscurity,  he  says, 
"  As  Spirit,  by  renouncing  Individuality,  Man  is  in  truth 
elevated  above  himself,  without  having  abandoned  the 
human  nature  :  as  Spirit  renouncing  Absoluteness,  God 
has  lowered  Himself  to  human  nature,  without  having 
abandoned  his  existence  as  Divine  Spirit.  The  unity  of 
the  divine  and  human  nature  is  but  the  unity  in  that 
Spirit  whose  existence  is  the  knowledge  of  the  truth,  with 
which  the  doing  of  good  is  identical.  This  Spirit,  as  God 
in  the  human  nature  and  as  Man  in  the  divine  nature,  is 
the  God-Man.  The  man  wise  in  divine  holiness,  and  holy  in 
divine  wisdom,  is  the  God-Man.  As  a  historical  fact,"  he 
continues,  "  this  union  of  God  with  man  is  manifest  and 
real  in  the  Person  of  Jesus  Christ :  in  Him  the  divine 
manifestation  has  become  perfectly  human.  The  concep 
tion  of  the  God-Man  in  the  historical  Person  of  Jesus 
Christ,  contains  in  itself  two  phases  in  one ;  first,  that  God 
is  manifest  only  through  man ;  and  in  this  relation  Christ 
is  as  yet  placed  on  an  equality  with  all  other  men  :  He  is 


154  LIMITS  OF  RELIGIOUS  LECT.  V. 

the  Son  of  Man,  and  therein  at  first  represents  only  the 
possibility  of  God  becoming  Man :  secondly,  that  in  this 
Man,  Jesus  Christ,  God  is  manifest,  as  in  none  other :  this 
manifest  Man  is  the  manifest  God ;  but  the  manifest  God 
is  the  Son  of  God ;  and  in  this  relation,  Christ  is  God's 
Son ;  and  this  is  the  actual  fulfilment  of  the  possibility  or 
promise  ;  it  is  the  reality  of  God  becoming  Man."  C28) 

But  this  kind  of  halting  between  t\vo  opinions,  which 
endeavors  to  combine  the  historical  fact  with  the  philo 
sophical  theory,  was  not  of  a  nature  to  satisfy  the  bolder 
and  more  logical  minds  of  the  same  school.  In  the  theory 
of  Strauss,  we  find  the  direct  antagonism  between  the  his 
torical  and  the  philosophical  Christ  fairly  acknowledged ; 
and  the  former  is  accordingly  set  aside  entirely,  to  make 
way  for  the  latter.  And  here  we  have  at  least  the  advan 
tage,  that  the  trumpet  gives  no  uncertain  sound  ;  —  that 
we  are  no  longer  deluded  by  a  phantom  of  Christian  doc 
trine  enveloped  in  a  mist  of  metaphysical  obscurity;  but 
the  two  systems  stand  out  sharply  and  clearly  defined,  in 
their  utter  contrariety  to  each  other.  "  In  an  individual,  a 
God-Man,"  he  tells  us,  "the  properties  and  functions  which 
the  church  ascribes  to  Christ  contradict  themselves  ;  in  the 
idea  of  the  race,  they  perfectly  agree.  Humanity  is  the 
union  of  the  two  natures  —  God  become  Man,  the  infinite 
manifesting  itself  in  the  finite,  and  the  finite  Spirit  remem 
bering  its  infinitude  :  it  is  the  child  of  the  visible  Mother 
and  the  invisible  Father,  Nature  and  Spirit :  it  is  the 
worker  of  miracles,  in  so  far  as  in  the  course  of  human 
history  the  spirit  more  and  more  completely  subjugates 
nature,  both  within  and  around  man,  until  it  lies  before 
him  as  the  inert  matter  on  which  he  exercises  his  active 
power :  it  is  the  sinless  one,  for  the  course  of  its  develop 
ment  is  a  blameless  one ;  pollution  cleaves  to  the  individ- 


LECT  V.          THOUGHT  EXAMINED.  155 

nnl  only,  but  in  the  race  and  its  history  it  is.  taken  awny. 
It  is  Humanity  that  dies,  rises,  and  ascends  to  heaven ; 
for  from  the  negation  of  its  natural  state  there  ever  pro 
ceeds  a  higher  spiritual  life ;  from  the  suppression  of  its 
finite  character  as  a  personal,  national,  and  terrestrial  Spirit, 
arises  its  union  with  the  infinite  Spirit  of  the  heavens.  By 
faith  in  this  Christ,  especially  in  his  death  and  resurrection, 
man  is  justified  before  God  :  that  is,  by  the  kindling  within 
him  of  the  idea  of  Humanity,  the  individual  man  partici 
pates  in  the  divinely  human  life  of  the  species.  Now  the 
main  element  of  that  idea  is,  that  the  negation  of  the 
merely  natural  and  sensual  life,  which  is  itself  the  negation 
of  the  spirit  (the  negation  of  negation,  therefore),  is  the 
sole  way  to  true  spiritual  life."  (29) 

These  be  thy  gods,  O  Philosophy :  these  are  the  Meta 
physics  of  Salvation.  (>3°)  This  is  that  knowledge  of  things 
divine  and  human,  which  we  are  called  upon  to  substitute 
for  the  revealed  doctrine  of  the  Incarnation  of  the  eternal 
Son  in  the  fulness  of  time.  It  is  for  this  philosophical  idea, 
so  superior  to  all  history  and  fact,  —  this  necessary  process 
of  the  unconscious  and  impersonal  Infinite,  —  that  we  are 
to  sacrifice  that  blessed  miracle  of  Divine  Love  and  Mercy, 
by  which  the  Son  of  God,  of  His  own  free  act  and  will,  took 
man's  nature  upon  Him  for  man's  redemption.  It  is  for  this 
that  we  are  to  obliterate  from  our  faith  that  touching  picture 
of  the  pure  and  holy  Jesus,  to  which  mankind  for  eighteen 
centuries  has  ever  turned,  with  the  devotion  of  man  to  God 
rendered  only  more  heartfelt  by  the  sympathy  of  love  be 
tween  man  and  man  :  which  from  generation  to  generation 
has  nurtured  the  first  seeds  of  religion  in  the  opening  mind 
of  childhood,  by  the  image  of  that  Divine  Child  who  was 
cradled  in  the  manger  of  Bethlehem,  and  was  subject  to 
His  parents  at  Xazareth :  which  has  checked  the  fiery 


156  LIMITS   OF  EELIGIOUS  LECT.    V. 

temptations /)f  youth,  by  the  thought  of  Him  who  "  was  in 
all  points  tempted  like  as  we  are,  yet  without  sin  :  "x  which 
has  consoled  the  man  struggling  with  poverty  and  sorrow, 
by  the  pathetic  remembrance  of  Him  who  on  earth  had  not 
where  to  lay  his  head : 2  which  has  blended  into  one  broth 
erhood  the  rich  and  the  poor,  the  mighty  and  the  menu 
among  mankind,  by  the  example  of  Him  who,  though  He 
was  rich,  yet  for  our  sakes  became  poor;3  though  He  was 
equal  with  God,  yet  took  upon  Him  the  form  of  a  servant:4 
which  has  given  to  the  highest  and  purest  precepts  of 
morality  an  additional  weight  and  sanction,  by  the  records 
of  that  life  in  which  the  marvellous  and  the  familiar  are  so 
strangely  yet  so  perfectly  united;  —  that  life  so  natural  in 
its  human  virtue,  so  supernatural  in  its  divine  power  :  which 
has  robbed  death  of  its  sting,  and  the  grave  of  its  victory, 
by  faith  in  Him  who  "  wras  delivered  for  our  offences,  and 
was  raised  again  for  our  justification  :  "5  which  has  ennobled 
and  sanctified  even  therwants  and  weaknesses  of  our  mortal 
nature,  by  the  memory  of  Him  who  was  an  hungered  in  the 
wilderness  and  athirst  upon  the  cross ;  who  mourned  over 
the  destruction  of  Jerusalem,  and  wept  at  the  grave  of 
Lazarus. 

Let  Philosophy  say  what  she  will,  the  fact  remains  un 
shaken.  It  is  the  consciousness  of  the  deep  wants  of  our 
human  nature,  that  first  awakens  God's  presence  in  the  soul; 
it  is  by  adapting  His  Revelation  to  those  wants  that  God 
graciously  condescends  to  satisfy  them.  The  time  may 
indeed  come,  though  not  in  this  life,  when  these  various 
manifestations  of  God,  "  at  sundry  times  and  in  divers  man 
ners,"6  may  be  seen  to  be  but  different  sides  and  partial 


1  Hebrews  iv.  15.  2  St.  Luke  ix.  58.  3  2  Corinthians  viii.  9. 

4  Philippians  ii.  G,  7.        fl  Romans  iv.  25.  6  Hebrews  i.  1. 


LECT.  V.  THOUGHT   EXAMINED.  157 

representations  of  one  and  the  same  Divine  Reality  ; — when 
the  light  which  now  gleams  in  restless  flashes  from  the  ruf 
fled  waters  of  the  human  soul,  will  settle  into  the  steadfast 
image  of  God's  face  shining  on  its  unbroken  surface.  But 
ere  this  shall  be,  that  which  is  perfect  must  come,  and  that 
which  is  in  part  must  be  done  away.1  But  as  regards  the 
human  wisdom  which  would  lead  us  to  this  consummation 
now,  there  is  but  one  lesson  which  it  can  teach  us ;  and  that 
it  teaches  in  spite  of  itself.  It  teaches  the  lesson  which  the 
wise  king  of  Israel  learned  from  his  own  experience  :  "  I 
gave  my  heart  to  seek  and  search  out  by  wisdom  concerning 
all  things  that  are  done  under  heaven :  I  have  seen  all  the 
works  that  are  done  under  the  sun  :  and,  behold,  all  is  vanity 
and  vexation  of  spirit.  And  I  gave  my  heart  to  know  wis 
dom,  and  to  know  madness  and  folly  :  I  perceived  that  this 
also  is  vexation  of  spirit."2  And  if  ever  the  time  should 
come  to  any  of  us,  when,  in  the  bitter  conviction  of  that 
vanity  and  vexation,  we,  who  would  be  as  gods  in  knowl 
edge,  wake  up  only  to  the  consciousness  of  our  own  naked 
ness,  happy  shall  we  be,  if  then  we  may  still  hear,  ringing 
in  our  ears  and  piercing  to  our  hearts,  an  echo  from  that 
personal  life  of  Jesus  which  our  philosophy  has  striven  in 
vain  to  pervert  or  to  destroy :  "  Lord,  to  whom  shall  wre  go? 
thou  hast  the  words  of  eternal  life:  and  we  believe  and  are 
sure  that  thou  art  that  Christ,  the  Son  of  the  living  God."3 

i  1  Corinthians  xiii.  10.  2  Ecclesiastes  i.  13,  14,  17. 

3  St.  John  vi.  68,  69, 

14 


LECTURE    VI. 

FOR  WHAT  MAN  KNOWETH  THE  THINGS  OF  A  MAN,  SAVE  THE  SPIRIT 
OF  MAN  WHICH  IS  IN  HIM?  EVEN  SO  THE  THINGS  OF  GOD  KNOW- 
ETH  NO  MAN,  BUT  THE  SPIRIT  OF  GOD.  — 1  CORINTHIANS  II.  11. 

THE  conclusion  to  be  drawn  from  our  previous  inquiries 
is,  that  the  doctrines  of  Revealed  Religion,  like  all  other 
objects  of  human  thought,  have  a  relation  to  the  constitu 
tion  of  the  thinker  to  whom  they  are  addressed ;  within 
which  relation  their  practical  application  and  significance 
is  confined.  At  the  same  time,  this  very  relation  indicates 
the  existence  of  a  higher  form  of  the  same  truths,  beyond 
the  range  of  human  intelligence,  and  therefore  not  capable 
of  representation  in  any  positive  mode  of  thought.  Relig 
ious  ideas,  in  short,  like  all  other  objects  of  man's  conscious 
ness,  are  composed  of  two  distinct  elements,  —  a  Matter, 
furnished  from  without,  and  a  Form,  imposed  from  within 
by  the  laws  of  the  mind  itself.  The  latter  element  is  com 
mon  to  all  objects  of  thought  as  such :  the  former  is  the 
peculiar  and  distinguishing  feature,  by  which  the  doc 
trines  of  Revelation  are  distinguished  from  other  religi 
ous  representations,  derived  from  natural  sources ;  or  by 
which,  in  more  remote  comparison,  religious  ideas  in  gen- 


LECT.  VI.  THOUGHT   EXAMINED.  159 

eral  may  be  distinguished  from  those  relating  to  other 
objects.  Now  it  is  indispensable,  before  we  can  rightly 
estimate  the  value  of  the  various  objections  which  are  ad 
duced  against  this  or  that  representation  of  Christian  doc 
trine,  to  ascertain  which  of  these  elements  it  is,  against 
which  the  force  of  the  objection  really  makes  itself  felt. 
There  may  be  objections  whose  force,  such  as  it  is,  tells 
against  the  revealed  doctrine  alone,  and  which  are  harm 
less  when  directed  against  any  other  mode  of  religious  rep 
resentation.  And  there  may  also  be  objections  which  are 
applicable  to  the  form  which  revealed  religion  shares  in 
common  with  other  modes  of  human  thinking,  and  whose 
force,  if  they  have  any,  is  in  reality  directed,  not  against 
Revelation  in  particular,  but  against  all  Religion,  and 
indeed  against  all  Philosophy  also.  Now  if,  upon  ex 
amination,  it  should  appear  that  the  principal  objections 
which  are  raised  on  the  side  of  Rationalism  properly  so 
called,  —  those,  namely,  which  turn  on  a  supposed  in 
compatibility  between  the  doctrine  of  Scripture  and  the 
deductions  of  human  reason,  are  of  the  latter  kind,  and 
not  of  the  former,  Christianity  is  at  least  so  far  secure 
from  any  apprehension  of  danger  from  the  side  of  rational 
philosophy.  For  the  weapon  with  which  she  is  assailed 
exhibits  its  own  weakness  in  the  very  act  of  assailing.  If 
there  is  error  or  imperfection  in  the  essential  forms  of 
human  thought,  it  must  adhere  to  the  thought  criticizing, 
no  less  than  to  the  thought  criticized;  and  the  result  admits 
of  but  two  legitimate  alternatives.  Either  we  must  aban 
don  ourselves  to  an  absolute  Skepticism,  which  believes 
nothing  and  disbelieves  nothing,  and  which  thereby  de 
stroys  itself  in  believing  that  nothing  is  to  be  believed; 
or  we  must  confess  that  reason,  in  thus  criticizing,  has 
transcended  its  legitimate  province  :  that  it  has  failed,  not 


160  LIMITS   OF  RELIGIOUS  LECT.  VI. 

through  its  inherent  weakness,  but  through  being  misdi 
rected  in  its  aim.  We  must  then  shift  the  inquiry  to  an 
other  field,  and  allow  our  belief  to  be  determined,  not  solely 
by  the  internal  character  of  the  doctrines  themselves,  as 
reasonable  or  unreasonable,  but  partly  at  least,  by  the  evi 
dence  which  can  be  produced  in  favor  of  their  asserted 
origin  as  a  fact.  The  reasonable  believer,  in  short,  must 
abstain  from  pronouncing  judgment  on  the  nature  of  the 
message,  until  he  has  fairly  examined  the  credentials  of  the 


» 
messenger. 


There  are  two  methods  by  which  such  an  examination 
of  objections  may  be  conducted.  We  may  commence  by 
an  analysis  of  thought  in  general,  distinguishing  the  Form, 
or  permanent  element,  from  the  Matter,  or  variable  ele 
ment  ;  and  then,  by  applying  the  results  of  that  analysis 
to  special  instances,  we  may  show,  upon  deductive  grounds, 
the  formal  or  material  character  of  this  or  that  class  of  ob 
jections.  Or  we  may  reverse  the  process,  commencing  by 
an  examination  of  the  objections  themselves  ;  and,  by  ex 
hibiting  them  in  their  relation  to  other  doctrines  besides 
those  of  Revelation,  we  may  arrive  at  the  same  conclusion 
as  to  their  general  or  special  applicability.  The  former 
method  is  perhaps  the  most  searching  and  complete,  but 
could  hardly  be  adequately  carried  out  within  my  present 
limits,  nor  without  the  employment  of  a  language  more 
technical  than  would  be  suitable  on  this  occasion.  In  se 
lecting  the  latter  method,  as  the  more  appropriate,  I  must 
request  my  hearers  to  bear  in  mind  the  general  principles 
which  it  is  proposed  to  exhibit  in  one  or  two  special  in 
stances.  These  are,  first,  that  there  is  no  rational  difficulty 
in  Christian  Theology  which  has  not  its  corresponding 
difficulty  in  human  Philosophy  :  and,  secondly,  that  there 
fore  we  may  reasonably  conclude  that  the  stumbling- 


LECT.  VI.         THOUGHT  EXAMINED.  161 

blocks  which  the  rationalist  professes  to  find  in  the  doc 
trines  of  revealed  religion  arise,  not  from  defects  peculiar 
to  revelation,  but  from  the  laws  and  limits  of  human 
thought  in  general,  and  are  thus  inherent  in  the  method 
of  rationalism  itself,  not  in  the  objects  which  it  pretends 
to  criticize. 

But,  before  applying  this  method  to  the  peculiar  doc 
trines  of  the  Christian  revelation,  it  will  be  desirable  to 
say  a  few  words  on  a  preliminary  condition,  on  which  our 
belief  in  the  possibility  of  any  revelation  at  all  is  depend 
ent.  •  "We  must  justify,  in  the  first  instance,  the  limitations 
which  have  been  assigned  to  human  reason  in  relation  to 
the  great  foundation  of  all  religious  belief  whatsoever :  we 
must  show  how  far  the  same  method  warrants  the  asser 
tion  which  has  been  already  made  on  other  grounds  ; 
namely,  that  we  may  and  ought  to  believe  in  the  existence 
of  a  God  whose  nature  we  are  unable  to  comprehend;  that 
we  are  bound  to  believe  that  God  exists ;  and  to  acknowl 
edge  Him  as  our  Sustainer  and  our  Moral  Governor  : 
though  we  are  wholly  unable  to  declare  what  He  is  in 
His  own  Absolute  Essence.  W 

Many  philosophical  theologians,  who  are  far  from  reject 
ing  any  of  the  essential  doctrines  of  revelation,  are  yet  un 
willing  to  ground  their  acceptance  of  them  on  the  duty  of 
believing  in  the  inconceivable.  "The  doctrine  of  the  in- 
cognizability  of  the  Divine  essence,"  says  the  learned  and 
deep-thinking  Julius  Miiller,  "  with  the  intention  of  exalt 
ing  God  to  the  highest,  deprives  Him  of  the  realities, 
without  which,  as  it  is  itself  obliged  to  confess,  we  cannot 
really  think  of  Him.  That  this  negative  result,  just  as 
decidedly  as  the  assumption  of  an  absolute  knowledge  of 
God,  contradicts  the  Holy  Scriptures,  which  especially 
teach  that  God  becomes  revealed  in  Christ,  as  it  does  that 

14* 


162  LIMITS    OF   RELIGIOUS  LECT.  VI. 

of  the  simple  Christian  consciousness,  may  be  too  easily 
shown  for  it  to  be  requisite  that  we  should  here  enter 
upon  the  same :  it  is  also  of  itself  clear  into  what  a 
strange  position  theology  must  fall  by  the  renunciation  of 
the  knowledge  of  its  essential  object."  (2)  As  regards  the 
former  part  of  this  objection,  I  endeavored,  in  my  last 
Lecture,  to  show  that  a  full  belief  in  God,  as  revealed  in 
Christ,  is  not  incompatible  with  a  speculative  inability  to 
apprehend  the  Divine  Essence.  As  regards  the  latter 
part,  it  is  important  to  observe  the  exact  parallel  which 
in  this  respect  exists  between  the  fundamental  conception 
of  Theology  and  that  of  Philosophy.  The  Principle  of 
Causality,  the  father,  as  it  has  been  called,  of  metaphysi 
cal  science,  <3)  is  to  the  philosopher  what  the  belief  in  the 
existence  of  God  is  to  the  theologian.  Both  are  principles 
inherent  in  our  nature,  exhibiting,  whatever  may  be  their 
origin,  those  characteristics  of  universality  and  certainty 
which  mark  them  as  part  of  the  inalienable  inheritance  of 
the  human  mind.  Neither  can  be  reduced  to  a  mere  logi 
cal  inference  from  the  facts  of  a  limited  and  contingent 
experience.  Both  are  equally  indispensable  to  their  re 
spective  sciences  :  without  Causation,  there  can  be  no  Phi 
losophy  ;  as  without  God  there  can  be  no  Theology.  Yet 
to  this  day,  while  enunciating  now,  as  ever,  the  funda 
mental  axiom,  that  for  every  event  there  must  be  a  Cause, 
Philosophy  has  never  been  able  to  determine  what  Causa 
tion  is ;  to  analyze  the  elements  which  the  causal  nexus 
involves  ;  or  to  show  by  what  law  she  is  justified  in  assum 
ing  the  universal  postulate  upon  which  all  her  reasonings 
depend.  (4)  The  Principle  of  Causality  has  ever  been,  and 
probably  ever  will  be,  the  battle  ground  on  which,  from 
generation  to  generation,  Philosophy  has  struggled  for  her 
very  existence  in  the  death-gripe  of  Skepticism;  and  at 


LECT.  VI.  THOUGHT  EXAMINED.  163 

every  pause  in  the  contest,  the  answer  has  been  still  the 
same  :  "  We  cannot  explain  it,  but  we  must  believe  it." 
Causation  is  not  the  mere  invariable  association  of  antece 
dent  and  consequent :  we  feel  that  it  implies  something 
more  than  this.  <5)  Yet,  beyond  the  little  sphere  of  our 
own  volitions,  what  more  can  we  discover  ?  and  within  that 
sphere,  what  do  we  discover  that  we  can  explain  ?  (6)  The 
unknown  something,  call  it  by  what  name  you  will,  — 
power,  effort,  tendency,  —  still  remains  absolutely  con 
cealed,  yet  is  still  conceived  as  absolutely  indispensable. 
Of  Causality,  as  of  Deity,  we  may  almost  say,  in  the  em 
phatic  language  of  Augustine,  "  Cujus  nulla  scientia  est  in 
anima,  nisi  scire  quomodo  eum  nesciat."  (")  We  can  speak 
out  boldly  and  clearly  of  each,  if  we  are  asked,  what  it  is 
not:  we  are  silent  only  when  we  are  asked,  what  it  is. 
The  eloquent  words  of  the  same  great  father  are  as  appli 
cable  to  human  as  to  divine  Philosophy  r1  "  Deus  ineffabilis 
est :  facilius  dicimus  quid  non  sit,  quam  quid  sit.  Terrain 
cogitas ;  non  est  hoc  Deus :  mare  cogitas ;  non  est  hoc 
Deus :  omnia  qua?  sunt  in  terra,  homines  et  animalia ;  non 
est  hoc  Deus :  omnia  quaa  sunt  in  mari,  qua3  volant  per 
aerem ;  non  est  hoc  Deus :  quidquid  lucet  in  coelo,  stellse, 
sol  et  luna  ;  non  est  hoc  Deus  :  ipsum  ccelum  ;  non  est  hoc 
Deus.  Angelos  cogita,  Virtutes,  Potestates,  Archangelos, 
Thronos,  Sedes,  Dominationes ;  non  est  hoc  Deus.  Et 
quid  est  ?  Hoc  soluni  potui  dicere,  quid  non  sit."  (8) 

1  "  God  is  ineffable;  more  easily  do  we  tell  what  He  is  not,  than  what  He 
is.  You  think  of  earth;  this  is  not  God:  of  the  sea;  this  is  not  God:  of 
all  things  that  are  on  the  earth,  men  and  animals ;  these  are  not  God : 
of  all  that  are  in  the  sea,  that  fly  through  the  air;  these  are  not  God:  of 
whatever  shines  in  heaven,  stars,  sun,  and  moon ;  these  are  not  God :  the 
heaven  itself;  this  is  not  God.  Think  of  Angels,  Virtues,  Powers,  Arch 
angels,  Thrones,  Seats,  Dominations ;  these  are  not  God.  And  what  is 
He?  This  only  can  I  tell,  what  He  is  not." 


164  LIMITS   OF  RELIGIOUS  LECT.  YL 

From  the  fundamental  doctrine  of  Religion  in  general, 
let  us  pass  on  to  that  of  Christianity  in  particular.  "  The 
Catholic  Faith  is  this :  that  we  worship  one  God  in  Trinity, 
and  Trinity  in  Unity."  How,  asks  the  objector,  can  the 
One  be  Many,  or  the  Many  One?  or  how  is  a  distinction 
of  Persons  compatible  with  their  perfect  equality  ?  (9)  It  is 
not  a  contradiction  to  say,  that  we  are  compelled  by  the 
Christian  Verity  to  acknowledge  every  Person  by  Him 
self  to  be  God  and  Lord  ;  and  yet  are  forbidden  by  the 
Catholic  Religion  to  say,  There  be  three  Gods,  or  three 
Lords.  (10) 

To  exhibit  the  philosophical  value  of  this  objection,  we 
need  only  make  a  slight  change  in  the  language  of  the  doc 
trine  criticized.  Instead  of  a  plurality  of  persons  in  the  Di 
vine  Unity,  we  have  only  to  speak  of  a  plurality  of  Attri 
butes  in  the  Divine  Essence.  How  can  there  be  a  variety 
of  Attributes,  each  infinite  in  its  kind,  and  yet  all  together 
constituting  but  one  Infinite?  or  how,  on  the  other  hand, 
can  the  Infinite  be  conceived  as  existing  without  diversity 
at  all  ?  We  know,  indeed,  that  various  attributes  exist  in 
man  constituting  in  their  plurality  one  and  the  same  con 
scious  self.  Even  here,  there  is  a  mystery  which  we  cannot 
explain  ;  but  the  fact  is  one  which  we  are  compelled,  by 
the  direct  testimony  of  consciousness,  to  accept  without 
explanation.  But  in  admitting,  as  we  are  compelled  to 
do,  the  coexistence  of  many  attributes  in  one  person,  we 
can  conceive  those  attributes  only  as  distinct  from  each 
other,  and  as  limiting  each  other.  Each  mental  attribute 
is  manifested  as  a  separate  and  determinate  mode  of  con 
sciousness,  marked  off  and  limited,  by  the  very  fact  of  its 
manifestation  as  such.  Each  is  developed  in  activities  and 
operations  from  which  the  others  are  excluded.  But  this 
type  of  the  conscious  existence  fails  us  altogether,  when  we 


LECT.  VI.         THOUGHT  EXAMINED.  165 

attempt  to  transfer  it  to  the  region  of  the  Infinite.  That 
there  can  be  but  one  Infinite,  appears  to  be  a  necessary 
conclusion  of  reason  ;  for  diversity  is  itself  a  limitation : 
yet  here  we  have  many  Infinites,  each  distinct  from  the 
other,  yet  all  constituting  one  Infinite,  which  is  neither 
identical  with  them  nor  distinguishable  from  them.  If 
Reason,  thus  baffled,  falls  back  on  the  conception  of  a 
simple  Infinite  Nature,  composed  of  no  attributes,  her  case 
is  still  more  hopeless.  That  which  has  no  attributes  is 
nothing  conceivable  ;  for  things  are  conceived  by  their  at 
tributes.  Strip  the  Infinite  of  the  Attributes  by  which  it  is 
distinguished  as  infinite,  and  the  Finite  of  those  by  which 
it  is  distinguished  as  finite  ;  and  the  residue  is  neither  the 
Infinite  as  such,  nor  the  Finite  as  such,  nor  any  one  being 
as  distinguished  from  any  other  being.  It  is  the  vague 
and  empty  conception  of  Being  in  general,  which  is  no  be' 
ing  in  particular,  —  a  shape, 

"  If  Shape  it  might  be  called,  that  shape  had  none 
Distinguishable  in  member,  joint,  or  limb, 
Or  Substance  might  be  called,  that  Shadow  seemed, 
For  each  seemed  either."  (11) 

The  objection,  "  How  can  the  One  be  Many,  or  the  Many 
One  ?  "  is  thus  so  far  from  telling  with  peculiar  force  against 
the  Catholic  doctrine  of  the  Holy  Trinity,  that  it  has  pre 
cisely  the  same  power  or  want  of  power,  and  may  be  urged 
with  precisely  the  same  effect,  or  want  of  effect,  against  any 
conception,  theological  or  philosophical,  in  which  we  may 
attempt  to  represent  the  Divine  Nature  and  Attributes  as 
infinite,  or,  indeed,  to  exhibit  the  Infinite  at  all.  The  same 
argument  applies  with  equal  force  to  the  conception  of  the 
Absolute.  If  the  Divine  Nature  is  conceived  as  beins;  noth- 

O 

ing  more  than  the  sum  of  the  Divine  Attributes,  it  is  not 


1G6  LIMITS   OF  RELIGIOUS  LECT.  VI. 

Absolute ;  for  the  existence  of  the  whole,  will  be  dependent 
on  the  existence  of  its  several  parts.  If,  on  the  other  hand, 
it  is  something  distinct  from  the  Attributes,  and  capable  of 
existing  without  them,  it  becomes,  in  its  absolute  essence, 
an  absolute  void,  —  an  existence  manifested  by  no  charac 
teristic  features,  —  a  conception  constituted  by  nothing  con 
ceivable.  (12) 

The  same  principle  may  be  also  applied  to  another  por 
tion  of  this  great  fundamental  truth.  The  doctrine  of  the 
Son  of  God,  begotten  of  the  Father,  and  yet  coeternal  with 
the  Father,  is  in  nowise  more  or  less  comprehensible  by  hu 
man  reason,  than  the  relation  between  the  Divine  Essence 
and  its  Attributes.*13)  In  the  order  of  Thought,  or  of  Na 
ture,  the  substance  to  which  attributes  belong  has  a  logical 
priority  to  the  attributes  which  exist  in  relation  to  it.  The 
Attributes  are  attributes  of  a  Substance.  The  former  are 
conceived  as  the  dependent  and  derived ;  the  latter  as  the 
independent  and  original  existence.  Yet  in  the  order  of 
Time  (and  to  the  order  of  Time  all  human  thought  is  lim 
ited),  it  is  as  impossible  to  conceive  the  Substance  existing 
before  its  Attributes,  as  the  Attributes  before  the  Sub 
stance.  (14)  We  cannot  conceive  a  being  originally  simple, 
developing  itself  in  the  course  of  time  into  a  complexity  of 
attributes;  for  absolute  simplicity  cannot  be  conceived  as 
containing  within  itself  a  principle  of  development,  nor  as 
differently  related  to  different  periods  of  time,  so  as  to  com 
mence  its  development  at  any  particular  moment.  <15)  Nor 
yet  can  we  conceive  the  attributes  as  existing  prior  to  the 
substance;  for  the  very  conception  of  an  attribute  implies 
relation  to  a  substance.  Yet  the  third  hypothesis,  that  of 
their  coexistence  in  all  time,  is  equally  incomprehensible  ; 
for  this  is  to  merge  the  Absolute  and  Infinite  in  an  eternal 
relation  and  difference.  We  cannot  conceive  God  as  first 


LECT.  VI.          THOUGHT  EXAMINED.  167 

existing,  and  then  as  creating  His  own  attributes  ;  for  the 
creative  power  must  then  itself  be  created.  Xor  yet  can 
we  conceive  the  Divine  Essence  as  constituted  by  the  eter 
nal  coexistence  of  attributes ;  for  then  we  have  many  Infi 
nites,  with  no  bond  of  unity  between  them.  The  mystery 
of  the  Many  and  the  One,  which  has  baffled  philosophy  ever 
since  philosophy  began,  meets  it  here,  as  everywhere,  with 
its  eternal  riddle.  Reason  gains  nothing  by  repudiating 
Revelation ;  for  the  mystery  of  Revelation  is  the  mystery 
of  Reason  also. 

I  should  not  for  an  instant  dream  of  adducing  this  meta 
physical  parallel  as  offering  the  slightest  approach  to  a  proof 
of  the  Christian  doctrine  of  the  Trinity  in  Unity.  What  it 
really  illustrates  is,  not  God's  Nature,  but  man's  ignorance. 
Without  an  Absolute  Knowing  there  can  be  no  comprehen 
sion  of  Absolute  Being.  (16)  The  position  of  human  reason, 
with  regard  to  the  ideas  of  the  Absolute  and  the  Infinite,  is 
such  as  equally  to  exclude  the  Dogmatism  which  would 
demonstrate  Christian  Doctrine  from  philosophical  premises, 
and  the  Rationalism  which  rejects  it  on  the  ground  of  phil 
osophical  difficulties,  as  well  as  that  monstrous  combination 
of  both,  which  distorts  it  in  pretending  to  systematize  it. 
The  Infinite  is  known  to  human  reason,  merely  as  the  ne 
gation  of  the  Finite :  we  know  what  it  is  not ;  and  that  is 
all.  The  conviction,  that  an  Infinite  Being  exists,  seems 
forced  upon  us  by  the  manifest  incompleteness  of  our  finite 
knowledge ;  but  we  have  no  rational  means  whatever  of  de 
termining  what  is  the  nature  of  that  Being.  (1?)  The  mind 
is  thus  perfectly  blank  with  regard  to  any  speculative  repre 
sentation  of  the  Divine  Essence ;  and  for  that  very  reason, 
Philosophy  is  not  entitled,  on  internal  evidence,  to  accept 
any,  or  to  reject  any.  The  only  question  which  we  are 
reasonably  at  liberty  to  ask  in  this  matter,  relates  to  the 


168  LIMITS    OF   RELIGIOUS  LECT.  VI. 

evidences  of  the  Revelation  as  n,  fact.  If  there  is  sufficient 
evidence,  on  other  grounds,  to  show  that  the  Scripture,  in 
which  this  doctrine  is  contained,  is  a  Revelation  from  God, 
the  doctrine  itself  must  be  unconditionally  received,  not  as 
reasonable,  nor  as  unreasonable,  but  as  scriptural.  If  there 
is  not  such  evidence,  the  doctrine  itself  will  lack  its  proper 
support;  but  the  Reason  which  rejects  it  is  utterly  incom 
petent  to  substitute  any  other  representation  in  its  place. 

Let  us  pass  on  to  the  second  great  doctrine  of  the  Catho 
lic  Faith,  —  that  which  asserts  the  union  of  two  Natures  in 
the  Person  of  Christ.  "The  right  Faith  is,  that  we  believe 
and  confess,  that  our  Lord  Jesus  Christ,  the  Son  of  God,  is 
God  and  Man :  God  of  the  Substance  of  the  Father,  begot 
ten  before  the  worlds ;  and  Man,  of  the  Substance  of  His 
Mother,  born  in  the  world."  <18) 

Our  former  parallel  was  drawn  from  the  impossibility  of 
conceiving,  in  any  form,  a  relation  between  the  Infinite  and 
the  Infinite.  Our  present  parallel  may  be  found  in  the  equal 
impossibility  of  conceiving,  by  the  natural  reason,  a  relation 
between  the  Infinite  and  the  Finite;  —  an  impossibility 
equally  insurmountable,  whether  the  two  natures  are  con 
ceived  as-existing  in  one  Being,  or  in  divers.  Let  us  attempt, 
if  we  can,  to  conceive,  at  any  moment  of  time,  a  finite 
world  coming  into  existence  by  the  fiat  of  an  Infinite  Cre 
ator.  Can  we  conceive  that  the  amount  of  existence  is 
thereby  increased, — that  the  Infinite  and  the  Finite  to 
gether  contain  more  reality  than  formerly  existed  in  the 
Infinite  alone?  The  supposition  annihilates  itself;  for  it 
represents  Infinite  Existence  as  capable  of  becoming  greater 
still.  But,  on  the  other  hand,  can  we  have  recourse  to  the 
opposite  alternative,  and  conceive  the  Creator  as  evolving 
the  world  out  of  His  own  Essence  ;  the  amount  of  Beinsc 

s  O 

remaining  as  before,  yet  the  Infinite  and  the  Finite  both 


LECT.  VI.  THOUGHT   EXAMINED.  169 

existing?  This  supposition  also  annihilates  itself;  for  if 
the  Infinite  suffer  diminution  by  that  portion  of  it  which 
becomes  the  Finite,  it  is  infinite  no  longer ;  and  if  it  suffers 
no  diminution,  the  two  together  are  but  equal  to  the  Infinite 
alone,  and  the  Finite  is  reduced  to  absolute  nonentity.  <19)  In 
any  mode  whatever  of  human  thought,  the  coexistence  of 
the  Infinite  and  the  Finite  is  inconceivable ;  and  yet  the 
non-existence  of  either  is,  by  the  same  laws  of  conscious 
ness,  equally  inconceivable.  If  Reason  is  to  be  the  supreme 
Judge  of  Divine  Truths,  it  will  not  be  sufficient  to  follow  its 
guidance  up  to  a  certain  point,  and  to  stop  when  it  is  incon 
venient  to  proceed  further.  There  is  no  logical  break  in  the 
chain  of  consequences,  from  Socinianism  to  Pantheism,  and 
from  Pantheism  to  Atheism,  and  from  Atheism  to  Pyrrhon 
ism;  and  Pyrrhonism  is  but  the  suicide  of  Reason  itself. 
"  Nature,"  says  Pascal,  "  confounds  the  Pyrrhonists,  and 
reason  confounds  the  Dogmatists.  What  then  becomes  of 
man,  if  he  seeks  to  discover  his  true  condition  by  his  natural 
reason  ?  He  cannot  avoid  one  of  these  sects,  and  he  cannot 
subsist  in  either."  <2°) 

Let  Religion  begin  where  it  will,  it  must  begin  with  that 
which  is  above  Reason.  What  then  do  we  gain  by  that 
parsimony  of  belief,  which  strives  to  deal  out  the  Infinite 
in  infinitesimal  fragments,  and  to  erect  the  largest  possi 
ble  superstructure  of  deduction  upon  the  smallest  possible 
foundation  of  faith  ?  We  gain  just  this  :  that  we  forsake 
an  incomprehensible  doctrine,  which  rests  upon  the  word 
of  God,  for  one  equally  incomprehensible,  which  rests  upon 
the  word  of  man.  Religion,  to  be  a  relation  between  God 
and  man  at  all,  must  rest  on  a  belief  in  the  Infinite,  and 
also  on  a  belief  in  the  Finite ;  for  if  we  deny  the  first> 
there  is  no  God;  and  if  we  deny  the  second,  there  is 
no  Man.  But  the  coexistence  of  the  Infinite  and  the 

15 


170  LIMITS  OF  RELIGIOUS  LECT.  VI. 

Finite,  in  any  manner  whatever,  is  inconceivable  by  rea 
son  ;  and  the  only  ground  that  can  be  taken  for  accepting 
one  representation  of  it  rather  than  another,  is  that  one 
is  revealed,  and  another  is  not  revealed.  We  may  seek 
as  we  will  for  a  "  Religion  within  the  limits  of  the  bare 
Reason ; "  and  we  shall  not  find  it ;  simply  because  no  such 
thing  exists ;  and  if  we  dream  for  a  moment  that  it  does 
exist,  it  is  only  because  we  are  unable  or  unwilling  to  pur 
sue  reason  to  its  final  consequences.  But  if  we  do  not, 
others  will ;  and  the  system  which  we  have  raised  on  the 
shifting  basis  of  our  arbitrary  resting-place,  waits  only  till 
the  wind  of  controversy  blows  against  it,  and  the  flood  of 
unbelief  descends  upon  it,  to  manifest  itself  as  the  work  of 
the  "foolish  man  which  built  his  house  upon  the  sand."1 

Having  thus  endeavored  to  exhibit  the  limits  of  human 
reason  in  relation  to  those  doctrines  of  Holy  Scripture 
which  reveal  to  us  the  nature  of  God,  I  shall  next  attempt 
briefly  to  apply  the  same  argument  to  those  representations 
which  more  directly  declare  His  relation  to  the  world. 

The  course  of  Divine  Providence,  in  the  government  of 
the  world,  is  represented  in  Scripture  under  the  twofold 
aspect  of  General  Law  and  Special  Interposition.  Not 
only  is  God  the  Author  of  the  universe,  and  of  those  regu 
lar  laws  by  which  the  periodical  recurrence  of  its  natural 
phenomena  is  determined ; 2  but  He  is  also  exhibited  as 
standing  in  a  special  relation  to  mankind ;  as  the  direct 
cause  of  events  by  which  their  temporal  or  spiritual  wel 
fare  is  affected :  as  accessible  to  the  prayers  of  His  ser 
vants;  as  to  be  praised  for  His  special  mercies  towards 


1  St.  Matthew  vii.  26. 

2  Genesis  i.  14;  viii.  22;  Job  xxxviii.  xxxix;  Psalm  xix.  1—6;  Ixxiv.  17; 
civ.  5 — 31;  cxxxv.  7;  cxlviii.  6. 


LECT.  VI.          THOUGHT  EXAMINED  171 

each  of  us  in  particular.1  But  this  scriptural  representa 
tion  has  been  discovered  by  Philosophy  to  be  irrational. 
God  is  unchangeable ;  and  therefore  He  cannot  be  moved 

o  ? 

by  man's  entreaty.  He  is  infinitely  wise  and  good  ;  and 
therefore  He  ought  not  to  deviate  from  the  perfection  of 
His  Eternal  Counsels.  "  The  religious  man,"  says  a  writer 
of  the  present  day,  "  who  believes  that  all  events,  mental  as 
well  as  physical,  are  preordered  and  arranged  according  to 
the  decrees  of  infinite  wisdom,  and  the  philosopher,  who 
knows  that,  by  the  wise  and  eternal  laws  of  the  universe, 
cause  and  effect  are  indissolubly  chained  together,  and  that 
one  follows  the  other  in  inevitable  succession,  —  equally 
feel  that  this  ordination  —  this  chain  —  cannot  be  change 
able  at  the  cry  of  man.  ...  If  the  purposes  of  God  were 
not  wise,  they  would  not  be  formed  ;  —  if  wise,  they  can 
not  be  changed,  for  then  they  would  become  unwise.  .  .  . 
The  devout  philosopher,  trained  to  the  investigation  of 
universal  system,  —  the  serene  astronomer,  fresh  from  the 
study  of  the  changeless  laws  which  govern  innumerable 
worlds,  —  shrinks  from  the  monstrous  irrationality  of  ask 
ing  the  great  Architect  and  Governor  of  all  to  work  a  mir 
acle  in  his  behalf,  —  to  interfere,  for  the  sake  of  his  con 
venience  or  his  plans,  with  the  sublime  order  conceive'd  by 
the  Ancient  of  Days  in  the  for  Eternity  of  the  Past ;  for 
what  is  a  special  providence  but  an  interference  with 
established  laws  ?  and  what  is  such  interference  but  a 
miracle  ?  "  (21) 

Now  here,  as  in  the  objections  previously  noticed,  the 
rationalist  mistakes  a  general  difficulty  of  all  human 
thought  for  a  special  difficulty  of  Christian  belief.  The 
really  insoluble  problem  is,  how  to  conceive  God  as  acting 
at  all;  not  how  to  conceive  Him  as  acting  in  this  way,  rather 

i  Psalm  Ixv.  2;  cii.  17,  18;  ciii.  1,  3;  cxliii.  1,  2;  cxlv.  19. 


172  LIMITS   OP  RELIGIOUS  LECT.  VI. 

than  in  that.  The  creation  of  the  world  at  any  period  of 
time  ;  —  the  establishment,  at  any  moment,  of  immutable 
laws  for  the  future  government  of  that  world; — this  is 
the  real  mystery  which  reason  is  unable  to  fathom,  this  is 
the  representation  which  seems  to  contradict  our  con 
ceptions  of  the  Divine  Perfection.  To  that  pretentious 
perversion  of  the  finite  which  philosophy  dignifies  with 
the  name  of  the  Infinite,  it  is  a  contradiction  to  suppose 
that  any  change  can  take  place  at  any  moment ;  —  that  any 
thing  can  begin  to  exist,  which  was  not  from  all  eternity. 
To  conceive  the  Infinite  Creator,  at  any  moment  of  time, 
calling  into  existence  a  finite  world,  is,  in  the  human  point 
of  view,  to  suppose  an  imperfection,  cither  before  the  act, 
or  after  it.  It  is  to  suppose  the  development  of  a  power 
hitherto  unexercised,  or  the  limiting  to  a  determinate  act 
that  which  Avas  before  general  and  indeterminate. 

May  we  not  then  repeat  our  author's  objection  in 
another  form  ?  How  can  a  Being  of  Infinite  Wisdom  and 
Goodness,  without  an  act  of  self-deterioration,  change  the 
laws  which  have  governed  His  own  solitary  existence  in 
the  far  Eternity  when  the  world  was  not  ?  Or  rather,  may 
we  not  ask  what  these  very  phrases  of  "  changeless  laws  " 
and  "  far  Eternity  "  really  mean  ?  Do  they  not  represent 
God's  existence  as  manifested  under  the  conditions  of  dura 
tion  and  succession, — conditions  which  necessarily  involve 
the  conception  of  the  imperfect  and  the  finite  ?  They  have 
not  emancipated  the  Deity  from  the  law  of  Time  :  they 
have  only  placed  Him  in  a  different  relation  to  it.  They 
have  merely  substituted,  for  the  revealed  representation  of 
the  God  who  from  time  to  time  vouchsafes  His  aid  to  the 
needs  of  His  creatures,  the  rationalizing  representation  of 
the  God  who,  throughout  all  time,  steadfastly  refuses  to 
do  so.  I22) 


LECT.  VI.  THOUGHT   EXAMINED.  173 

If,  then,  the  condition  of  Time  is  inseparable  from  all 
human  conceptions  of  the  Divine  Nature,  what  advantage 
do  we  gain,  even  in  philosophy,  by  substituting  the  supposi 
tion  of  immutable  order  in  time  for  that  of  special  interpo 
sition  in  time  ?  Both  of  these  representations  are  doubt 
less  speculatively  imperfect :  both  depict  the  Infinite  God 
under  finite  symbols.  But  for  the  regulative  purposes  of 
human  conduct  in  this  life,  each  is  equally  necessary  :  and 
who  may  dare,  from  the  depths  of  his  own  ignorance,  to 
say  that  each  may  not  have  its  prototype  in  the  ineffable 
Being  of  God  ?  <23)  "VVe  are  sometimes  told  that  it  gives 
us  a  more  elevated  idea  of  the  Divine  Wisdom  and  Power, 
to  regard  the  Creator  as  having  finished  His  work  once  for 
all,  and  then  abandoned  it  to  its  own  unerring  laws,  than  to 
represent  Him  as  interfering,  from  time  to  time,  by  the 
way  of  direct  personal  superintendence; — just  as  it  im 
plies  higher  mechanical  skill  to  make  an  engine  which  s-hall 
go  on  perpetually  by  its  own  motion,  than  one  which  re 
quires  to  be  continually  regulated  by  the  hand  of  its 
maker.  (24)  This  ingenious  simile  fails  only  in  the  im 
portant  particular,  that  both  its  terms  are  utterly  unlike 
the  objects  which  they  profess  to  represent.  The  world 
is  not  a  machine  ;  and  God  is  not  a  mechanic.  The  world 
is  not  a  machine ;  for  it  consists,  not  merely  of  wheels  of 
brass,  and  springs  of  steel,  and  the  fixed  properties  of  inani 
mate  matter ;  but  of  living  and  intelligent  and  free-acting 
persons,  capable  of  personal  relations  to  a  living  and  in 
telligent  and  free-acting  Ruler.  And  God  is  not  a  me 
chanic  ;  for  the  mechanic  is  separated  from  his  machine 
by  the  whole  diameter  of  being ;  as  mind,  giving  birth  to 
material  results;  as  the  conscious  workman,  who  meets 
with  no  reciprocal  consciousness  in  his  work.  It  may  be 
a  higher  evidence  of  mechanical  skill,  to  abandon  brute 

15* 


174  LIMITS   OP  RELIGIOUS  LECT.  VI. 

matter  once  for  all  to  its  own  laws  ;  but  to  take  this  as  the 
analogy  of  God's  dealings  with  His  living  creatures  —  as 
well  tell  us  that  the  highest  image  of  parental  love  and 
forethought  is  that  of  the  ostrich,  "which  leaveth  her 
eggs  in  the  earth,  and  warmeth  them  in  dust."  x  <25) 

But  if  such  conclusions  are  not  justified  by  our  a  priori 
knowledge  of  the  Divine  nature,  are  they  borne  out  em- 
•  pirically  by  the  actual  constitution  of  the  world  ?  Is  there 
any  truth  in  the  assertion,  so  often  put  forth  as  an  unde 
niable  discovery  of  modern  science,  "  that  cause  and  effect 
are  indissolubly  chained  together,  and  that  one  follows 
the  other  in  inevitable  succession?"  There  is  just  that 
amount  of  half-truth  which  makes  an  error  dangerous  ; 
and  there  is  no  more.  Experience  is  of  two  kinds,  and 
Philosophy  is  of  two  kinds ;  —  that  of  the  world  of  mat 
ter,  and  that  of  the  world  of  mind,  -*-  that  of  physical  suc 
cession,  and  that  of  moral  action.  In  the  material  world, 
if  it  be  true  that  the  researches  of  science  tend  towards 
(though  who  can  say  that  they  will  ever  reach  ?)  the  es- 
stablishment  of  a  system  of  fixed  and  orderly  recurrence; 
in  the  mental  world,  we  are  no  less  confronted,  at  every 
instant,  by  the  presence  of  contingency  and  free  will.  (2G) 
In  the  one  we  are  conscious  of  a  chain  of  phenomenal 
effects ;  in  the  other  of  self,  as  an  acting  and  originating 
cause.  Nay,  the  very  conception  of  the  immutability  of 
the  law  of  cause  and  effect,  is  not  so  much  derived  from 
the  positive  evidence  of  the  former,  as  from  the  negative 
evidence  of  the  latter.  We  believe  the  succession  to  be 
necessary,  because  nothing  but  mind  can  be  conceived  as 
interfering  with  the  successions  of  matter  ;  and,  where 
mind  is  excluded,  we  are  unable  to  imagine  contin- 
gence.  (27>  But  what  right  has  this  so-called  philosophy 

i  Job  xxxix.  14. 


LECT.  VI.  THOUGHT   EXAMINED.  175 

to  build  a  theory  of  the  universe  on  material  principles 
alone,  and  to  neglect  what  experience  daily  and  hourly 
forces  upon  our  notice,  —  the  perpetual  interchange  of  the 
relations  of  matter  and  mind  ?  In  passing  from  the  ma 
terial  to  the  moral  world,  we  pass  at  once  from  the  phe 
nomenal  to  the  real ;  from  the  successive  to  the  continu 
ous  ;  from  the  many  to  the  one ;  from  an  endless  chain  of 
mutual  dependence  to  an  originating  and  self-determining 
source  of  power.  That  mysterious,  yet  unquestionable 
presence  of  Will;  —  that  agent,  uncompelled,  yet  not  un 
influenced,  whose  continuous  existence  and  productive 
energy  are  summoned  up  in  the  word  Myself ;  —  that 
perpetual  struggle  of  good  with  evil;  —  those  warnings 
and  promptings  of  a  Spirit,  striving  with  our  spirit,  com 
manding,  yet  not  compelling ;  acting  upon  us,  yet  leaving 
us  free  to  act  for  ourselves  ;  —  that  twofold  consciousness 
of  infirmity  and  strength  in  the  hour  of  temptation  ;  — 
that  grand  ideal  of  what  we  ought  to  be,  so  little,  alas !  to 
be  gathered  from  the  observation  of  what  we  are  ;  —  that 
overwhelming  conviction  of  Sin  in  the  sight  of  One  higher 
and  holier  than  we  ;  —  that  irresistible  impulse  to  Prayer, 
which  bids  us  pour  out  our  sorrows  and  make  our  wants 
known  to  One  who  hears  and  will  answer  us ;  —  that  in 
definable  yet  inextinguishable  consciousness  of  a  direct 
intercourse  and  communion  of  man  with  God,  of  God's  in 
fluence  upon  man,  yea,  and  (with  reverence  be  it  spoken) 
of  man's  influence  upon  God  :  —  these  are  facts  of  experi 
ence,  to  the  full  as  real  and  as  certain  as  the  laws  of 
planetary  motions  and  chemical  affinities  ;  —  facts  which 
Philosophy  is  bound  to  take  into  account,  or  to  stand 
convicted  as  shallow  and  one-sided ;  —  facts  which  can 
deceive  us,  only  if  our  whole  Consciousness  is  a  liar,  and 
the  boasted  voice  of  Reason  itself  but  an  echo  of  the  uni 
versal  lie. 


176  LIMITS    OP   RELIGIOUS  LECT.  VI. 

Even  within  the  domain  of  Physical  Science,  however 
much  analogy  may  lead  us  to  conjecture  the  universal 
prevalence  of  law  and  orderly  sequence,  it  has  been 
acutely  remarked,  that  the  phenomena  which  are  most 
immediately  important  to  the  life  and  welfare  of  man,  are 
precisely  those  which  he  never  has  been,  and  probably 
never  will  be,  able  to  reduce  to  a  scientific  calculation.  <28) 
The  astronomer,  wh.o  can  predict  the  exact  position  of  a 
planet  in  the  heavens  a  thousand  years  hence,  knows  not 
what  may  be  his  own  state  of  health  to-morrow,  nor  how 
the  wind  which  blows  upon  him  will  vary  from  day  to 
day.  May  we  not  be  permitted  to  conclude,  with  a  dis 
tinguished  Christian  philosopher  of  the  present  day,  that 
there  is  a  Divine  Purpose  in  this  arrangement  of  nature ; 
that,  while  enough  is  displayed  to  stimulate  the  intellect 
ual  and  practical  energies  of  man,  enough  is  still  concealed 
to  make  him  feel  his  dependence  upon  God?  (29) 

For  man's  training  in  this  life,  the  conceptions  of  Gen 
eral  Law  and  of  Special  Providence  are  both  equally  nec 
essary  ;  the  one,  that  he  may  labor  for  God's  blessings, 
and  the  other,  that  he  may  pray  for  them.  lie  sows,  and 
reaps,  and  gathers  in  his  produce,  to  meet  the  different 
seasons,  as  they  roll  their  unchanging  course  :  he  acknowl 
edges  also  that  "  neither  is  he  that  planteth  anything, 
neither  he  that  watereth ;  but  God  that  giveth  the  in 
crease."  l  He  labors  in  the  moral  training  of  himself  and 
others,  in  obedience  to  the  general  laws  of  means  and 
ends,  of  motives  and  influences ;  while  he  asks,  at  the 
same  time,  for  wisdom  from  above  to  guide  his  course 
aright,  and  for  grace  to  enable  him  to  follow  that  guid 
ance.  Necessary  alike  during  this  our  state  of  trial,  it 
may  be  that  both  conceptions  alike  are  but  shadows  of 

1 1  Corinthians  iii.  7. 


LKCT.  VI.  THOUGHT    EXAMINED.  177 

some  higher  truth,  in  which  their  apparent  oppositions  are 
merged  in  one  harmonious  whole.  But  when  we  attempt, 
from  our  limited  point  of  view,  to  destroy  the  one,  in  order 
to  establish  the  other  more  surely,  we  overlook  the  fact 
that  our  conception  of  General  Law  is  to  the  full  as  human 
as  that  of  Special  Interposition;  —  that  we  are  not  really 
thereby  acquiring  a  truer  knowledge  of  the  hidden  things 
of  God,  but  are  measuring  Him  by  a  standard  derived 
from  the  limited  representations  of  man.  (3°) 

Subordinate  to  the  Conception  of  Special  Providence,  and 
subject  to  the  same  laws  of  thought  in  its  application,  is 
that  of  Miraculous  Agency.  I  am  not  now  going  to  waste 
an  additional  argument  in  answer  to  that  shallowest  and 
crudest  of  all  the  assumptions  of  unbelief,  which  dictatorially 
pronounces  that  Miracles  are  impossible ;  —  an  assumption 
which  is  repudiated  by  the  more  philosophical  among  the 
leaders  of  Rationalism  itself;  <31)  and  which  implies,  that  he 
who  maintains  it  has  such  a  perfect  and  intimate  acquaint 
ance  with  the  Divine  Nature  and  Purposes,  as  to  warrant 
him  in  asserting  that  God  cannot  or  will  not  depart  from 
the  ordinary  course  of  His  Providence  on  any  occasion 
whatever.  If,  as  I  have  endeavored  to  show,  the  doctrine 
of  Divine  Interposition  is  not  in  itself  more  opposed  to  rea 
son  than  that  of  General  Law ;  and  if  the  asserted  immuta 
bility  of  the  laws  of  nature  is,  at  the  utmost,  tenable  only 
on  the  supposition  that  material  nature  alone  is  spoken  of, 
—  we  are  not  warranted,  on  any  ground,  whether  of  de 
duction  from  principles  or  of  induction  from  experience,  in 
denying  the  possible  suspension  of  the  Laws  of  Matter  by 
the  will  of  the  Divine  Mind.  But  the  question  on  which  it 
may  still  be  desirable  to  say  a  few  words,  before  concluding 
this  portion  of  my  argument,  is  one  which  is  disputed,  not 
necessarily  between  the  believer  and  the  unbeliever,  but 


178  LIMITS    OF    RELIGIOUS  LEOT.  VI. 

often  between  believers  equally  sincere  and  equally  pious, 
differing  only  in  their  modes  of  representing  to  their  own 
minds  the  facts  and  doctrines  which  both  accept.  Granting, 
that  is  to  say,  that  variations  from  the  established  sequence 
of  physical  phenomena  may  take  place,  and  have  taken 
place,  as  Scripture  bears  witness  ;  —  are  such  variations  to 
be  represented  as  departures  from  or  suspensions  of  natural 
law ;  or  rather,  as  themselves  the  result  of  some  higher  law 
to  us  unknown,  and  as  miraculous  only  from  the  point  of 
view  of  our  present  ignorance  ?  (32> 

Which  of  these  representations,  or  whether  either  of 
them,  is  the  true  one,  wThen  such  occurrences  are  considered 
in  their  relation  to  the  Absolute  Nature  of  God,  our  igno 
rance  of  that  Nature  forbids  us  to  determine.  Speculatively, 
to  human  understanding,  it  appears  as  little  consistent  with 
the  nature  of  the  Absolute  and  Infinite,  to  be  subject  to 
universal  law,  as  it  is  to  act  at  particular  moments.  But  as 
a  regulative  truth,  adapted  to  the  religious  wants  of  man's 
constitution,  the  more  natural  representation,  that  of  a  de 
parture  from  the  general  law,  seems  to  be  also  the  more 
accurate.  We  are  liable,  in  considering  this  question,  to 
confound  together  two  distinct  notions  under  the  equivocal 
name  of  Law.  The  first  is  a  positive  notion,  derived  from 
the  observation  of  facts,  and  founded,  with  various  modifi 
cations,  upon  the  general  idea  of  the  periodical  recurrence 
of  phenomena.  The  other  is  a  merely  negative  notion,  de 
duced  from  a  supposed  apprehension  of  the  Divine  Nature, 
and  professing  to  be  based  on  the  idea  of  the  eternal  Pur 
poses  of  God.  Of  the  former,  the  ideas  of  succession  and 
repetition  form  an  essential  part.  To  the  latter,  the  idea  of 
Time,  in  any  form,  has  no  legitimate  application ;  and  it  is 
thus  placed  beyond  the  sphere  of  human  thought.  Now, 
when  we  speak  of  a  Miracle  as  the  possible  result  of  some 


LECT.  VI.  THOUGHT  EXAMINED.  179 

higher  law,  do  we  employ  the  term  laic  in  the  former  sense, 
or  in  the  latter  ?  do  we  mean,  a  law  which  actually  exists  in 
the  knowledge  of  God ;  or  one  which,  in  the  progress  of 
science,  may  come  to  the  knowledge  of  man  ?  —  one  which 
might  be  discovered  by  a  better  acquaintance  with  the  Di 
vine  Counsels,  or  one  which  might  be  inferred  from  a  larger 
experience  of  natural  phenomena  ?  If  we  mean  the  former, 
we  do  not  know  that  a  more  perfect  acquaintance  with  the 
Divine  Counsels,  implying,  as  it  does,  the  elevation  of  our 
faculties  to  a  superhuman  level,  might  not  abolish  the  con 
ception  of  Law  altogether.  If  we  mean  the  latter,  we  as 
sume  that  which  no  experience  warrants  us  in  assuming  ;  we 
endanger  the  religious  significance  and  value  of  the  miracle, 
only  for  the  sake  of  removing  God  a  few  degrees  further 
back  from  that  chain  of  phenomena  which  is  admitted  ulti 
mately  to  depend  upon  Him.  A  miracle,  in  one  sense,  need 
not  be  necessarily  a  violation  of  the  laws  of  nature.  God 
may  make  use  of  natural  instruments,  acting  after  their 
kind  ;  as  man  himself,  within  his  own  sphere,  does  in  the 
production  of  artificial  combinations.  The  great  question, 
however,  still  remains :  Has  God  ever,  for  religious  purposes, 
exhibited  phenomena  in  certain  relations,  which  the  ob 
served  course  of  nature,  and  the  artistic  skill  of  man,  are 
unable  to  bring  about,  or  to  account  for  ? 

I  have  thus  far  endeavored  to  apply  the  principle  of  the 
Limits  of  Religious  Thought  to  some  of  these  representa 
tions  which  are  usually  objected  to  by  the  Rationalist,  as  in 
apparent  opposition  to  the  Speculative  Reason  of  Man.  In 
my  next  Lecture,  I  shall  attempt  to  pursue  the  same  argu 
ment,  in  relation  to  those  doctrines  which  are  sometimes 
regarded  as  repugnant  to  man's  Moral  Reason.  The  lesson 
to  be  derived  from  our  present  inquiry  may  be  given  in  the 
pregnant  sentence  of  a  great  philosopher,  but  recently  taken 


180  LIMITS   OP  RELIGIOUS  LECT.  VI. 

from  us :  "  No  difficulty  emerges  in  Theology,  which  had 
not  previously  emerged  in  Philosophy."  (33)  The  intellectual 
stumblingblocks,  which  men  find  in  the  doctrines  of  Reve 
lation,  are  not  in  consequence  of  any  improbability  or  er= 
ror  peculiar  to  the  things  revealed;  but  are  such  as  the 
thinker  brings  with  him  to  the  examination  of  the  question ; 
— such  as  meet  him  on  every  side,  whether  he  thinks  with 
or  against  the  testimony  of  Scripture ;  being  inherent  in  the 
constitution  and  laws  of  the  Human  Mind  itself.  But  must 
we  therefore  acquiesce  in  the  melancholy  conclusion,  that 
self-contradiction  is  the  law  of  our  intellectual  being ; — that 
the  light  of  Reason,  which  is  God's  gift,  no  less  than  Reve 
lation,  is  a  delusive  light,  which  we  follow  to  our  own  de 
ception  ?  Far  from  it :  the  examination  of  the  Limits  of 
Thought  leads  to  a  conclusion  the  very  opposite  to  this. 
Reason  does  not  deceive  us,  if  we  will  only  read  her  witness 
aright ;  and  Reason  herself  gives  us  warning,  when  we  are 
in  danger  of  reading  it  wrong.  The  light  that  is  within  us 
is  not  darkness  ;  only  it  cannot  illuminate  that  which  is  be 
yond  the  sphere  of  its  rays.  The  self-contradictions,  into 
which  we  inevitably  fall,  when  we  attempt  certain  courses 
of  speculation,  are  the  beacons  placed  by  the  hand  of  God 
in  the  mind  of  man,  to  warn  us  that  we  are  deviating  from 
the  track  that  He  designs  us  to  pursue ;  that  we  are  striving 
to  pass  the  barriers  which  He  has  planted  around  us.  The 
flaming  sword  turns  every  way  against  those  who  strive,  in 
the  strength  of  their  own  reason,  to  force  their  passage  to 
the  tree  of  life.  Within  her  own  province,  and  among  her 
own  objects,  let  Reason  go  forth,  conquering  and  to  conquer. 
The  finite  objects,  which  she  can  clearly  and  distinctly  con 
ceive,  are  her  lawful  empire  and  her  true  glory.  The  count 
less  phenomena  of  the  visible  world;  the  unseen  things 
which  lie  in  the  depths  of  the  human  soul ;  —  these  are  given 


LECT.  VI.  THOUGHT  EXAMINED.  181 

into  her  hand ;  and  over  them  she  may  reign  in  unquestioned 
dominion.  But  when  she  strives  to  approach  too  near  to 
the  hidden  mysteries  of  the  Infinite ;  —  when,  not  content 
with  beholding  afar  off  the  partial  and  relative  manifesta 
tions  of  God's  presence,  she  would  "  turn  aside  and  see  this 
great  sight,"  and  know  why  God  hath  revealed  Himself 
thus;  —  the  voice  of  the  Lord  Himself  is  heard,  as  it  were, 
speaking  in  warning  from  the  midst :  "  Draw  not  nigh 
hither :  put  off  thy  shoes  from  off  thy  feet ;  for  the  place 
whereon  thou  standest  is  holy  ground."1 

i  Exodus  iii.  5. 
16 


LECTURE  VII. 

YET  TE  SAY,  THE  WAY  OF  THE  LORD  IS  NOT  EQUAL.   HEAR  NOW, 

o    HOUSE   or  ISRAEL;    is  NOT  MY  WAY  EQUAL?    ARE  NOT  YOUR 

WAYS    UNEQUAL?— EZEKIEL    XVIII.    25. 

"  IF  I  build  again  the  things  which  I  destroyed,  I  make 
myself  a  transgressor."  x  This  text  might  be  appropriately 
prefixed  to  an  examination  of  that  system  of  moral  and 
religious  criticism  which,  at  the  close  of  the  last  century, 
succeeded  for  a  time  in  giving  a  philosophical  connection 
to  the  hitherto  loose  and  floating  theological  rationalism 
of  its  age  and  country.  W  It  was  indeed  a  marvellous 
attempt  to  send  forth  from  the  same  fountain  sweet  waters 
and  bitter,  to  pull  down  and  to  build  up  by  the  same  act 
and  method.  The  result  of  the  Critical  Philosophy,  as 
applied  to  the  speculative  side  of  human  Reason,  was  to 
prove  beyond  all  question  the  existence  of  certain  neces 
sary  forms  and  laws  of  Intuition  and  thought,  which 
impart  a  corresponding  character  to  all  the  objects  of 
which  Consciousness,  intuitive  or  reflective,  can  take  cog 
nizance.  Consciousness  was  thus  exhibited  as  a  Relation 
between  the  human  mind  and  its  object ;  and  this  conclu 
sion,  once  established,  is  fatal  to  the  very  conception  of  a 
Philosophy  of  the  Absolute.  But  by  an  inconsistency 
scarcely  to  be  paralleled  in  the  history  of  philosophy,  the 
author  of  this  comprehensive  criticism  attempted  to  de 
duce  a  partial  conclusion  from  universal  premises,  and  to 

i  Galatians  ii.  18. 


LECT.  VII.  THOUGHT   EXAMINED.  183 

exempt  the  speculations  of  moral  and  religions  thought 
from  the  relative  character  with  which,  upon  his  own  prin 
ciples,  all  the  products  of  human  consciousness  were  neces 
sarily  invested.  The  Moral  Law,  and  the  ideas  which  it 
carries  with  it,  are,  according  to  this  theory,  not  merely 
facts  of  human  consciousness,  conceived  under  the  laws  of 
human  thought,  but  absolute,  transcendental  realities, 
implied  in  the  conception  of  all  Reasonable  Beings  as 
such,  and  therefore  independent  of  the  law  of  time,  and 
binding,  not  on  man  as  man,  but  on  all  possible  intelligent 
beings,  created  or  uncreated.  <2)  The  Moral  Reason  is  thus 
a  source  of  absolute  and  unchangeable  realities  ;  while  the 
Speculative  Reason  is  concerned  only  with  phenomena,  or 
things  modified  by  the  constitution  of  the  human  mind.  <3) 
As  a  corollary  to  this  theory,  it  follows,  that  the  law  of 
human  morality  must  be  regarded  as  the  measure  and 
adequate  representative  of  the  moral  nature  of  God; — in 
fact,  that  our  knowledge  of  the  Divine  Being  is  identical 
with  that  of  our  own  moral  duties; — for  God  is  made 
known  to  us,  as  existing  at  all,  only  in  and  by  the  moral 
reason  :  we  do  not  look  upon  actions  as  binding  because 
they  are  commanded  by  God ;  but  we  know  them  to  be 
divine  commands  because  we  are  bound  by  them.  W 
Applying  these  principles  to  the  criticism  of  Revealed 
Religion,  the  philosopher  maintains  that  no  code  of  laws 
claiming  divine  authority  can  have  any  religious  value, 
except  as  approved  by  the  moral  reason  ;  (5>  that  there  can 
be  no  duties  of  faith  or  practice  towards  God,  distinct  from 
the  moral  obligations  which  reason  enjoins ;  (6)  and  that, 
consequently,  every  doctrine  to  which  this  test  is  inapplica 
ble  is  either  no  part  of  revelation  at  all,  or  at  best  can  only 
be  given  for  local  and  temporary  purposes,  of  which  the 
enlightened  reason  need  no  longer  take  any  account.  (") 


184  LIMITS   OF  RELIGIOUS  LECT.  VII. 

Amid  much  that  is  true  and  noble  in  this  teaching  when 
confined  within  its  proper  limits,  its  fundamental  weakness 
as  an  absolute  criterion  of  religious  truth  is  so  manifest  as 
hardly  to  need  exposure.  The  fiction  of  a  moral  law  bind 
ing  in  a  particular  form  upon  all  possible  intelligences, 
acquires  this  .seeming  universality,  only  because  human 
intelligence  is  made  the  representative  of  all.  I  can  con 
ceive  moral  attributes  only  as  I  know  them  in  conscious 
ness  :  I  can  imagine  other  minds  only  by  first  assuming 
their  likeness  to  my  own.  To  construct  a  theory,  whether 
of  practical  or  of  speculative  reason,  which  shall  be  valid 
for  other  than  human  intelligences,  it  is  necessary  that  the 
author  should  himself  be  emancipated  from  the  conditions 
of  human  thought.  Till  this  is  done,  the  so-called  Abso 
lute  is  but  the  Relative  under  another  name:  the  universal 
consciousness  is  but  the  human  mind" striving  to  transcend 
itself. 

The  very  characteristics  of  Universality  and  Necessity, 
with  which  our  moral  obligations  are  invested,  point  to  an 
origin  the  very  reverse  of  that  which  the  above  theory  sup 
poses.  For  these  characteristics  are  in  all  cases  due  to  the 
presence  of  the  formal  and  personal  element  in  the  phenom 
ena  of  consciousness,  and  appear  most  evidently  in  those 
conceptions  in  which  the  matter  as  well  as  the  manner  of 
thinking  is  drawn  from  the  laws  or  formal  conditions  of 
experience.  Of  these  conditions,  I  have  in  a  former  Lecture 
enumerated  three — Time,  Space,  and  Personality;  the  first 
as  the  condition  of  human  consciousness  in  general :  the 
second  and  third  as  the  conditions  of  the  same.conscious- 
ness  in  relation  to  the  phenomena  of  matter  and  of  mind 
respectively.  <8)  From  these  are  derived  three  correspond 
ing  systems  of  necessary  truths  in  the  highest  human  sense 
of  the  term:  the  science  of  Numbers  being  connected  with 


LECT.  VII         THOUGHT  EXAMINED.  185 

the  condition  of  Time ;  that  of  Magnitudes  with  Space ; 
and  that  of  Morals  with  Personality.  These  three  sciences 
rest  on  similar  bases,  and  are  confined  within  the  same 
limits :  all  being  equally  necessary  and  valid  within  the 
legitimate  bounds  of  human  intelligence ;  and  all  equally 
negative  and  self-contradictory,  when  we  attempt  to  pass 
beyond  those  bounds.  The  contradictions  involved  in  the 
conceptions  of  Infinite  Number  and  Infinite  Magnitude 
find  their  parallel  when  we  attempt  to  conceive  the  attri 
butes  of  an  Infinite  Morality :  the  necessity  which  is  man 
ifested  in  the  finite  relations  of  the  two  former  is  the  coun 
terpart  of  that  which  accompanies  those  of  the  latter.  (9> 
That  Moral  Obligation,  conceived  as  a  law  binding  upon 
man,  must  be  regarded  as  immutable  so  long  as  man's 
nature  remains  unchanged,  is  manifest  from  the  character 
of  the  conception  itself,  and  follows  naturally  from  a 
knowledge  of  its  origin.  An  act  of  Duty  is  presented  to 
my  consciousness  as  enjoined  by  a  Law  wThose  obligation 
upon  myself  is  directly  and  intuitively  discerned.  It  thus 
differs  essentially  from  the  phenomena  of  external  nature, 
whose  laws  are  not  immediately  perceived,  but  inferred 
from  the  observed  recurrence  of  facts.  The  immediate  con 
sciousness  of  Law  unavoidably  carries  with  it  the  convic 
tion  of  necessity  and  immutability  in  relation  to  the  agent 
who  is  subject  to  it.  For  to  suppose  that  a  moral  law 
can  be  reversed  or  suspended  in  relation  to  myself;  —  to 
suppose  a  conviction  of  right  unaccompanied  by  an  obliga 
tion  to  act,  or  a  conviction  of  wrong  unaccompanied  by  an 
obligation  to  forbear,  —  is  to  suppose  a  reversal  of  the  con 
ditions  of  my  personal  existence  ;  —  a  supposition  which 
annihilates  itself;  since  those  conditions  are  implied  in  the 
attempt  to  conceive  my  personal  existence  at  all.  The 
Moral  Sense  is  thus,  like  the  intuitions  of  Time  and  Space, 


186  LIMITS   OF  RELIGIOUS  LECT.  Vll 

an  a  priori  law  of  the  human  mind,  not  determined  by 
experience  as  it  is,  but  determining  beforehand  what  expe 
rience  ought  to  be.  But  it  is  not  thereby  elevated  above  the 
conditions  of  human  intelligence ;  and  the  attempt  so  to 
elevate  it  is  especially  inadmissible  in  that  philosophy 
which  resolves  Time  and  Space  into  forms  of  the  human 
consciousness,  and  limits  their  operation  to  the  field  of  the 
phenomena  and  the  relative. 

That  there  is  an  Absolute  Morality,  based  upon,  or 
rather  identical  with,  the  Eternal  Nature  of  God,  is  indeed 
a  conviction  forced  upon  us  by  the  same  evidence  as  that 
on  which  we  believe  that  God  exists  at  all.  But  ivhat  that 
Absolute  Morality  is,  we  are  as  unable  to  fix  in  any  human 
conception,  as  we  are  to  define  the  other  attributes  of  the 
same  Divine  Nature.  To  human  conception  it  seems  im 
possible  that  absolute  morality  should  be  manifested  in  the 
form  of  a  law  of  obligation /  for  such  a  law  implies  rela 
tion  and  subjection  to  the  authority  of  a  lawgiver.  And  as 
all  human  morality  is  manifested  in  this  form,  the  conclu 
sion  seems  unavoidable,  that  human  morality,  even  in  its 
highest  elevation,  is  not  identical  with,  nor  adequate  to 
measure,  the  Absolute  Morality  of  God.  (10) 

A  like  conclusion  is  forced  upon  us  by  a  closer  examina 
tion  of  human  morality  itself.  To  maintain  the  immuta 
bility  of  moral  principles  in  the  abstract  is  a  very  different 
thing  from  maintaining  the  immutability  of  the  particular 
acts  by  which  those  principles  are  manifested  in  practice. 
The  parallel  between  the  mathematical  and  the  moral  sci 
ences,  as  systems  of  necessary  truth,  holds  good  in  this 
respect  also.  As  principles  in  the  abstract,  the  laws  of 
morality  are  as  unchangeable  as  the  axioms  of  geometry. 
That  duty  ought  in  all  cases  to  be  followed  in  preference  to 
inclination,  is  as  certain  a  truth  as  that  two  straight  lines 


VII.  THOUGHT   EXAMINED.  187 


cannot  enclose  a  space.  In  their  concrete  application,  both 
principles  are  equally  liable  to  error  ;  —  we  may  err  in  sup 
posing  a  particular  visible  line  to  be  perfectly  straight  ;  as 
we  may  err  in  supposing  a  particular  act  to  be  one  of 
duty.  (n)  But  the  two  errors,  though  equally  possible,  are 
by  no  means  equally  important.  For  mathematical  science, 
as  such,  is  complete  in  its  merely  theoretical  aspect  ;  while 
moral  science  is  valuable  chiefly  in  its  application  to  prac 
tice.  It  is  in  their  concrete  form  that  moral  principles  are 
adopted  as  guides  of  conduct  and  canons  of  judgment; 
and  in  this  form  they  admit  of  various  degrees  of  uncer 
tainty  or  of  positive  error.  But  the  difference  between 
.the  highest  and  the  lowest  conception  of  moral  duty  is  one 
of  degree,  not  of  kind;  the  interval  between  them  is  oc 
cupied  by  intermediate  stages,  separated  from  each  other 
by  minute  and  scarcely  appreciable  differences  ;  and  the 
very  conception  of  a  gradual  progress  in  moral  enlighten 
ment  implies  the  possibility  of  a  further  advance,  of  a 
more  exalted  intellect,  and  a  more  enlightened  conscience. 
While  we  repudiate,  as  subversive  of  all  morality,  the  the 
ory  which  maintains  that  each  man  is  the  measure  of  his 
own  moral  acts  ;  we  must  repudiate  also,  as  subversive  of 
all  religion,  the  opposite  theory,  which  virtually  maintains 
that  man  may  become  the  measure  of  the  absolute  Nature 
of  God. 

God  did  not  create  Absolute  Morality  :  it  is  coeternal 
with  Himself;  and  it  were  blasphemy  to  say  that  there 
ever  was  a  time  when  God  was  and  Goodness  was  not. 
But  God  did  create  the  human  manifestation  of  morality, 
when  He  created  the  moral  constitution  of  man,  and  placed 
him  in  those  circumstances  by  which  the  eternal  principles 
of  right  and  wrong  are  modified  in  relation  to  the  present 
life.  (12)  For  it  is  manifest,  to  take  the  simplest  instances, 
that  the  sixth  Commandment  of  the  Decalogue,  in  its  lit- 


188  LIMITS   OF  RELIGIOUS  LECT.  VII. 

eral  obligation,  is  relative  to  that  state  of  things  in  which 
men  are  subject  to  death;  and  the  seventh,  to  which  there 
is  marrying  and  giving  in  marriage  ;  and  the  eighth,  to 
that  in  which  men  possess  temporal  goods.  It  is  manifest, 
to  take  a  more  general  ground,  that  the  very  conception 
of  moral  obligation  implies  a  superior  authority,  and  an 
ability  to  transgress  what  that  authority  commands ;  that 
it  implies  a  complex,  and  -therefore  a  limited  nature  in  the 
moral  agent ;  the  intellect,  which  apprehends  the  duty, 
being  distinct  from  the  will,  which  obeys  or  disobeys. 
That  there  is  a  higher  and  unchangeable  principle  em 
bodied  in  these  forms,  we  have  abundant  reason  to  be 
lieve  ;  and  yet  we  cannot,  from  our  present  point  of  view, 
examine  the  same  duties  apart  from  their  human  element, 
and  separate  that  which  is  relative  and  peculiar  to  man  in 
this  life  from  that  which  is  absolute  and  common  to  all 
moral  beings.  In  this  respect,  again,  our  moral  concep 
tions  offer  a  remarkable  analogy  to  the  cognate  phenom 
ena  on  which  other  systems  of  necessary  truth  are  based. 
Take,  for  example,  the  idea  of  Time,  the  foundation  of 
the  science  of  Number.  We  find  no  difficulty  in  conceiv 
ing  that  this  present  world  was  created  at  some  definite 
point  of  time  ;  but  we  are  unable  to  conceive  the  same  mo 
ment  as  the  creation  of  Time  itself.  On  the  contrary,  we 
are  compelled  to  believe  that  there  was  a  time  before  as 
well  as  after  the  creation  of  the  world  :  that  the  being  of 
God  reaches  back  in  boundless  duration  beyond  the  mo 
ment  when  He  said,  Let  there  be  light ;  and  there  was 
light.  But  when  we  attempt  to  unite  this  conviction  with 
another,  necessary  to  the  completion  of  the  thought;  — 
when  we  try  to  conceive  God  as  an  Infinite  Being,  exist 
ing  in  continuous  duration,  —  the  contradictions,  which 
beset  us  on  every  side,  admonish  us  that  we  have  trans 
cended  the  boundary  within  which  alone  human  thought  is 


LECT.  VH.        THOUGHT  EXAMINED.  189 

possible.  And  so,  .too,  while  we  are  competent  to  believe 
that  the  creation  of  man's  moral  nature  was  not  identical 
with  the  creation  of  morality  itself;  —  that  the  great  prin 
ciples  of  all  that  is  holy  and  righteous  existed  in  God,  be 
fore  they  assumed  their  finite  form  in  the  heart  of  man ; 
—  we  still  find  ourselves  baffled  in  every  attempt  to  con 
ceive  an  infinite  moral  nature,  or  its  condition,  an  infinite 
personality  :  we  find  ourselves  compelled  to  walk  by  faith, 
and  not  by  sight ;  —  to  admit  that  we  have  knowledge 
enough  to  guide  us  in  our  moral  training  here ;  but  not 
enough  to  unveil  the  hidden  things  of  God.  (13> 

In  so  far,  then,  as  Morality,  in  its  human  character,  depends 
upon  conditions  not  coeternal  with  God,  but  created  along 
with  man,  in  so  far  we  are  not  justified  in  regarding  the  oc 
casional  suspension  of  human  duties,  by  the  same  authority 
which  enacted  them,  as  a  violation  of  the  immutable  princi 
ples  of  morality  itself.  That  there  are  limits,  indeed,  within 
which  alone  this  rule  can  be  safely  applied;  —  that  there 
are  doctrines  and  practices  which  carry  on  their  front 
convincing  proof  that  they  cannot  have  been  revealed  or 
commanded  by  God ;  —  that  there  are  systems  of  religion 
which  by  this  criterion  may  be  shown  to  have  sprung,  not 
from  divine  appointment,  but  from  human  corruption,  —  is 
not  for  an  instant  denied.  In  my  concluding  Lecture,  I 
shall  endeavor  to  point  out  some  of  the  conditions  under 
which  this  kind  of  evidence  is  admissible.  For  the  present, 
my  argument  is  concerned,  not  with  special  and  occasional 
commands,  but  writh  universal  and  perpetual  doctrines  ;  not 
with  isolated  facts  recorded  in  sacred  history,  but  with  re 
vealed  truths,  forming  an  integral  portion  of  religious  be 
lief.  In  this  point  of  view,  I  propose  to  apply  the  principle 
hitherto  maintained,  of  the  Limits  of  Religious  Thought,  to 
the  examination  of  those  doctrines  of  the  Christian  Faith 


190  LIMITS   OF  RELIGIOUS  LECT.  VII. 

which  are  sometimes  regarded  as  containing  something 
repugnant  to  the  Moral  Reason  of  man. 

The  Atoning  Sacrifice  of  Christ  has  been  the  mark  as- 
assailed  by  various  attacks  of  this  kind  ;  some  of  them  not 
very  consistent  with  each  other,  but  all  founded  on  some 
supposed  incongruity  between  this  doctrine  and  the  moral 
attributes  of  the  Divine  Nature.  By  one  critic,  the  doc 
trine  is  rejected  because  it  is  more  consistent  with  the  in 
finite  mercy  of  God  to  pardon  sin  freely,  without  any  atone 
ment  whatsoever.  <14)  By  another,  because,  from  the  un 
changeable  nature  of  God's  laws,  it  is  impossible  that  sin  can 
be  pardoned  at  all.  <15)  A  third  maintains  that  it  is  unjust 
that  the  innocent  should  suffer  for  the  sins  of  the  guilty.  (16) 
A  fourth  is  indignant  at  the  supposition  that  God  can  be 
angry;  (17>  while  a  fifth  cannot  see  by  what  moral  fitness 
the  shedding  of  blood  can  do  away  with  sin  or  its  punish 
ment.  (18)  The  principle  which  governs  these  and  similar 
objections  is,  that  we  have  a  right  to  assume  that  there  is, 
if  not  a  perfect  identity,  at  least  an  exact  resemblance  be 
tween  the  moral  nature  of  man  and  that  of  God  ;  that  the 
laws  and  principles  of  infinite  justice  and  mercy  are  but 
magnified  images  of  those  which  are  manifested  on  a  finite 
scale  ;  —  that  nothing  can  be  compatible  with  the  boundless 
goodness  of  God,  which  is  incompatible  with  the  little  good 
ness  of  which  man  may  be  conscious  in  himself. 

The  value  of  this  principle,  as  an  absolute  criterion  of  re 
ligious  truth,  may  be  tested  by  the  simple  experiment  of 
applying  the  same  reasoning  to  an  imaginary  revelation 
constructed  on  the  rational  principles  of  some  one  of  the 
objectors.  Let  us  suppose,  then,  that,  instead  of  the  Chris 
tian  doctrine  of  the  Atonement,  the  Scriptures  had  told  us 
of  an  absolute  and  unconditional  pardon  of  sin,  following 
upon  the  mere  repentance  of  the  sinner.  It  is  easy  to  im- 


LECT.   VII.  THOUGHT  EXAMINED.  191 

agine  how  ready  our  reasoning  theologians  would  be  with 
their  philosophical  criticism,  speculative  or  moral.  Docs  it 
not,  they  might  say,  represent  man  as  influencing  God,  — 
the  Finite  as  controlling,  by  the  act  of  repentance,  the  un 
changeable  self-determinations  of  the  Infinite?  Does  it  not 
depict  the  Deity  as  acting  in  time,  as  influenced  by  mo 
tives  and  occasions,  as  subject  to  human  feelings  ?  Does 
it  not  tend  to  weaken  our  impression  of  the  hatefulness  of 
sin,  and  to  encourage  carelessness  in  the  sinner,  by  the  easy 
terms  on  which  he  is  promised  forgiveness  ?  (19>  If  it  is  un 
worthy  of  God  to  represent  Him  as  angry  and  needing  to 
be  propitiated,  how  can  philosophy  tolerate  the  conception 
that  He  is  placable,  and  to  be  softened  by  repentance  ?  And 
what  moral  fitness  has  repentance  to  do  away  with  the  guilt 
or  punishment  of  a  past  transgression  ?  Whatever  moral 
fitness  there  exists  between  righteousness  and  God's  favor, 
the  same  must  exist  between  sin  and  God's  anger :  in  what 
ever  degree  that  which  deserves  punishment  is  not  pun 
ished,  in  that  degree  God's  justice  is  limited  in  its  opera 
tion.  A  strictly  moral  theory  requires,  therefore,  not  free 
forgiveness,  but  an  exactly  graduated  proportion  between 
guilt  and  suffering,  virtue  and  happiness.  (2°)  If,  on  the 
other  hand,  we  maintain  that  there  is  no  moral  fitness  in 
either  case,  we  virtually  deny  the  existence  of  a  moral 
Deity  at  all :  we  make  God  indifferent  to  good  and  evil 
as  such :  we  represent  Him  as  rewarding  and  punishing 
arbitrarily  and  with  respect  of  persons.  The  moral  objec 
tion,  in  truth,  so  far  as  it  has  any  weight  at  all,  has  no 
special  application  to  the  Christian  doctrine  :  it  lies  against 
the  entire  supposition  of  the  remission  of  sins  on  any  terms 
and  by  any  means :  and  if  it  has  been  more  strongly  urged 
by  Rationalists  against  the  Christian  representation  than 
against  others,  this  is  merely  because  the  former  has  had 


192  LIMITS   OP  RELIGIOUS  LECT.  VII. 

the  misfortune  to  provoke  hostility  by  being  found  in  the 
Bible. 

It  is  obvious  indeed,  on  a  moment's  reflection,  that  the 
duty  of  man  to  forgive  the  trespasses  of  his  neighbor,  rests 
precisely  upon  those  features  of  human  nature  which  can 
not  by  any  analogy  be  regarded  as  representing  an  image 
of  God.  (21)  Man  is  not  the  author  of  the  moral  law :  he  is 
not,  as  man,  the  moral  governor  of  his  fellows :  he  has  no 
authority,  merely  as  man,  to  punish  moral  transgressions  as 
such.  It  is  not  as  sin,  but  as  injury,  that  vice  is  a  trans 
gression  against  man  :  it  is  not  that  his  holiness  is  outraged, 
but  that  his  rights  or  his  interests  are  impaired.  The  duty 
of  forgiveness  is  imposed  as  a  check,  not  upon  the  justice, 
but  upon  the  selfishness  of  man :  it  is  not  designed  to  ex 
tinguish  his  indignation  against  vice,  but  to  restrain  his 
tendency  to  exaggerate  his  own  personal  injuries,  t22)  The 
reasoner  maintains,  "  it  is  a  duty  in  man  to  forgive  sins, 
therefore  it  must  be  morally  fitting  for  God  to  forgive 
them  also,"  overlooks  the  fact  that  this  duty  is  binding 
upon  man  on  account  of  the  weakness  and  ignorance  and 
sinfulness  of  his  nature  ;  that  he  is  bound  to  forgive,  as  one 
who  himself  needs  forgiveness;  as  one  whose  weakness 
renders  him  liable  to  suffering ;  as  one  whose  self-love  is 
ever  ready  to  arouse  his  passions  and  pervert  his  judgment. 

Nor  yet  wrould  the  advocates  of  the  Moral  Reason  gain 
anything  in  Theology  by  the  substitution  of  a  rigid  system 
of  reward  and  punishment,  in  which  nothing  is  forgiven, 
but  every  act  meets  with  its  appropriate  recompense.  We 
have  only  to  suppose  that  this  were  the  doctrine  of  Revela 
tion,  to  imagine  the  outcry  with  which  it  would  be  assailed. 
"It  is  moral,"  the  objector  might  urge,  "only  in  the  harsher 
and  less  amiable  features  of  human  morality :  it  gives  us 
a  God  whom  we  may  fear,  but  whom  we  cannot  love  ; 


LECT.  VII.  THOUGHT   EXAMINED.  193 

who  has  given  us  affections  with  which  He  has  no  sym 
pathy,  and  passions  for  whose  consequences  He  allows  no 
redress :  who  created  man  liable  to  fall,  and  placed  him  in 
a  world  of  temptations,  knowing  that  he  would  fall,  and 
purposing  to  take  advantage  of  his  frailty  to  the  utmost." 
Criticisms  of  this  kind  may  be  imagined  without  number ; 
—  nay,  they  are  actually  found  in  more  than  one  modern 
work,  the  writers  of  which  have  erroneously  imagined  that 
they  were  assailing  the  real  teaching  of  Scripture.  (23)  Ver 
ily,  this  vaunted  Moral  Reason  is  a  "  Lesbian  rule."  <24)  It 
may  be  applied  with  equal  facility  to  the  criticism  of  every 
possible  scheme  of  Divine  Providence ;  and  therefore  we 
may  be  permitted  to  suspect  that  it  is  not  entitled  to  im 
plicit  confidence  against  any.  (25> 

The  endless  controversy  concerning  Predestination  and 
Free  Will,  whether  viewed  in  its  speculative  or  in  its  moral 
aspect,  is  but  another  example  of  the  hardihood  of  human 
ignorance.  The  question,  as  I  have  observed  before,  has 
its  philosophical  as  well  as  its  theological  aspect :  it  has  no 
difficulties  peculiar  to  itself:  it  is  but  a  special  form  of  the 
fundamental  mystery  of  the  coexistence  of  the  Infinite  and 
the  Finite.  Yet,  with  this  mystery  meeting  and  baffling 
human  reason  at  every  turn,  theologians  have  not  scrupled 
to  trace  in  their  petty  channels  the  exact  flow  and  course 
of  Infinite  wisdom  ;  one  school  boldly  maintaining  that 
even  Omniscience  itself  has  no  knowledge  of  contingent 
events ;  another  asserting,  with  equal  confidence,  that  God's 
knowledge  must  be  a  restraint  on  man's  freedom.  (26)  It' 
philosophy  offers  for  the  moment  an  apparent  escape  from 
the  dilemma,  by  suggesting  that  God's  knowledge  is  not 
properly  foreknowledge,  as  having  no  relation  to  time  ;  (27) 
the  suggestion  itself  is  one  which  can  neither  be  verified  as  a 
truth,  nor  even  intelligibly  exhibited  as  a  thought ;  and  the 

17 


194  LIMITS   OF  RELIGIOUS  LECT.  VII. 

Rationalist  evades  the  solution  by  shifting  the  ground  of  at 
tack,  and  retorts  that  Prophecy  at  least  is  anterior  to  the 
event  which  it  foretells ;  and  that  a  prediction  of  human  ac 
tions  is  irreconcilable  with  freedom.  <28)  But  the  w7hole  mean 
ing  of  the  difficulty  vanishes,  as  soon  as  we  acknowledge  that 
the  Infinite  is  not  an  object  of  human  thought  at  all.  There 
can  be  no  consciousness  of  a  relation,  whether  of  agreement 
or  of  opposition,  wrhere  there  is  not  a  consciousness  of  both 
the  objects  related.  That  a  man,  by  his  own  power,  should 
be  able  with  certainty  to  foretell  the  future,  implies  that 
the  laws  of  that  future  are  fixed  and  unchangeable  ;  for  man 
can  only  foresee  particular  occurrences  through  a  knowl 
edge  of  the  general  law  on  which  they  depend.  But  is 
this  relation  of  cause  to  effect,  of  law  to  its  consequences, 
really  a  knowledge  or  an  ignorance  ?  Is  the  causal  rela 
tion  itself  a  law  of  things,  or  only  a  human  mode  of  repre 
senting  phenomena  ?  Supposing  it  were  possible  for  man, 
in  some  other  state  of  intelligence,  to  foresee  a  future  event 
without  foreseeing  it  as  the  result  of  a  law,  —  would  that 
knowledge  be  a  higher  or  a  lower  one  than  he  at  present 
possesses  ?  —  would  it  be  the  removal  of  some  reality  which 
he  now  sees,  or  only  of  some  limitation  under  which  he 
now  sees  it  ?  <29)  Man  can  only  foresee  what  is  certain  ; 
and  from  his  point  of  view,  the  foreknowledge  depends 
upon  the  certainty.  But,  apart  from  the  human  con 
ditions  of  thought,  in  relation  to  a  more  perfect  intelli 
gence,  can  we  venture  to  say,  even  as  regards  temporal 
succession,  whether  necessity  is  the  condition  of  foreknowl 
edge,  or  foreknowledge  of  necessity,  or  whether  indeed 
necessity  itself  has  any  existence  at  all  ?  (3°)  May  not  the 
whole  scheme  of  Law  and  Determinism  indicate  a  weak 
ness,  rather  than  a  power  of  the  human  mind ;  and  are 
there  not  facts  of  consciousness  which  give  some  support 


LECT.  VII.  THOUGHT   EXAMINED.  195 

to  this  conjecture  ?  (31>  Can  anything  be  necessary  to  an 
intellect  whose  thought  creates  its  own  objects  ?  Can  any 
necessity  of  things  determine  the  cognitions  of  the  Abso 
lute  Mind,  even  if  those  cognitions  take  place  in  succession 
to  each  other  ?  These  questions  admit  of  no  certain  an 
swer  ;  but  the  very  inability  to  answer  them  proves  that 
dogmatic  decisions  on  either  side  are  the  decisions  of  igno 
rance,  not  of  knowledge. 

But  the  problem,  be  its  difficulties  and  their  origin  what 
they  may,  is  not  peculiar  to  Theology,  and  receives  no 
additional  complication  from  its  position  in  Holy  "Writ. 
The  very  same  question  may  be  discussed  in  a  purely  met 
aphysical  form,  by  merely  substituting  the  universal  law 
of  causation  for  the  universal  knowledge  of  God.  What  is 
the  meaning  and  value  of  that  law  of  the  human  mind 
which  apparently  compels  us  to  think  that  every  event 
whatever  has  its  determining  cause?  And  how  is  that 
conviction  reconcilable  with  a  liberty  in  the  human  will  to 
choose  between  two  alternatives  ?  The  answer  is  substan 
tially  the  same  as  before.  The  freedom  of  the  will  is  a 
positive  fact  of  our  consciousness:  as  for  the  principle 
of  causality,  we  know  not  whence  it  is,  nor  what  it  is. 
We  know  not  whether  it  is  a  law  of  things,  or  a  mode  of 
human  representation ;  whether  it  denotes  an  impotence 
or  a  power;  whether  it  is  innate  or  acquired.  We  know 
not  in  what  the  causal  relation  itself  consists ;  nor  by  what 
authority  we  are  warranted  in  extending  its  significance 
beyond  the  temporal  sequence  which  suggests  it  and  the 
material  phenomena  in  which  that  sequence  is  undisturbed. 

And  is  not  the  same  conviction  of  the  ignorance  of  man, 
and  of  his  rashness  in  the  midst  of  ignorance,  forced  upon 
us  by  the  spectacle  of  the  arbitrary  and  summary  decisions 
of  human  reason  on  the  most  mysterious  as  well  as  the 


196  LIMITS   OF   RELIGIOUS  LECT.  VII. 

most  awful  of  God's  revealed  judgments  against  sin,  —  the 
sentence  of  Eternal  Punishment?  "We  know  not  what  is 
the  relation  of  Sin  to  Infinite  Justice.  We  know  not 
under  what  conditions,  consistently  with  the  freedom  of 
man,  the  final  restoration  of  the  impenitent  sinner  is  possi 
ble  ;  nor  how,  without  such  a  restoration,  guilt  and  misery 
can  ever  cease.  We  know  not  whether  the  future  punish 
ment  of  sin  will  be  inflicted  by  way  of  natural  consequence 
or  of  supernatural  visitation ;  whether  it  will  be  produced 
from  within  or  inflicted  from  without.  We  know  not  hotf 
man  can  be  rescued  from  sin  and  suffering  without  the 
cooperation  of  his  own  will;  nor  what  means  can  coop* 
erate  with  that  will,  beyond  those  which  are  offered  to  al/ 
of  us  during  our  state  of  trial.  (32>  It  becomes  us  to  speak 
cautiously  and  reverently  on  a  matter  of  which  God  ha? 
revealed  so  little,  and  that  little  of  such  awful  moment; 
but  if  we  may  be  permitted  to  criticize  the  arguments  of 
the  opponents  of  this  doctrine  with  the  same  freedom  with 
which  they  have  criticized  the  ways  of  God,  we  may  re 
mark  that  the  whole  apparent  force  of  the  moral  objec 
tion  rests  upon  two  purely  gratuitous  assumptions.  It  isr 
assumed,  in  the  first  place,  that  God's  punishment  of  sin  in 
the  world  to  come  is  so  far  analogous  to  man's  admin istra^ 
tion  of  punishment  in  this  world,  that  it  will  take  place  as 
a  special  infliction,  not  as  a  natural  consequence.  And  it 
is  assumed,  in  the  second  place,  that  punishment  will  be 
inflicted  solely  with  reference  to  the  sins  committed  dur 
ing  the  earthly  life; — that  the  guilt  will  continue  finite, 
while  the  misery  is  prolonged  to  infinity.  <33)  Are  we  then 
so  sure,  it  may  be  asked,  that  there  can  be  no  sin  beyond 
the  grave?  Can  any  immortal  soul  incur  God's  wrath  and 
condemnation,  only  so  long  as  it  is  united  to  a  mortal 
body?  With  as  much  reason  might  we  assert  that  the 


LECT.  VII.  THOUGHT  EXAMINED  197 

angels  are  incapable  of  obedience  to  God,  that  the  devils 
are  incapable  of  rebellion.  What  if  the  sin  perpetuates 
itself,  —  if  the  prolonged  misery  be  the  offspring  of  the 
prolonged  guilt  ?  <34) 

Against  this  it  is  urged  that  sin  cannot  forever  be  trium 
phant  against  God.  C35)  As  if  the  whole  mystery  of  ini 
quity  were  contained  in  the  words  for  ever!  The  real  rid 
dle  of  existence — the  problem  which  confounds  all  philoso 
phy,  aye,  and  all  religion  too,  so  far  as  religion  is  a  thing 
of  man's  reason  —  is  the  fact  that  evil  exists  at  all;  not 
that  it  exists  for  a  longer  or  a  shorter  duration.  Is  not 
God  infinitely  wise  and  holy  and  powerful  now?  and  does 
not  sin  exist  along  with  that  infinite  holiness  and  wisdom, 
and  power?  Is  God  to  become  more  holy,  more  wise, 
more  powerful  hereafter ;  and  must  evil  be  annihilated  to 
make  room  for  His  perfections  to  expand?  Does  the 
infinity  of  His  eternal  nature  ebb  and  flow  with  every 
increase  or  diminution  in  the  sum  of  human  guilt  arid  mis 
ery  ?  Against  this  immovable  barrier  of  the  existence  of 
evil,  the  waves  of  philosophy  have  dashed  themselves  un 
ceasingly  since  the  birthday  of  human  thought,  and  have 
retired  broken  and  powerless,  without  displacing  the  mi 
nutest  fragment  of  the  stubborn  rock,  without  softening 
one  feature  of  its  dark  and  rugged  surface.  (3°)  We  may 
be  told  that  evil  is  a  privation,  or  a  negation,  or  a  partial 
aspect  of  the  universal  good,  or  some  other  equally  un 
meaning  abstraction ;  whilst  all  the  while  our  own  hearts 
bear  testimony  to  its  fearful  reality,  to  its  direct  antagonism 
to  every  possible  form  of  good.  (37)  But  this  mystery,  vast 
and  inscrutable  as  it  is,  is  but  one  aspect  of  a  more  gen 
eral  problem  ;  it  is  but  the  moral  form  of  the  ever-recurring 
secret  of  the  Infinite.  How  the  Infinite  and  the  Finite,  in 
any  form  of  antagonism  or  other  relation,  can  exist  to- 

17* 


198  LIMITS    OF   RELIGIOUS  LECT.  VII. 

gether ;  how  infinite  power  can  coexist  with  finite  activ 
ity;  how  infinite  wisdom  can  coexist  with  finite  contin 
gency  ;  how  infinite  goodness  can  coexist  with  finite  evil ; 
how  the  Infinite  can  exist  in  any  manner  without  ex 
hausting  the  universe  of  reality ;  —  this  is  the  riddle  which 
Infinite  Wisdom  alone  can  solve,  the  problem  whose  very 
conception  belongs  only  to  that  Universal  Knowing  which 
fills  and  embraces  the  Universe  of  Being.  When  philoso 
phy  can  answer  this  question ;  when  she  can  even  state 
intelligibly  the  notions  which  its  terms  involve,  —  then, 
and  not  till  then,  she  may  be  entitled  to  demand  a  solution 
of  the  far  smaller  difficulties  which  she  finds  in  revealed 
religion ;  —  or  rather,  she  will  have  solved  them  already ; 
for  from  this  they  all  proceed,  and  to  this  they  all  ulti 
mately  return. 

The  reflections  which  this  great  and  terrible  mystery  of 
Divine  Judgment  have  suggested,  receive  perhaps  some 
further  support  when  we  contemplate  it  in  another  aspect, 
and  one  more  legitimately  within  the  province  of  human 
reason;  that  is  to  say,  in  its  analogy  to  the  actual  con 
stitution  and  course  of  nature.  "  The  Divine  moral  govern 
ment  which  religion  teaches  us,"  says  Bishop  Butler,  "  im 
plies  that  the  consequence  of  vice  shall  be  misery,  in  some 
future  state,  by  the  righteous  judgment  of  God.  That 
such  consequent  punishment  shall  take  effect  by  His  ap 
pointment,  is  necessarily  implied.  But,  as  it  is  not  in  any 
sort  to  be  supposed  that  we  are  made  acquainted  with  all 
the  ends  or  reasons,  for  which  it  is  fit  future  punishment 
should  be  inflicted,  or  why  God  has  appointed  such  and 
such  consequent  misery  should  follow  vice ;  and  as  we  are 
altogether  in  the  dark,  how  or  in  what  manner  it  shall  fol 
low,  by  what  immediate  occasions,  or  by  the  instrumental 
ity  of  what  means,  —  there  is  no  absurdity  in  supposing 


LECT.  VII.  THOUGHT   EXAMINED.  199 

it  may  follow  in  a  way  analogous  to  that  in  which  many 
miseries  follow  such  and  such  courses  of  action  at  present : 
poverty,  sickness,  infamy,  untimely  death  from  diseases, 
death  from  the  hands  of  civil  justice.  There  is  no  absurd 
ity  in  supposing  future  punishment  may  follow  wickedness 
of  course,  as  we  speak,  or  in  the  way  of  natural  conse 
quence  from  God's  original  constitution  of  the  world  ;  from 
the  nature  He  has  given  us,  and  from  the  condition  in 
which  He  places  us ;  or  in  a  like  manner  as  a  person  rashly 
trifling  upon  a  precipice,  in  the  way  of  natural  conse 
quence,  falls  down;  in  the  way  of  natural  consequence, 
breaks  his  limbs,  suppose ;  in  the  way  of  natural  conse 
quence  of  this,  without  help  perishes." (38^ 

And  if  we  may  be  permitted  to  extend  the  same  anal 
ogy  from  the  constitution  of  external  nature  to  that  of 
the  human  mind,  may  we  not  trace  something  not  wholly 
unlike  the  irrevocable  sentence  of  the  future,  in  that  dark 
and  fearful,  yet  too  certain  law  of  our  nature,  by  which 
sin  and  misery  ever  tend  to  perpetuate  themselves;  by 
which  evil  habits  gather  strength  with  every  fresh  indul 
gence,  till  it  is  no  longer,  humanly  speaking,  in  the  power 
of  the  sinner  to  shake  off  the  burden  which  his  own  deeds 
have  laid  upon  him  ?  In  that  mysterious  condition  of  the 
depraved  will,  compelled,  and  yet  free,  —  the  slave  of  sin 
ful  habit,  yet  responsible  for  every  act  of  sin,  and  gather 
ing  deeper  condemnation  as  the  power  of  amendment 
grows  less  and  less,  —  may  we  not  see  some  possible  fore 
shadowing  of  the  yet  deeper  guilt  and  the  yet  more  hope 
less  misery  of  the  worm  that  dieth  not,  and  the  fire  that  is 
not  quenched  ?  The  fact,  awful  as  it  is,  is  one  to  which 
our  every  day's  experience  bears  witness :  and  who  shall 
say  that  the  invisible  things  of  God  may  riot,  in  this  as  in 
other  instances,  be  shadowed  forth  to  us  in  the  things  that 
are  seen  ? 


200  LIMITS   OP  RELIGIOUS  LKCT.  VII. 

The  same  argument  from  analogy  is  indeed  applicable 
to  every  one  of  the  difficulties  which  Rationalism  professes 
to  discover  in  the  revealed  ways  of  God's  dealings  with 
man.  The  Fall  of  Adam,  and  the  inherited  corruption  of 
his  posterity,  find  their  parallel  in  the  liability  to  sin  which 
remains  unextinguished  throughout  man's  moral  progress ; 
and  in  that  mysterious,  though  certain  dispensation  of 
Providence,  which  ordains  that  not  only  bodily  taints  and 
infirmities,  but  even  moral  dispositions  and  tendencies 
should,  in  many  instances,  descend  from  father  to  son; 
and  which  permits  the  child  of  sinful  parents  to  be  de 
praved  by  evil  example,  before  he  knows  how,  by  his  own 
reason,  clearly  to  discern  between  right  and  wrong ;  before 
he  has  strength,  of  his  own  will,  to  refuse  the  evil  and 
choose  the  good  (39)  There  is  a  parallel,  too,  in  that 
strange,  yet  too  familiar  fact,  of  vice  persisted  in,  with  the 
clearest  and  strongest  conviction  of  its  viciousness  and 
wretchedness ;  and  the  skepticism  which  denies  that  man, 
if  created  sinless,  could  so  easily  have  fallen  from  inno 
cence,  finds  its  philosophical  counterpart  in  the  paradox 
of  the  ancient  moralist,  who  maintained  that  conscious  sin 
is  impossible,  because  nothing  can  be  stronger  than  knowl 
edge.  <40)  Justification  by  faith  through  the  merits  of 
Christ  is  at  least  in  harmony  with  that  course  of  things 
established  by  Divine  Providence  in  this  world ;  in  which 
so  many  benefits,  which  we  cannot  procure  for  ourselves  or 
deserve  by  any  merit  of  our  own,  are  obtained  for  us  by 
the  instrumentality  of  others;  and  in  which  we  are  so 
often  compelled,  as  an  indispensable  condition  of  obtain 
ing  the  benefit,  to  trust  in  the  power  and  good-will  of 
those  whom  we  have  never  tried,  and  to  believe  in  the 
efficacy  of  means  whose  manner  of  working  we  know 
not.  (41)  The  operations  of  Divine  Grace,  influencing,  yet 


LECT.  VII.  THOUGHT    EXAMINED.  2C1 

not  necessitating,  the  movements  of  the  human  soul,  find 
their  corresponding  fact  and  their  corresponding  mystery 
in  the  determinations  of  the  Will;  —  in  that  Freedom  to 
do  or  leave  undone,  so  certain  in  fact,  so  inexplicable  in 
theory,  which  consists  neither  in  absolute  indifference  nor 
in  absolute  subjection  ;  which  is  acted  upon  and  influenced 
by  motives,  yet  in  its  turn  acts  upon  and  controls  their  in 
fluences,  prevented  by  them,  and  yet  working  with  them.  (*-) 
But  it  is  unnecessary  to  pursue  further  an  argument  which, 
in  all  its  essential  features,  has  already  been  fully  exhibited 
by  a  philosopher  whose  profound  and  searching  wisdom 
has  answered  by  anticipation  nearly  every  cavil  of  the 
latest  form  of  Rationalism,  no  less  than  those  of  his  own 
day.  We  may  add  here  and  there  a  detail  of  application, 
as  the  exigencies  of  controversy  may  suggest ;  but  the 
principle  of  the  whole,  and  its  most  important  conse 
quences,  have  been  established  and  worked  out  more  than 
a  century  ago,  in  the  unanswerable  argument  of  Butler. 

The  warning  which  his  great  work  contains  against 
"  that  idle  and  not  very  innocent  employment  of  forming 
imaginary  models  of  a  world,  and  schemes  of  governing 
it,"  <43)  is  as  necessary  now  as  then,  as  applicable  to  moral 
as  to  speculative  theories.  Neither  with  regard  to  the 
physical  nor  to  the  moral  world,  is  man  capable  of  con 
structing  a  Cosmogony ;  and  those  Babels  of  Reason, 
which  Philosophy  has  built  for  itself,  under  the  names  of 
Rational  Theories  of  Religion,  and  Criticisms  of  every 
Revelation,  are  but  the  successors  of  those  elder  children 
of  chaos  and  night,  which,  with  no  greater  knowledge, 
but  with  less  presumption,  sought  to  describe  the  gener 
ation  of  the  visible  universe.  It  is  no  disparagement  of 
the  value  and  authority  of  the  Moral  Reason  in  its  regu 
lative  capacity,  within  its  proper  sphere  of  human  action, 


202  LIMITS   OF   RELIGIOUS  LECT.  VII. 

if  we  refuse  to  exalt  it  to  the  measure  and  standard  of  the 
Absolute  and  Infinite  Goodness  of  God.  The  very  Philos 
opher  whose  writings  have  most  contributed  to  establish 
the  supreme  authority  of  Conscience  in  man,  is  also  the 
one  who  has  pointed  out  most  clearly  the  existence  of 
analogous  moral  difficulties  in  nature  and  in  religion,  and 
the  true  answer  to  both,  —  the  admission  that  God's  Gov 
ernment,  natural  as  well  as  spiritual,  is  a  scheme  imper 
fectly  comprehended. 

In  His  Moral  Attributes,  no  less  than  in  the  rest  of  His 
Infinite  Being,  God's  judgments  are  unsearchable,  and  His 
ways  past  finding  out.1  While  He  manifests  Himself 
clearly  as  a  Moral  Governor  and  Legislator,  by  the  witness 
of  the  Moral  Law  which  He  has  established  in  the  hearts 
of  men,  we  cannot  help  feeling,  at  the  same  time,  that  that 
Law,  grand  as  it  is,  is  no  measure  of  His  Grandeur,  that 
He  Himself  is  beyond  it,  though  not  opposed  to  it,  dis 
tinct,  though  not  alien  from  it.  We  feel  that  He  who 
planted  in  man's  conscience  that  stern,  unyielding  Impera 
tive  of  Duty,  must  Himself  be  true  and  righteous  alto 
gether;  that  He  from  whom  all  holy  desires,  all  good  coun 
sels,  and  all  just  works  do  proceed,  must  Himself  be  more 
holy,  more  good,  more  just  than  these.  But  when  we  try 
to  realize  in  thought  this  sure  conviction  of  our  faith,  we 
find  that  here,  as  everywhere,  the  Finite  cannot  fathom 
the  Infinite ;  that,  while  in  our  hearts  we  believe,  yet  our 
thoughts  at  times  are  sore  troubled.  It  is  consonant  to 
the  whole  analogy  of  our  earthly  state  of  trial,  that,  in  this 
as  in  other  features  of  God's  Providence,  we  should  meet 
with  things  impossible  to  understand  and  difficult  to  be 
lieve  ;  by  which  reason  is  baffled  and  faith  tried;  —  acts 
whose  purpose  we  see  not ;  dispensations  whose  wisdom  is 

1  Romans  xi.  33. 


LECT.  VII.         THOUGHT  EXAMINED.  203 

above  us ;  thoughts  which  are  not  our  thoughts,  and  ways 
which  are  not  our  ways.  In  these  things  we  hear,  as  it 
were,  the  same  loving  voice  which  spoke  to  the  wondering 
disciple  of  old  :  "  What  I  do,  thou  knowest  not  now ;  but 
thou  shalt  know  hereafter."1  The  luminary  by  whose 
influence  the  ebb  and  flow  of  man's  moral  being  is  regu 
lated,  moves  around  and  along  with  man's  little  world,  in 
a  regular  and  bounded  orbit ;  one  side,  and  one  side  only, 
looks  downward  upon  its  earthly  centre;  the  other,  which 
we  see  not,  is  ever  turned  upwards  to  the  all-surrounding 
Infinite.  And  those  tides  have  their  seasons  of  rise  and 
fall,  their  places  of  strength  and  weakness  ;  and  that  light 
waxes  and  wanes  with  the  growth  or  decay  of  man's  men 
tal  and  moral  and  religious  culture ;  and  its  borrowed  rays 
seem  at  times  to  shine  as  with  their  own  lustre,  in  rivalry, 
even  in  opposition,  to  the  source  from  which  they  emanate. 
Yet  is  that  light  still  but  a  faint  and  partial  reflection  of 
the  hidden  glories  of  the  Sun  of  Righteousness,  waiting 
but  the  brighter  illumination  of  His  presence,  to  fade  and 
be  swallowed  up  in  the  full  blaze  of  the  heaven  kindling 
around  it ;  —  not  cast  down  indeed  from  its  orbit,  nor 
shorn  of  its  true  brightness  and  influence,  but  still  felt  and 
acknowledged  in  its  real  existence  and  power,  in  the  mem 
ory  of  the  past  discipline,  in  the  product  of  the  present 
perfectness,  though  now  distinct  no  more,  but  vanishing 
from  sight  to  be  made  one  with  the  Glory  that  beams  from 
the  "Father  of  lights,  with  whom  is  no  variableness, 
neither  shadow  of  turning."  2 

1  St.  John  xiii.  7.  2  St.  James  i.  17. 


LECTURE    VIII. 


THE  WORKS  WHICH  THE  FATHER  HATH  GIVEN  ME  TO  FINISH,  THE 
SAME  WORKS  THAT  I  DO,  BEAR  WITNESS  OF  ME,  THAT  THE  FA 
THER  HATH  SENT  ME. —  ST.  JOHN  V.  36. 


To  construct  a  complete  Criticism  of  any  Revelation,  it 
is  necessary  that  the  Critic  should  be  in  possession  of  a  per 
fect  Philosophy  of  the  Infinite.  For,  except  on  the  sup 
position  that  we  possess  an  exact  knowledge  of  the  whole 
Nature  of  God,  such  as  only  that  Philosophy  can  furnish, 
we  cannot  know  for  certain  what  are  the  purposes  which 
God  intends  to  accomplish  by  means  of  Revelation,  and 
what  are  the  instruments  by  which  those  purposes  may  be 
best  carried  out.  If  then  it  can  be  shown,  as  I  have  at 
tempted  to  show  in  the  previous  Lectures,  that  the  attain 
ment  of  a  Philosophy  of  the  Infinite  is  utterly  impossible 
under  the  existing  laws  of  human  thought,  it  follows  that 
it  is  not  by  means  of  philosophical  criticism  that  the  claims 
of  a  supposed  Revelation  can  be  adequately  tested.  We 
are  thus  compelled  to  seek  another  field  for  the  right  use 
of  Reason  in  religious  questions ;  and  what  that  field  is,  it 
will  not  be  difficult  to  determine.  To  Reason,  rightly  em 
ployed,  within  its  proper  limits  and  on  its  proper  objects, 
our  Lord  himself  and  his  Apostles  openly  appealed  in  proof 
of  their  divine  mission  ;  and  the  same  proof  has  been  un 
hesitatingly  claimed  by  the  defenders  of  Christianity  in  all 
subsequent  ages.  In  other  words,  the  legitimate  object  of 


LECT.   VIII.  THOUGHT   EXAMINED.  205 

a  rational  criticism  of  revealed  religion,  is  not  to  be  found 
in  the  contents  of  that  religion,  but  in  its  evidences. 

At  first  sight  it  may  appear  as  if  this  distinction  involved 
no  real  difference ;  for  the  contents  of  a  revelation,  it  might 
be  objected,  are  included  among  its  evidences.  In  one 
sense,  no  doubt  they  are ;  but  that  very  inclusion  gives 
them  a  totally  different  significance  and  weight  from  that 
to  which  they  lay  claim  when  considered  as  the  basis  of  a 
philosophical  criticism.  In  the  one  case,  they  are  judged 
by  their  conformity  to  the  supposed  nature  and  purposes  of 
God  ;  in  the  other,  by  their  adaptation  to  the  actual  circum 
stances  and  wants  of  man.  In  the  one  case  they  are  re 
garded  as  furnishing  a  single  and  a  certain  criterion  ;  for 
on  the  supposition  that  our  reason  is  competent  to  deter 
mine,  from  our  knowledge  of  the  Divine  Nature,  what  the 
characteristics  of  a  true  Revelation  ought  to  be,  we  are 
entitled,  by  virtue  of  that  criterion  alone,  to  reject  without 
hesitation  whatever  does  not  satisfy  its  requirements.  In 
the  other  case,  they  are  regarded  as  furnishing  only  one 
probable  presumption  out  of  many ;  —  a  presumption  winch 
may  confirm  and  be  confirmed  by  coinciding  testimony  from 
other  sources,  or,  on  the  contrary,  may  be  outweighed,  when 
we  come  to  balance  probabilities,  by  conflicting  evidence  on 
the  other  side. 

The  practical  conclusion,  which  may  be  deduced  from 
the  whole  previous  survey  of  the  Limits  of  Religious 
Thought,  is  this  :  that  if  no  one  faculty  of  the  human 
mind  is  competent  to  convey  a  direct  knowledge  of  the 
Absolute  and  the  Infinite,  no  one  faculty  is  entitled  to 
claim  preeminence  over  the  rest,  as  furnishing  especially 
the  criterion  of  the  truth  or  falsehood  of  a  supposed  Reve 
lation.  There  are  presumptions  to  be  drawn  from  the  in 
ternal  character  of  the  doctrines  which  the  revelation  con- 

18 


206  LIMITS   OF  RELIGIOUS  LECT.  VIII. 

tains :  there  are  presumptions  to  be  drawn  from  the  facts 
connected  with  its  first  promulgation :  there  are  presump 
tions  to  be  drawn  from  its  subsequent  history  and  the 
effects  which  it  has  produced  among  mankind.  But  the 
true  evidence,  for  or  against  the  religion,  is  not  to  be 
found  in  any  one  of  these  taken  singly  and  exclusively; 
but  in  the  resultant  of  all,  fairly  examined  and  compared 
together ;  the  apparently  conflicting  evidences  being  bal 
anced  against  each  other,  and  the  apparently  concurring 
evidences  estimated  by  their  united  efficacy. 

A  truth  so  obvious  as  this  may  be  thought  hardly  worth 
announcing  as  the  result  of  an  elaborate  inquiry.  But  the 
whole  history  of  religious  controversy  bears  witness  that, 
however  evident  in  theory,  there  is  no  truth  more  liable  to 
be  neglected  in  practice.  The  defenders  of  Christianity 
are  not  altogether  free  from  the  charge  of  insisting  ex 
clusively  or  preeminently  upon  some  one  alone  of  its  evi 
dences  :  the  assailants,  under  the  influence  of  a  still  more 
exclusive  reaction,  have  assumed  that  a  method  which  fails 
to  accomplish  everything  has  succeeded  in  accomplishing 
nothing  ;  and,  flying  at  once  to  the  opposite  extreme,  have 
in  their  turn  appealed  to  some  one  infallible  criterion,  as 
constituting  a  royal  road  to  philosophical  unbelief. 

In  the  present  day  we  are  feeling  the  pernicious  effects 
of  a  reaction  of  this  kind.  Because  the  writings  of  Paley 
and  his  followers  in  the  last  generation  laid  a  principal 
stress  on  the  direct  historical  evidences  of  Christianity,  we 
meet  now  with  an  antagonist  school  of  writers,  who  per 
petually  assure  us  that  history  has  nothing  whatever  to  do 
with  religion  ;  (*)  that  an  external  revelation  of  religious 
truth  is  impossible ;  W  that  we  may  learn  all  that  is  essen 
tial  to  the  Gospel  by  inward  and  spiritual  evidence  only.  (8) 
In  the  spirit  of  the  Pharisees  of  old,  who  said,  "  This  man 


LECT.   VIII.  THOUGHT   EXAMINED.  207 

is  not  of  God,  because  lie  keepeth  not  the  Sabbath  day," 1 
we  nre  now  told  that  the  doctrine  must  in  all  cases  prove 
the  miracles,  and  not  the  miracles  the  doctrine ;  (4)  that 
the  external  evidence  of  miracles  is  entirely  useless  for  the 
support  of  the  religious  philosophy  of  Christ ;  (5>  that  man 
no  more  needs  a  miraculous  revelation  of  things  pertaining 
to  religion  than  of  things  pertaining  to  agriculture  or  man 
ufactures.  <6)  And,  as  is  usually  the  case  in  such  rea'ctions, 
the  last  state  has  become  worse  than  the  first ;  —  a  slight 
comparative  neglect  of  the  internal  evidence  on  the  one 
side  has  been  replaced  by  an  utter  repudiation  of  all  ex 
ternal  evidence  on  the  other ;  a  trifling  disproportion  in 
the  edifice  of  the  Christian  Faith  has  been  remedied  by 
the  entire  removal  of  some  of  its  main  pillars  of  support. 
The  crying  evil  of  the  present  day  in  religious  controversy 
is  the  neglect  or  contempt  of  the  external  evidences  of 
Christianity  :  the  first  step  towards  the  establishment  of  a 
sound  religious  philosophy  must  consist  in  the  restoration 
of  those  evidences  to  their  true  place  in  the  Theological 
system. 

The  evidence  derived  from  the  internal  character  of  a 
religion,  whatever  may  be  its  value  within  its  proper  limits, 
is,  as  regards  the  divine  origin  of  the  religion,  purely  nega 
tive.  It  may  prove  in  certain  cases  (though  even  here 
the  argument  requires  much  caution  in  its  employment) 
that  a  religion  has  not  come. from  God  ;  but  it  is  in  no  case 
sufficient  to  prove  that  it  has  come  from  Him.  <T)  For  the 
doctrines  revealed  must  either  be  such  as  are  within  the 
power  of  man's  natural  reason  to  verify,  or  such  as  are  be 
yond  it.  In  the  former  case,  the  reason  which  is  com 
petent  to  verify  may  also  be  competent  to  discover :  the 
doctrine  is  tested  by  its  conformity  to  the  conclusions  of 

i  St.  John  ix.  16. 


208  LIMITS   OF  RELIGIOUS  LECT.  VIII. 

human  philosophy ;  and  the  wisdom  which  sits  in  judg 
ment  on  the  truth  of  a  doctrine  must  itself  be  presumed 
to  have  an  equal  power  of  discerning  the  truth.  In  the 
latter  case,  where  the  doctrine  is  beyond  the  power  of 
human  reason  to  discover,  it  can  be  accepted  only  as  rest 
ing  on  the  authority  of  the  teacher  who  proclaims  it ;  and 
that  authority  itself  must  then  be  guaranteed  by  the  ex 
ternal  evidence  of  a  superhuman  mission.  To  advance  a 
step  beyond  the  merely  negative  argument,  it  is  necessary 
that  the  evidence  contained  in  the  character  of  the  doc 
trine  itself  should  be  combined  with  that  derived  from  the 
exterior  history.  When,  for  example,  the  Divine  Origin  of 
Christianity  is  maintained,  on  the  ground  of  its  vast  moral 
superiority  to  all  Heathen  systems  of  Ethics ;  or  on  that 
of  the  improbability  that  such  a  system  could  have  been 
conceived  by  a  Galilean  peasant  among  the  influences  of 
the  contemporary  Judaism  ;  the  argument  is  legitimate 
and  powerful :  but  its  positive  force  depends  not  merely 
on  the  internal  character  of  the  doctrine,  but  principally 
on  its  relation  to  certain  external  facts.  <8) 

And  even  the  negative  argument,  which  concludes  from 
the  character  of  the  contents  of  a  religion  that  it  can 
not  have  come  from  God,  however  legitimate  within  its 
proper  limits,  is  one  which  requires  considerable  caution  in 
the  application.  The  lesson  to  be  learnt  from  an  examina 
tion  of  the  Limits  of  Religious  Thought,  is  not  that  man's 
judgments  are  worthless  in  relation  to  divine  things,  but 
that  they  are  fallible;  and  the  probability  of  error  in  any 
particular  case  can  never  be  fairly  estimated,  without  giv 
ing  their  full  weight  to  all  collateral  considerations.  We 
are  indeed  bound  to  believe  that  a  Revelation  given  by 
God  can  never  contain  anything  that  is  really  unwise  or 
unrighteous ;  but  we  are  not  always  capable  of  estimating 


LECT.  VIII.  THOUGHT    EXAMINED.  209 

exactly  the  wisdom  or  righteousness  of  particular  doctrines 
or  precepts.  And  we  are  bound  to  bear  in  mind  that  ex 
actly  in  proportion  to  the  strength  of  the  remaining  evi 
dence  for  the  divine  origin  of  a  religion^  is  the  probability 
that  we  may  be  mistaken  in  supposing  this  or  that  portion 
of  its  contents  to  be  unworthy  of  God.  Taken  in  conjunc 
tion,  the  two  arguments  may  confirm  or  correct  each  other : 
taken  singly  and  absolutely,  each  may  vitiate  the  result 
which  should  follow  from  their  joint  application.  We  do 
not  certainly  know  the  exact  nature  and  operation  of  the 
moral  attributes  of  God;  we  can  but  infer  and  conjecture 
from  what  we  know  of  the  moral  attributes  of  man :  and 
the  analogy  between  the  Finite  and  the  Infinite  can  never 
be  so  perfect  as  to  preclude  all  possibility  of  error  in  the 
process.  But  the  possibility  becomes  almost  a  certainty, 
when  any  one  human  faculty  is  elevated  by  itself  into  an 
authoritative  criterion  of  religious  truth,  without  regard 
to  those  collateral  evidences  by  which  its  decisions  may  be 
modified  and  corrected. 

"The  human  mind,"  says  a  writer  of  the  present  day,  "is 
competent  to  sit  in  moral  and  spiritual  judgment  on  a 
professed  revelation ;  and  to  decide,  if  the  case  seems  to 
require  it,  in  the  following  tone :  This  doctrine  attributes 
to  God,  that  which  we  should  all  call  harsh,  cruel,  or  unjust 
in  man :  it  is  therefore  intrinsically  inadmissible."  ..."  In 
fact,"  he  continues,  "all  Christian  apostles  and  mission 
aries,  like  the  Hebrew  prophets,  have  always  refuted  Pagan 
ism  by  direct  attacks  on  its  immoral  and  unspiritual  doc 
trines  ;  and  have  appealed  to  the  consciences  of  heathens, 
as  competent  to  decide  in  the  controversy."  (9)  Now,  an 
appeal  of  this  kind  may  be  legitimate  or  not,  according  to 
the  purpose  for  which  it  is  made,  and  the  manner  in  which 
it  is  applied.  The  primary  nnd  proper  employment  of 

18* 


210  LIMITS    OF   RELIGIOUS  LECT.  VIII. 

man's  moral  sense,  as  of  his  other  faculties,  is  not  specula 
tive,  but  regulative.  It  is  not  designed  to  tell  us  what  arc 
the  absolute  and  immutable  principles  of  Right,  as  existing 
in  the  eternal  nature  of  God;  but  to  discern  those  relative 
and  temporary  manifestations  of  them,  which  are  neces 
sary  for  human  training  in  this  present  life.  But  if  moral 
ity,  in  its  human  manifestation,  contains  a  relative  and 
temporary,  as  well  as  an  absolute  and  eternal  element,  an 
occasional  suspension  of  the  human  Law  is  by  no  means  to 
be  confounded  with  a  violation  of  the  divine  Principle. 
We  can  only  partially  judge  of  the  Moral  government  of 
God,  on  the  assumption  that  there  is  an  analogy  between 
the  divine  nature  and  the  human:  and  in  proportion  as 
the  analogy  recedes  from  perfect  likeness,  the  decisions  of 
the  human  reason  necessarily  become  more  and  more 
doubtful.  The  primary  and  direct  inquiry,  which  human 
reason  is  entitled  to  make  concerning  a  professed  revela 
tion  is,  —  how  far  does  it  tend  to  promote  or  to  hinder  the 
moral  discipline  of  man.  It  is  but  a  secondary  and  indi 
rect  question,  and  one  very  liable  to  mislead,  to  ask  how 
far  it  is  compatible  with  the  Infinite  Goodness  of  God. 

Thus,  for  example,  it  is  one  thing  to  condemn  a  religion 
on  account  of  the  habitual  observance  of  licentious  or  inhu 
man  rites  of  worship,  and  another  to  pronounce  judgment 
on  isolated  acts,  historically  recorded  as  having  been  done 
by  divine  command,  but  not  perpetuated  in  precepts  for 
the  imitation  of  posterity.  The  former  are  condemned  for 
their  regulative  character,  as  contributing  to  the  perpetual 
corruption  of  mankind ;  the  latter  are  condemned  on  spec 
ulative  grounds,  as  inconsistent  with  our  preconceived 
notions  of  the  character  of  God.  "  There  are  some  par 
ticular  precepts  in  Scripture,"  says  Bishop  Butler,  "  given 
to  particular  persons,  requiring  actions,  which  would  be 


LECT.  VIII.  THOUGHT   EXAMINED.  211 

immoral  and  vicious,  were  it  not  for  such  precepts.  But  it 
is  easy  to  see,  that  all  these  are  of  such  a  kind,  as  that  the 
precept  changes  the  whole  nature  of  the  case  and  of  the 
action ;  and  both  constitutes  and  shows  that  not  to  be 
unjust  or  immoral,  which,  prior  to  the  precept,  must  have 
appeared,  and  really  have  been  so :  which  may  well  be, 
since  none  of  these  precepts  are  contrary  to  immutable 
morality.  If  it  were  commanded  to  cultivate  the  princi 
ples  and  act  from  the  spirit  of  treachery,  ingratitude, 
cruelty ;  the  command  would  not  alter  the  nature  of  the 
case  or  of  the  action,  in  any  of  these  instances.  But  it  is 
quite  otherwise  in  precepts  which  require  only  the  doing 
an  external  action  ;  for  instance,  taking  away  the  property 
or  life  of  any.  For  men  have  no  right  to  either  life  or 
property,  but  what  arises  solely  from  the  grant  of  God : 
when  this  grant  is  revoked,  they  cease  to  have  any  right 
at  all  in  either:  and  when  this  revocation  is  made  known, 
as  surely  it  is  possible  it  may  be,  it  must  cease  to  be  unjust 
to  deprive  them  of  either.  And  though  a  course  of  exter 
nal  acts,  which  without  command  would  be  immoral,  must 
make  an  immoral  habit;  yet  a  few  detached  commands 
have  no  such  natural  tendency.  .  .  .  There  seems  no  diffi 
culty  at  all  in  these  precepts,  but  what  arises  from  their 
being  offences  :  i.  e.  from  their  being  liable  to  be  perverted, 
as  indeed  they  are,  by  wicked  designing  men,  to  serve 
the  most  horrid  purposes;  and,  perhaps,  to  mislead  the 
weak  and  enthusiastic.  And  objections  from  this  head  are 
not  objections  against  revelation ;  but  against  the  whole 
notion  of  religion,  as  a  trial ;  and  against  the  general  con 
stitution  of  nature."  (10) 

There  is  indeed  an  obvious  analogy  between  these  tem 
porary  suspensions  of  the  laws  of  moral  obligation  and  that 
corresponding  suspension  of  the  laws  of  natural  phenomena 


212  LIMITS    OF  RELIGIOUS  LECT.  VIII. 

Which  constitutes  our  ordinary  conception  of  a  Miracle. 
So  much  so,  indeed,  that  the  former  might  without  impro 
priety  be  designated  as  Moral  Miracles.  In  both,  the 
Almighty  is  regarded  as  suspending,  for  special  purposes, 
not  the  eternal  laws  which  constitute  His  own  absolute 
Nature,  but  the  created  laws,  which  he  imposed  at  a  cer 
tain  time  upon  a  particular  portion  of  his  creatures.  Both 
are  isolated  and  rare  in  their  occurrence ;  and  apparently, 
from  the  nature  of  the  case,  must  be  so,  in  order  to  unite 
harmoniously  with  the  normal  manifestations  of  God's  gov 
ernment  of  the  world.  A  perpetual  series  of  physical  mira 
cles  would  destroy  that  confidence  in  the  regularity  of  the 
course  of  nature,  which  is  indispensable  to  the  cultivation 
of  man's  intellectual  and  productive  energies :  a  permanent 
suspension  of  practical  duties  would  be  similarly  prejudi 
cial  to  the  cultivation  of  his  moral  character.  But  the 
isolated  character  of  both  classes  of  phenomena  removes 
the  objection  which  might  otherwise  be  brought  against 
them  on  this  account:  and  this  objection  is  the  only  one 
which  can  legitimately  be  urged,  on  philosophical  grounds, 
against  the  conception  of  such  cases  as  possible  ;  as  dis 
tinguished  from  the  historical  evidence,  which  may  be  ad 
duced  for  or  against  their  actual  occurrence. 

Even  within  its  own  legitimate  province,  an  argument 
of  this  kind  may  have  more  or  less  weight,  varying  from 
the  lowest  presumption  to  the  highest  moral  certainty, 
according  to  the  nature  of  the  offence  which  we  believe 
ourselves  to  have  detected,  and  the  means  which  we 
possess  of  estimating  its  character  or  consequences.  It 
is  certain  that  we  are  not  competent  judges  of  the  Abso 
lute  Nature  of  God :  it  is  not  certain  that  we  are  com 
petent  judges,  in  all  cases,  of  what  is  best  fitted  for  the 
moral  discipline  of  man.  But  granting  to  the  above  argu- 


LECT.   VIII.  THOUGHT   EXAMINED.  213 

ment  its  full  value  in  this  relation,  it  is  still  important  to 
remember  that  we  are  dealing,  not  with  demonstrative  but 
with  probable  evidence ;  not  with  a  single  line  of  reasoning, 
but  with  a  common  focus,  to  which  many  and  various  rays 
converge ;  that  we  have  not  solved  the  entire  problem, 
but  only  obtained  one  of  the  elements  contributing  to  its 
solution.  And  the  combined  result  of  all  these  elements 
is  by  no  means  identical  with  the  sum  of  their  separate 
effects.  The  image,  hitherto  employed,  of  a  balance  of 
probabilities,  is,  in  one  respect  at  least,  very  inadequate  to 
express  the  character  of  Christian  evidence.  It  may  be 
used  with  some  propriety  to  express  the  provisional  stage 
of  the  inquiry,  while  we  are  still  uncertain  to  which  side 
the  evidence  inclines ;  but  it  becomes  inapplicable  as  soon 
as  our  decision  is  made.  For  the  objections  urged  against 
a  religion  are  not  like  the  weights  in  a  scale,  which  retain 
their  full  value,  even  when  outweighed  on  the  other  side  ; 
—  on  the  contrary,  they  become  absolutely  worthless,  as 
soon  as  we  are  convinced  that  there  is  superior  evidence  to 
prove  that  the  religion  is  true.  We  may  not  say,  for  exam 
ple,  that  certain  parts  of  the  Christian  scheme  are  unwise 
or  unrighteous,  though  outweighed  by  greater  acts  of 
righteousness  and  wisdom;  —  we  are  bound  to  believe 
that  we  were  mistaken  from  the  first  in  supposing  them  to 
be  unwise  or  unrighteous  at  all.  In  a  matter  of  which  we 
are  so  ignorant  and  so  liable  to  be  deceived,  the  objection 
which  fails  to  prove  everything  proves  nothing :  from  him 
that  hath  not,  is  taken  away  even  that  which  he  seemeth 
to  have.  And  on  the  other  hand,  the  objection  which 
really  proves  anything  proves  everything.  If  the  teaching* 
of  Christ  is  in  any  one  thing  not  the  teaching  of  God,  it  is 
in  all  things  the  teaching  of  man :  its  doctrines  are  subject 
to  all  the  imperfections  inseparable  from  man's  sinfulness 


214  LIMITS   OF  RELIGIOUS  LECT    VIII. 

and  ignorance :  its  effects  must  be  such  as  can  fully  be 
accounted  for  as  the  results  of  man's  wisdom,  with  all  its 
weakness  and  all  its  error. 

Here  then  is  the  issue,  which  the  wavering  disciple  is 
bound  seriously  to  consider.  Taking  into  account  the  vari 
ous  questions  whose  answers,  on  the  one  side  or  the  other, 
form  the  sum  total  of  Evidences  for  or  against  the  claims 
of  the  Christian  Faith  ;  —  the  genuineness  and  authenticity 
of  the  documents ;  the  judgment  and  good  faith  of  the 
writers ;  the  testimony  to  the  actual  occurrence  of  prophe 
cies  and  miracles,  and  their  relation  to  the  religious  teaching 
with  which  they  are  connected;  the  character  of  the  Teacher 
Himself,  that  one  protrait,  which,  in  its  perfect  purity 
and  holiness  and  beauty,  stands  alone  and  unapproached 
in  human  history  or  human  fiction  ;  those  rites  and  cere 
monies  of  the  elder  Law,  so  significant  as  typical  of  Christ, 
so  strange  and  meaningless  without  Him ;  those  predictions 
of  the  promised  Messiah,  whose  obvious  meaning  is  rendered 
still  more  manifest  by  the  futile  ingenuity  which  strives  to 
pervert  them;(n)  the  history  of  the  rise  and  progress  of 
Christianity,  and  its  comparison  with  that  of  other  religions  ; 
the  ability  or  inability  of  human  means  to  bring  about  the  re 
sults  which  it  actually  accomplished ;  its  antagonism  to  the 
current  ideas  of  the  age  and  country  of  its  origin  ;  its  effects 
as  a  system  on  the  moral  and  social  condition  of  subsequent 
generations  of  mankind ;  its  fitness  to  satisfy  the  wants  and 
console  the  sufferings  of  human  nature ;  the  character  of 
those  by  whom  it  was  first  promulgated  and  received  ;  the 
sufferings  which  attested  the  sincerity  of  their  convictions ; 
the  comparative  trustworthiness  of  ancient  testimony  and 
modern  conjecture  ;  the  mutual  contradictions  of  conflicting 
theories  of  unbelief,  and  the  inadequacy  of  all  of  them  to 
explain  the  facts  for  which  they  are  bound  to  account ;  — 


LECT.  VIII.  THOUGHT   EXAMINED.  215 

taking  all  these  and  similar  questions  into  full  considera 
tion,  are  you  prepared  to  affirm,  as  the  result  of  the  whole 
inquiry,  that  Jesus  of  Nazareth  was  an  impostor,  or  an  en 
thusiast,  or  a  mythical  figment  ;  and  his  disciples  crafty 
and  designing,  or  well-meaning,  but  deluded  men  ?  For  be 
assured,  that  nothing  short  of  this  is  the  conclusion  which 
you  must  maintain,  if  you  reject  one  jot  or  one  tittle  of  the 
whole  doctrine  of  Christ.  Either  He  was  what  He  pro 
claimed  Himself  to  be,  —  the  incarnate  Son  of  God,  the 
Divine  Saviour  of  a  fallen  world  —  and  if  so,  we  may  not 
divide  God's  Revelation,  and  dare  to  put  asunder  what  He 
has  joined  together,  —  or  the  civilized  world  for  eighteen 
centuries  has  been  deluded  by  a  cunningly  devised  fable ; 
and  He  from  whom  that  fable  came  has  turned  that  world 
from  darkness  to  light,  from  Satan  to  God,  with  a  lie  in  His 
right  hand. 

Many  who  would  shrink  with  horror  from  the  idea  of  re 
jecting  Christ  altogether,  will  yet  speak  and  act  as  if  they 
were  at  liberty  to  set  up  for  themselves  an  eclectic  Christi 
anity  ;  separating  the  essential  from  the  superfluous  por 
tions  of  Christ's  teaching ;  deciding  for  themselves  how 
much  is  permanent  and  necessary  for  all  men,  and  how 
much  is  temporary  and  designed  only  for  a  particular  age 
and  people.  (12>  Yet  if  Christ  is  indeed  God  manifest  in  the 
flesh,  it  is  surely  scarcely  less  impious  to  attempt  to  im 
prove  His  teaching,  than  to  reject  it  altogether.  Nay,  in 
one  respect  it  is  more  so  ;  for  it  is  to  acknowledge  a  doc 
trine  as  the  revelation  of  God,  and  at  the  same  time  to  pro 
claim  that  it  is  inferior  to  the  wisdom  of  man.  That  it 
may  indeed  come,  and  has  come,  within  the  purposes  of 
God's  Providence,  to  give  to  mankind  a  Revelation  partly 
at  least  designed  for  a  temporary  purpose,  and  for  a  limited 
portion  of  mankind  ;  —  a  Law  in  which  something  was  per- 


216  LIMITS   OF  RELIGIOUS  LECT.  VIII. 

mitted  to  the  hardness  of  men's  hearts,1  and  much  was 
designed  but  as  a  shadow  of  things  to  come;2 — this  we 
know,  to  whom  a  more  perfect  Revelation  has  been  given. 
But  to  admit  that  God  may  make  His  own  Revelation 
more  perfect  from  time  to  time,  is  very  different  from  ad 
mitting  that  human  reason,  by  its  own  knowledge,  is  com 
petent  to  separate  the  perfect  from  the  imperfect,  and  to 
construct  for  itself  an  absolute  religion  out  of  the  fragments 
of  an  incomplete  Revelation.  The  experiment  has  been 
tried  under  the  elder  and  less  perfect  dispensation  ;  but  the 
result  can  hardly  be  considered  so  successful  as  to  encour 
age  a  repetition  of  the  attempt.  The  philosophical  im 
provement  of  the  Hebrew  Scriptures  produced,  not  the 
Sermon  on  the  Mount,  but  the  Creed  of  the  Sadducee. 
The  ripened  intelligence  of  the  Jewish  people,  instructed, 
as  modern  critics  would  assure  us,  by  the  enlightening  in 
fluence  of  time,  and  by  intercourse  with  foreign  nations, 
bore  fruit  in  a  conclusion  singularly  coinciding  with  that  of 
modern  rationalism :  "  The  Sadducees  say  that  there  is  no 
resurrection,  neither  angel,  nor  spirit." 3  (13>  And  doubtless 
there  were  many  then,  as  now,  to  applaud  this  wonderful 
discovery,  as  a  proof  that  "  religious  truth  is  necessarily 
progressive,  because  our  powers  are  progressive ;  "  <14)  and 
to  find  a  mythical  or  critical  theory,  to  explain  or  to  set 
aside  those  passages  of  Scripture  which  appeared  to  incul 
cate  a  contrary  doctrine.  Unfortunately  for  human  wis 
dom,  Prometheus  himself  needs  a  Prometheus.  The  lapse 
of  time,  as  all  history  bears  witness,  is  at  least  as  fruit 
ful  in  corruption  as  in  enlightenment  ;  and  reason,  when 
it  has  done  its  best,  still  needs  a  higher  reason  to  decide 
between  its  conflicting  theories,  and  to  tell  us  which  is  the 
advanced,  which  the  retrograde  Theology.  (15> 

i  St.  Matthew  xix.  8.  2  Hebrews  x.  1.  3  Acts  xxiii.  8. 


LECT.  VIII.  THOUGHT   EXAMINED.  217 

In  one  respect,  indeed,  this  semi-rationalism,  which  ad 
mits  the  authority  of  Revelation  up  to  a  certain  point  and 
no  further,  rests  on  a  for  less  reasonable  basis  than  the  firm 
belief  which  accepts  the  whole,  or  the  complete  unbelief 
which  accepts  nothing.  For  whatever  may  be  the  antece 
dent  improbability  w^hich  attaches  to  a  miraculous  narra 
tive,  as  compared  with  one  of  ordinary  events,  it  can  affect 
only  the  narrative  taken  as  a  whole,  and  the  entire  series 
of  miracles  from  the  greatest  to  the  least.  If  a  single  mir 
acle  is  once  admitted  as  supported  by  competent  evidence, 
the  entire  history  is  at  once  removed  from  the  ordinary 
calculations  of  more  or  less  probability.  One  miracle  is 
sufficient  to  show  that  the  series  of  events,  with  which  it 
is  connected,  is  one  which  the  Almighty  has  seen  fit  to 
mark  by  exceptions  to  the  ordinary  course  of  His  Provi 
dence  :  and  this  being  once  granted,  we  have  no  a  priori 
grounds  to  warrant  us  in  asserting  that  the  number  of  such 
exceptions  ought  to  be  larger  or  smaller.  If  any  one  mira 
cle  recorded  in  the  Gospels  —  the  Resurrection  of  Christ, 
for  example — be  once  admitted  as  true,  the  remainder 
cease  to  have  any  antecedent  improbability  at  all,  and  re 
quire  no  greater  evidence  to  prove  them  than  is  needed  for 
the  most  ordinary  events  of  any  other  history.  For  the 
improbability,  such  as  it  is,  reaches  no  further  than  to 
show  that  it  is  unlikely  that  God  should  work  miracles  at 
all ;  not  that  it  is  unlikely  that  He  should  work  more  than 
a  certain  number. 

Our  right  to  criticize  at  all  depends  upon  this  one  ques 
tion  :  "What  think  ye  of  Christ?  whose  Son  is  He?"1 
What  is  it  that  constitutes  our  need  of  Christ  ?  Is  it  a 
conviction  of  guilt  and  wretchedness,  or  a  taste  for  Philos 
ophy  ?  Do  we  want  a  Redeemer  to  save  us  from  our  sins, 

1  St.  Matthew  xxii.  42. 
19 


218  LIMITS   OF  RELIGIOUS  LECT.  VIII. 

or  a  moral  Teacher  to  give  us  a  plausible  theory  of  human 
duties  ?  Christ  can  be  our  Redeemer  only  if  He  is  what 
He  proclaims  himself  to  be,  the  Son  of  God,  sent  into  the 
world,  that  the  world  through  Him  might  be  saved.1  If 
He  is  not  this,  His  moral  teaching  began  with  falsehood, 
and  was  propagated  by  delusion.  And  if  He  is  this,  what 
but  contempt  and  insult  can  be  found  in  that  half-allegi 
ance  which  criticizes  while  it  bows ;  which  sifts  and  selects 
while  it  submits ;  which  approves  or  rejects  as  its  reason 
or  its  feelings  or  its  nervous  sensibilities  may  dictate; 
which  condescends  to  acknowledge  Him  as  the  teacher 
of  a  dark  age  and  an  ignorant  people  ;  bowing  the  knee 
before  Him,  half  in  reverence,  half  in  mockery,  and  crying, 
"  Hail,  King  of  the  Jews ! "  If  Christ  is  a  mere  human 
teacher,  we  of  this  nineteenth  century  can  no  more  be 
Christians  than  we  can  be  Platonists  or  Aristotelians.  He 
belongs  to  that  past  which  cannot  repeat  itself;  His  modes 
of  thought  are  not  ours ;  His  difficulties  are  not  ours ;  His 
needs  are  not  ours.  He  may  be  our  Teacher,  but  not  our 
Master;  for  no  man  is  master  over  the  free  thoughts  of 
his  fellow-men  :  we  may  learn  from  him,  but  we  sit  in 
judgment  while  we  learn  ;  we  modify  his  teaching  by  the 
wisdom  of  later  ages ;  we  refuse  the  evil  and  choose  the 
good.  But  remember  that  we  can  do  this,  only  if  Christ 
is  a  mere  human  teacher,  or  if  we  of  these  latter  days  have 
received  a  newer  and  a  better  revelation.  If  now,  as  of 
old,  He  speaks  as  never  man  spake  ;2 — if  God,  who  at  sun 
dry  times  and  in  divers  manners  spake  in  time  past  unto 
the  fathers  by  the  prophets,  hath  in  these  last  days  spoken 
unto  us  by  His  Son,3 — what  remains  for  us  to  do  but  to 
cast  down  imaginations,  and  every  high  thing  that  exalt- 
eth  itself  against  the  knowledge  of  God,  and  to  bring  into 

i  St.  John  iii.  17.  2  St.  John  vii.  46.  3  Hebrews  i.  1,  2. 


LECT.  Yin.  THOUGHT  EXAMINED.  219 

captivity  every  thought  to  the  obedience  of  Christ? l  The 
witness  which  Christ  offers  of  Himself  either  proves  every 
thing  or  it  proves  nothing.  No  man  has  a  right  to  say,  "I 
will  accept  Christ  as  I  like,  and  reject  him  as  I  like ;  I  will 
follow  the  holy  Example ;  I  will  turn  away  from  the  aton 
ing  Sacrifice  ;  I  will  listen  to  His  teaching ;  I  will  have 
nothing  to  do  with  His  mediation ;  I  will  believe  Him 
when  He  tells  me  that  He  came  from  the  Father,  because 
I  feel  that  His  doctrine  has  a  divine  beauty  and  fitness ; 
but  I  will  not  believe  Him  when  He  tells  me  that  He  is 
one  with  the  Father,  because  I  cannot  conceive  how  this 
unity  is  possible."  This  is  not  philosophy,  which  thus 
mutilates  man ;  this  is  not  Christianity,  which  thus  divides 
Christ.  <16)  If  Christ  is  no  more  than  one  of  us,  let  us  hon 
estly  renounce  the  shadow  of  allegiance  to  an  usurped 
authority,  and  boldly  proclaim  that  every  man  is  his  own 
Redeemer.  If  Christ  is  God,  no  less  than  man,  let  us 
beware,  lest  haply  we  be  found  even  to  fight  against  God.2 
Beyond  question,  every  doubt  which  our  reason  may 
suggest  in  matters  of  religion  is  entitled  to  its  due  place 
in  the  examination  of  the  evidences  of  religion ;  if  we  will 
treat  it  as  a  part  only  and  not  the  whole ;  if  we  will  not 
insist  on  a  positive  solution  of  that  which,  it  may  be,  is 
given  us  for  another  purpose  than  to  be  solved.  It  is 
reasonable  to  believe  that,  in 'matters  of  belief  as  well  as 
of  practice,  God  has  not  thought  fit  to  annihilate  the 
free  will  of  man ;  but  has  permitted  speculative  difficul 
ties  to  exist  as  the  trial  and  the  discipline  of  sharp  and 
subtle  intellects,  as  he  has  permitted  moral  temptations  to 
form  the  trial  and  the  discipline  of  strong  and  eager  pas 
sions.  (17)  Our  passions  are  not  annihilated  when  we  resist 
the  temptation  to  sin:  why  should  we  expect  that  our 

i  2  Corinthians  x.  5.  2  Acts  v.  39. 


220  LIMITS   OF  RELIGIOUS  LECT.  VIII. 

doubts  must  be  annihilated  if  we  are  to  resist  the  tempta 
tion  to  unbelief?  This  correspondence  of  difficulties  is  so 
far  from  throwing  doubt  on  the  divine  origin  of  Revela 
tion,  that  it  rather  strengthens  the  proof  that  it  has  ema 
nated  from  that  Giver  whose  other  gifts  are  subject  to  like 
conditions.  We  do  not  doubt  that  the  conditions  of  our 
moral  trial  tend  towards  good  and  not  towards  evil ;  that 
human  nature,  even  in  its  fallen  state,  bears  traces  of  the 
image  of  its  Maker,  and  is  fitted  to  be  an  instrument  in 
His  moral  government.  And  we  believe  this,  notwith 
standing  the  existence  of  passions  and  appetites  which, 
isolated  and  uncontrolled,  appear  to  lead  in  an  opposite 
direction.  Is  it  then  more  reasonable  to  deny  that  a  sys 
tem  of  revealed  religion,  whose  unquestionable  tendency 
as  a  whole  is  to  promote  the  glory  of  God  and  the  welfare 
of  mankind,  can  have  proceeded  from  the  same  Author, 
merely  because  we  may  be  unable  to  detect  the  same  char 
acter  in  some  of  its  minuter  features,  viewed  apart  from 
the  system  to  which  they  belong  ? 

It  would  of  course  be  impossible  now  to  enter  upon  any 
detailed  examination  of  the  positive  Evidences  of  Chris 
tianity.  The  purpose  of  the  foregoing  Lectures  will  have 
been  answered,  if  they  can  only  succeed  in  clearing  the 
way  for  a  candid  and  impartial  inquiry ;  by  showing  what 
are  the  limits  within  which  it  must  be  confined,  and  what 
kind  of  reasoning  is  inadmissible,  as  transgressing  those 
limits.  The  conclusion,  which  an  examination  of  the  con 
ditions  of  human  thought  unavoidably  forces  upon  us,  is 
this :  There  can  be  no  such  thing  as  a  positive  science  of 
Speculative  Theology ;  for  such  a  science  must  necessarily 
be  based  on  an  apprehension  of  the  Infinite;  and  the 
Infinite,  though  we  are  compelled  to  believe  in  its  exist 
ence,  cannot  be  positively  apprehended  in  any  mode  of 


LECT.  Yin.  THOUGHT  EXAMINED.  221 

the  human  Consciousness.  The  same  impediment  which 
prevents  the  formation  of  Theology  as  a  science,  is  also 
manifestly  fatal  to  the  theory  which  asserts  its  progressive 
development.  We  can  test  the  progress  of  knowledge, 
only  by  comparing  its  successive  representations  with  the 
objects  which  they  profess  to  represent:  and  as  the  object 
in  this  case  is  inaccessible  to  human  faculties,  we  have  no 
criterion  by  which  to  distinguish  between  progress  and 
mere  fluctuation.  The  so-called  progress  in  Theology  is  in 
truth  only  an  advance  in  those  conceptions  of  man's  moral 
and  religious  duties  which  form  the  basis  of  natural  re 
ligion  ;  —  an  advance  which  is  regulative  and  not  specula 
tive  ;  which  is  primarily  and  properly  a  knowledge,  not  of 
God's  nature,  but  of  man's  obligations ;  and  which  is  the 
result,  not  of  an  immediate  intuition  of  the  Nature  of  the 
Infinite,  but  of  a  closer  study  of  the  Laws  of  the  Finite. 
A  progress  of  this  kind  can  obviously  have  no  place  in 
relation  to  those  truths,  if  such  there  be,  which  human 
reason  is  incapable  of  discovering  for  itself:  and  to  assert 
its  applicability  to  the  criticism  of  Revealed  Religion,  is 
to  beg  the  entire  question  in  dispute,  by  assuming,  without 
the  slightest  authority,  that  Revelation  cannot  be  anything 
more  than  a  republication  of  Natural  Religion.  (18) 

But,  on  the  other  hand,  there  is  an  opposite  caution  no 
less  needed,  in  making  use  of  the  counter-theory,  which 
regards  the  doctrines  of  Revelation  as  truths  accommo 
dated  to  the  finite  capacities  of  man ;  as  serving  for  regu 
lative,  not  for  speculative  knowledge ;  and  as  not  amenable 
to  any  criticism  based  on  human  representations  of  the 
Infinite.  This  theory  is  useful,  not  as  explaining  the  diffi 
culties  involved  in  religious  thought,  but  as  showing  why 
we  must  leave  them  unexplained;  not  as  removing  the 
mysteries  of  revelation,  but  as  showing  why  such  myste- 

19* 


222  LIMITS   OF  RELIGIOUS  LECT.  VIII. 

ries  must  exist.  This  caution  has  not  always  been  suffi 
ciently  observed,  even  by  those  theologians  who  have 
shown  the  most  just  appreciation  of  the  limits  of  man's 
faculties  in  the  comprehension  of  divine  things.  Thus,  to 
mention  an  example  of  an  ancient  method  of  interpreta 
tion  which  has  been  revived  with  considerable  ability  and 
effect  in  modern  times,  —  the  rule,  that  the  Attributes 
ascribed  to  God  in  Scripture  must  be  understood  as  denot 
ing  correspondence  in  Eifects,  but  not  similarity  of  Causes, 
is  one  which  is  liable  to  considerable  misapplication :  it 
contains  indeed  a  portion  of  truth,  but  a  portion  which  is 
sometimes  treated  as  if  it  were  the  whole.  "Affectus  in 
Deo,"  says  Aquinas,  "  denotat  effectum : "  (19)  and  the  canon 
has  been  applied  by  a  distinguished  Prelate  of  our  own 
Church,  in  language  probably  familiar  to  many  of  us. 
"The  meaning,"  says  Archbishop  King,  "confessedly  is, 
that  He  will  as  certainly  punish  the  wicked  as  if  He  were 
inflamed  with  the  passion  of  anger  against  them ;  that  He 
will  as  infallibly  reward  the  good,  as  we  will  those  for 
whom  we  have  a  particular  and  affectionate  love ;  that 
when  men  turn  from  their  wickedness,  and  do  what  is 
agreeable  to  the  divine  command,  He  will  as  surely  change 
His  dispensations  towards  them,  as  if  He  really  repented, 
and  had  changed  His  mind."  (2°) 

This  is  no  doubt  a  portion  of  the  meaning ;  but  is  it  the 
whole  ?  Does  Scripture  intend  merely  to  assert  a  resem 
blance  in  the  effects  and  none  at  all  in  the  causes  ?  If  so, 
it  is  difficult  to  see  why  the  natural  rule  of  accommoda 
tion  should  have  been  reversed ;  why  a  plain  and  intelli 
gible  statement  concerning -the  Divine  Acts  should  have 
been  veiled  under  an  obscure  and  mysterious  image  of  the 
Divine  Attributes.  If  God's  Anger  means  no  more  than 
His  infliction  of  punishments ;  if  His  Love  means  no  more 


LECT.  Vm.  THOUGHT   EXAMINED.  223 

than  His  bestowal  of  rewards ;  it  would  surely  have  been 
sufficient  to  have  told  us  that  God  punishes  sin  and  re 
wards  obedience,  without  the  interposition  of  a  fictitious 
feeling  as  the  basis  of  the  relation.  The  conception  of  a 
God  who  acts,  is  at  least  as  human  as  that  of  a  God  who 
feels;  and  though  both  are  but  imperfect  representations 
of  the  Infinite  under  finite  images,  yet,  while  both  rest 
upon  the  same  authority  of  Scripture,  it  is  surely  going 
beyond  the  limits  of  a  just  reserve  in  speaking  of  divine 
mysteries,  to  assume  that  the  one  is  merely  the  symbol, 
and  the  other  the  interpretation.  It  is  surely  more  reason 
able,  as  well  as  more  reverent,  to  believe  that  these  partial 
representations  of  the  Divine  Consciousness,  though,  as 
finite,  they  are  unable  speculatively  to  represent  the  Abso 
lute  Nature  of  God,  have  yet  each  of  them  a  regulative 
purpose  to  fulfil  in  the  training  of  the  mind  of  man  :  that 
there  is  a  religious  influence  to  be  imparted  to  us  by  the 
thought  of  God's  Anger,  no  less  than  by  that  of  His  Pun 
ishments  ;  by  the  thought  of  His  Love,  no  less  than  by 
that  of  His  Benefits :  that  both,  inadequate  and  human  as 
they  are,  yet  dimly  indicate  some  corresponding  reality  in 
the  Divine  Nature  ;  and  that  to  merge  one  in  the  other  is 
not  to  gain  a  purer  representation  of  God  as  He  is,  but 
only  to  mutilate  that  under  which  He  has  been  pleased  to 
reveal  Himself.  <21) 

It  is  obvious  indeed  that  the  theory  of  an  adaptation  of 
divine  truths  to  human  faculties,  entirely  changes  its  sig 
nificance,  as  soon  as  we  attempt  to  give  a  further  adapta 
tion  to  the  adapted  symbol  itself;  to  modify  into  a  still 
lower  truth  that  which  is  itself  a  modification  of  a  higher. 
The  instant  we  undertake  to  say  that  this  or  that  specula 
tive  or  practical  interpretation  is  the  only  real  meaning  of 
that  which  Scripture  represents  to  us  under  a  different 


224  LIMITS   OF  RELIGIOUS  LECT.  VIII. 

image,  we  abandon  at  once  the  supposition  of  an  accom 
modation  to  the  necessary  limits  of  human  thought,  and 
virtually  admit  that  the  ulterior  significance  of  the  repre 
sentation  falls  as  much  within  those  limits  as  the  represen 
tation  itself,  i22)  Thus  interpreted,  the  principle  no  longer 
offers  the  slightest  safeguard  against  Rationalism  ;  —  nay, 
it  becomes  identified  with  the  fundamental  vice  of  Ration 
alism  itself,  —  that  of  explaining  away  what  we  are  unable 
to  comprehend. 

The  adaptation  for  which  I  contend  is  one  which  admits 
of  no  such  explanation.  It  is  not  an  adaptation  to  the 
ignorance  of  one  man,  to  be  seen  through  by  the  superior 
knowledge  of  another ;  but  one  which  exists  in  relation  to 
the  whole  human  race,  as  men,  bound  by  the  laws  of  man's 
thought ;  as  creatures  of  time,  instructed  in  the  things  of 
eternity;  as  finite  beings,  placed  in  relation  to  and  com 
munication  with  the  Infinite.  I  believe  that  Scripture 
teaches,  to  each  and  all  of  us,  the  lesson  which  it  was 
designed  to  teach,  so  long  as  we  are  men  upon  earth,  and 
not  as  the  angels  in  heaven,  t23)  I  believe  that  "  now  we 
see  through  a  glass  darkly,"  —  in  an  enigma ;  —  but  that 
now  is  one  which  encompasses  the  whole  race  of  mankind, 
from  the  cradle  to  the  grave,  from  the  creation  to  the 
day  of  judgment:  that  dark  enigma  is  one  which  no 
human  wisdom  can  solve;  which  Reason  is  unable  to 
penetrate;  and  which  Faith  can  only  rest  content  with 
here,  in  hope  of  a  clearer  vision  to  be  granted  hereafter. 
If  there  be  any  who  think  that  the  Laws  of  Thought 
themselves  may  change  with  the  changing  knowledge  of 
man ;  that  the  limitations  of  Subject  and  Object,  of  Dura 
tion  and  Succession,  of  Space  and  Time,  belong  to  the 
vulgar  only,  and  not  to  the  philosopher ;  —  if  there  be  any 
who  believe  that  they  can  think  without  the  consciousness 


LECT.  VIII.  THOUGHT   EXAMINED.  225 

of  themselves  as  thinking,  or  of  anything  about  which  they 
think;  that  they  can  be  in  such  or  such  a  mental  state, 
and  yet  for  no  period  of  duration ;  that  they  can  remem 
ber  this  state  and  make  subsequent  use  of  it,  without  con 
ceiving  it  as  antecedent,  or  as  standing  in  any  order  of 
time  to  their  present  consciousness ;  that  they  can  reflect 
upon  God  without  their  reflections  following  each  other, 
without  their  succeeding  to  any  earlier  or  being  succeeded 
by  any  later  state  of  mind  ;  —  if  there  be  any  who  main 
tain  that  they  can  conceive  Justice  and  Mercy  and  Wis 
dom,  as  neither  existing  in  a  merciful  and  just  and  wise 
Being,  nor  in  any  way  distinguishable  from  each  other, — 
if  there  be  any  who  imagine  that  they  can  be  conscious 
without  variety,  or  discern  without  differences  ,  —  these, 
and  these  alone,  may  aspire  to  correct  Revelation  by  the 
aid  of  Philosophy  ;  for  such  alone  are  the  conditions  under 
which  Philosophy  can  attain  to  a  rational  knowledge  of 
the  Infinite  God. 

The  intellectual  difficulties  which  Rationalism  discovers 
in  the  contents  of  Revelation  (I  do  not  now  speak  of  those 
which  belong  to  its  external  evidences)  are  such  as  no  sys 
tem  of  Rational  Theology  can  hope  to  remove ;  for  they 
are  inherent  in  the  constitution  of  Reason  itself.  Our 
mental  laws,  like  our  moral  passions,  are  designed  to  serve 
the  purposes  of  our  earthly  culture  and  discipline ;  both 
have  their  part  to  perform  in  moulding  the  intellect  and 
the  will  of  man  through  the  slow  stages  of  that  training 
here,  whose  completion  is  to  be  looked  for  hereafter. 
Without  the  possibility  of  temptation,  where  would  be  the 
merit  of  obedience?  Without  room  for  doubt,  where 
would  be  the  righteousness  of  faith  ?  (24)  But  there  is  no 
temptation  which  taketh  us,  as  Christians,  but  such  as  is 


226  LIMITS   OF  RELIGIOUS  LECT.  VIII. 

common  to  man ; l  and  there  is  no  doubt  that  taketh  us 
but  such  as  is  common  to  man  also.  It  is  the  province  of 
Philosophy  to  teach  us  this  ;  and  it  is  the  province  of  Re 
ligion  to  turn  the  lesson  to  account.  The  proud  definition 
of  ancient  sages,  which  bade  the  philosopher,  as  a  lover  of 
wisdom,  strive  after  the  knowledge  of  things  divine  and 
human,  would  speak  more  soberly  and  more  truly  by 
enjoining  a  Knowledge  of  things  human,  as  subservient 
and  auxiliary  to  Faith  in  things  divine.  (25)  Of  the  Nature 
and  Attributes  of  God  in  His  Infinite  Being,  Philosophy 
can  tell  us  nothing :  of  man's  inability  to  apprehend  that 
Nature,  and  why  he  is  thus  unable,  she  tells  us  all  that  we 
can  know,  and  all  that  we  need  to  know.  "  Know  thy 
self,"  was  the  precept  inscribed  in  the  Delphic  Temple,  as 
the  best  lesson  of  Heathen  wisdom.  (26>  "  Know  thyself," 
was  the  exhortation  of  the  Christian  Teacher  to  his  disci 
ple,  adding,  "  if  any  man  know  himself,  he  will  also  know 
God."  (27)  He  will  at  least  be  content  to  know  so  much  of 
God's  nature  as  God  Himself  has  been  pleased  to  reveal ; 
and,  where  Revelation  is  silent,  to  worship  without  seek 
ing  to  know  more. 

Know  thyself  in  the  various  elements  of  thy  intellectual 
and  moral  being :  all  alike  will  point  reverently  upward  to 
the  throne  of  the  Invisible ;  but  none  will  scale  that  throne 
itself,  or  pierce  through  the  glory  which  conceals  Him  that 
sitteth  thereon.  Know  thyself  in  thy  powers  of  Thought, 
which,  cramped  and  confined  on  every  side,  yet  bear  wit 
ness,  in  their  very  limits,  to  the  Illimitable  beyond.  Know 
thyself  in  the  energies  of  thy  Will,  which,  free  and  yet 
bound,  the  master  at  once  and  the  servant  of  Law,  bows 
itself  under  the  imperfect  consciousness  of  a  higher  Law 
giver,  and  asserts  its  freedom  but  by  the  permission  of  the 

l  Corinthians  x.  13. 


LECT.  VIII.  THOUGHT  EXAMINED.  227 

Almighty.  Know  thyself  in  the  yearnings  of  thy  Affec 
tions,  which,  marvellously  adapted  as  they  are  to  their 
several  finite  ends,  yet  testify  in  their  restlessness  to  the 
deep  need  of  something  better.  (28)  Know  thyself  in  that 
fearful  and  wonderful  system  of  Human  Nature  as  a  whole, 
which  is  composed  of  all  these,  and  yet  not  one  with  any 
nor  with  all  of  them  ;  —  that  system  to  whose  inmost 
centre  and  utmost  circumference  the  whole  system  of 
Christian  Faith  so  strangely  yet  so  fully  adapts  itself.  It 
is  to  the  whole  Man  that  Christianity  appeals  :  it  is  as  a 
Whole  and  in  relation  to  the  whole  Man  that  it  must  be 
judged.  (S9)  It  is  not  an  object  for  the  thought  alone,  nor 
for  the  will  alone,  nor  for  the  feelings  alone.  It  may  not 
be  judged  by  reference  to  this  petty  cavil  or  that  minute 
scruple :  it  may  not  be  cut  down  to  the  dimensions  and 
wants  of  any  single  ruling  principle  or  passion.  We  have 
no  right  to  say  that  we  will  be  Christians  as  far  as  pleases 
us,  and  no  further;  that  we  will  accept  or  reject,  according 
as  our  understanding  is  satisfied  or  perplexed.  (3°)  The 
tree  is  not  then  most  flourishing,  when  its  branches  are 
lopped,  and  its  trunk  peeled,  and  its  whole  body  cut  down 
to  one  hard,  unyielding  mass ;  but  when  one  principle  of 
life  pervades  it  throughout ;  when  the  trunk  and  the 
branches  claim  brotherhood  and  fellowship  with  the  leaf 
that  quivers,  and  the  twig  that  bends  to  the  breeze,  and  the 
bark  that  is  delicate  and  easily  wounded,  and  the  root  that 
lies  lowly  and  unnoticed  in  the  earth.  And  man  is  never 
so  weak  as  when  he  seems  to  be  strongest,  standing  alone 
in  the  confidence  of  an  isolated  and  self-sufficing  Intellect : 
he  is  never  so  strong  as  when  he  seems  to  be  weakest, 
with  every  thought  and  resolve,  and  passion  and  affection, 
from  the  highest  to  the  lowest,  bound  together  in  one  by 
the  common  tie  of  a  frail  and  feeble  Humanity.  He  is 


228  LIMITS  OF  RELIGIOUS  LECT.  VIII. 

never  so  weak  as  when  he  casts  off  his  burdens,  and  stands 
upright  and  unincumbered  in  the  strength  of  his  own  will ; 
he  is  never  so  strong  as  when,  bowed  down  in  his  feeble 
ness,  and  tottering  under  the  whole  load  that  God  has  laid 
upon  him,  he  comes  humbly  before  the  throne  of  grace,  to 
cast  his  care  upon  the  God  who  careth  for  him.1  The  life 
of  man  is  one,  and  the  system  of  Christian  Faith  is  one ; 
each  part  supplying  something  that  another  lacks ;  each 
element  making  good  some  missing  link  in  the  evidence 
furnished  by  the  rest.  But  we  may  avail  ourselves  of  that 
which  satisfies  our  own  peculiar  needs,  only  by  accepting 
it  as  part  and  parcel  of  the  one  indivisible  Whole.  Thus 
only  shall  we  grow  in  our  Christian  Life  in  just  proportion 
of  every  part ;  the  intellect  instructed,  the  will  controlled, 
the  affections  purified,  "till  we  all  come,  in  the  unity  of  the 
faith  and  of  the  knowledge  of  the  Son  of  God,  unto  a  per 
fect  man,  unto  the  measure  of  the  stature  of  the  fulness  of 
Christ :  that  we  henceforth  be  no  more  children,  tossed  to 
and  fro,  and  carried  about  with  every  wind  of  doctrine,  by 
the  sleight  of  men,  and  cunning  craftiness,  whereby  they  lie 
in  wait  to  deceive ;  but  speaking  the  truth  in  love,  may 
grow  up  into  Him  in  all  things,  which  is  the  Head,  even 
Christ ;  from  whom  the  whole  body,  fitly  joined  together 
and  compacted  by  that  which  every  joint  supplieth,  accord 
ing  to  the  effectual  working  in  the  measure  of  every  part, 
maketh  increase  of  the  body  unto  the  edifying  of  itself  in 
love." 2 

1  1  St.  Peter  v.  7.  2  Ephesians  iv.  13—16. 


NOTES. 


NOTES. 


LECTURE    I. 


NOTE  I.,  p.  46. 

SEE  Galen,  De  Sectis,  c.  i.  In  this  sense,  the  Dogmatists  or  Rationalists 
were  distinguished  from  the  Empirics.  For  the  corresponding  philosoph 
ical  sense  of  the  term,  see  Sextus  Empiricus,  Pyrrh.  Hyp.  I.  §  1—3. 


NOTE  H.,  p.  47. 

"  Dogmatism  has  its  name  from  this,  —  that  it  professes  to  demonstrate, 
i.  e.  to  establish  dogmatically,  as  a  causal  nexus,  the  relation  between 
things  perse  and  phenomena;  and  maintains  that  things  per  se  contain  the 
ground  of  all  that  we  observe  in  man  and  in  the  world  of  nature." — Poe- 
litz,  Kant's  Vorlesungen  iiber  die  Metaphysik.  Einleitung,  p.  xxi. 


NOTE  III.,  p.  47. 

Of  the  theological  method  of  Wolf,  the  leader  of  philosophical  dogma 
tism  in  the  eighteenth  century,  Mr.  Rose  observes :  "  He  maintained  that 
philosophy  was  indispensable  to  theology,  and  that,  together  with  biblical 
proofs,  a  mathematical  or  strictly  demonstrative  dogmatical  system,  ac 
cording  to  the  principles  of  reason,  was  absolutely  necessary.  His  own 
works  carried  this  theory  into  practice,  and  after  the  first  clamors  against 
them  had  subsided,  his  opinions  gained  more  attention,  and  it  was  not 
long  before  he  had  a  school  of  vehement  admirers  who  far  outstripped 
him  in  the  use  of  his  own  principles.  We  find  some  of  them  not  content 
with  applying  demonstration  to  the  truth  of  the  system,  but  endeavoring 
to  establish  each  separate  dogma,  the  Trinity,  the  nature  of  the  Redeemer, 
the  Incarnation,  the  eternity  of  punishment,  on  philosophical,  and,  strange 
as  it  may  appear,  some  of  those  truths  on  mathematical  grounds."  i 

1  State  of  Protfstantism  in  Germany,  p.  54.     Second  edition. 


232  NOTES.  LECT.  I. 

The  language  of  Wolf  himself  may  be  quoted  as  expressing  exactly  the 
relation  between  Scripture  and  human  reason  mentioned  in  the  text 
"  Sacred  Scripture  serves  as  an  aid  to  natural  theology.  For  in  the  Scripture 
those  things  also  are  taught  concerning  God,  which  can  be  demonstrated 
from  principles  of  reason;  a  thing  which  no  one  denies,  who  is  versed  in 
the  reading  of  Scripture.  It  therefore  furnishes  natural  theology  with 
propositions,  which  ought  to  be  demonstrated ;  consequently  the  philoso 
pher  is  bound,  not  to  invent,  but  to  demonstrate  them."  i 

The  writings  of  Canz,  a  disciple  of  the  Wolfian  philosophy,  are  men 
tioned  by  Mr.  Rose  and  by  Dr.  Pusey  (Historical  Inquiry,  p.  116),  as  ex 
emplifying  the  manner  in  which  this  philosophy  was  applied  to  doctrinal 
theology.  The  following  extracts  from  his  attempted  demonstration  of 
the  doctrine  of  the  Trinity  may  be  interesting  to  the  reader,not  only  on  account 
of  the  extreme  rarity  of  the  work  from  which  they  are  taken,  but  also  as 
furnishing  a  specimen  of  the  dogmatic  method,  and  showing  the  abuse  to 
which  it  is  liable  in  injudicious  hands. 

"  Since  the  character  of  every  substance  lies  in  some  power  of  action, 
we  must  form  our  judgment  of  God  from  a  power  of  action  infinite  and 
general.  This  power  being  infinite,  embraces  all  perfections,  and  there 
fore,  does  not  lie  in  a  bare  faculty,  which  sometimes  ceases  from  activity; 
for  that  would  imply  imperfection;  nor  in  the  power  of  doing  this  thing 
only,  or  only  that,  for  that  in  like  manner  would  betray  limitations;  but 
in  an  ever-during  act  of  working  all  things  whatsoever  in  the  most  perfect 
and  therefore  the  wisest  manner.  He  is  therefore  a  substance  entirely 
singular. 

"  Moreover,  since  God  is  pure  actuality,  working  all  in  all,  it  follows  that 
finite  things,  which  may  be  and  may  not  be,  do  not  find  the  ground  of 
their  existence  in  themselves,  but  in  Him  who  works  all  things,  i.  e.  in 
God.  There  is  therefore  in  God  —  and  this  we  observe  in  the  first  place  — 
an  infinite  Creative  Power. 

"  But  since  all  created  things  relate  to  one  another  as  means  and  ends, 
yet  are  themselves,  in  the  ultimate  scope,  referred  to  the  glory  of  God,  it  is 
plain  that  there  is  in  God  an  infinite  Faculty  of  Wisdom 

"  Finally,  inasmuch  as  there  is  infinite  good  in  created  things,  and  God, 
who' works  all,  must  be  judged  to  have  furnished  forth  all  this  good;  it  is 
not  difficult  to  understand  that  there  is  in  God  an  infinite  Power  of  Love. 
For  he  loves,  who  increases,  as  far  as  possible,  with  various  blessings,  the 
happiness  of  others. 

********* 

"  That  which  exists,  is  said  to  subsist,  when  it  has  reached  its  own  full 
completion,  and  proceeds  no  farther.  .  .  . 

1  Tkeologia  Naturalis,  Pars  Prior,  $  22. 


LECT.  I.  NOTES.  233 

"  Whatever  in  this  way,  in  its  existence,  proceeds  no  farther,  is  called 
by  Metaphysicians  v(pi(rrdfj.€vov,  and  if  to  this  be  added  the  gift  of  intelli 
gence  or  reason,  then  there  exists  a  Person  (persona). 

"  These  things  premised,  let  us  see  what  there  is  in  the  nature  of  God 
thst  justifies  the  designation  of  ThrecT?ersons.  There  is  certainly  in  God 
a  boundless  power  of  action,  and  therefore  evidence  of  His  being  a  wholly 
singular  Substance.  We  can  also  discover  a  triple  activity,  which  com 
pletes  that  power;  a  triple  activity,  which  not  only  exists,  as  it  presup 
poses  a  power  of  action,  but  subsists  also,  as  it  is  neither  a  part,  nor  an 
adjunct,  nor  an  operation  of  anything  else. 

"  And  now  there  belongs  to  this  triple  unlimited  activity,  by  which  the 
Divine  power  is  completed,  a  consciousness  of  itself,  and  a  sense  alike  of 
the  past  and  the  future.  It  is  therefore  intelligent,  and  therefore  a  Person. 

"  Since  there  are  three  activities  of  this  kind  in  God,  or  in  the  Divine 
Nature,  which  is  an  unlimited  power  of  action,  it  follows  that  there  are  in 
it  Three  Persons,  which  by  a  threefold  unlimited  operation  complete  and 
exercise  that  unlimited  power. 

"  Since  in  every  created  being,  endowed  with  intelligence,  the  power  of 
working,  understanding,  loving,  cannot  be  completed  except  by  one  oper 
ation,  or  by  one  activity;  it  follows,  that  in  every  finite  being  there  can 
only  be  one  person. 

"  There  is  therefore  a  Trinity  of  Persons  in  God,  which  proceeds  from  his 
Infinite  Nature  as  such:  which  was  the  thing  proposed  for  demonstra 
tion."! 

NOTE  IV.,  p.  48. 

Kant  defines  Rationalism,  as  distinguished  from  Naturalism  and  Super- 
naturalism,  in  the  following  terms :  "  He  who  interprets  natural  religion 
as  morally  necessary,  i.  e.  as  Duty,  may  also  be  called  (in  matters  of 
faith)  Rationalist.  When  such  an  one  denies  the  reality  of  all  supernatural 
Divine  revelation,  he  is  called  Naturalist ;  if  now  he  allows  this,  but  main 
tains  that  to  know  it  and  accept  it  as  real  is  not  a  necessary  requisite  to 
Religion,  he  could  be  called  a  pure  Rationalist;  but  if  he  holds  a  faith  in 
the  same  to  be  necessary  to  all  Religion,  he  would  have  to  be  called,  in 
matters  of  faith,  a  pure  Supernaturalist."  2  In  the  text,  the  term  is  used  in 

1  Philosophic^  Wolfiaruz   Consensus  cum    Theologia,  Francofurti  et  Lipsiae,  1737. 
This  volume  forms  the  third  part  of  the  Philosophic  Leibnitiance  et  Wolfiantz  usus 
in  Theologia,  of  which  the  first  part  was  published  in  1728,  and  the  second  in 
1732.    The  third  part  is  extremely  rare.    The  two  former  parts  were  reprinted  in 
1749. 

2  Religion  innerhalb  der  Grenzen  der  blossen  Vernunft  ( Werke,  ed.  Rosenkranz,  x. 
p.  185).    For  different  senses  in  which  the  term  Rationalist  has  been  used,  see 

20* 


234  NOTES.  LECT.  J. 

a  somewhat  wider  extent  than  that  of  the  above  definition.  It  is  not  nec 
essary  to  limit  the  name  of  Rationalist  to  those  who  maintain  that  Revela 
tion  as  a  whole  is  unnecessary  to  religion;  nor  to  those  whose  system  is 
based  solely  on  moral  principles.  There  may  be  a  partial  as  well  as  a 
total  Rationalism:  it  is  possible"  to  acknowledge  in  general  terms  the 
authority  of  Scripture,  and  yet  to  exercise  considerable  license  in  rejecting 
particular  portions  as  speculatively  incomprehensible  or  morally  unneces 
sary.  The  term  is  sometimes  specially  applied  to  the  Kantian  school  of 
theologians,  of  whom  Paulus  and  Wegscheider  are  representatives.  In 
this  sense,  Hegel  declares  his  antagonism  to  the  Rationalism  of  his  day;  1 
and  Strauss,  in  his  controversies  with  the  naturalist  critics  of  the  Gospels, 
frequently  speaks  of  their  method  as  "  Rationalism."  In  the  sense  in 
which  the  term  is  employed  in  the  text,  Hegel  and  Strauss  are  them 
selves  as  thoroughly  rationalists  as  their  opponents.  Even  Schleiermacher, 
though  a  decided  antagonist  of  the  naturalist  school,  is  himself  a  partial 
Rationalist  of  another  kind;  for  with  him  the  Christian  Consciousness,  i.  e. 
the  internal  experience  resulting  to  the  individual  from  his  connection 
with  the  Christian  community,  is  made  a  test  of  religious  truth  almost  as 
arbitrary  as  the  Moral  Reason  of  Kant.  On  the  strength  of  this  self- 
chosen  criterion,  Schleiermacher  sets  aside,  among  other  doctrines,  as  un 
essential  to  Christian  belief,  the  supernatural  conception  of  Jesus,  the  facts 
of  his  resurrection,  ascension,  and  the  prediction  of  his  future  judgment 
of  the  world;  asserting  that  it  is  impossible  to  see  how  such  facts  can  be1 
connected  with  the  redeeming  power  of  Christ.2  Indeed,  in  some  of  the 
details  of  his  system,  he  falls  into  pure  Rationalism ;  as  in  his  speculations 
on  the  existence  of  Angels,  good  and  evil,  on  the  Fall  of  Man,  on  eternal 
Punishment,  on  the  two  Natures  of  Christ,  and  on  the  equality  of  the  Per 
sons  in  the  Holy  Trinity. 

The  so-called  Spiritualism  of  the  present  day  is  again  only  Rationalism 
disguised;  for  feeling  or  intuition  is  but  an  arbitrary  standard,  resting 
solely  on  the  personal  consciousness,  and  moreover  must  be  translated  into 
distinct  thought,  before  it  can  be  available  for  the  purposes  of  religious 
criticism. 

NOTE  V.,  p.  48. 

Thus  "Wegscheider  represents  the  claim  of  the  Rationalists.  "They 
claim  for  sound  reason  the  power  of  deciding  upon  any  religious  doctrine 

Wegscheider,  Instit.  Tkeol.  §  10;  Hose,  State  of  Protestantism  in  Germany,  Introd. 
p.  xvii.  second  edition;  Kahnis,  Internal  History  of  German  Protestantism,  p.  169, 
Meyer's  translation. 

1  Geschichte  der  Philosophie  (  Werlce,  XIII.  p.  96). 

2  Christliche  Glaube,  §  97,  99. 


LECT.  I.  NOTES.  235 

whatsoever,  derived  from  a  supposed  supernatural  revelation,  and  of  de 
termining  the  argument  for  it  to  be  made  out,  only  according  to  the  laws 
of  thought  and  action  implanted  in  reason." — Inst.  Theol.  §  10.  See  also 
Rohr,  Briefe  iiber  den  Rationalismus,  p.  31. 

NOTE  VI.,  p.  51. 

"Wherefore  if  it  is  not  fitting  in  God  to  do  anything  contrary  to  justice 
or  good  order,  it  does  not  pertain  to  His  freedom  or  goodness  or  will  to  let 
the  sinner  go  unpunished,  who  docs  not  pay  to  God,  that  of  which  he  has 
robbed  Him." —  Anselm,  Cur  Deus  Homo,  i.  12.  "  For  the  voluntary  satis 
faction  of  sin,  and  (or)  the  exaction  of  punishment  from  him  who  makes 
no  satisfaction,  hold  in  the  same  universe  their  own  place  and  fair  order. 
And  if  the  Divine  wisdom  should  not  make  application  of  these,  where  sin 
is  striving  to  disturb  right  order,  the  orderly  beauty  of  that  very  universe 
which  God  ought  to  control,  would  be  violated  and  disfigured,  and  God 
would  seem  to  be  deficient  in  his  own  administration.  These  two  (suppo 
sitions)  being  as  impossible  as  they  are  contrary  to  the  fitness  of  things, 
either  satisfaction  or  punishment  is  the  necessary  consequence  of  sin." 
Ibid.  i.  15.  "If  therefore,  as  is  evident,  it  is  from  men  that  the  celestial 
state  is  to  be  made  complete, —  and  this  cannot  be  done  unless  the  afore 
said  satisfaction  be  made,  which  none  can  make  but  God,  and  none  ought, 
but  man,  —  then,  as  a  necessary  consequence,  it  must  be  made  by  God- 
man." —  Ibid.  ii.  6.  Compare  Alex,  ab  Ales.  Summa  Theologia,  p.  iii.  Memb. 
7,  where  the  same  argument  is  concisely  stated. 

NOTE  VII.,  p.  51. 
Anselm,  Cur  Deus  Homo,  1.  ii.  c.  16. 

NOTE  VIII.,  p.  51. 
Anselm,  Cur  Deus  Homo,  1.  i.  c.  5. 

NOTE  IX.,  p.  51. 

"God  is  in  such  way  merciful,  that  He  is  also  at  the  same  time  just; 
mercy  does  not  exclude,  in  Him,  the  eternal  rule  of  justice,  but  there  is  in 
Him  a  perfect  and  admirable  mingling  of  mercy  and  justice;  therefore, 
without  an  equivalent  price,  sin  could  not,  in  the  judgment  of  God,  have 
been  remitted  to  man,  and  the  Divine  justice  have  been  unimpaired. 


236  NOTES.  LECT.  I. 

There  remained,  therefore,  no  other  remedy,  than  for  the  Son  of  God  him 
self  to  assume  human  nature,  and  in  it  and  through  it  to  make  satisfac 
tion.  God  ought  not,  man  could  not." — J.  Gerhard,  Loci  Theologici,  De 
Persona  et  Ojficio  Cliristi,  c.  8. 

NOTE  X.,  p.  51. 

"  Because  a  mere  creature  could  not  have  endured  the  immense  weight 
of  God's  wrath,  due  to  the  sins  of  the  whole  world."—  Chemnitz,  De  duabus 
Naturis  in  Christo,  c.  11. 

• 

NOTE  XL,  p.  52. 

Such  is  the  demand  of  Anselm's  interlocutor,  which  he  himself  under 
takes  to  satisfy.  "  That  I  may  understand  on  the  ground  of  a  reasonable 
necessity  that  all  those  things  ought  to  be,  which  the  Catholic  faith  teaches 
us  to  believe  concerning  Christ." —  Cur  Deus  Homo,  L.  I.  c.  25.  To  argu 
ments  founded  on  this  principle  the  judicious  remarks  of  Bishop  Butler 
may  be  applied :  "  It  may  be  needful  to  mention  that  several  questions, 
which  have  been  brought  into  the  subject  before  us,  and  determined,  are 
not  in  the  least  entered  into  here:  questions  which  have  been,  I  fear, 
rashly  determined,  and  perhaps  with  equal  rashness  contrary  ways.  For 
instance,  whether  God  could  have  saved  the  world  by  other  means  than  the 
death  of  Christ,  consistently  with  the  general  laws  of  his  government."  * 


NOTE  XII.,  p.  52. 

"In  what  did  this  satisfaction  consist?  Was  it  that  God  was  angry, 
and  needed  to  be  propitiated  like  some  heathen  deity  of  old?  Such  a 
thought  refutes  itself  by  the  very  indignation  which  it  calls  up  in  the  hu 
man  bosom."—  Jowett,  Epistles  of  St.  Paul,  vol.  ii.  p.  472.  "  Neither  can  there 
be  any  such  thing  as  vicarious  atonement  or  punishment,  which,  again,  is 
a  relic  of  heathen  conceptions  of  an  angered  Deity,  to  be  propitiated  by 
offerings  and  sacrifices."— Greg,  Creed  of  Christendom,  p.  265.  "The  re 
ligion  of  types  and  notions  can  travel  only  in  a  circle  from  whence  there  is 
no  escape.  It  is  but  an  elaborate  process  of  self-confutation.  After  much 
verbiage  it  demolishes  what  it  created,  and  having  begun  by  assuming 
God  to  be  angry,  ends,  not  by  admitting  its  own  gross  mistake,  but  by 
asserting  Him  to  be  changed  and  reconciled." — Mackay,  Progress  of  the 
Intellect,  vol.  ii.  p.  504.  Compare  Wegscheider,  Inst.  Theol  §  141. 

1  Analogy,  Part  II.  Ch.  5. 


LECT.  I.  NOTES.  237 


NOTE  XIII.,  p.  52. 

"For  what  is  more  unjust,  than  that  an  innocent  one  be  punished  in 
stead  of  the  guilty,  especially  when  the  guilty  ar»  themselves  before  the 
tribunal,  and  can  themselves  be  punished  ?"—  F.  Socinus,  Prcelect.  Theol., 
c.  xviii.  "That  each  should  have  his  exact  due  is  just  — is  the  best  for 
himself.  That  the  consequence  of  his  guilt  should  be  transferred  from 
him  to  one  that  is  innocent  (although  that  innocent  one  be  himself  willing 
to  accept  it),  whatever  else  it  be,  is  not  justice." —  Froude,  Nemesis  of  Faith, 
p.  70.  Compare  Newman,  Phases  of  Faith,  p.  92;  Greg,  Creed  of  Christen 
dom,  p.  265.  A  similar  objection  is  introduced,  and  apparently  approved, 
by  Mr.  Maurice,  Theological  Essays,  p.  139. 

NOTE  XIV.,  p.  52. 

"There  is  no  one  who  cannot,  with  the  utmost  justice,  pardon  and  re 
mit  injuries  done  to  himself,  and  debts  contracted  to  himself,  without 
having  received  any  real  satisfaction.  Therefore,  unless  we  mean  to  allow 
less  to  God  than  is  allowed  to  men  themselves,  we  must  confess  that  God 
might  justly  have  pardoned  our  sins  without  having  received  any  real 
satisfaction  for  them." — F.  Socinus,  Prcelect.  Theol.  c.  xvi. 

"  Now  it  is  certainly  required  of  us,  that  if  our  brother  only  repent,  we 
should  forgive  him,  even  though  he  should  repeat  his  offence  seven  times 
a  day.  On  the  same  generous  maxim,  therefore,  we  cannot  but  conclude 
that  the  Divine  being  acts  towards  us." —  Priestley,  History  of  Corruptions, 
vol.  i.  p.  151.  "Every  good  man  has  learnt  to  forgive,  and  when  the  of 
fender  is  penitent,  to  forgive  freely  —  without  punishment  or  retribution : 
whence  the  conclusion  is  inevitable,  that  God  also  forgives,  as  soon  as  sin 
is  repented  of.'  —  Newman,  The  Soul,  pp.  99,  100.  "  Was  it  that  there  was 
a  debt  due  to  Him,  which  must  be  paid  ere  its  consequences  could  be  done 
away?  But  even  '  a  man's  '  debt  may  be  freely  forgiven."— Jo wett,  Epistles 
of  St.  Paul,  vol.  ii.  p.  472.  Compare  also  Maurice,  Theol.  'Essays,  p.  138, 
and  Garve,  quoted  by  Rohr,  Brief e  iiber  den  Eatimalismus,  p.  442. 

NOTE  XV.,  p.  52. 

"Pecuniary  penalties,  therefore,  can  be  paid  for  another,  because  one 
person's  money  can  be  made  another's ;  as  when  any  one  pays  money,  as 
a  penalty,  for  some  other  person,  then  he  for  whom  it  is  paid  is  tacitly, 
in  reality,  first  presented  with  the  money,  and  is  considered  to  have  paid 
It  himself.  But  the  death,  or  any  bodily  distress,  of  one  person,  cannot  be 


238  NOTES.  LECT.  I. 

made  another's."  — F.  Socinus,  Prcelect.  Theol.  c.  xviii.  "  Since  money  is, 
as  the  jurists  say,  something  real,  and  so  can  be  transferred  from  one  to 
another.  But  punishments,  and  the  deserts  of  men's  sins  from  the  law  of 
God,  are  something  personal,  and  moreover  of  such  sort  that  they  per 
petually  adhere  to  him  who  suffers  them,  and  cannot  be  transferred  to 
another."  —  F.  Socinus,  Christiante  Religionis  Institutio.  ( Opera,  1656.  vol. 

i.  p.  665.)    "This  original  guilt cannot,  so  far  as  we  see  by  the 

light  of  the  law  of  Reason  within  us,  be  abolished  by  any  one  else,  for  it  is 
no  transmissible  obligation,  which,  like  a  pecuniary  debt  (where  it  is  indif 
ferent  to  the  creditor  whether  the  debtor  pay  it  himself  or  another  pay  it 
for  him),  can  be  transferred  to  another,  but  the  most  personal  of  all  per 
sonal  ones,  —  the  guilt  of  sin,  which  only  the  guilty  can  bear,  not  the 
innocent,  be  he  ever  so  generous  as  to  be  willing  to  undertake  it." —  Kant, 
Religion  innerhalb  der  Grenzen  der  blossen  Vernunft,  p.  84,  ed.  Rosenkranz. 
Compare  Coleridge,  Aids  to  Reflection,  p.  249,  ed.  1839.  His  argument  is 
chiefly  an  expansion  of  Kant's. 

NOTE  XVI.,  p.  53. 

"VVilberforce,  Doctrine  of  the  Incarnation,  pp.  44,  45;  4th  edition.  The 
germ  of  this  theory  may  perhaps  be  found  in  Damascenus,  De  Fide  Orihod. 
lib.  iii.  c.  6.  See  Dorncr,  Lehre  von  der  person  Christi,  p.  115.  It  aiso  par 
tially  appears,  in  a  form  more  adapted  to  the  realistic  controversy,  in 
Anselm,  particularly  in  his  treatise  -De  Fide  Trinitatis  et  de  Jncarnatione 
Verbi,  written  to  refute  the  theological  errors  of  the  nominalist  Roscelin. 
In  modern  times,  a  similar  theory  has  found  favor  with  those  philosophers 
of  the  Hegelian  school,  who,  in  opposition  to  the  development  represented 
by  Strauss,  have  undertaken  the  difficult  task  of  reconciling  the  philosophy 
of  their  master  with  historical  Christianity.  In  this  point  of  view  it  has 
been  adopted  by  Schaller  in  his  "  Der  historische  Christus  und  die  Philoso 
phic,"  and  by  Goschel  in  his  "  Beitrage  zur  Speculative!!  Philosophic  von 
Gott  und  dem  Menschen  und  von  dem  Gottmenschen."  For  an  account 
of  these  theories  see  Dorner,  p,  462,  477.  A  similar  view  is  maintained  by 
Marheineke,  Grundlehren  der  Christlichen  Dogmatik,  §  338,  and  by  Dorner 
himself,  Lehre  von  der  Person  Christi,  p.  527. 

NOTE  XVII.,  p.  54. 

"  Item  sequitur  quod  aliquid  de  essentia  Christi  erit  miserum  et  damna- 
tum,  quia  ilia  natura  communis  existens  realiter  in  Christo  et  in  damnato 
erit  damnatum,  quia  in  Juda." — Occam,  Logica,  P.  i.  c.  15. 


LECT.  I.  NOTES.  239 


NOTE  XVIII.,  p.  56. 

"Religion  is  (subjectively  considered)  the  acknowledgment  of  all  our 
duties  as  divine  commands." — Kant,  Religion  innerhalb  der  Grenzen  der 
llossen  Vernunft,  p.  184.  ed.  Rosenkranz.  In  the  same  spirit,  Fichte  says, 
"  Since  all  religion  sets  forth  God  only  as  a  moral  lawgiver,  all  that  is  not 
commanded  by  the  moral  law  within  us,  is  not  His,  and  there  is  no  means 
of  pleasing  Him,  except  by  the  observance  of  this  same  moral  law."  — 
Versuch  einer  Kritik  alter  Offenbarung  ( Werke,  v.  p.  127).  This  fs  exactly 
the  theory  of  Religion  which  is  refuted  in  anticipation  by  Bishop  Butler 
(Analogy,  P.  n.  ch.  i.),  as  the  opinion  of  those  who  hold  that  the  "only 
design  "  of  Revelation  "  must  be  to  establish  a  belief  of  the  moral  system 
of  nature,  and  to  enforce  the  practice  of  natural  piety  and  virtue." 


NOTE  XIX.,  p.  56. 
Kant,  Religion  innerhalb  der  Grenzen  der  blossen  Vernunft,  pp.  184,  186. 

NOTE  XX.,  p.  56. 

"  Prayer,  as  an  inward  formal  worship  of  God,  and  on  that  account  con 
sidered  as  a  means  of  grace,  is  a  superstitious  delusion." —  Ibid.,  p.  235. 

NOTE  XXI.,  p.  56. 

"  A  hearty  wish  to  please  God  in  all  our  conduct,  —  i.  e.  the  disposition, 
accompanying  all  our  actions,  to  do  them  as  in  the  service  of  God,  —  is 
the  spirit  of  prayer,  which  can  and  ought  to  be  in  us  '  without  ceasing.' 
But  to  clothe  this  wish  in  words  and  forms  (be  it  only  inwardly,  even), 
can,  at  the  utmost,  only  carry  with  it  the  value  of  a  means  for  the  re 
peated  quickening  of  that  disposition  in  ourselves,  but  can  have  no  imme 
diate  relation  to  the  divine  favor;  also  on  that  account  cannot  be  a  univer 
sal  duty,  because  a  means  can  only  be  prescribed  to  him  who  needs  it  for 
certain  ends."  —  Kant,  Religion  u.  s.  w.  p.  235.  — Cf.  Fichte,  Kritik  aller 
Offenbarung,  p.  127.  For  an  account  of  a  similar  view  advocated  in  Scot 
land  in  the  last  century,  by  Dr.  Leechman  and  others,  see  Combe's  Consti 
tution  of  Man,  ch.  ix.  Subsequent  writers  have  repeated  the  above  theory 
in  various  forms,  and  in  various  spirits,  but  all  urging  the  same  objection, 
from  the  supposed  unchangeable  nature  of  God.  See  Schleiermacher, 
Christliche  Glaube,  §  147,  and  his  sermon  "  Die  Kraft  des  Gebetes,"  Predig- 
ten,  I.  p.  24;  Strauss,  Glaubenskhre,  II.  p.  387;  Foxton,  Popular  Christi- 


240  NOTES.  LECT.  I. 

anity,  p.  113;  Parker,  Theism,  Atheism,  and  Popular  Theology,  p.  65;  Emer 
son,  Essay  on  Self-Reliance ;  and  a  remarkable  passage  from  Greg's  Creed 
of  Christendom,  quoted  in  Lecture  VI.  p.  147.  Some  valuable  remarks  on 
the  other  side  will  be  found  in  two  writers,  usually  opposed  to  each  other, 
but  for  once  united  in  vindicating  the  religious  instincts  of  mankind  from 
the  perversions  of  a  false  philosophy.  See  F.  "W.  Newman,  The,  Soul,  p. 
118,  and  "  Correspondence  of  R.  E.  PI.  Greyson,  Esq,"  p.  218  (Am.  Ed.). 
Kant's  theory  is  ably  criticized  by  Drobisch,  Grundlehren  der  Religionsphi- 
toaopie,  pt  267. 

NOTE  XXIL,  p.  56. 

Thus  Fichte  lays  it  down,  as  one  of  the  tests  of  a  true  Revelation,  that  it 
must  not  countenance  an  objective  Anthropomorphism  of  God.  In  illustra 
tion  of  this  canon,  he  says,  "  If  we  can  really  determine  God  by  our 
feelings,  can  move  him  to  sympathy,  to  compassion,  to  joy,  then  is  He 
not  the  Unchangeable,  the  Only-sufficient,  the  Only-blessed,  then  is  He 
detcrminable  by  something  else  than  by  the  moral  law;  then  can  we  hope 
to  move  Him,  by  moaning  and  contrition,  to  proceed  otherwise  with  us, 
than  the  degree  of  our  morality  may  have  deserved.  All  these  sensuous 
representations  of  divine  attributes  must  not,  therefore,  be  pronounced  ob 
jectively  valid ;  it  must  not  be  left  doubtful,  whether  such  be  essentially 
the  nature  of  God  (Gott  an  sick),  or  whether  he  is  willing  to  allow  us  so  to 
think  of  it,  in  behoof  of  our  sensuous  needs."1  On  this  principle,  he  con 
siders  the  notions  of  a  Resurrection  and  a  Day  of  Judgment  as  having  a 
merely  subjective  validity. 2  In  another  passage,  he  speaks  of  the  repre 
sentation  of  God  under  conditions  of  time,  as  "  a  gross  Anthropomorph 
ism  ; " 3  apparently  not  seeing  that  the  notion  of  unchangeableness  is  at 
least  as  much  one  of  time,  and  therefore  of  Anthropomorphism,  as  that 
of  compassion  or  joy.  In  a  similar  spirit,  a  later  writer  observes :  "  With 
the  great  importance  so  often  attached  to  the  personality  of  God,  is  quite 
too  easily  mingled  the  interest  of  Anthropopathism  and  Anthropomorph 
ism."4  In  another  passage,  Fichte  says :  "  He  who  says,  Form  for  thyself 
no  idea  of  God,  says,  in  other  words,  Make  for  thyself  no  idol ;  and  his 
command  has  for  the  mind  the  same  significance  as  the  ancient  Mosaic 
commandment  had  for  the  senses :  Thou  shalt  make  to  thyself  no  graven 
image."5  These  words  may  perhaps  have  suggested  the  cognate  remarks 

1  Versuch  einer  Kritik  aller  Offenbarung  ( Werke,  V.  p.  135). 

2  Versuch  einer  Kritik  aller  Offenbarung  (  Werke,  V.  p.  136,  137). 

3  Ibid.,  p.  109. 

4  Baur,  Christliche  Gnosis,  p.  705. 

5  Gerichtliche  Verantivortung  ( WerJce,  V.  p.  267).     In  like  manner,  Herder  says, 


LECT.  I.  NOTES.  241 

of  Professor  Jowett :  "  It  would  be  little  better  than  idolatry  to  fill  the 
mind  with  an  idea  of  God  which  represented  Him  in  fashion  as  a  man. 
And  in  using  a  figure  of  speech,  we  are  bound  to  explain  to  all  who  are 
capable  of  understanding,  that  we  speak  in  a  figure  only,  and  to  remind 
them  that  logical  categories  may  give  as  false  and  imperfect  a  conception 
of  the  Divine  nature  in  our  own  age,  as  graven  images  in  the  days  of  the 
patriarchs." l  If  by  logical  categories  are  meant  analogical  representations 
formed  from  the  facts  of  human  consciousness,  this  passage  may  be  so 
interpreted  as  to  imply  either  an  important  truth,  or  a  dangerous  error. 
If  interpreted  to  mean  that  such  representations  of  God  cannot  be 
regarded  as  adequate  expressions  of  His  absolute  and  infinite  nature,  it 
states  a  truth,  the  importance  of  which  can  hardly  be  over-estimated; 
but  if  it  be  meant,  as  Fichte  undoubtedly  meant,  to  signify  that  mental  no 
less  than  bodily  images,  are,  regarded  from  a  human  point  of  view,  false 
and  idolatrous,  the  author  would  do  well  to  tell  us  what  we  can  substitute 
in  their  place.  "We  may  confidently  challenge  all  natural  Theology," 
says  Kant,  "  to  name  a  single  distinctive  attribute  of  the  Deity,  whether 
denoting  intelligence  or  will,  which,  apart  from  Anthropomorphism,  is 
anything  more  than  a  mere  word,  to  which  not  the  slightest  notion  can  be 
attached,  which  can  serve  to  extend  our  theoretical  knowledge."  2  Kant, 
however,  attempts  to  avoid  the  conclusion  to  which  this  admission  neces 
sarily  leads ;  —  namely,  that  Anthropomorphism,  in  this  sense  of  the  term, 
is  the  indispensable  condition  of  all  human  theology.  As  regards  the 
charge  of  idolatry,  it  is  best  answered  in  the  words  of  Storr :  "  The  image 
of  -God  we  have  not  made  for  ourselves,  but  God  has  placed  it  before 
us."3  The  very  commandment  which  forbids  the  representation  of  God 
by  a  bodily  likeness,  does  so  by  means  of  two  other  human  representa 
tions,  that  of  a  mental  state,  and  that  of  a  consequent  course  of  action. 
"Thou  shalt  not  make  to  thyself  any  graven  image;  for  I  the  Lord  thy 
God  am  a  jealous  God,  and  visit  the  sins  of  the  fathers  upon  the  children." 
The  Satire  of  Xenophancs  has  been  repeated  by  modern  critics  in  a  man 
ner  which  deprives  it  entirely  of  its  original  point.  Thus  Mr.  Theodore 

"Therefore  when  we  speak  of  God,  better  (have)  no  images  !  In  philosophy,  as 
in  the  law  of  Mcses,  this  is  our  first  commandment ."  —  Gott.  Einige  Gesprache 
uber  Spinoza's  System.  (  Werke,  VIII.  p.  228.) 

1  Epistles  of  St.  Paul,  Vol.  ii.  p.  404. 

2  Kritik  der  pmktischen  Vernunft,  p.  282,  ed.  Rosenkranz.     Compare  the  remark 
able  words  of  Jacobi   ( Von  den  gottlichen  Dingen.  Wtrke,  III.  p.  418,  422).     "  We 
confess,  accordingly,  to  an  Anthropomorphism  inseparable  from  th£  conviction 
that  man  bears  in  him  the  image  of  God;  and  maintain  that  besides  this  An 
thropomorphism,  which  has  always  been  called  Theism,  is  nothing  but  Atheism 
or  Fetichism." 

3  Annotationes  qua'dam  Tlieologicce,  p   10, 

21 


242  NOTES.  LECT.  I. 

Parker  says,  "  A  Beaver  or  a  Reindeer,  if  possessed  of  religious  faculties, 
would  also  conceive  of  the  Deity  with  the  limitations  of  its  own  personal 
ity,  as  a  Beaver  or  a  Reindeer."  1  The  satire  loses  its  entire  force,  when 
transferred  from  bodily  forms  to  mental  attributes.  In  imagining  a 
Beaver  or  a  Reindeer  writh  a  personal  consciousness,  we  so  far  imagine 
him  as  resembling  man,  notwithstanding  the  difference  of  bodily  form. 
The  sarcasm,  therefore,  amounts  to  ro  more  than  this :  that  human  con 
sciousness  in  another  body  would  be  subject  to  the  same  limits  of  religious 
thought  as  in  its  present  one.  The  latest  specimen  of  this  kind  of  would- 
be  philosophy  is  furnished  by  Professor  Baden  Powell,  in  his  "  Christianity 
without  Judaism,"  p.  108.  "  It  is  not  one  of  the  least  remarkable  of  these 
Anthropomorphisms,"  he  says,  "that  (as  in  former  instances)  the  disclos 
ure  of  the  Divine  purposes  is  made  under  the  figure  of  Jehovah  entering 
into  a  covenant  with  his  people,  —  an  Uea  specially  adapted  to  a  nation  of 
the  lowest  moral  capacity."  One  would  have  thought  that  the  fact  that 
this  image  was  selected  by  God  Himself,  as  the  symbol  of  His  relation  to 
His  chosen  people  (to  say  nothing  of  its  repetition  in  the  New  Testament), 
might  have  insured  its  more  respectful  treatment  at  the  hands  of  a  Clergy 
man.  But  Mr.  Powell,  in  his  zeal  for  "Christianity  without  Judaism," 
seems  to  forget  that  Judaism,  as  well  as  Christianity,  was  a  Revelation 
from  God. 

NOTE  XXIII.,  p.  58. 

This  remark  may  seem  at  first  sight  not  so  appropriate  in  relation  to 
Kant  as  to  some  other  advocates  of  a  similar  theory,  such,  for  instance,  as 
Mr.  Greg,  whose  remarks  on  prayer  are  quoted  in  Lecture  VI.  p.  147.  For 
Kant,  in  language  at  least,  expressly  denies  that  any  temporal  consecution 
can  be  included  in  the  conception  of  God.2  But,  in  truth,  this  denial  is 
and  must  be  merely  verbal.  For  the  moral  law,  in  Kant's  own  theory,  is 
regarded  as  a  divine  command  because  it  is  conceived  as  a  perpetual  obli 
gation,  binding  upon  all  human  acts;  and  the  perpetuity  of  the  obligation, 
in  relation  to  successive  acts,  necessarily  implies  the  idea  of  Time.  Thus 
God  in  relation  to  man,  as  a  moral  Governor,  is  necessarily  manifested 
under  the  condition  of  time;  and  this  manifestation  is  the  only  philosoph 
ical  representation  of  God  which  the  Kantian  philosophy  recognizes  as 
valid.  Indeed,  if  Time  be,  as  Kant  maintains,  a  necessary  form  of  human 
consciousness,  the  language  which  speaks  of  a  Being  existing  out  of  time 
can  have  no  significance  to  any  human  thinker. 

1  Discourse  of  Matters  pertaining  to  Religion,  p.  100. 

2  Religion  innerhalb  der  Grenzen  tier  blossen  Vernunft,  p.  57,  ed.  Itosenkranz. 


LECT.  I.  NOTES.  243 


NOTE  XXIV.,  p.  58. 

Xenophancs,  apud  Clem.  Alex.  Stromata,  V.  p.  601 : 

"  But  if  oxen  and  lions  had  hands  like  ours,  and  fingers, 
Then  would  horses  like  unto  horses,  and  oxen  to  oxen, 
Paint  and  fashion  their  god-forms,  and  give  to  them  bodies 
Of  like  shape  to  their  own,  as  they  themselves  too  are  fashioned." 

[As  translated  in  Morrison's  Hitter's  Hist.  Anc.  Phil.,  vol.  I.,  p.  431. J 

I 

NOTE  XXV.,  p.  62. 
Plato,  Republic,  IV.  p.  433. 

NOTE  XXVI.  p.  62. 
Advancement  of  Learning.    ( Works,  ed.  Montagu,  vol.  ii.  p.  303.) 

NOTE  XXVIL,  p.  63. 

Versuch  einer  KritiJc  alter  Offenbarung,  Konigsberg,  1792,  2d  Ed.  1793. 
(Fichte's  Werke,  V.  p.  9.)  A  few  specimens  of  the  criticisms  hazarded  in 
this  work  will  be  sufficient  to  show  the  arbitrary  character  of  the  method 
on  which  it  proceeds.  The  author  assumes  that  God  is  determined  entirely 
and  solely  by  the  moral  law  as  conceived  by  man;  and  that  Religion, 
therefore,  must  consist  solely  in  moral  duties.1  Hence  he  lays  down, 
among  others,  the  following  criteria,  without  satisfying  which,  no  revela 
tion  can  be  accepted  as  of  divine  origin. 

There  must  have  been  a  moral  necessity  for  it  at  the  time  of  its  publica 
tion  (p.  113). 

It  must  not  draw  men  to  obedience  by  any  other  motive  than  reverence 
for  God's  holiness.  Hence  it  must  not  contain  any  prospect  of  future 
reward  or  punishment  (p.  115). 

It  must  not  communicate  any  knowledge  attainable  by  the  natural 
reason  (p.  122). 

It  must  contain  only  such  moral  rules  as  may  be  deduced  from  the  prin 
ciple  of  the  practical  reason  (p.  124). 

It  must  not  promise  any  supernatural  aids  to  men  in  the  performance  of 
their  duty  (p.  129). 

Kant's  own  work,  Religion  innerhalb  der  Grenzen  der  blossen  Vernunft, 

1  Werke,  V.  pp.  42,  55. 


244  NOTES.  LECT.  I. 

Konigsberg,  1793,  is  based  on  a  similar  principle ;  and  many  of  his  conclu 
sions  are  identical  with  those  of  Fichtc.  He  agrees  Avith  his  disciple  in 
maintaining  that  no  doctrine  can  be  received  on  the  authority  of  Revela 
tion,  without  the  concurrent  testimony  of  Reason ;  1  and  that  a  moral  life  is 
the  only  duty  which  God  can  require  of  a  man.2  Hence  he  defines  Re 
ligion  as  "the  acknowledgment  of  all  our  duties  as  divine  commands;" 
and  asserts  that  there  can  be  no  special  duties  towards  God  distinct  from 
our  moral  obligations  to  our  fellow-men.3  In  accordance  with  these  prin 
ciples,  he  advocates,  and  in  some  instances  applies,  a  method  of  Scripture 
interpretation,  which  consists  in  forcing  every  available  doctrine  and  pre 
cept  into  a  so-called  moral  significance,  and  rejecting  as  unessential  what 
ever  will  not  bear  this  treatment.4  Thus,  in  the  fifty-ninth  Psalm,  the 
enemies  of  David  are  interpreted  to  mean  the  evil  passions  which  he 
wished  to  overcome. 

The  narrowness  of  Kant's  fundamental  assumption,  even  as  regards  the 
human  side  of  religion  only,  is  pointed  out  by  Willrn,  Histoire  de  la  Philos 
ophic  Allemande,  vol.  ii.  p.  47 :  "  By  regarding  religion  as  chiefly  a  means 
of  promoting  morality,  Kant  has  too  much  limited  its  divine  mission;  he 
has  forgotten  that  religion  must  besides  be  a  source  of  consolation  and 
of  hope,  in  the  midst  of  the  ills  of  the  present  life;  and  that  by  powerful 
motives  and  lofty  meditations  it  must  come  to  the  succor  of  frail  human 
ity,  that  it  must  serve  as  a  support  in  the  double  struggle  that  we  have  to 
sustain  against  temptation  to  evil  and  against  suffering."  See  also  Dro- 
bisch,  Grundlehren  der  Rdiyionspldlo&ophie,  p.  264,  who  adopts  a  similar 
ground  of  criticism. 

NOTE  XXVIIL,  p.  65. 

"  In  the  exposition  of  the  pure  conception  it  has  yet  further  been  de 
clared,  that  it  is  the  absolute  divine  conception  itself;  so  that  in  truth  there 
would  not  be  the  relation  of  an  application,  but  the  logical  process  is  the 
immediate  exhibition  of  God's  self-determination  to  Being." — Hegel,  Loyik. 
(  Werke,  V.  p.  170.)  In  like  manner  his  disciple  Marheineke  says,  "  Only 
as  subsumed  into  this  Idea,  and  subletted^  in  it,  is  the  human  spirit  capable 
of  knowing  God.  His  true  self-exalting  to  God  by  thinking,  is  however, 

1  Werke,  X.  p.  228. 

2  Ibid.  p.  122. 

3  Ibid.  p.  184. 

4  Ibid.  pp.  98, 130. 

5  [  "This  sublating  has  the  double  meaning  of  toilers,  and  of  conservare,  and  in 
dicates  the  taking  up  and  the  retaining  under  a  higher  point  of  view,  etc."— 
Chalybaeus's  Hist,  of  Speculative  Philosophy,  transl.  by  Edersheim,  p.  351:  Edinburgh, 
1854.]  — TRANS. 


LECT.  I.  NOTES.  245 

ever  at  the  same  time,  a  being-exalted,  the  insertion  of  the  human  thinking 
of  God  into  the  divine  thinking  of  God." *  Such  passages  are  instructive 
as  showing  the  only  conditions  under  which,  according  to  the  admission 
of  its  ablest  advocates,  a  Philosophy  of  the  Absolute  is  attainable  by  hu 
man  thought.  In  reference  to  these  lofty  pretensions,  Sir  William  Hamil 
ton  justly  speaks  of  "the  scheme  of  pantheistic  omniscience,  so  prevalent 
among  the  sequacious  thinkers  of  the  day."  2 

NOTE  XXIX.,  p.  65. 

"  Besides  God  there  exists,  truly  and  in  the  proper  sense  of  the  word, 
nothing  at  all  but  knowledge ;  and  this  knowledge  is  the  divine  Existence 
itself,  absolutely  and  immediately,  and  in  so  far  as  we  are  knowledge,  are 
we,  in  the  deepest  root  of  our  being,  the  divine  Existence." — Fichte, 
Anweisungen  zum  seligen  Leben  (Werke,  V.  p.  448).  "  Man,  rational  being 
in  general,  is  ordained  to  be  a  complement  of  the  phenomenal  world ;  out 
of  him,  out  of  his  activity,  is  to  develop  itself  all  that  is  wanting  to  the 
totality  of  the  revelation  of  God,  since  nature  receives,  indeed,  the  whole 
divine  substance,  but  only  in  the  Real :  rational  being  is  to  express  the 
image  of  the  same  divine  Nature,  as  it  is  in  itself,  accordingly,  in  the 
Ideal." — Schelling,  Vorlesungen  iiber  die  Metlwde  des  Academischen  Studium, 
p.  18.  "God  is  infinite,  I  finite  —  these  are  false  expressions,  forms  not 

fitted  to  the  idea,  to  the  nature  of  the  case God  is  the  movement 

to  the  finite,  and  thereby  as  sublation  of  the  same  to  himself;  in  the  /  as 
the  self-sublating  as  finite,  God  regresses  to  himself,  and  is  only  God  as 
this  regress." — Hegel,  Vorlesungen,  iiber  die  Philosophic  der  Religion  (  Werke, 
XI.  p.  194).  "Man's  knowledge  of  God  is,  according  to  the  essential 
communion,  a  common  knowledge;  i.  e.,  man  has  knowledge  of  God, 
only  in  so  far  as  God  has  knowledge  of  Himself;  this  knowledge  is  God's 
self-consciousness;  but  just  so  is  it,  too,  His  knowledge  of  man;  and  God's 
knowledge  of  man  is  man's  knowledge  of  God." —  Ibid.  XII.  p.  496.  "  Ra 
tional  knowledge  of  truth  is,  first  of  all,  as  a  knowledge  of  God,  knowledge 
through  God,  knowledge  in  his  Spirit  and  through  it.  By  finite,  rela 
tive  thinking,  God,  who  is  nothing  finite  and  relative,  cannot  be  thought 
and  known.  On  the  contrary,  in  the  knowledge,  the  I  is  out  beyond 


1  Grundlehren  der  Christlichen  Dogmatik,  §  21.     In  another  passage  of  the  same 
work  (§  84)  he  says,  "As  God  in  the  knowledge  of  Himself  does  not  have  Him 
self  fxtra  se,  and  as  the  self-knowing  is  no  other  than  the  known,  but  rather  the 
Spirit,  unity  and  essence  of  both,  so  is  the  idea  of  the  Absolute  the  absolute  idea, 
and  as  such  the  stand-point  of  all  knowledge  and  all  science." 

2  Discussions,  p.  787. 

21* 


246  NOTES.  LECT.  I. 

itself,  and  the  subjectivity  of  the  isolated  consciousness  of  itself,  — it  is  in 
God,  and  God  in  it."  JMarheincke,  G rumUdiren  der  Christlichen  Dogmatilc, 
§  115. 

Rationalism  here  takes  up  a  common  ground  with  Mysticism,  and  the 
logical  process  of  the  Hegelians  becomes  identical  with  the  ecstatic  intui 
tion  of  the  Neo-Platonists.  Compare  the  language  of  Plotinus,  Enn.  VI. 

L.  ix.  c.  9.    "  It  (the  soul)  may  then  see  itself becoming  God, 

or  rather  being  God."  In  the  same  strain  sings  the  "Cherubic  Wan 
derer,"  Angelus  Silesius : 

"  In  God  is  nothing  known :  He  is  the  only  One : 
What  we  in  Him  do  know,  that  we  ourselves  must  be."  l 

For  an  exactly  similar  doctrine,  asserted  in  the  Hindu  Vedas,  see  Dr. 
Mill's  Observations  on  the  application  of  pantheistic  principles  to  the  criticism 
of  the  Gospel,  p.  150. 

NOTE   XXX.,  p.  65. 

Hegel,  in  his  Lectures  on  the  Philosophy  of  Religion,  thus  interprets  the 

history  of  Christ.     "  The  truth which  men  have  reached  in  this 

entire  history  is  this:  that  the  idea  of  God  has  for  them  a  certainty;  that 
the  Human  is  immediate,  present  God;  and  indeed,  in  such  wise,  that  in 
this  history,  as  the  spirit  apprehends  it,  the  exhibition  of  the  process  per 
tains  to  that,  which  constitutes  man,  the  spirit."  2  The  view  here  obscurely 
intimated  is  more  explicitly  stated  by  his  disciple,  Strauss,  whose  theory 
is  little  more  than  the  legitimate  development  of  his  master's.  In  his 
Christliche  Glaubenslehre,  §  33,  he  sums  up  the  result  of  the  speculations  of 
modern  philosophy  concerning  the  Personality  of  God,  in  the  following 
words :  "  God  being  in  himself  the  eternal  Personality  itself,  has  been 
forever  bringing  forth  out  from  Himself  his  Other  (or  alterum)  Nature, 
in  order  forever  to  return  to  Himself  as  self-conscious  Spirit.  Or,  the  Per 
sonality  of  God  must  not  be  thought  of  as  single-personality,  but  as  all- 
personality;  instead  of  on  our  side  personifying  the  absolute,  we  must 
learn  to  apprehend  it  as  the  endlessly  Self-personifying."  This  view  is 
still  more  plainly  stated  in  a  fearful  passage  of  his  Leben  Jesu,  §  151,  which 
the  reader  will  find  quoted  at  length  in  Lecture  V.  p.  130.  The  critic 
of  Strauss,  Bruno  Bauer,  in  his  Kritik  der  evangelischen  Geschichte  der  Sy- 
noptiker,  §  91,  adopts  the  same  view,  observing,  "In  general  the  religious 

1  Cherubinischer  Wandersmann,  I.  285.     Quoted  by  Strauss,  Christliche  Glaubens 
lehre,  I.  p.  531. 

2  Werke,  XII.  p.  307. 


LECT.  I.  NOTES.  247 

consciousness  is  the  Spirit  estranged  from  itself;"  and  to  this  origin  ho 
ascribes  the  doctrine  of  Christ's  Divinity:  "The  historical  Christ  is  man, 
raised  to  heaven  by  the  religious  consciousness."  Feuerbach,  in  his 
Wesen  des  Cliristenthums,1  from  a  different  point  of  view,  arrives  at  a 
similar  conclusion,  maintaining  that  God  is  but  the  personification  of  the 
general  notion  of  humanity.  Emerson  gives  us  occasional  glimpses 
of  the  same  philosophy.  Thus  in  his  "Christian  Teacher"  he  explains 
the  Divinity  of  Christ :  "  He  saw  that  God  incarnates  himself  in  man,  and 
evermore  goes  forth  anew  to  take  possession  of  his  world.  He  said  in 
this  jubilee  of  sublime  emotion:  'I  am  divine.  Through  me  God  acts; 
through  me,  speaks.  Would  you  see  God,  see  me;  or  see  thee,  when  thou 
also  thinkest  as  I  now  think.' "2  And,  in  the  "Over-Soul."  in  still  more 
daring  language,  he  says :  "  In  all  conversation  between  two  persons,  tacit 
reference  is  made  as  to  a  third  party,  to  a  common  nature.  That  third 
party  or  common  nature  is  not  social;  it  is  impersonal,  is  God."  3 

Another  form  of  this  deification  of  humanity  is  that  of  M.  Comtc,  who 
agrees  with  Strauss  and  Feuerbach,  in  finding  God  only  in  the  human 
race.  This  discovery  is  announced  as  the  grand  consummation  of  Posi 
tive  Philosophy.  "This  final  estimation  condenses  I' ensemble  of  positive 
conceptions  in  the  single  notion  of  one  Being  immense  and  eternal,  Hu 
manity,  whose  sociological  destinies  develop  themselves,  always  under  the 
necessary  preponderance  of  biological  and  cosmological  fatalities.  Around 
this  veritable  Great-Being,  the  immediate  mover  of  every  existence,  indi 
vidual  or  collective,  our  affections  centre  as  spontaneously  as  our  thoughts 
and  our  actions."4  From  this  grand  ideal  of  humanity,  unworthy  individ 
uals  of  the  race  are  excluded;  but,  "si  ces  producteurs  de  fumier  ne  font 
vraiment  point  partie  de  1'Humanite,  une  juste  compensation  vous  pre- 
scrit  de  joindre  au  nouvel  Etre-Supreme  tous  ses  dignes  auxiliaires  ani- 
maux."5  Such  is  the  brilliant  discovery  which  entitles  its  author,  in  his 
own  modest  estimate,  to  be  considered  as  uniting  in  his  own  person  the 
chai-acters  of  St.  Paul  and  Aristotle,  as  the  founder  at  once  of  true  religion 
and  sound  philosophy. 6 

1  See  Ewerbeck,  Qu'est  ce  que  la  Religion  d'apres  la  nouvette  Philosophic  Attemande^ 
pp  271,  390,  413. 

2  Essays  (Orr's  Edition,  1851),  p.  511. 

3  Ibid.,  p.  125. 

4  Catechisme  Positiviste,  p.  19. 

5  Catechisme  Positiviste,  p.  31.    Thus,  under  the  auspices  of  the  positive  philoso 
phy,  we  return  once  more  to  the  worship  of  the  ibis,  the  ichneumon,  and  the  cat. 
The  Egyptians  had  the  same  reverence  for  their  "  dignes  auxiliares  animaux." 
"They  deified  no  beast,  but  for  some  utility  which  they  might  get  from  it."  — 
(Cicero,  De  Natura  Deorum,  I.  36.) 

6  This  exquisite  passage  must  bo  quoted  in  the  original  to  be  properly  appre- 


248  NOTES.  LECT.  I. 

"  Oh,  worthy  thou  of  Egypt's  wise  abodes, — 
A  decent  priest,  where  monkeys  were  the  gods  !  " 


NOTE  XXXI.,  p.  66. 

"The  object  of  religion  as  of  philosophy,  is  eternal  truth  in  its  very 
objectivity,  God,  and  nothing  but  God,  and  the  unfolding  of  God."  — 
Hegel,  Philosophic  der  Religion  (Werke,  XI.  p.  21). 

NOTE  XXXIL,  p.  66. 

"  Thus  is  religion  the  divine  Spirit's  knowledge  of  Himself  through  the 
mediation  of  the  finite  Spirit."—  Hegel,  Werke,  XI.  p.  200.  "Religion 
we  have  denned  as  the  self-consciousness  of  God."  —  Ibid.  XII.  p.  191. 
Compare  Marheineke,  Grundlehren  der  Christlichen  Dogmatik,  §  420.  "  Re 
ligion  is,  accordingly,  nothing  at  all  but  the  existence  of  the  divine  Spirit 
in  the  human;  but  an  existence,  which  is  life,  a  life  which  is  conscious 
ness,  a  consciousness  which,  in  its  truth,  is  knowledge.  This  human 
knowledge  is  essentially  divine;  for  it  is,  first  of  all,  the  divine  Spirit's 

knowledge,  and  religion  in  its  absoluteness." 

* 

NOTE  XXXIII.,  p.  66. 

"  Logic  is  consequently  to  be  conceived  as  the  system  of  the  pure  reason, 
as  the  realm  of  pure  thought.  This  realm  is  truth  unveiled  and  absolute. 
We  may  therefore  say,  that  it  contains  in  itself  the  exhibition  of  God, 
as  He  is  in  His  eternal  essence  before  the  creation  of  nature  and  a  finite 
spirit."—  Hegel,  Logik  (Werke,  III.  p.  33). 

NOTE  XXXIV.,  p.  66. 

Clemens  Alex.  Stromata,  i.  2.  Upurov  i^v,  d  Kal  &XPWTOS  eftj  <piXocro  • 
tpia,  ft  evxpTl<r70s  ^  Trjy  dxpTjarias  ficfiaiiaa-is, 


elated.  "  En  appliquant  aussitot  ce  principe  evident,  je  devais  spontanement 
choisir  1'angelique  interlocutrice,  qui,  apres  une  seule  annee  d'hifluence  objective 
se  trouve,  depuis  plus  de  six  ans,  subjectivement  associee  a  toutes  mes  pensees 
comme  a  tous  mes  sentiments.  C'est  par  elle  qui  je  suis  enfin  devenu,  pour 
1'Humanite,  un  organe  vraiment  double,  comme  quiconque  a  dignement  subi 
1'ascendant  feminin.  Sans  elle,  je  n'aurais  jamais  pu  faire  activement  succeder  le 
carriere  de  St.  Paul  a  celle  d'Aristote,  en  fondant  la  religion  universelle  sur  la 
saine  philosophic,  apres  avoir  tire  cellc-ci  dc  la  science  reelle."  —  Preface,  p.  xxii. 


LECT.  II.  NOTES.  249 


LECTURE    II. 

NOTE  I.,  p.  69. 

"  Unless  we  have  independent  means  of  knowing  that  God  knows  the 
truth,  and  is  disposed  to  tell  it  to  us,  his  word  (if  we  be  ever  so  certain  that  it 
is  really  his  word)  might  as  well  not  have  been  spoken.  But  if  we  know, 
independently  of  the  Bible,  that  God  knows  the  truth,  and  is  disposed  to 
tell  it  to  us,  obviously  we  know  a  great  deal  more  also.  We  know  not 
only  the  existence  of  God,  but  much  concerning  his  character.  For,  only 
by  discerning  that  he  has  Virtues  similar  in  kind  to  human  Virtues,  do 
we  know  of  his  truthfulness  and  his  goodness.  Without  this  a  priori 
belief,  a  book-revelation  is  a  useless  impertinence." — F.  W.  Newman,  The 
Soul,  p.  <r;8.  With  this  a  priori  belief,  it  is  obvious  that  a  book-revelation 
is,  as  far  as  our  independent  knowledge  extends,  still  more  impertinent; 
for  it  merely  tells  us  what  we  knew  before.  See  an  able  criticism  of  this 
theory  in  the  Eclipse  of  Faith,  p.  73  sqq. 


NOTE  II.,  p.  71. 

"  Furthermore,  since,  for  us,  that  falls  under  the  sphere  of  the  under 
standing,  which  a  great  many  philosophers  before  us  have  declared  to  be 
within  the  province  of  the  reason,  we  shall  have  for  the  highest  kind  of 
intelligence  a  position  unattained  by  them;  and  we  shall  define  it  as  that 
by  which  finite  and  infinite  are  seen  in  the  eternal,  but  not  the  eternal 
in  the  finite  or  in  the  infinite."  —  Schelling,  Bruno,  p.  163.  (Compare  p. 
69.)  "But  there  are  still  other  spheres,  which  can  be  observed,  —  not 
merely  those  which  are  confined  to  a  relativity  of  finite  to  finite,  but 
those,  too,  wherein  the  divine  in  its  absoluteness  is  in  the  conscious 
ness."— Hegel,  Philosophic  der  Religion  (Werke,  XI.  p.  196).  In  like 
manner,  Mr.  Newman  speaks  of  the  Soul  as  "the  organ  of  specific  infor 
mation  to  us,"  respecting  things  spiritual;1  and  Mr.  Parker  says,  "that 
there  is  a  connection  between  God  and  the  soul,  as  between  light  and  the 
eye,  sound  and  the  ear,  food  and  the  palate,  etc."  2 


NOTE  III.,  p.  71. 

"This  substance,  simple,  primitive,  must  comprise  the  perfections  in 
eminent  degree,   contained  in  the  derivative  substances,  which  are  its 

1  The  Soul,  p.  3.        2  Discourse  of  Matters  pertaining  to  Religion,  p.  130. 


250  NOTES.  LECT.  II. 

effects;  thus  it  will  have  power,  knowledge,  good-will  in  perfection;  that  is, 
omnipotence,  omniscience,  supreme  goodness.  And  as  justice,  taken  gen 
erally,  is  nothing  but  goodness  conformed  to  wisdom,  there  must  also  be 
in  God  a  supreme  justice." — Leibnitz,  Principes  de  la  Nature  et  de  la  Grace, 
§  9.  "  Being  conscious  that  I  have,  personally,  a  little  Love,  and  a  little 
Goodness,  I  ask  concerning  it,  as  concerning  Intelligence,  —  where  did  I 
pick  it  up?  and  I  feel  an  invincible  persuasion,  that  if  I  have  some  moral 
goodness,  the  great  Author  of  my  being  has  infinitely  more.  lie  did  not 
merely  make  rocks,  and  seas,  and  stars,  and  brutes,  but  the  human  Soul 
also ;  and,  therefore,  I  am  assured  he  possesses  all  the  powers  and  excel 
lencies  of  that  soul  in  an  infinitely  higher  degree."  —  F.  W.  Newman, 
Reply  to  the  Eclipse  of  Faith,  p.  26.  This  argument,  however  true  in  its 
general  principle,  is  liable  to  considerable  error  in  its  special  applications. 
The  remarks  of  Bishop  Browne  are  worth  consideration,  as  furnishing 
a  caution  on  the  other  side.  "To  say  that  God  is  infinite  in  perfection, 
means  nothing  real  and  positive  in  him,  unless  we  say,  in  a  kind  of  per 
fection  altogether  inconceivable  to  us  as  it  is  in  itself.  For  the  multiply 
ing  or  magnifying  the  greatest  perfections  whereof  we  have  any  direct 
conception  or  idea,  and  then  adding  our  gross  notion  only  of  indefinite  to 
them,  is  no  other  than  heaping  up  together  a  number  of  imperfections  to 
form  a  chimera  of  our  imagination."  —  Divine  Analogy,  p.  171. 


NOTE  IV.,  p.  72. 

Compare  Wegscheider's  definition  of  Mysticism,  Instit.  Theol.  §  5.  —  "  A 
near  approach  to  superstition,  or  rather  a  species  of  it,  is  mysticism;  or  a 

belief  in  a  particular  faculty  of  the  soul, by  which  it  may  reach 

even  in  this  world  an  immediate  intercourse  with  the  Deity  or  with  celestial 
natures,  and  enjoy  immediately  a  knowledge  of  divine  things." 


NOTE  V.,  p.  73. 

Fichte,  Versuch  einer  Kritik  aller  Offeiibarung.  (  Werke,,  V.  pp.  40,  115.) 
—  The  following  remarks  of  Mr.  Parker  are  another  application  of  the 
same  principle,  substituting,  however,  as  if  on  purpose  to  show  the  con 
tradictory  conclusions  to  which  such  a  method  of  reasoning  may  lead, 
the  conception  of  perfect  love  and  future  compensation,  for  that  of  a 
moral  nature  with  no  affections  and  no  future  promises.  "  This  we  know, 
that  the  Infinite  God  must  be  a  perfect  Creator,  the  sole  and  undisturbed 

author  of  all  that  is  in  Nature Now,  a  perfect  Motive  for  creation,  — 

what  will  that  be  ?     It  must  be  absolute  Love,  producing  a  desire  to  bless 


LECT.  II.  NOTES.  251 

everything  which  He  creates If  God  be  infinite,  then  He  must  make 

and  administer  the  world  from  perfect  motives,  for  a  perfect  purpose,  and 
as  a  perfect  means,  —  all  tending  to  the  ultimate  and  absolute  blessed 
ness  of  each  thing  He  directly  or  mediately  creates;  the  world  must  be 
administered  so  as  to  achieve  that  purpose  for  each  thing.  Else  God  has 
made  some  things  from  a  motive  and  for  a  purpose  not  benevolent,  or  as 
a  means  not  adequate  to  the  benevolent  purpose.  These  suppositions  are 
at  variance  with  the  nature  of  the  Infinite  God.  I  do  not  see  how  this 
benevolent  purpose  can  be  accomplished  unless  all  animals  are  immortal, 
and  rind  retribution  in  another  life." —  Theism,  Atheism  and  the  Popular 
Theology,  pp.  108,  109,  198. 

NOTE  VI.,  p.  73. 

The  nature  of  the  case  implies  that  the  human  mind  is  competent  to 
sit  in  moral  and  spiritual  judgment  on  a  professed  revelation,  and  to  decide 
(if  the  case  seem  to  require  it)  in  the  following  tone.  'This  doctrine 
attributes  to  God  that  which  we  should  all  call  harsh,  cruel,  or  unjust, 
in  man :  it  is,  therefore,  intrinsically  inadmissible/ "  —  Newman,  The 
Soul,  p.  58.  For  an  able  refutation  of  this  reasoning,  see  the  Defence  of 
the  Eclipse  of  Faith,  p.  38. 

NOTE  VII.,  p.  73. 

"  To  suppose  the  future  volitions  of  moral  agents  not  to  be  necessary 
events ;  or,  which  is  the  same  thing,  events  which  it  is  not  impossible  but 
that  they  may  not  come  to  pass;  and  yet  to  suppose  that  God  certainly 
foreknows  them,  and  knows  all  things ;  is  to  suppose  God's  Knowledge  to 
be  inconsistent  Avith  itself."  —  Edwards,  On  the  Freedom  of  the  Will,  part 
2  sect.  12. 

NOTE  VIII.,  p.  73. 

"  Let  us  suppose  a  great  prince  governing  a  wicked  and  rebellious  peo 
ple.  He  has  it  in  his  power  to  punish :  he  thinks  fit  to  pardon  them.  But 
he  orders  his  only  and  well-beloved  son  to  be  put  to  death,  to  expiate 
their  sins,  and  to  satisfy  his  royal  vengeance.  Would  this  proceeding 
appear  to  the  eye  of  reason,  and  in  the  unprejudiced  light  of  nature,  wise, 
or  just,  or  good  ?  "  —  Bolingbroke,  Fragments  or  Minutes  of  Essays  (  Works, 
vol.  v.  p.  289,  ed.  1754).  Compare  Newman,  Phases  of  Faitii,  p.  92.  See 
also  above  Lecture  I.,  note  13. 


252  NOTES.  LECT.  II. 


NOTE  IX.,  p.  73. 

"Intellectually,  we  of  necessity  hold  that  the  highest  human  perfection 

is  the  best  type  of  the  Divine Every  good  man  has  learnt  to  forgive, 

and  when  the  offender  is  penitent,  to  forgive  freely,  —  without  punish 
ment  or  retribution:  whence  the  conclusion  is  inevitable,  that  God  also 
forgives,  as  soon  as  sin  is  repented  of."  —  Newman,  The  Soul,  p.  99.  "  It 
may  be  collected  from  the  principles  of  Natural  Religion,  that  God,  on  the 
sincere  repentance  of  offenders,  will  receive  them  again  into  favour,  and 
render  them  capable  of  those  rewards  naturally  attendant  on  right  be 
haviour." —  Warburton,  Divine  Legation,  b.  ix.,  ch.  2.  Compare,  on  the 
other  side,  Magee  on  the  Atonement,  notes  iv.  and  xxiv.  See  also  above, 
Lecture  I.,  note  14. 


NOTE  X.,  p.  73. 

"A  divine  command  is  pleaded  in  vain,  except  it  can  be  shown  that  the 
thing  supposed  to  be  commanded  is  not  inconsistent  with  the  law  of 
nature;  which,  if  God  can  dispense  with  in  any  one  case,  he  may  in  all." 
—  Tindal,  Christianity  as  old  as  the  Creation,  p.  272,  quoted  and  answered  by 
Waterland,  Scripture  Vindicated,  on  Numbers  xxi.  2,  3. 


NOTE  XL,  p.  74. 

Kant,  Streit  der  Facultdlen,  p.  321,  ed.  Rosenkranz.    Newman,  Phases  of 
Faith,  p.  150.     Parker,  Discourse  of  Matters  pertaining  to  Religion,  p.  84. 


NOTE  XII.,  p.  74. 
Tindal,  apud  Waterland  1.  c.    Newman,  Phases  of  Faith,  p.  151. 

NOTE  XIIL,  p.  74. 
Newman,  The  Soul,  p.  60.     Greg,  Creed  of  Christendom,  p.  8. 

NOTE  XIV.,  p.  75. 

"  The  Absolute  is  that  which  is  free  from  all  necessary  relation,  that 
is,  which  is  free  from  every  relation  as  a  condition  of  existence;  but  it  may 
exist  in  relation,  provided  that  relation  be  not  a  necessary  condition  of  its 


LECT.  II.  NOTES.  253 

existence;  that  is,  provided  that  relation  may  be  removed  without  affect 
ing  its  existence."  .  .  .  "The  Infinite  expresses  the  entire  absence  of  all 
limitation,  and  is  applicable  to  the  one  Infinite  Being  in  all  his  attri 
butes."— Calderwood,  Philosophy  of  the  Infinite,  pp.  30,  37.  The  defini 
tions  may  be  accepted,  though  they  lead  to  conclusions  the  very  opposite 
of  those  which  the  ingenious  author  has  attempted  to  establish.  The 
Absolute,  as  above  defined,  is  taken  in  the  first  of  the  two  senses  dis 
tinguished  by  Sir  W.  Hamilton,  Discussions,  p.  14 ;  and  in  this  sense  it  is 
the  necessary  complement  of  the  idea  of  the  Infinite.  The  other  sense,  in 
which  the  Absolute  is  contradictory  of  the  Infinite,  is  irrelevant  to  the 
present  argument. 


NOTE  XV.,  p.  76. 

"  The  absolutely  infinite  is  what  contains  everything,  or  every  perfection, 
which  can  exist  or  be  conceived;  that  you  are  wont  to  call  infinite  in  per 
fection.  Infinite,  e.  g.  predicated  of  extension,  means  what  embraces  all 
existing  or  conceivable  extension." — Werenfels,  DeFinibus  Mundi  Dia 
logue  (Dissertationes,  1716,  vol.  ii.,  p.  192).  In  the  latter  sense,  Clarke 
speaks  of  the  error  of  "  imagining  all  Infinites  to  be  equal,  when  in  things 
disparate  they  manifestly  are  not  so;  an  infinite  Line  being  not  only  not 
equal  to,  but  infinitely  less  than  an  infinite  Surface,  and  an  infinite  Surface 
than  Space  infinite  in  all  Dimensions."1  This  remark  assumes  that  an 
infinite  extension  is  a  possible  object  of  conception  at  all;  whereas,  in 
fact,  the  attempt  to  conceive  it  involves  the  same  fundamental  contradic 
tions  which  accompany  the  notion  of  the  Infinite  in  every  other  aspect. 
This  is  ingeniously  showrn  by  Werenfels,  in  the  above  Dialogue,  p.  218. 
"  D.  But  do  you  then  think,  that  an  infinite  line  cannot  be  conceived  at 
all  without  contradiction?  Ph.  I  do,  indeed;  and  I  cannot  be  drawn  from 
this  opinion,  unless  some  one  of  you  have  a  conclusive  answer  to  this 
demonstration;  but  this,  unless  you  lack  the  patience  to  listen,  I  will 

briefly  propose  anew.    You  see  this  line  b a  c.    Let  us  suppose 

it  to  be  infinite,  and  to  be  extended  ad  infinitwn  beyond  the  termini  b  and  c. 
Let  this  line  be  divided  at  the  point  a.  It  is  manifest  that  these  parts  are 
equal  to  one  another,  because  each  begins  at  the  point  a  and  is  extended 
ad  infinitum.  Now,  I  ask  you,  Daedalus,  are  these  two  parts  finite,  or 
infinite?  D.  Finite.  Ph.  So  an  infinite  would  be  composed  of  two 
finites;  which  is  a  contradiction.  D.  I  confess  my  mistake.  They  are 
infinite.  Ph.  Now  you  fall  into  Scylla  Thus  parts  would  be  equal  to 

1  Demonstration  of  the  Being  and  Attributes  of  Goc/,  Prop.  I. 

22 


254  NOTES.  LECT.  II. 

a  whole;  for  infinite  is  equal  to  infinite.  Besides,  you  see,  that  each  part 
is  terminated  at  the  point  a;  it  is,  therefore,  not  without  ends  and  bounds. 
What  say  you  to  this,  Polymathcs?  Po.  I  have  an  answer.  Each  of 
these  parts  is  on  the  one  side  finite,  —  namely,  at  the  point  a,  —  on  the 
other,  infinite,  because  it  is  extended  beyond  b  and  c  ad  infinitum.  Ph. 
Ingeniously,  acutely,  nothing  more  so.  But  I  ask  you,  whether  there  is 
on  either  section  of  the  infinite  line  an  infinite  number  of  such  parts  as 
the  line  ab  and  the  line  ac  ?  Po.  Yes.  Ph.  But  is  that  number  infinite,  to 
which  an  equal  can  be  added,  and  the  double  of  which  is  not  only  con 
ceivable,  but  really  existent?  If  you  answer  yes,  then  an  infinite  number 
docs  not  contain  all  units,  but  there  can  besides  be  conceived  and  added 
to  it,  as  many  units  as  it  may  not  have.  But  if  this  be  not  a  contradiction, 
then  what  is  there,  that  is  a  contradiction?  Po.  But,  what  if  either  sec 
tion  of  the  given  line  consist  of  a  finite  number  of  parts  of  such  mag 
nitude  as  the  line  ab  ?  Ph.  Then  the  given  line  is  finite;  because  two  finite 
numbers  added  together,  make  a  finite  number;  which  was  the  tiling 'to 
be  proved."  The  contradictions  thus  involved  in  the  notion  of  infinite 
magnitudes  in  space,  are  not  solved  by  maintaining,  with  Spinoza  and 
Clarke,  that  infinite  quantity  is  not  composed  of  parts;  1  for  space  with  no 
parts  is  as  inconceivable  as  space  composed  of  an  infinite  number  of  parts. 
These  contradictions  sufficiently  show  that  relative  infinity,  no  less  than 
absolute,  is  not  a  positive  object  of  thought  at  all;  the  so-called  infinites 
and  infinitesimals  of  the  mathematicians  being  in  fact  only  negative  ex 
pressions,  denoting  magnitudes  which  bear  no  relation  to  any  assignable 
quantity,  however  great  or  small.  They  are  thus  apprehended  only  by 
reference  to  their  inconceivability;  being  merely  the  expression  of  our 
inability  to  represent  in  thought  a  first  or  last  unit  of  space  or  time.  —  See 
Leibnitz,  The'odicee  Discours,  §  70.  "  We  are  embarrassed  in  the  series  of 
numbers,  progressing  ad  infinitum.  We  conceive  of  a  last  term,  of  an 
infinite  or  an  infinitesimal;  but  these  are  only  fictions.  Every  number 
is  finite  and  assignable,  and  the  infinites  and  the  infinitesimals  signify 
nothing  but  magnitudes,  which  we  may  take  as  large  or  as  small  as  we 
please,  etc."  —  Compare  Pascal,  Pensees,  Partie  I.  Art.  II.  "In  short, 

1  See  Spinoza,  Epist.  XXIX,  Ethica,  P.  I.  Prop.  xv. ;  and  Clarke,  Demonstration, 
Prop.  1.  A  curious  psychological  discrepancy  may  be  observed  in  relation  to 
this  controversy.  Spinoza  maintains  that  quantity  as  represented  in  the  imagi 
nation  is  finite,  but  that  as  conceived  by  the  intellect  it  is  infinite.  Werenfels,  on 
the  contrary,  asserts  that  the  imagined  quantity  is  infinite,  the  conceived  finite. 
The  truth  is,  that  in  relation  to  Space,  which  is  not  a  general  notion  containing 
individuals  under  it,  conception  and  imagination  are  identical;  and  the  notions 
of  an  ultimate  limit  of  extension  and  of  an  unlimited  extension,  are  both  equally 
self-contradictory  from  every  point  of  view. 


LECT.  II.  NOTES.  255 

whatever  be  the  motion,  number,  space,  time,  there  is  always  a  greater 
and  a  less;  so  that  they  all  stand  between  nothing  and  infinity,  being 
always  infinitely  removed  from  these  extremes."  Some  ingenious  rea 
soning  on  this  question  will  be  found  in  a  note  by  Mosheim  on  Cud- 
worth's  Intellectual  System,  b.  I.  eh.  V.,  translated  in  Harrison's  edition  of 
Cudworth,  vol.  II.  p.  541;  though  the  entire  discussion  is  by  no  means 
satisfactory. 


NOTE  XVI.,  p.  76. 

"  By  the  Deity  I  understand  a  Being  absolutely  infinite,  i.  e.,  a  substance 
consisting  of  infinite  attributes,  each  one  of  which  expresses  an  eternal 
and  infinite  essence.  I  say  infinite  absolutely,  but  not  in  its  kind,  for  whatever 
is  infinite  in  ils  kind  only,  of  that  we  cannot  affirm  infinite  attributes ;  but  to  the 
essence  of  that  ichich  is  absolutely  infinite,  there  pertains  whatever  expresses 
essence  and  involves  no  negation." —  Spinoza,  Ethica,  P.  I.  Def.  VI. 


NOTE  XVII.,  p.  76. 

See  Spinoza  1.  c.;  Wolf,  TJieologia  Naturalis,  P.  II.  §  15;  Kant,  Kritilcder 
reinen  Vernunft,  p.  450.  ed.  Rosenkranz;  Vorksungen  iiber  die  Metaphysik, 
ed.  Poelitz,  p.  276;  Schelling,  Vom  Ich,  §  10.  The  assumption  ultimately 
annihilates  itself;  for  if  any  object  of  conception  exhausts  the  universe  of 
reality,  it  follows  that  the  mind  which  conceives  it  has  no  existence.  The 
older  form  of  this  representation  is  criticized  by  Hegel,  Encydopddie,  §  36. 
His  own  conception  of  God,  however,  virtually  amounts  to  the  same 
thing.  A  similar  view  is  implied  in  his  criticism  of  Aristotle,  whom  he 
censures  for  regarding  God  as  one  object  out  of  many.  See  Geschichte  der 
Philosophie,  Werke,  XIV.  p.  283. 


NOTE  XVHI.,  p.  76. 

Geschichte  der  Philosophie,  Werke,  XV.  p.  275.  See  also,  Philosophie  der 
Religion,  Werke,  XI.  p.  24.  Encyklopadie,  §  19,  20,  21.  Compare  Schel 
ling,  Philosophie  und  Religion,  p.  35,  quoted  by  Willm,  Histoire  de  la  Philos 
ophic  AHemande,  vol.  iii.  p.  301.  Schleiermacher  (Christliche  Glaube,  §  89) 
is  compelled  in  like  manner  to  assert  that  God  must  be  in  some  manner 
the  author  of  evil ;  an  opinion  which  is  also  maintained  by  Mr.  Parker, 
Theism,  Atheism,  and  the  Popular  Theology,  p.  119. 


256  NOTES.  LECT.  H. 

.NOTE  XIX.,  p.  76. 

"  A  thing  is  said  to  be  finite  in  its  kind,  which  can  be  limited  by  another 
of  the  same  nature ;  e.  g,  a  body  is  called  finite,  because  we  always  con 
ceive  of  one  greater." —  Spinoza,  Ethica,  P.  I.  Def.  II. 

NOTE  XX.,  p.  76. 

See  Aquinas,  Summa,  P.  I.  Qu.  II.  Art.  3;  Qu.  IX.  Art.  1.  "Actus 
simplicissimus,"  says  Hobbes  contemptuously,  "  signifieth  nothing."1 
And  Clarke  in  like  manner  observes,  "  Either  the  words  signify  nothing, 
or  else  they  express  only  the  perfection  of  his  power,"2 

NOTE  XXI.,  p.  76. 

See  Plato,  Republic,  II.  p.  381;  Aristotle,  Metaph.  VIII.  8,  15;  Augustine, 
Enarratio  in  Ps.  IX.  ii.  De  Trinitate,  XV.  c.  15;  Hooker,  E.  P.  b.  I.  c.  0; 
Descartes,  Meditatio  Tertia,  p.  22.  ed.  168-3;  Spinoza,  Etldca,  P.  I.  Prop.  xvii. 
Schol. ;  Hartley,  Observations  on  Man,  Prop,  cxv.;  Herder,  Gott,  Werke, 
VIII.  p.  180;  Schleiermacher,  Christliche  Glaube,  §  54;  Hegel,  Werke, 
XIV.  p.  290;  Marheineke,  Grundlehren  der  Christlichen  Doymatik,  §  195. 
The  conclusion,  that  God  actually  does  all  that  he  can  do;  and,  conse 
quently,  that  there  is  no  possibility  of  free  action  in  any  finite  being,  can 
only  be  avoided  by  the  admission,  which  is  ultimately  forced  upon  us, 
that  our  human  conception  of  the  infinite  is  not  the  true  one.  Miiller 
(Christliche  Lehre  von  der  Siinde,  II.  p.  251,  third  edit. )  endeavors  to  meet 
this  conclusion  by  a  counter-argument.  He  shows  that  it  is  equally  a 
limitation  of  the  divine  Nature  to  suppose  that  God  is  compelled  of  neces 
sity  to  realize  in  act  everything  which  he  has  the  power  to  accomplish. 
This  argument  completes  the  dilemma,  and  brings  into  full  view  the 
counter-impotences  of  human  thought  in  relation  to  the  infinite.  We 
cannot  conceive  an  Infinite  Being  as  capable  of  becoming  that  which  he  is 
not;  nor,  on  the  other  hand,  can  we  conceive  him  as  actually  being  all 
that  he  can  be. 

NOTE  XXII.,  p.  77. 

"  Now  it  is  sufficiently  manifest,  that  a  thing  existing  absolutely  (i.  e. 
not  under  relation),  and  a  thing  existing  absolutely  as  a  cause,  are  contry- 

1  Questions  concerning  Liberty,  Necessity  and  Chance,  Animadversions,  No.  XXIV. 
See,  on  the  other  side,  Bramliall,  Works,  vol.  IV.  p.  524. 

2  Demonstration,  Prop.  IV.    See,  on  the  other  side,  Hegel,  Geschichte  der  Philos 
ophic,  Werke,  XIV.  p.  290. 


LECT.  II.  NOTES.  257 

dictory.  The  former  is  the  absolute  negation  of  all  relation;  the  latter  is 
the  absolute  affirmation  of  a  particular  relation.  A  cause  is  a  relative,  and 
what  exists  absolutely  as  a  cause,  exists  absolutely  under  relation." — 
Sir  \V.  Hamilton,  Discussions,  p.  34. 

NOTE  XXIII.,  p.  77. 

That  a  belief  in  creation  is  incompatible  with  a  philosophy  of  the  Abso 
lute,  was  clearly  seen  by  Fichte,  who  consistently  denounces  it,  as  a  Jewish 
and  Heathenish  notion  and  the  fundamental  error  of  all  false  Metaphysics. 
He  even  goes  so  far  as  to  maintain  that  St.  John,  the  only  teacher  of  true 
Christianity,  did  not  believe  in  the  Creation,  and  that  the  beginning  of 
his  Gospel  was  designed  to  contradict  the  Mosaic  narrative.  See  his 
Anweisung  zum  seligcn  Lcben  (  Werke,  v.  p.  479).  Compare  Schelling, 
Bruno,  p.  GO,  who  regards  the  finite  as  necessarily  coeternal  with  the 
infinite.  So  also  Rothe,  Theologische  Ethik,  §  40,  asserts  that  the  doctrine 
of  a  creation  in  time  is  inconsistent  with  the  essential  nature  of  God,  as 
unchangeable  and  necessarily  creative.  Spinoza's  attempted  demonstra 
tion  that  one  substance  cannot  be  produced  from  another,1  though  in  itself 
a  mere  juggle  of  equivocal  terms,  yet  testifies  in  like  manner  to  his  con 
viction,  that  to  deny  the  possibility  of  creation  is  an  indispensable  step  to 
a  philosophy  of  the  Absolute.  Cognate  to  these  theories  arc  the  specula 
tions  of  Hermogcnes,  mentioned  by  Tertullian,  Adv.  Herm.  c.  2;  and  of 
Origen,  De  Princ.  I.  2.  10.  Of  the  latter,  Neander  well  observes :  "  Here, 
therefore,  there  occurred  to  him  those  reasons  against  a  beginning  of 
creation  generally,  which  must  ever  suggest  themselves  to  the  reflecting 
mind,  Avhich  cannot  rest  satisfied  with  simple  faith  in  that  which  to 
itself  is  incomprehensible.  Supposing  that  to  create  is  agreeable  to  the 
divine  essence,  how  is  it  conceivable  that  what  is  thus  conformable  to 
God's  nature  should  at  anytime  have  been  wanting?  Why  should  not 
those  attributes  which  belong  to  the  very  essence  of  the  Deity,  His 
almighty  power  and  goodness,  be  always  active?  A  transition  from  the 
state  of  not-creating  to  the  act  of  creation  is  inconceivable  without  a 
change,  which  is  incompatible  with  the  being  of  God."  2 

NOTE  XXIV.,  p.  78. 

Arist.  Metaph.  XIV.  0.  [Ed.  Gul.  Duval,  Paris,  1629.]  "  If  it  have  aught 
as  the  object  of  intelligence,  and  something  other  than  itself  be  thus  supe- 

1  Et/nca,  I*.  I.  Prop.  vi. 

2  Church  History,  English  translation,  Vol.  II.  p  281,  Bonn's  edition. 

•22* 


258  NOTES.  LECT.  II. 

rlor  to  it,  it  will  not  ho  the  Best  (for  then  it  will  be  intelligence  only  po 
tentially,  not  essentially);  since  it  is  in  the  act  of  intelligence  that  the 

excellence  lies Itself,  therefore,  it  has  as  the  object  of  intelligence,  if 

indeed  it  is  the  Supreme;  and  the  intelligence  is  intelligence  of  intelli 
gence."  Plotinus,  on  the  other  hand,  shows  that  even  self-consciousness, 
as  involving  a  logical  distinction  between  the  subject  and  object,  is  incom 
patible  with  the  notion  of  the  Absolute.  See  Enn.  V.  1.  VI.  c.  2. 


NOTE  XXV.,  p.  78. 

Plotinus,  Enn.,  III.  1.  IX.  c.  3.  "  The  Intelligence  is  now  twofold,  and 
objectifies  itself;  and  it  is  wanting  in  somewhat  because  it  has  'the  Well' 
(rb  e3)  in  the  act  of  intelligence,  not  in  the  substance."  Emi.  V.  1.  VI.  c. 

2.     "  Being  a  duality  it  will  not  be  the  first, in  itself  it  will  properly 

be  neither  the  intelligent  nor  the  intelligible;  for  what  is  intelligible  is  so 
relatively  to  another."  Enn,  V.  1.  VI.  c.  6.  "Therefore  there  will  again 
be  a  duality  in  the  conscious  intelligence;  but  that  (the  first  or  the  Abso 
lute)  is  nowise  a  duality."  Cf.  Porphyr.  Sent.  XV.  "  But  if  there  be 
plurality  in  the  intelligible,  since  there  is  a  plurality,  not  unity,  in  the 
objects  of  the  conscious  intelligence,  then  of  necessity  there  must  be 
plurality  in  the  essence  of  the  intelligence.  But  unity  (the  One)  is  prior 
to  plurality,  so  that  of  necessity  it  is  prior  to  the  intelligence."  "  The 
Absolute,  as  absolutely  universal,  is  absolutely  one;  absolute  unity  is  con 
vertible  with  the  absolute  negation  of  plurality  and  difference;  the  Absolute, 
and  the  Knowledge  of  the  Absolute,  are  therefore  identical.  But  knowledge, 
or  intelligence,  supposes  a  plurality  of  terms  —  the  plurality  of  subject  and 
object.  Intelligence,  whose  essence  is  plurality,  cannot  therefore  be  iden 
tified  with  the  Absolute,  whose  essence  is  unity;  and  if  known,  the  Abso 
lute,  as  knoivn,  must  be  different  from  the  Absolute,  as  existing;  that  is, 
there  must  be  two  Absolutes  —  an  Absolute  in  knowledge  and  an  Absolute 
in  existence :  which  is  contradictory." —  Sir  W.  Hamilton,  Discussions,  p.  32. 

NOTE  XXVL,  p.  78. 

Clem.  Alex.  Strom.  V.  12.  p.  587.    "  Nor,  indeed,  would  any  one  rightly 

call  it  a  whole,  for  the  whole  is  predicated  of  magnitude nor  can  it 

be  said  to  have  parts,  for  the  One  is  indivisible."  Plotinus,  Enn.  V.  1.  VI. 
c.  5.  "  For  of  a  thing  that  is  absolutely  one,  how  can  you  predicate  the 
coming  to  itself,  or  the  want  of  consciousness?"  On  this  point,  the 
earlier  and  later  forms  of  Pantheism  are  divided  against  each  other. 
Spinoza  (Eth.  P.  I.  Def.  6)  defines  the  Deity  as  composed  of  an  infinite 


LECT.  II.  NOTES.  259 

number  of  attributes.  "  By  the  Deity  I  understand  a  Being  absolutely 
infinite,  i.  e.,  a  substance  consisting  of  infinite  attributes,  CArcry  one  of 
which  expresses  eternal  and  infinite  essence."  Hegel,  on  the  contrary,  in 
his  Lectures  on  the  proofs  of  the  existence  of  God,  regards  a  plurality  of 
attributes  as  incompatible  with  the  idea  of  the  Infinite.  "  Here  (/.  e.  in 
the  absolute  unity  of  God)  the  plurality  of  predicates  —  which  only  subjec 
tively  are  bound  in  unity,  but  in  themselves  would  be  distinguished,  and 
so  would  come  into  opposition  and  into  contradiction  —  shows  itself  as 
something  false,  and  the  plurality  of  determinations  (in  the  notion  of 
God)  as  an  impertinent  category."1  The  lesson  to  be  learnt  from  both  is 
the  same.  Xo  human  form  of  thought  can  represent  the  Infinite:  —  a 
truth  which  Spinoza  attempts  to  evade  by  multiplying  such  forms  to  infin 
ity,  and  Hegel  by  renouncing  human  thought  altogether. 


NOTE  XXVIL,  p.  78. 

That  the  Absolute  cannot  be  conceived  as  composed  of  a  plurality  of 
attributes,  but  only  as  the  one  substance  conceived  apart  from  all  plu 
rality,  is  shown  by  Plotinus,  Enn.  V.  1.  VI.,  c.  3.  "  If  it  be  said  that 
nothing  hinders  this  same  (i.  e.  the  First)  being  the  Many,  the  answer  must 
be,  that  these  Many  have  an  underlying  One  (One  Subject,  viroKti/j.ei'ov);  for 
the  Many  cannot  exist,  except  there  exist  the  One  from  which  the  Many 

must  be  derived,  and  in  which  the  Many  must  exist and  this  One 

must  be  taken  as  in  itself  the  only  One.".  .  .  .Compare  Proclus,  Inst.Theol. 
c.  1.  "All  plurality  in  some  way  partakes  of  Unity  (or  the  One),  for  if 
not,  then  neither  will  the  whole  be  One,  nor  each  one  of  the  many  which 
make  up  the  plurality;  but  of  certain  entities  each  Avill  be  a  plurality,  and 
this  on  to  an  infinite,  and  of  these  infinites  each  again  will  be  an  infinite 
plurality."  To  the  same  effect  is  the  reasoning  of  Augustine,  De  Trinitaie, 
vi.  c.  6.  7.  "  In  every  body  magnitude  is  one  thing,  color  another,  figure 
another.  For  the  magnitude  diminished,  the  color  may  remain  the  same, 
and  the  figure  the  same;  and  the  figure  changed,  the  body  may  be  just  as 
large  and  of  just  the  same  color;  and  whatever  other  things  are  predicated 
of  the  body,  may  exist  together,  and  may  be  changed  without  change  on 
the  part  of  the  rest.  And  thus  the  nature  of  the  body  is  proved  to  be 

manifold,  but  in  nowise  simple But  also  in  the  soul  since  it  is  one 

thing  to  be  ingenious,  another  to  be  dull,  another  to  be  acute,  another  to 
have  a  good  memory;  since  desire  is  one  thing,  fear  another,  joy  another, 
sorrow  another;  and  since  there  can  be  found  in  the  nature  of  the  soul 

1  Werke,  XII.  p  419.     See  also  EncyklopMie,  §  28  (  Wtrke,  VI.  p.  62). 


260  NOTES.  LECT.  II. 

some  things  without  others,  and  some  more,  and  some  less,  and  these  to  a 
number  beyond  all  computation ;  —  it  is  manifest  that  the  nature  of  the 
soul  is  not  simple  but  manifold,  for  nothing  simple  is  changeable;  but 
every  created  being  is  changeable.  But  God  indeed  is  said  to  be  in  various 
ways  great,  good,  wise,  happy,  true,  and  whatever  else  is  not  unworthily 
prcdicable  of  Him ;  but  his  greatness  is  the  same  as  his  wisdom ;  for  he 
is  great,  not  in  quantity,  but  in  quality;  and  his  goodness  is  the  same  as 
his  wisdom  and  greatness,  and  his  truth  the  same  as  all  these;  and  with 
Him  the  being  happy  is  not  different  from  being  great,  or  wise,  or  true,  or 
good,  or  from  being  Himself."  See  also  Aquinas,  Summa,  P.  I.  Qu.  III. 
Art.  5,  6,  7.  Schleiermacher,  Christliche  Glaube,  §  50. 


NOTE  XXVIII.,  p.  79. 

See  Plato,  Republic,  II.  p.  380,  VI.  p.  511,  VII.  p.  517;  Timeus,  p.  31. 
Aristotle,  Metaph.  XI.  8,  18:  10,  14;  Eth.  Nic.  VII.  14,  8.  Cicero,  Tusc. 
Qucest.  I.  29;  De  Nat.  Deor.  II.  11.  Plotinus,  Enn.  II.  9,  1,  III.  9,  3.  V.  4.  1, 
VI.  5,  1 :  9,  6.  Proclus,  List.  Theol.  c.  i.  xxii.  lix.  cxxxiii.  Clemens  Alex., 
Strom.  V.  p.  587.  Origen,  De  Princ.  I.  1,  6.  Augustine,  De  Civ.  Dti,  VIII. 
6:  De  Trinitate,VI.  6,  VII.  1,  XV.  5,  13.  Aquinas,  Summa,  P.  I.  Qu.  III. 
Art.  7,  Qu.  VII.  Art.  2.  Qu.  XI.  Art.  3.  Leibnitz,  Monadologie,  §  39,  40,  47. 
Clarke,  Demonstration,  Prop.  vi.  vii.  Schelling,  Vom  Ich,  §  9;  Bruno,  p. 
1S5.  Rothe,  Theol.. Ethik,  §  8. 

NOTE  XXIX.,  p.  79. 

"  Hence,  therefore,  it  is  evident,  that  nothing  is  called  one  or  unique, 
except  after  some  other  has  been  conceived,  which  agrees  with  it.  But 
since  the  existence  of  God  belongs  to  his  own  essence,  and  of  his  essence 
we  cannot  form  a  universal  idea,  it  is  certain  that  he  who  calls  God  one 
or  unique,  can  have  no  idea  of  God,  or  speaks  improperly  of  Him." — 
Spinoza,  Epist.  L.  Compare  Schleiermacher,  Cliristliche  Glaube,  §  50. 

NOTE  XXX.,  p.  80. 

"For  the  expression,  '  if  it  be  possible,'  referred  not  merely  to  the  power 
of  God,  but  also  to  his  justice;  for,  as  to  the  power  of  -God,  all  things  are 
possible,  whether  just  or  unjust;  but  as  to  his  justice,  He  being  not  only 
powerful,  but  just,  not  all  things  are  possible,  but  only  those  which  are 
just." — Origen  in  St.  Matt.  xxvi.  42;  compare  c.  Ctlsum,  III.  70.  Origen 
speaks  still  more  strongly  in  a  remarkable  fragment  of  the  De  Prindpiis, 


LECT.  II.  NOTES.  261 

which  has  been  preserved  in  the  original :  "In  that  beginning  (i.  e.,  at  the 
creation)  God  determined  (to  create)  as  great  a  number  of  intelligent 
beings  as  might  be  sufficient;  for  we  must  say  that  the  divine  power  was 
limited,  nor  under  pretence  of  praise  take  away  all  limitation  of  it;  for  if 
the  divine  power  were  unlimited,  then,  necessarily,  it  did  not  have  a  con 
sciousness  of  itself."  The  language  of  Hooker  (E.  P.  b.  I.  ch.  2.  §  3)  is  more 
cautious  and  reverent,  but  contains  the  same  acknowledgment  of  what, 
from  a  human  point  of  view,  is  limitation.  "  If,  therefore,  it  be  demanded 
why,  God  having  power  and  ability  infinite,  the  effects  notwithstanding 
of  that  power  are  all  so  limited  as  we  see  they  are;  the  reason  hereof  is 
the  end  which  he  hath  proposed,  and  the  law  whereby  his  wisdom  hath 
stinted  the  effects  of  his.  power  in  such  sort,  that  it  doth  not  work  infi 
nitely,  but  correspondently  unto  that  end  for  which  it  worketh."  Some 
excellent  remarks  on  the  limitation  of  man's  faculties  with  regard  to  the 
Divine  Attributes,  will  be  found  in  Mr.  Meyrick's  sermon,  God's  Revelation 
and  Man's  Moral  Sense  considered  in  reference  to  the  Sacrifice  of  the  O'oss,  p. 
14.  See  the  Collection,  of  Sermons  on  Christian  Faitii  and  the  Atonement, 
Oxford,  1&36. 

NOTE  XXXI.,  p.  80. 

Thus  Spinoza  (Ethica,  P.  I.  Prop.  26)  says,  "A  thing  which  was  de 
termined  to  the  doing  of  somewhat,  was  necessarily  so  determined  by 
God ; "  and,  carrying  the  same  theory  to  its  inevitable  consequence,  he 
consistently  maintains  (P.  IV.  Prop.  64)  that  the  notion  of  evil  only 
exists  in  consequence  of  the  inadequacy  of  our  ideas.  Hegel  in  like  man 
ner  (Encyld.  §  35)  reduces  evil  to  a  mere  negation,  which  may  be  iden 
tified  with  good  in  the  absolute.  See  also  above,  note  18,  p.  231. 


NOTE  XXXII.,  p.  80. 

Plato,  Rep.  II.  p.  381.  "Does  He,  then,  change  Himself  into  some 
thing  better  and  nobler,  or  into  something  worse  and  baser  than  Himself? 
Necessarily,  said  he,  into  something  better,  for  we  cannot  say  that  God  is 
wanting  in  any  good  or  noble  quality.  Exactly  so;  and  that  being  the 
case,  does  it  seem  to  you,  that  any  one,  whether  God  or  man,  would  vol 
untarily  make  himself  worse  in  any  respect?"  Compai-e  Augustine,  In 
Jocinm's  Evangelium,  Tract.  XXIII.  9.  "You  do  not  find  in  God  any 
changeableness,  anything  whic.h  is  different  now,  from  what  it  was  a  little 
while  ago.  For  where  you  find  difference,  there  has  taken  place  a  kind  of 
death;  for  that  id  death,  the  not  being  what  (one)  was.  Whatever  there- 


•62  NOTES.  LECT.  II. 

fore,  undergoes  this  sort  of  death,  whether  from  the  better  to  the  worse, 
or  from  the  worse  to  the  better,  —  that  is  not  God."  And  so  Jacobi  (  Van 
den  yottlichen  Dingen,  Werke,  III.  p.  391)  says  of  the  system  of  Schelling: 
"  Consider  that  the  one  only  living  and  true  God  (Nature)  cannot  become 
greater  or  less,  higher  or  lower;  but  that  this  God,  equivalent  to  Nature 
or  the  Universe,  remains,  from  eternity  to  eternity,  ever  one  and  the  same, 
in  quality  and  in  quantity.  It  would,  therefore,  be  absolutely  impossible 
for  Him  to  bring  about  any  change  in  Himself,  without  being  changea- 
bleness,  temporalness,  change  itself.  This  changeableness,  however,  is,  we 
are  told,  in  its  root,  an  Unchangeable,  namely,  the  holy,  ever-creating  orig 
inal  force  of  the  world ;  in  its  fruit,  on  the  contrary,  in  the  real  world,  an 
absolutely  changeable,  so  that  in  each  single  determined  momentum  the  All  of 
beings  is  nothing.  Accordingly,  the  creative  word  of  the  naturalistic  God 
is  incontestibly,  Let  there  be  Nothing!  He  calls  forth  Not-Being  from 
Being;  as  the  God  of  theism  calls  forth  Being  from  Not-Being."  Compare 
Sir  W.  Hamilton's  criticism  of  Cousin,  Discussions,  p.  30;  and  see  also 
above,  note  23,  p.  233. 

NOTE  XXXIII.,  p.  81. 

"What,"  says  Sir  "VV.  Hamilton,  "is  our  thought  of  creation?  It  is  not 
a  thought  of  the  mere  springing  of  nothing  into  something.  On  the  con 
trary,  creation  is  conceived,  and  is  by  us  conceivable,  only  as  the  evolu 
tion  of  existence  from  possibility  into  actuality,  by  the  fiat  of  the  Deity. 
....  And  what  is  true  of  our  concept  of  creation,  holds  of  our  concept  of 
annihilation.  We  can  think  no  real  annihilation,  —  no  absolute  sinking 
of  something  into  nothing.  But  as  creation  is  cogitable  by  us,  only  as  a 
putting  forth  of  Divine  power,  so  is  annihilation  by  us  only  conceivable, 
as  a  withdrawal  of  that  same  power.  All  that  is  now  actually  existent  in 
the  universe,  this  we  think  and  must  think,  as  having,  prior  to  creation, 
virtually  existed  in  the  Creator;  and  in  imagining  the  universe  to  be  anni 
hilated,  we  can  only  conceive  this,  as  the  retractation  by  the  Deity  of  an 
overt  energy  into  latent  power.  In  short,  it  is  impossible  for  the  human 
mind  to  think  what  it  thinks  existent,  lapsing  into  absolute  non-existence, 
either  in  time  past  or  in  time  future."  1  With  all  deference  to  this  great 

1  Discussions,  p  620.  Compare  a  remarkable  passage  in  Herder's  Gott  (Wrrke 
VIII.  p.  241)  where  the  author  maintains  a  similar  view  of  the  impossibility  of 
conceiving  creation  from  or  reduction  to  nothing.  But  Herder  is  speaking  as  a 
professed  defender  of  Spinoza.  Sir  W.  Hamilton's  system  is  in  all  its  essential 
features  the  direct  antagonist  of  Spinoza;  and  even  in  the  present  passage  the 
apparently  pantheistic  hypothesis  is  represented  as  the  result  not  of  thought,  but 
of  an  inability  to  think.  Still  it  is  to  be  regretted  that  the  distinguished  author 
should  have  used  language  liable  to  be  misunderstood  in  this  respect,  especially 
as  it  scarcely  accords  with  the  general  principles  of  his  owu  system. 


LECT.  II.  NOTES.  263 

philosopher,  I  cannot  help  thinking  that  a  different  representation  would 
have  been  more  in  harmony  with  the  main  principles  of  his  own  system. 
We  cannot  conceive  creation  at  all,  neither  as  a  springing  of  nothing  into 
something,  nor  as  an  evolution  of  the  relative  from  the  absolute;  for  the 
simple  reason  that  the  first  terms  of  both  hypotheses,  nothing  and  the 
absolute,  are  equally  beyond  the  reach  of  human  conception.  But  while 
creation,  as  a  process  in  the  act  of  being  accomplished,  is  equally  inconceiv 
able  on  every  hypothesis,  creation,  as  a  result  already  completed,  presents 
no  insurmountable  difficulty  to  human  thought  if  we  consent  to  abandon 
the  attempt  to  apprehend  the  absolute.  There  is  no  difficulty  in  conceiv 
ing  that  the  amount  of  existence  in  the  universe  may  at  one  time  be  rep 
resented  by  A,  and  at  another  by  A  -f-  B :  though  we  are  equally  unable 
to  conceive  how  B  can  come  out  of  nothing,  and  how  A,  or  any  part  of  A, 
can  become  B  while  A  remains  undiminished.  But  the  result,  no  less 
than  the  process,  becomes  self-contradictory,  when  we  attempt  to  conceive 
A  as  absolute  and  infinite;  for  in  that  case  A-\-B  must  be  something 
greater  than  infinity. 

NOTE  XXXIV.,  p.  83. 

"Pantheism  teaches  that  all  is  good,  for  all  is  only  one;  and  that  every 
appearance  of  what  we  call  wrong  is  only  an  empty  delusion.  Hence  its 
disturbing  influence  upon  the  life;  for  here,  —  turn  about' language  as  we 
may,  and  attach  ourselves  as  we  will  to  the  faith  that  everywhere  comes 
forth  through  the  voice  of  conscience,  —  yet  at  bottom,  if  we  remain  true  to 
the  destructive  principle  of  the  pantheistic  doctrine,  we  must  do  away  with 
and  declare  null  and  void,  the  eternal  distinction  between  good  and  evil, 
between  right  and  wrong." — F.  Schlegel,  Utber  die  Sprache  und  Wcisheit 
der  Jndier,  b.  IH.  c.  2.  ( Werke,  VIII.  p.  324).  "  If  it  is  God  who  thinks  in 
me,  my  thought  is  absolute;  not  only  am  I  unable  to  think  otherwise 
than  I  do  think,  .  .  .  but  I  can  make  no  choice  in  my  conceptions,  approve 
or  search  after  some,  reject  and  shun  others,  all  being  necessary  and  per 
fect,  all  being  divine;  in  fine,  I  become  a  machine  for  thinking,  an  intelli 
gent  machine,  but  irresponsible." —  Bartholmess,  Histoire  des  doctrines  rd'uj- 
ieuses  de  la  philosophie  moderne,  Introduction,  p.  xxxvii.  These  necessary 
consequences  of  Pantheism  are  fully  exhibited  by  Spinoza,  Eihica,  P.  I. 
Prop.  20;  P.  II.  Props.  32,  33,  34,  35;  P.  IV.  Prop.  64.  Hegel  (  Werke,  XI. 
pp.  0-3,  208,  390)  endeavors,  not  very  successfully,  to  defend  his  own*  phi 
losophy  from  the  charge  of  Pantheism  and  its  consequences.  His  defence 
amounts  to  no  more  than  the  assertion  that  God  cannot  be  identified  Avith 
the  universe  of  finite  objects,  in  a  system  in  which  finite  objects  have  no 
real  existence.  Thus  explained,  the  system  is  identical  with  Pantheism 


264  &  0  T  E  S  .  LECT.  II. 

in  the  strictest  sense  of  the  term.    All  that  is  proved  is,  that  it  cannot  with 
equal  propriety  be  called  Pantatheism. 

NOTE  XXXV.,  p.  83. 

"  The  dialectic  intellect,  by  the  exertion  of  its  own  powers  exclusively, 
can  lead  us  to  a  general  affirmation  of  the  supreme  reality  of  an  absolute 
being.  But  here  it  stops.  It  is  utterly  incapable  of  communicating  in 
sight  or  conviction  concerning  the  existence  or  possibility  of  the  world,  as 
different  from  Deity.  It  finds  itself  constrained  to  identify,  more  truly  to 
confound,  the  Creator  with  the  aggregate  of  his  creatures,  and,  cutting  the 
knot  which  it  cannot  untwist,  to  deny  altogether  the  reality  of  all  finite 
existence,  and  then  to  shelter  itself  from  its  own  dissatisfaction,  its  own 
importunate  queries,  in  the  wretched  evasion  that  of  nothings  no  solution 
can  be  required :  till  pain  haply,  and  anguish,  and  remorse,  with  bitter 
scoff  and  moody  laughter  inquire,  —  Are  we  then  indeed  nothings?  —  till 
through  every  organ  of  sense  nature  herself  asks,  —  How  and  whence  did 
this  sterile  and  pertinacious  nothing  acquire  its  plural  number? —  Unde, 
quceso,  hcec  nihili  in  nihila  tarn  portentosa  transnihilatio?  —  and  lastly:  —  What 
is  that  inward  mirror,  in  and  for  which  these  nothings  have  at  least  relative 
existence?"  — Coleridge,  The  Friend,  vol.  III.  p.  213. 

NOTE  XXXVI.,  p.  83. 

The  limitation,  speculative  Atheism,  is  necessary;  for  the  denial  of  the 
Infinite  does  not  in  every  case  constitute  practical  Atheism.  For  it  is  not 
under  the  form  of  the  Infinite  that  the  idea  of  God  is  distinctly  presented 
in  worship;  and  it  is  possible  to  adore  a  superior  Being,  without  pos 
itively  asking  how  far  that  superiority  extends.  It  is  only  when  we  are 
able  to  investigate  the  problem  of  the  relation  between  the  infinite  and  the 
finite,  and  to  perceive  that  the  latter  cannot  be  regarded  as  expressing  the 
true  idea  of  the  Deity,  that  the  denial  of  the  infinite  becomes  atheism  in 
speculation.  On  the  alternative  between  Christianity  and  Atheism,  some 
excellent  remarks  will  be  found  in  the  Restoration  of  Belief,  p.  248. 

NOTE  XXXVII.,  p.  84. 

"Much  stress  is  wont  to  be  laid  upon  the  limits  of  thought,  and  it  is  as 
serted  that  the  limit  cannot  be  transcended.  In  this  assertion  lies  the 
unconsciousness,  that  even  in  fixing  somewhat  as  limit,  it  has  already  been 
transcended.  For  a  determination,  a  bound,  is  determined  as  limit,  only 


LECT.  II.  NOTES  265 

in  opposition  to  its  Other  (alterum),  its  Unlimited;  thcOlher  ^Jhe  correlate), 
of  a  limit  is  something  beyond  it."  —  Hegel,  Logik  (Werke,  III.  p.  130). 
Compare  Encyklopddie,  §  60  (  Werke,  VI.,  p.  121).  In  maintaining  that 
a  limit  as  such  always  implies  something  beyond,  and,  consequently, 
that  the  notion  of  a  limited  universe  is  self-contradictory,  Hegel  is 
unquestionably  right;  but  he  is  wrong  in  attempting  to  infer  from 
thence  the  non-limitation  of  thought.  For  that  which  is  limited  is  not 
necessarily  limited  by  something  of  the  same  kind;  —  nay,  the  very  con 
ception  of  kinds  is  itself  a  limitation.  Hence  the  consciousness  that 
thought  is  limited  by  something  beyond  itself,  by  no  means  implies  that 
thought  itself  transcends  that  limit.  A  prisoner  chained  up  feels  that  his 
motion  is  limited,  by  his  inability  to  move  into  the  space  which  he  sees  or 
imagines  beyond  the  length  of  his  chain.  On  Hegel's  principles,  he  ought 
to  know  his  inability  by  actually  moving  into  it. 

NOTE  XXXVIII.,  p.  84. 

These  opposite  limitations  fall  under  the  general  law  of  the  Conditioned 
enunciated  by  Sir  "\V.  Hamilton.  "  The  mind  is  astricted  to  think  in  cer 
tain  forms ;  and,  under  these,  thought  is  possible  only  in  the  conditioned 
interval  between  two  unconditioned  contradictory  extremes  or  poles,  each 
of  which  is  altogether  inconceivable,  but  of  which,  on  the  principle  of  Ex 
cluded  Middle,  the  one  or  the  other  is  necessarily  true."  1  The  lamented 
author  has  left  us  only  a  few  fragmentary  specimens  of  the  application  of 
this  canon  to  the  vexed  questions  of  metaphysical  speculation,  and  the 
principal  one  of  these,  in  some  of  its  details,  may  be  open  to  objections; 
but  the  truth  of  the  principle  itself  is  unquestionable;  and  its  value,  rightly 
applied,  in  confining  the  inquiries  of  philosophy  within  their  legitimate 
boundaries,  can  hardly  be  estimated  too  highly. 

NOTE  XXXIX.,  p.  84. 

"Every  finite  is,  by  virtue  of  its  notion,  bounded  by  its  opposite;  and 
absolute  finiteness  is  a  self-contradictory  notion."  — Fichte,  Grundlage  der 
gesammten  Wissenschqftslehre  (Werke,  I.,  p.  185). 

NOTE  XL.,  p.  87. 

Religion  innerhalb  der  Grenzen  der  blossen  Vernunfl,  p.  98,  122,  137.  For 
the  influence  of  Kant  on  the  rationalist  theology,  see  Rosenkranz,  Geschichte 

1  Discussions,  p.  618. 

23 


266  NOTES.  LECT.  II. 

der  Kanfschen^Philosophie,  b.  III.  cap.  2.  Amand  Saintes,  Histoire  du 
Rationalisme  en  Allemagne,  1.  II.  ch.  n.  Kahnis,  History  of  German  Pro 
testantism,  translated  by  Meyer,  p.  107. 

NOTE  XLL,  p.  87. 

Paulus,  in  the  preface  to  his  Leben  Jesu,  expressly  adopts,  though  with 
out  naming  the  author,  Kant's  theory,  that  miracles  are  indifferent  to 
religion,  and  that  the  whole  essence  of  Christianity  consists  in  morality. 
Consistently  with  these  principles,  he  maintains  (§2)  that  the  historical 
inquirer  can  admit  no  event  as  credible  which  cannot  be  explained  by 
natural  causes.  The  entire  details  of  the  evangelical  narrative  are  ex 
plained  by  this  method.  The  miracles  of  healing  were  performed  by  med 
ical  skill,  which  Christ  imparted  to  his  disciples,  and  thus  was  enabled  to 
heal,  not  by  a  word,  but  by  deputy.  Thus  he  coolly  translates  the  words 
of  the  centurion,  Matt.  viii.  8,  "  If  He  would  only  give  an  order  to  one  of 
His  (disciples),  to  provide  in  His  name  for  the  healing."  The  feeding  of 
the  five  thousand  consisted  merely  in  persuading  the  richer  travellers  to 
share  their  provisions  with  the  poorer.  The  stilling  of  the  tempest  was 
effected  by  steering  round  a  point  which  cut  off  the  wind.  Lazarus,  and 
the  widow's  son  of  Nain,  were  both  cases  of  premature  interment.  Our 
Lord's  own  death  was  merely  a  swoon,  from  which  he  was  restored  by  the 
warmth  of  the  sepulchre  and  the  stimulating  effect  of  the  spices.  Such 
are  a  few  specimens  of  historical  inquiry.  The  various  explanations  of 
Paulus  are  examined  in  detail,  and  completely  refuted  by  Strauss.  The 
natural  hypothesis  had  to  be  annihilated,  to  make  way  for  the  mythical. 

NOTE  XLIL,  p.  87. 

Wegscheider,  though  he  expressly  rejects  Kant's  allegorizing  interpre 
tations  of  Scripture  (see  Institutlones  Theoloyice,  §  25),  agrees  with  him  in 
maintaining  the  supreme  authority  of  reason  in  all  religious  questions, 
and  in  accommodating  all  religious  doctrines  to  Ethical  precepts  (Prcef.  p. 
viii.  ix.).  Accordingly,  in  the  place  of  the  allegory,  he  adopts  the  con 
venient  theory  of  adaptation  to  the  prejudices  of  the  age ;  by  which  a  critic 
is  enabled  at  once  to  set  aside  all  doctrines  which  do  not  harmonize  with 
his  theory.  Among  the  doctrines  thus  rejected,  as  powerless  for  the 
true  end  of  religion,  and  useless  or  even  prejudicial  to  piety,  are  those  of 
the  Trinity,  the  Atonement,  the  Corruption  of  human  nature,  Justification, 
and  the  Resurrection  of  the  body.  See  §  51. 


LECT.  II.  NOTES.  267 


NOTE  XLIIL,  p.  87. 

See  his  Gnind-iind-Gloubens-Sut~edcr  Evangetisch-Protestantischen  Kirche, 
p.  70  (2nd  edition).  This  work  of  Ruhr  was  principally  directed  against 
the  Lutheran  Symbolical  books ;  but  the  Catholic  Creeds  are  also  included 
in  his  sweeping  condemnations.  Of  the  Apostles'  Creed  he  observes : 
"  Our  age  needs  a  more  logically  correct,  and  a  more  comprehensive  sur 
vey  of  the  pure  evangelical  faith  than  is  afforded  by  the  so-called  Apostles' 
Creed,  which  is  good  for  its  immediate  and  ordinary  purpose,  but  too 
short,  too  aphoristic,  and  too  historical  for  that  which  is  here  proposed." 
(p.  49.)  Of  the  Nicene  and  Athanasian  Creeds  he  remarks  in  a  note: 
"  The  Nieeno-Constantinopolitan  and  the  pseudo-Athanasian  Creeds,  with 
their  decidedly  anti-scriptural  dogmas,  are  here  altogether  out  of  the 
question,  however  much  they  were  admitted  by  the  reformers,  in  all  hon 
esty  and  faith,  as  truly  scriptural."  Ruhr  agrees  with  Kant  in  separating 
the  historical  facts  of  Christianity  from  the  religion  itself  (p.  157),  and  in 
maintaining  that  morality  is  the  only  mode  of  honoring  God  (p.  56).  His 
proposed  creed,  from  which  everything  "historical"  is  studiously  ex 
cluded,  runs  as  follows : 

"  There  is  one  true  God,  proclaimed  to  us  by  his  only-begotten  Son,  Jesus 
Christ.  To  this  God,  as  the  most  perfect  of  all  Beings,  as  the  Creator, 
Sustainer,  and  Governor  of  the  world,  and  as  the  Father  and  Instructor  of 
men  and  of  all  rational  spirits,  the  deepest  veneration  is  due.  This  vener 
ation  is  best  rendered  by  active  striving  after  virtue  and  righteousness,  by 
zealous  control  of  the  inclinations  and  passions  of  our  sensual  and  evilly- 
disposed  nature,  and  by  honest,  entire  fulfilment  of  our  duty,  according  to 
the  exalted  example  of  Jesus,  whereby  we  may  assure  ourselves  of  the  aid 
of  his  divine  Spirit.  In  the  consciousness  of  the  filial  relation  into  which 
AVC  thereby  enter  with  him,  we  may,  in  earthly  need,  reckon  with  confi 
dence  on  his  fatherly  help,  in  the  feeling  of  our  moral  weakness  and 
unworthiness,  upon  his  grace  and  mercy  assured  to  us  through  Christ,  and 
in  the  moment  of  death  be  assured  that  we  shall  continue  to  exist  immor 
tally,  and  receive  a  recompense  in  a  better  life." 

The  celebrated  Brief e  uber  den  Rationalismus,  by  the  same  author,  have  at 
least  the  merit  of  being  an  honest  and  logical  exposition  of  Rationalist 
principles  and  their  consequences,  without  disguise  or  compromise.  The 
commendation,  however,  to  which  in  this  respect  the  work  is  partly 
entitled,  cannot  be  extended  to  the  concluding  letter,  in  which  the  author 
endeavors  to  establish,  for  himself  and  his  fellow  rationalists,  the  right  to 
discharge  the  spiritual  functions,  and  subscribe  to  the  confessions,  of  a 
church  whose  doctrines  they  disbelieve;  and  even  to  make  use  of  their 
position  to  unsettle  the  faith  of  the  young  committed  to  their  instruction. 


268  NOTES.  LECT.  II. 


NOTE  XLIV.,  p.  87. 

The  character  of  Hegel's  philosophy  in  this  respect  is  sufficiently  shown 
by  Strauss,  Streitschriften,  Heft  III.  p.  57,  sqq. 


NOTE  XLV.,  p.  87. 

Vatke's  Religion  des  Alien  Testamentes,  forms  the  first  part  of  his  BibUscJte 
Theoloyie  idssenschafllich  daryestelll;  Berlin,  1835.  In  the  Introduction 
(§  7,  12,  13)  the  author  lays  down  a  law  of  the  development  of  religion  as 
a  process  of  the  infinite  spirit  in  self-revelation,  according  to  the  principles 
of  the  Hegelian  philosophy.  As  a  consequence  of  this  law  he  maintains 
that  it  is  impossible  for  an  individual  to  raise  himself,  even  by  the  aid  of 
divine  revelation,  above  the  spiritual  position  of  his  age,  or  for  a  nation  to 
rise  or  fall  from  its  normal  stage  of  religious  cultivation  (pp.  87, 181).  By 
this  canon  the  entire  narrative  of  Scripture  is  made  to  stand  or  fall.  The 
account  of  a  primitive  revelation  and  subsequent  alienation  from  God, 
must  be  rejected,  because  the  human  consciousness  must  attain  to  perfec 
tion  through  a  succession  of  progressive  stages  (p.  102).  The  book  of 
Genesis  has  no  historical- value;  and  we  cannot  decide  whether  the  patri 
archs  before  Moses  had  any  knowledge  of  the  one  true  God  (pp.  180,  184). 
Moses  himself,  as  represented  in  the  scriptural  account,  is  altogether 
inconceivable ;  for  he  appears  at  a  period  when,  according  to  the  laws  of 
historical  development,  the  time  was  not  yet  ripe  for  him  (p.  183).  Much 
of  the  history  of  Moses  must  be  regarded  as  a  mythus,  invented  by  the 
priests  at  a  later  period  (p.  180).  The  political  institutions  attributed  to 
him  could  not  possibly  have  been  founded  by  him  (p.  211).  The  ceremo 
nial  laws  arc  such  as  could  neither  have  been  discovered  by  an  individual 
nor  made  knoivn  by  divine  revelation  (p.  218).  The  Passover  was  originally 
a  feast  of  the  sun,  in  celebration  of  his  entering  into  the  sign  Aries ;  which 
fully  accounts  for  the  offering  of  a  male  lamb  (p.  492).  As  regards  the 
decalogue,  the  second  commandment  must  be  considered  as  an  interpola 
tion  of  a  later  date;  for  it  implies  a  higher  degree  of  abstraction  than 
could  have  been  reached  in  the  Mosaic  age  (p.  234).  The  lapses  into 
idolatry  recorded  in  the  book  of  Judges,  are  highly  improbable;  for 
a  whole  people  cannot  fall  back  from  a  higher  to  a  lower  state  of  relig 
ious  culture  (p.  181).  The  books  of  Samuel  betray  their  legendary 
origin  by  the  occurrence  of  round  numbers,  and  by  the  significant  names 
of  the  first  three  kings  (p.  289).  The  wisdom  attributed  to  Solomon  is 
irreconcilable  with  his  subsequent  idolatry;  and  the  account  must  there 
fore  be  regarded  as  legendary  (p.  309).  Such  are  a  few  of  the  results  of 


LECT.  II.  NOTES.  269 

the  so-called  philosophy  of  history,  exercised  on  the  narrative  of  Scrip 
ture.  The  book  is  valuable  in  one  respect,  and  in  one  only.  It  shows  the 
reckless  manner  in  which  rationalism  finds  it  necessary  to  deal  with  the 
sacred  text,  before  it  can  be  accommodated  to  the  antisupernatural 
hypothesis.  To  those  who  believe  that  a  record  of  facts  as  they  are  is 
more  trustworthy  than  a  theory  of  facts  as  they  ought  to  be  on  philo 
sophical  principles,  the  very  features  which  the  critic  is  compelled  to 
reject,  become  additional  evidence  of  the  truth  of  the  scripture  narrative. 

NOTE  XLVL,  p.  87. 

The  Hegelian  element  of  Strauss's  Leben  Jesu  is  briefly  exhibited  at  the 
end  of  the  book  (§  150).  The  body  of  the  work  is  mainly  occupied  Avith 
various  cavils,  some  of  them  of  the  very  minutest  philosophy,  designed  to 
invalidate  the  historical  character  of  the  Gospel  narratives.  Among  these 
precious  morsels  of  criticism,  we  meet  with  such  objections  as  the  follow 
ing.  That  the  name  of  the  angel  Gabriel  is  of  Hebrew  origin  (§  17). 
That  the  angel,  instead  of  inflicting  dumbness  on  Zacharias,  ought  to  have 
merely  reprimanded  him  (ibid.).  That  a  real  angel  would  not  have  pro 
claimed  the  advent  of  the  Messiah  in  language  so  strictly  Jewish  (§  25). 
That  the  appearance  of  the  star  to  the  magi  would  have  strengthened  tho 
popular  belief  in  the  false  science  of  astrology  (§  34).  That  John  the 
Baptist,  being  an  ascetic,  and  therefore  necessarily  prejudiced  and  narrow- 
minded,  could  not  have  considered  himself  inferior  to  one  who  did 
not  practise  similar  mortifications  (§  30).  That  Jesus  could  not  have  sub 
mitted  to  the  rite  of  baptism,  because  that  rite  symbolized  a  future  Mes 
siah  (§  49).  That  if  there  is  a  personal  devil,  he  cannot  take  a  visible 
form  (§  54).  That  it  is  improbable  that  Jesus,  when  he  read  in  the  syna 
gogue,  should  have  lighted  on  an  apposite  passage  of  the  prophet  Isaiah 
(§  58).  That  Jesus  could  not  have  known  that  the  woman  of  Samaria 
had  had  five  husbands,  because  it  is  not  probable  that  each  of  them  had 
left  a  distinct  image  in  her  mind,  and  because  a  minute  knowledge  of  the 
history  of  individuals  is  degrading  to  the  prophetic  dignity  (§  09).  That 
it  is  impossible  to  understand  "how  he,  whose  vocation  had  reference  to 
the  depths  of  the  human  heart,  should  be  tempted  to  occupy  himself  with 
the  fish-frequented  depths  of  the  waters"  (§  71).  That  Jesus  could  not 
have  ridden  into  Jerusalem  on  an  ass  whereon  never  man  sat,  because 
unbroken  asses  are  difficult  to  manage  (§  110).  That  the  resurrection  of 
the  dead  is  impossible,  because  the  inferior  principles,  whose  work  is 
corruption,  will  not  be  inclined  to  surrender  back  the  dominion  of  the 
body  to  its  former  master,  the  soul  (§  140).  That  the  ascension  of  Christ 

23* 


270  NOTES.  LECT.  II. 

is  impossible,  because  a  body  which  has  flesh  and  bones  cannot  be  quali 
fied  for  a  heavenly  abode ;  because  it  cannot  liberate  itself  from  the  laws 
of  gravity ;  and  because  it  is  childish  to  regard  heaven  as  a  definite  local 
ity  (§  142).  — It  is  not  creditable  to  the  boasted  enlightenment  of  the  age, 
that  a  work  which  can  seriously  urge  such  petty  quibbles  as  these  should 
have  obtained  so  much  reputation  and  influence.  In  studying  the  philos 
ophy  which  has  given  birth  to  such  consequences,  we  see  a  new  verifica 
tion  of  the  significant  remark  of  Clemens  Alexandrinus :  "  The  philoso 
phy,  which  is  according  to  the  divine  tradition,  establishes  and  confirms 
providence;  take  this  away,  and  the  Saviour's  economy  appears  to  be  a 
myth."1  "Strauss,  the  Hegelian  theologian,"  says  Sir  W.  Hamilton, 
"sees  in  Christianity  only  a  mytJius.  Naturally:  for  his  Hegelian  '  Idea,' 
itself  a  myth,  and  confessedly  finding  itself  in  everything,  of  course  finds 
in  anything  a  myth."  2  As  the  labors  of  Strauss  on  the  Gospel  narratives 
have  been  sometimes  compared  to  those  of  Niebuhr  on  the  history  of 
Rome,  it  may  be  instructive  to  peruse  the  opinion  of  the  great  historian 
on  the  cognate  theories  of  a  few  years'  earlier  date.  "  In  my  opinion," 
writes  Niebuhr  in  1818,  "  he  is  not  a  Protestant  Christian,  who  does  not 
receive  the  historical  facts  of  Christ's  earthly  life,  in  their  literal  accepta 
tion,  with  all  their  miracles,  as  equally  authentic  with  any  event.recorded  in 
history,  and  whose  belief  in  them  is  not  as  firm  and  tranquil  as  his  belief 
in  the  latter;  who  has  not  the  utmost  faith  in  the  articles  of  the  Apostles' 
Creed,  taken  in  their  grammatical  sense;  who  does  not  consider  every 
doctrine  and  every  precept  of  the  New  Testament  as  undoubted  divine 
revelation,  in  the  sense  of  the  Christians  of  the  first  century,  who  knew 
nothing  of  a  Theopneustia.  Moreover,  a  Christianity  after  the  fashion  of 
the  modern  philosophers  and  pantheists,  without  a  personal  God,  Avithout 
immortality,  without  human  individuality,  Avithout  historical  faith,  is  no 
Christianity  at  all  to  me;  though  it  may  be  very  intellectual,  very  ingen 
ious  philosophy.  I  have  often  said  that  I  do  not  know  what  to  do  with  a 
metaphysical  God,  and  that  I  will  have  none  but  the  God  of  the  Bible, 
who  is  heart  to  heart  with  us. "3 

Niebuhr  did  not  live  to  witness  the  publication  of  the  Leben  Jesu ;  but 
the  above  passage  is  as  appropriate  as  if  it  had  been  part  of  an  actual 
review  of  that  work. 

NOTE  XL VII. ,  p.  87. 

With  Feuerbach's  Wesen  des  Christenthums  I  am  only  acquainted 
through  the  French  translation  by  M.  Ewerbeck,  which  forms  the  prin- 

1  Stromata,  I.  ii.  p.  296.  2  Discussions,  p.  787  [696,  ed.  1852]. 

3  Life  and  Letters  of  B.  G.  Niebuhr  vol.  II.  p.  123. 


LECT.  H.  NOTES.  271 

cipal  portion  of  the  volume  entitled  Qu'est-ce  que  la  Religion  cFapres  la 
nouvdle  Philosophic  Allemande.  The  following  extracts  will  sufficiently 
show  the  character  of  the  work.  "The  grand  mystery,  or  rather  the 
grand  secret  of  religion,  is  here:  man  objectifies  his  being,  and  after 
having  objectified  it,  he  makes  himself  the  object  of  this  new  subject." 
(p.  129.)  "  God  is  the  notion,  the  personified  idea  of  personality.  He  is 
the  apotheosis  of  the  human  person,  the  J  without  the  Thou,  the  subjec 
tivity  separate  from  the  universe;  the  self-sufficient  egoity-"  (p.  219.) 
"  God  is  the  notion  of  kind,  but  the  notion  personified  and  individualized 
in  its  turn ;  He  is  the  notion  of  kind  or  its  essence,  and  this  essence  as 
universal  entity,  as  comprising  all  possible  perfections,  as  possessing  all 
human  qualities  cleared  of  their  limitations."  (p.  271.)  "  Where  religion 
expresses  the  relation  between  man  and  the  human  essence,  it  is  good 
and  humanitary.  AVhere  it  expresses  the  relation  between  man  and 
the  human  essence  changed  to  a  supernatural  being,  it  is  illogical,  false, 
and  carries  in  it  the  germ  of  all  those  horrors  which  have  been  desolating 
society  for  sixty  centuries."  (p.  340.)  "  Atheism  is  the  fruit  of  the  contra 
diction  in  the  existence  of  God we  are  told  that  God  exists  really 

and  not  really  at  the  same  time,  we  have  then  a  perfect  right  to  cut  the 
matter  short  with  such  an  absurd  existence,  and  to  say :  there  is  no  God." 
(p.  350.)  "From  the  preceding  we  infer,  that  the  divine  personality, 
of  which  man  avails  himself  to  attribute  his  own  ideas  and  his  own 
qualities  to  a  superhuman  being,  is  nothing  but  the  human  personality 
externalized  to  the  J.  It  is  this  psychological  act  which  has  become 
the  basis  of  the  speculative  doctrine  of  Hegel,  which  teaches,  that  the 
consciousness  that  man  has  of  God  is  the  consciousness  that  God  has  of 
man."  (p.  390.)  The  occasional  notes  which  the  translator  has  added  to 
this  work  are,  if  possible,  still  more  detestable  than  the  text.  So  much 
disregard  of  truth  and  decency  as  is  shown  in  some  of  his  remarks  on 
Christianity  has  probably  seldom  been  compressed  into  the  same  compass. 

NOTE  XL VIII.,  p.  89. 

"  Christ,  who  taught  his  disciples,  and  us  in  them,  how  to  pray,  pro 
pounded  not  the  knowledge  of  God,  though  without  that  he  could  not 
hear  us;  neither  represented  he  his  power,  though  without  that  he  cannot 
help  us ;  but  comprehended  all  in  this  relation,  When  ye  pray,  say,  Our 
Father." —  Pearson  on  the  Creed,  article  I. 


272  NOTES.  LECT.  III. 


LECTURE    III. 

NOTE  I.,  p.  93. 

"  Whatever  is  for  us  something  is  so  only  so  far  as  it  is  not  something 
else ;  all  position  is  possible  only  by  negation, ;  as  indeed  the  word  itself 
define  means  nothing  else  but  limit."—  Fichte,  Gerichtl'uhe  Verantwortung 
(  Werke,V.  p.  265).  "The  Finite  exists  in  relation  to  its  Otiter  (the  other 
of  it,  alterum),  which  is  its  negation,  and  puts  itself  there  as  its  limit." 
"Hegel,  EncyU.  §  28  (  Werke,  VI.  p.  63).  Compare  Plotinus,  Enn.  V.  1. 
III.  c.  12.  "But  that  is  the  One  itself,  without  the  Something  (i.  e.  not 
some  one  thing);  for  if  it  were  the  some  one  thing,  then  it  would  not  be 
the  One  itself;  for  the  One  itself  is  prior  to  the  Something." — Enn.  VI.  1. 
VII.  c.  39.  "  For  the  Intelligence,  if  it  is  to  exercise  intelligence,  must 

always  apprehend  difference  and  identity." —  Spinoza,   Epist.  50. 

"  This  determination,  therefore,  does  not  belong  to  the  (or  a)  thing  in  its 
own  csse,  but,  on  the  contrary,  belongs  to  its  non-esse."  The  canon,  unde 
niable  from  a  human  point  of  view,  that  all  consciousness  is  limitation, 
seems  to  have  had  some  influence  on  modern  philosophical  theories  con 
cerning  the  Divine  Nature.  Thus  Hegel  maintains  that  God  must  become 
limited  to  be  conscious  of  himself,1  and  defines  Religion  as  the  Divine 
Spirit's  knowledge  of  himself,  by  means  of  the  finite  Spirit.2 


NOTE  II.,  p.  94. 

"  For  being  limited  (finite)  ourselves,  it  would  be  absurd  for  us  to  make 
some  determination  of  the  infinite,  and  thus  endeavor  to  limit  it,  as  it  were, 
and  comprehend  it."— Descartes,  Pnncipia,  1. 26.  "  The  second  reason  of 
our  short  and  imperfect  notions  of  the  Deity  is,  the  Infinity  of  it.  For  this 
we  must  observe,  That  we  can  perfectly  know  and  comprehend  nothing,  but 
as  it  is  represented  to  us  under  some  certain  Bounds  and  Limitations.  .  .  . 
Upon  which  account,  what  a  loss  must  we  needs  be  at,  in  understanding 
or  knowing  the  Divine  Nature,  when  the  very  way  of  our  knowing  seems 
to  carry  in  it  something  opposite  to  the  thing  known.  For  the  way  of 
knowing  is  by  defining,  limiting,  and  determining;  and  the  thing  known 
is  that  of  which  there  neither  are,  nor  can  be,  any  Bounds,  Limits,  Defini 
tions,  or  Determinations." — South,  Animadversions  upon  Sherlock,  ch.  II.  p. 
55.  ed.  1693?  "All  our  thinking  is  a  limiting;  and  exactly  in  this  respect 

1  Werke,  XI.  p.  193.  2  Ibid.,  p.  200. 


LECT.  HI.  NOTES.  273 

is  it  called  apprehending;  i.  e.,  comprehending  something  from  out  of  a 
mass  of  dcterminable ;  so  that  there  always  may  remain  something  outside 
the  boundary -line,  which  has  not  been  included  (iinprehended)  within  it, — 
and  so  does  not  belong  to  that  which  has  been  apprehended/' — Fichte, 
Gerichtliche  Verantwartung  (  Werke,  Y.  p.  2(35).  "What  I  apprehend"  (or 
have  an  idea  of)  becomes  finite  by  my  mere  apprehending,  and  this,  even 
by  endless  ascending,  never  comes  to  the  infinite."— Fichte,  Bcstimmung  des 
Jli'nschen  (  Werke,  II.  p.  304).  "  The  subject  without  predicate  is,  what  in 
the  appearance  the  thing  is  without  attributes,  what  the  thing  is  in  itself,  an 
empty,  undetermined  ground ;  it  is  the  notion  in  itself,  which  only  in  the 
predicate'  gets  a  distinction  and  definiteness." —  Hegel,  Logik,  Th.  II. 
(  Werke,  Y.  p.  70).  Compare  FhibsopJiie  der  Religion  (  Werke,  XL  p.  30). 
EncyTcbpddie  §  28,  29  ( Werke,  YI.  p.  05). 


NOTE  III.,  p.  94. 

The  opposite  sides  of  this  contradiction  are  indicated  in  the  following 
passages.  Aristotle,  Phys.  III.  6,  [10,]  13 :  "  The  Infinite  ....  is  the  whole 
potentially,  but  not  actually.".  .  .  .  Compare  Metaph.  viii.  fix.  Ed.  Gul. 
Duval,  Paris, .  1629]  8,  16 :  "  That,  therefore,  which  is  capable  of  being, 
may  both  be  and  not  be;  the  same  thing,  therefore,  is  capable  both  of 
being  and  of  not  being.  But  that,  which  is  capable  of  not  being,  may 
not  be;  and  that,  which  may  not  be,  is  corruptible Nothing,  there 
fore,  of  things  simply  incorruptible,  is  potentially  simply  being."  For  a 
full  discussion  of  the  distinction  between  potentiality  and  actuality  (the 
8vva/j.ts  and  eVreAe'xeja  or  eW/ryeja  of  Aristotle),  see  Trendelenburg  on 
Arist.  De  Anima,  p.  295.  Compare  Arist.  Metaph.  viii.  [ix.  Ed.  Gul.  Duval.] 
6,  2:  "  It  is  actuality  when  a  thing  is  really  so,  not  as  when  we  say  poten 
tially.  For  we  say  potentially  as  (of)  the  Hermes  in  the  wood,  and  the  half 
in  the  whole,  because  it  might  be  taken  out;  and  so,  too,  a  learned  man, 
of  one  who  is  not  really  versed  in  learning,  if  he  have  the  capacity  for 
learning.".  .  .  .  This  distinction  plays  a  part  in  the  controversy  between 
Bramhall  and  Hobbes,  the  former  of  whom  says,  "  The  nearer  that  any 
thing  comes  to  the  essence  of  God,  the  more  remote  it  is  from  our  appre 
hension.  But  shall  we,  therefore,  make  potentialities  and  successive 
duration,  and  former  and  latter,  or  a  part  without  a  part  (as  they  say),  to 
be  in  God?  Because  we  are  not  able  to  understand  clearly  the  Divine 
perfection,  we  must  not  therefore  attribute  any  imperfection  to  Him." x 
To  this  Hobbes  replies,  "  Nor  do  I  understand  what  derogation  it  can  be 
to  the  divine  perfection,  to  attribute  to  it  potentiality,  that  is,  in  English, 

1  Works,  vol.  IV.  p.  158. 


274  NOTES.  LECT.  III. 

power." l  "  By  potentiality,"  retorts  Bramhall,  "  he  understandeth  '  power ' 
or  might;  others  understand  possibility  or  indetermination.  Is  not  he 
likely  to  confute  the  Schoolmen  to  good  purpose  ?"  2  Hobbes  concludes 
by  saying,  "  There  is  no  such  word  as  potentiality  in  the  Scriptures,  nor 
in  any  author  of  the  Latin  tongue.  It  is  found  only  in  School  divinity, 
as  a  word  of  art,  or  rather  as  a  word  of  craft,  to  amaze  and  puzzle  the 
laity." 3  This  charge  may  be  answered  in  the  words  of  Trendelenburg. 
"  In  unfolding  these  notions,  drawn  forth  from  the  very  recess  of  philoso 
phy,  we  are  forced  into  such  straits  by  the  laxness  and  the  poverty  of  the 
Latin  tongue  in  matters  pertaining  to  philosophy,  that  we  must  have 
recourse,  for  the  sake  of  perspicuity,  to  scholastic  terms."  4 

But  to  go  from  the  word  to  the  thing.  The  contradiction  thus  involved 
in  the  notion  of  the  Infinite  has  given  rise  to  two  opposite  representations 
of  it;  the  one,  as  the  affirmation  of  all  reality;  the  other,  as  the  negation 
of  all  reality.  The  older  metaphysicians  endeavored  to  exhaust  the 
infinite  by  an  endless  addition  of  predicates;  hence  arose  the  favorite 
representation  of  God,  as  the  Ens  perfcctissimum,  or  sum  of  all  realities, 
which  prevailed  in  the  Wolfian  Philosophy,  and  was  accepted  by  Kant.5 
On  the  other  hand,  the  post-Kantian  metaphysicians  perceived  clearly 
that  all  predication  is  necessarily  limitation,  and  that  to  multiply  attri 
butes  is  merely  to  represent  the  infinite  under  a  variety  of  finite  determi 
nations.  The  consummation  of  this  point  of  view  was  attained  in  the 
principle  of  Hegel,, that  pure  being  is  pure  nothing,  and  that  all  deter 
minate  being  (Daseyn)  is  necessarily  limited.6  Hence  his  constant  asser 
tion  that  God  cannot  be  represented  by  predicates.7  Both  schools  of  phi 
losophy  are  right  in  what  they  deny,  and  wrong  in  what  they  affirm. 
The  earlier  metaphysicians  were  right  in  assuming  that  thought  is  only 
possible  by  means  of  definite  conceptions;  but  they  were  wrong  in  sup 
posing  that  any  multiplication  of  such  conceptions  can  amount  to  a  repre 
sentation  of  the  infinite.  The  later  metaphysicians  were  right  in  opposing 
this  error;  but  they  fell  into  the  opposite  extreme  of  imagining  that  by 
the  removal  of  determinations  the  act  of  thought  and  its  object  could 
become  infinite.  In  truth,  a  thought  about  nothing  is  no  thought  at  all; 
and  the  rejection  of  determinations  is  simply  the  refusal  to  think.  The 


1  Works,  ed.  Molesworth,  vol.  V.  p.  342. 

2  Works,  vol.  IV.  p.  426. 

3  Works,  ed.  Molesworth,  vol.  IV.  p.  299. 

4  In  Arist.  de  Anima,  p.  295. 

5  See  "Wolf,  Theologia  Naturalis,  Pars  II.  §  6, 14;  Kant,  Kritikder  reinen  Vernunft, 
p.  450,  ed.  Eosenkranz. 

«  See  Werke,  III.  p.  73;  IV.  p.  26,  27;  V.  p.  70;  VI.  p.  63. 
7  See  Werke,  VI.  p.  65;  XI.  p.  31, 153;  XII.  p.  229,  418. 


LECT.  III.  NOTES.  275 

conclusion  to  be  drawn  from  the  entire  controversy  is,  that  the  infinite,  as 
such,  is  not  an  object  of  human  thought. 

NOTE  IV.,  p.  95. 

"  The  adding  infinity  to  any  idea  or  conception  necessarily  finite,  makes 
up  no  other  than  a  curious  contradiction  for  a  divine  attribute.  .  .  .  You 
make  up  an  attribute  of  knowledge  or  wisdom  infinitely  finite ;  which  is  as 
chimerical  and  gigantic  an  idea  as  an  infinite  human  body."— Bp.  Browne, 
Diane  Analoyy,  p.  77.  "  Discovering  conditions  of  the  Unconditioned, 
inventing  a  possibility  for  the  absolutely  Necessary,  and  the  being  willing 
to  construct  it  in  order  to  be  able  to  conceive  of  it,  must  immediately  and 
most  obviously  appear  to  be  an  absurd  undertaking." — Jacobi,  Ueber  die 
Lehre  des  Spinoza  (  Werke,  IV.  Abth.  IT.  p.  153).  "  Thou  art  different  from 
the  finite,  not  only  in  degree,  but  in  kind.  They  only  make  Thee  by  that 
upward  gradation  a  greater  man,  ajid  ever  still  only  a  greater  man ;  but 
never  God,  the  Infinite,  the  Immeasurable."— Fichte,  Bestimmuny  des 
Menschen  ( WerJce,  II.  p.  304). 

NOTE  V.,  p.  95. 

"  For,  if  we  should  suppose  a  man  to  be  made  with  clear  eyes,  and  all 
the  rest  of  his  organs  of  sight  well  disposed,  but  endued  with  no  other 
sense;  and  that  he  should  look  only  upon  one  thing,  which  is  always  of 
the  same  color  and  figure,  without  the  least  appearance  of  variety,  he 
would  seem  to  me,  whatsoever  others  might  say,  to  see,  no  more  than  I 
seem  to  myself  to  feel  the  bones  of  my  own  limbs  by  my  organs  of  feeling ; 
and  yet  those  bones  are  always,  and  on  all  sides,  touched  by  a  most  sensi 
ble  membrane.  I  might  perhaps  say  he  were  astonished,  and  looked  upon 
it;  but  I  should  not  say  he  saw  it;  it  being  almost  all  one  for  a  man  to  be 
always  sensible  of  one  and  the  same  thing,  and  not  to  be  sensible  at  all." 
Hobbes,  Elem.  Phil.  (Eng.  Works),  Sect.  I.  P.  IV.  c.  25,  5. 


NOTE  VI.,  p.  95. 

The  paradox  of  Hegel,  if  applied,  where  alone  we  have  any  data  for 
applying  it,  to  the  necessary  limits  of  human  thought,  becomes  no  para 
dox  at  all,  but  an  obvious  truth,  almost  a  truism.  Our  conceptions  are 
limited  to  the  finite  and  the  determinate;  and  a  thought  which  is  not  of 
any  definite  object,  is  but  the  negation  of  all  thinking.  Hegel's  error 
consists  in  mistaking  an  impotence  of  thought  for  a  condition  of  exist- 


276  NOTES.  LECT.  III. 

ence.  That  pure  being  is  in  itself  pure  nothing,  is  more  than  we  can  be 
warranted  in  assuming;  for  we  have  no  conception  of  pure  being  at  all, 
and  no  means  of  judging  of  the  possibility  of  its  existence.  The  ab 
surdity  becomes  still  more  glaring,  when  this  pure  nothing  is  represented 
as  containing  in  itself  a  process  of  self-development,  —  when  being  and 
non-being,  which  are  absolutely  one  and  the  same,  are  regarded  at  the 
same  time  as  two  opposite  elements,  which,  by  their  union,  constitute 
becoming,  and  thus  give  rise  to  finite  existence.  But  this  absurdity  is  una 
voidable  in  a  system  which  starts  with  the  assumption  that  thought  and 
being  are  identical,  and  thus  abolishes  at  the  outset  the  possibility  of  dis 
tinguishing  between  the  impotence  of  thought  and  its  activity. 

NOTE  VII.,  p.  96. 

Uber  den  Grund  unseres  Glaubens  an  eine  c/ottliche  Wcltregierung  ( Werke, 
V.  p.  180).  In  a  subsequent  work  written  in  defence  of  this  opinion, 
Fichte  explains  himself  as  meaning  that  existence,  as  a  conception  of 
sensible  origin,  cannot  be  ascribed  to  God.1  That  the  conception  of 
existence  is,  like  all  other  human  representations,  incompetent  to  express 
the  nature  of  the  Absolute,  has  been  frequently  admitted,  by  philosophers 
and  theologians.  Thus,  Plato  describes  the  supreme  good  "  as  not  exist 
ence,  but  as  above  existence,  and  superior  to  it  in  dignity  and  power :  "  2 
and  his  language  is  borrowed  by  Justin  Martyr  and  Athanasius,  to  express 
the  absolute  nature  of  God ; 3  Plotinus  in  like  manner  says  that  "  the  One 
is  above  being;"4  and  Schelling,  the  Plotinus  of  Germany,  asserts  that 
the  Absolute  in  its  essence  is  neither  ideal  nor  real,  neither  thought  nor 
being.s  This  position  is  perfectly  tenable  so  long  as  it  is  confessed  that 
the  Absolute  is.  not  the  object  of  theological  or  philosophical  speculation, 
and,  consequently,  that  the  provinces  of  thought  and  existence  are  not 
coextensive.  But  without  this  safeguard,  there  is  no  middle  course 

1  Appellation  an  das  Publicum  gegen  die  AnUage  des  Atheismus  (Werke.  V.  p.  220). 

2  Republic,  VI.  p.  509. 

3  Justin,  Dial.  c.  Tryph.  c.  4.    "Who  is  above  all  existence;  unspeakable,  ineffa 
ble,  but  the  only  Noble  and  Good.  — Athanasius  c.  Gentes.  c.  2.    "  Who  is  supe 
rior  to  all  existence,  and  human  intelligence,  seeing  that  He  is  good  and  surpass 
ing  in  moral  beauty."     Compare  Damascenus,  De  Fide  Orthod.  I.  4.     "  He  is 
none  of  the  things  that  are ;  not  so  as  not  to  be,  but  to  be  above  all  things  that 
are,  above  being  itself." 

4  Enn.  V.  I.  10.  rb  eVe'/mra  ovros  rb  Ij/.     Compare  Proclus,  Inst.  Theol.  c.  115. 
"  It  is  manifest  that  every  god  is  above  all  the  things  mentioned,  existence,  and 
life,  and  mind." 

5  Bruno,  p.  57.    "The  Absolute  we  have  now  defined  as  essentially  neither  ideal 
ror  real,  neither  thinking  nor  being." 


LECT.  HI.  NOTES.  277 

between  an  illogical  theology  and  an  atheistical  logic.  The  more  pious 
minds  will  take  refuge  in  mysticism,  and  seek  to  reach  the  absolute  by  a 
superhuman  process :  the  more  consistent  reasoners  will  rush  into  the 
opposite  extreme,  and  boldly  conclude  that  that  which  is  inconceivable  is 
also  non-existent. 

NOTE  VIII.,  p.  96. 

Sextus  Empiricus,  Adv.  Math.  VII.  311.  "If  the  subject  that  knows  is 
the  whole,  then  there  will  be  no  object  that  is  known;  and  it  belongs  to 
the  most  irrational  of  things,  that  there  be  that  which  knows,  and  there 
be  not,  that  which  is  known."— Plotinus,  Enn.  V.  III.  10.  "It  must  be, 
then,  that  that  which  has  intelligence,  be  in  duality  when  it  exercises  intel 
ligence,  and  that  either  one  of  the  two  be  outside  it,  or  that  both  be  in  it, 
and  that  intelligence  always  have  to  do  with  alterity  (difference)." — Com 
pare  Hegel,  Philosophic  der  Religion  ( Werke,  XI.  p.  167).  "In  the  con 
sciousness,  so  far  as  I  have  knowledge  of  an  object,  I  know  it  as  my 
Other  (or  the  Other  of  me),  and  hence  myself  limited  by  it  and  finite." — 
Marheineke,  Grundlehren,  §  81.  "  But  this  comes  to  pass  thus :  in  the  abso 
lute  idea,  in  which  science  takes  its  stand-point,  the  subject  is  not  different 
from  the  object,  but  just  as  it  (i.  e.  the  absolute  idea)  is  the  idea  of  the 
Absolute,  as  object,  so  also  is  the  object  in  it,  as  the  absolute  idea,  subject, 
and  therefore  the  absolute  idea  is  not  different  from  God  Himself." 


NOTE  IX.,  p.  97. 

In  exhibiting  the  two  universal  conditions  of  human  consciousness, 
that  of  difference  between  objects,  and  that  of  relation  between  object  and  sub 
ject,  I  have  considered  each  with  reference  to  its  more  immediate  and 
obvious  application ;  the  former  being  viewed  in  connection  with  the 
Infinite,  and  the  latter  with  the  Absolute.  But  at  the  same  time  it  is  obvi 
ous  that  the  two  conditions  are  so  intimately  connected  together,  and  the 
ideas  to  which  they  relate  so  mutually  involved  in  each  other,  that  either 
argument  might  be  employed  with  equal  force  in  the  other  direction. 
For  difference  is  a  relation,  as  well  as  a  limit;  that  which  is  one  out  of 
many  being  related  to  the  objects  from  which  it  is  distinguished.  And 
the  subject  and  object  of  consciousness,  in  like  manner,  are  not  only 
related  to,  but  distinguished  from,  each  other;  and  thus  each  is  a  limit 
to  the  other :  while,  if  either  of  them  could  be  destroyed,  a  conception  of 
the  infinite  by  the  finite  would  be  still  impossible;  for  either  there  would 
be  no  infinite  to  be  conceived,  or  there  would  be  no  finite  to  conceive  it. 

24 


2T8  NOTES.  LECT.  III. 

The  three  Laws  of  Thought,  commonly  acknowledged  by  logicians, 
those  of  Identity,  Contradiction,  and  Excluded  Middle,  are  but  the  above 
two  conditions  viewed  in  relation  to  a  given  notion.  For  in  the  first  place, 
every  definite  notion,  as  such,  is  discerned  in  the  two  relations  of  identity 
and  difference,  as  being  that  which  it  is,  and  as  distinguished  from  that 
which  it  is  not.  These  two  relations  are  expressed  by  the  Laws  of  Iden 
tity  and  Contradiction.  And  in  the  second  place,  a  notion  is  distinguished 
from  all  that  it  is  not  (A  from  not-A),  by  means  of  the  mutual  relation  of 
both  objects  to  a  common  subject,  the  universe  of  whose  consciousness  is 
constituted  by  this  distinction.  This  mutual  relation  is  expressed  by  the 
Law  of  Excluded  Middle. 


NOTE  X.,  p.  97. 

"Though  we  cannot  fully  comprehend  the  Deity,  nor  exhaust  the 
infiniteness  of  its  perfection,  yet  may  we  have  an  idea  or  conception  of  a 
Being  absolutely  perfect;  such  a  one  as  is  nostro  modulo  conformis, 
'  agreeable  and  proportionate  to  our  measure  and  scantling ; '  as  we  may 
approach  near  to  a  mountain,  and  touch  it  with  our  hands,  though  we 
cannot  encompass  it  all  round,  and  enclasp  it  within  our  arms." — Cud- 
worth,  Intellectual  System,  ch.  5  (vol.  II.  p.  518,  ed.  Harrison).  "  We  grant 
that  the  mind  is  limited,  but  does  it  thence  follow  that  the  object  of 
thought  must  be  limited?  We  think  not.  We  grant  that  the  mind  can 
not  embrace  the  Infinite,  but  we  nevertheless  consider  that  the  mind  may 
have  a  notion  of  the  Infinite.  No  more  do  we  believe  that  the  mind,  as 
finite,  can  only  recognize  finite  objects,  than  we  believe  that  the  eye,  be 
cause  limited  in  its  power,  can  only  recognize  those  objects  whose  entire 
extension  comes  within  the  range  of  vision.  As  well  tell  us  that  because 
a  mountain  is  too  large  for  the  eye  of  a  mole,  therefore  the  mole  can 
recognize  no  mountain :  as  well  tell  us  that  because  the  world  is  too  large 
for  the  eye  of  a  man,  therefore  man  can  recognize  no  world,  —  as  tell  us 
that  because  the  Infinite  cannot  be  embraced  by  the  finite  mind,  therefore 
the  mind  can  recognize  no  Infinite."  —  Calderwood,  Philosojriiy  of  the 
Infinite,  p.  12.  The  illustrations  employed  by  both  authors  are  unfor 
tunate.  The  part  of  the  mountain  touched  by  the  hand  of  the  man,  or 
seen  by  the  eye  of  the  mole,  is,  ex  Jiypothesi,  as  a  part  of  a  larger  object, 
imperfect,  relative,  and  finite.  And  the  world,  which  is  confessedly  too 
large  for  the  eye  of  a  man,  must,  in  its  unseen  portion,  be  apprehended, 
not  by  sight,  but  by  some  other  faculty.  If,  therefore,  the  Infinite  is  too 
large  for  the  mind  of  man,  it  can  only  be  recognized  by  some  other  mind, 
or  by  some  faculty  in  man  which  is  not  mind.  But  no  such  faculty  is  or 


LECT.  in.  NOTES.  279 

can  be  assumed.  In  admitting  that  we  do  not  recognize  the  Infinite  in  its 
entire  extension,  it  is  admitted  that  we  do  not  recognize  it  as  infinite.  The 
attempted  distinction  is  sufficiently  refuted  in  the  words  of  Bishop  Browne. 
"If  it  is  said  that  we  may  then  apprehend  God  directly,  though  not  com 
prehend  him;  that  we  may  have  a  direct  and  immediate  knowledge  partly, 
and  in  some  degree;  and  though  not  of  his  Essence,  yet  of  the  Perfections 
flowing  from  it :  I  answer,  That  all  the  Attributes  and  Perfections  of  God 
are  in  their  real  Nature  as  infinite  as  his  very  Essence;  so  that  there  can 
be  no  such  thing  as  having  a  direct  view  of  him  in  part;  for  whatever  is 
in  God  is  equally  Infinite.  If  God  is  to  be  apprehended  at  all  by  any 
direct  and  immediate  idea,  he  must  be  apprehended  as  Infinite;  and  in  that 
very  act  of  the  mind,  he  would  be  comprehended;  and  there  is  no  medium 
between  apprehending  an  Infinite  Being  directly  and  analogically."  1 


NOTE  XL,  p.  100. 

The  brevity  with  which  this  argument  is  necessarily  expressed  in  the 
text,  may  render  a  few  words  of  explanation  desirable.  Of  course  it  is 
not  meant  that  no  period  of  time  can  be  conceived,  except  in  a  time 
equally  long;  for  this  would  make  a  thousand  years  as  inconceivable  as 
an  eternity.  But  though  there  is  nothing  inconceivable  in  the  notion 
of  a  thousand  years  or  any  other  large  amount  of  time,  such  a  notion 
is  conceivable  only  under  the  form  of  a  portion  of  time,  having  other 
time  before  and  after  it.  An  infinite  duration,  on  the  other  hand,  can 
only  be  conceived  as  having  no  time  before  or  after  it,  and  hence  as 
having  no  relation  or  resemblance  to  any  amount  of  finite  time,  however 
great.  The  mere  conception  of  an  indefinite  duration,  bounding  every 
conceivable  portion  of  time,  is  thus  wholly  distinct  from  that  of  infinite 
duration ;  for  infinity  can  neither  bound  nor  be  bounded  by  any  duration 
beyond  itself. 

This  distinction  has  perhaps  not  been  sufficiently  observed  by  an  able 
and  excellent  writer  of  the  present  day,  in  a  work,  the  principal  portions 
of  which  are  worthy  of  the  highest  commendation.  Dr.  McCosb  argues  in 
behalf  of  a  positive  conception  of  infinity,  in  opposition  to  the  theory  of 
Sir  "W.  Hamilton,  in  the  following  manner:  "To  whatever  point  we  go 
out  in  imagination,  we  are  sure  that  we  are  not  at  the  limits  of  existence; 
nay,  we  believe  that,  to  whatever  farther  point  we  might  go,  there  would  be 
something  still  farther  on."  "  Such/'  he  continues,  "  seems  to  us  to  be 

1  Divine  Analogy,  p.  37.  The  author  is  speaking  of  our  knowledge  in  a  future 
state ;  but  his  arguments  are  more  properly  applicable  to  our  present  condition. 


280  NOTES.  LECT.  III. 

the  true  psychological  nature  of  the  mind's  conviction  in  regard  to  the 
infinite.  It  is  not  a  mere  impotence  to  conceive  that  existence,  that  time 
or  space,  should  cease,  but  a  positive  affirmation  that  they  do  not  cease." ] 

To  this  argument  it  may  T)e  objected,  in  the  first  place,  that  this  "some 
thing  still  farther  on  "  is  not  itself  primarily  an  object  of  conception,  but 
merely  the  boundary  of  conception.  It  is  a  condition  unavoidable  by  all 
finite  thought,  that  whatever  we  conceive  must  be  related  to  something 
else  which  we  do  not  conceive.  I  think  of  a  thousand  years  as  bounded 
by  a  further  duration  beyond  it.  But  if,  secondarily,  we  turn  our  atten 
tion  to  this  boundary  itself,  it  is  not  then  actually  conceived  as  either 
limited  or  unlimited  on  its  remoter  side;  we  do  not  positively  think  of  it 
as  having  no  boundary;  we  only  refrain  from  thinking  of  it  as  having  a 
boundary.  It  is  thus  presented  to  us  as  indefinite,  but  not  as  infinite.  And 
the  result  will  be  the  same,  if  to  our  conception  of  a  thousand  years  we 
add  cycle  upon  cycle,  till  we  are  wearied  with  the  effort.  An  idea  which 
we  tend  towards,  but  never  reach,  is  indefinite,  but  not  infinite;  for,  at 
whatever  point  we  rest,  there  are  conditions  beyond,  which  remain  unex 
hausted. 

In  the  second  place,  even  if  we  could  positively  perceive  this  furthci 
duration  as  going  on  forever,  we  should  still  be  far  removed  from  the  con 
ception  of  infinity.  For  such  a  duration  is  given  to  us  as  bounding  ant 
bounded  by  our  original  conception  of  a  thousand  years;  it  is  limited  al 
its  nearer  extremity,  though  unlimited  at  the  other.  If  this  be  regardcc 
as  infinite,  we  are  reduced  to  the  self-contradictory  notion  of  infinit) 
related  to  a  time  beyond  itself.  Is  a  thousand  years,  plus  its  infinite 
boundary,  greater  than  that  boundary  alone,  or  not?  If  it  is,  we  have  the 
absurdity  of  a  greater  than  the  infinite.  If  it  is  not,  the  original  concep 
tion  of  a  thousand  years,  from  relation  to  which  that  of  infinity  is  sup 
posed  to  arise,  is  itself  reduced  to  a  nonentity,  and  cannot  be  related  tc 
anything.  This  contradiction  may  be  avoided,  if  we  admit  that  our  con 
ception  of  time,  as  bounded,  implies  an  apprehension  of  the  indefinite,  bul 
not  of  the  infinite. 

But  possibly,  after  all,  the  difference  between  Dr.  McCosh's  view  anc 
that  of  Sir  W.  Hamilton,  may  be  rather  verbal  than  real.  For  the  sub 
sequent  remarks  of  the  former  are  such  as  might  be  fully  accepted  bj 
the  most  uncompromising  adherent  of  the  latter.  "  The  mind  seeks  in 
vain  to  embrace  the  infinite  in  a  positive  image,  but  is  constrained  to 
believe,  when  its  efforts  fail,  that  there  is  a  something  to  which  no  limits 
can  be  put."  All  that  need  practically  be  contended  for  by  the  supporters 

1  Method  of  the  Divine  Government,  p.  534, 4th  edition. 


LECT.  III.  NOTES.  281 

of  the  negative  theory  is,  first,  that  this  inability  to  assign  limits  indicates 
directly  only  an  indcflniteness  in  our  manner  of  thinking,  but  not  necessa 
rily  an  infinity  in  the  object  about  which  we  think;  and,  secondly,  that 
our  indirect  belief  in  the  infinite,  whether  referred  to  an  impotence  or  to  a 
power  of  mind,  is  not  of  such  a  character  that  we  can  deduce  from  it  any 
logical  consequences  available  in  philosophy  or  in  theology.  The  sober 
and  reverent  tone  of  religious  thought  which  characterizes  Dr.  McCosh's 
writings,  warrants  the  belief  that  he  would  not  himself  repudiate  these 
conclusions. 

NOTE  XII.,  p.  100. 

For  the  antagonist  theories  of  a  beginning  of  time  itself,  and  of  an  eter 
nal  succession  in  them,  sec  Plato,  Timceus,  p.  37,  38,  and  Aristotle,  Pltys. 
VIII.  1.  The  two  theories  are  ably  contrasted  in  Prof.  Butler's  Lectures  on 
the  History  of  Ancient  Philosophy,  vol.  II.  p.  18-3  sqq.  Plato  does  not  appear 
to  regard  the  beginning  of  time  as  the  beginning  of  material  existence, 
but  only  of  the  sensible  phenomena  of  matter.  The  insensible  substratum 
of  the  phenomena  seems  to  have  been  regarded  by  him  as  coeternal  with 
the  Deity.1  It  has  been  conjectured,  indeed,  that  to  this  matter  was 
attributed  a  perpetual  existence  in  successive  duration,  as  distinguished 
from  the  existence  of  the  Deity,  in  a  manner  devoid  of  all  succession.2 
This  hypothesis  perhaps  relieves  the  theory  from  the  apparent  paradox  of 
an  existence  before  time  (before  being  itself  a  temporal  relation),  but  it 
cannot  be  easily  reconciled  with  the  language  of  Plato ;  and  moreover,  it 
only  avoids  one  paradox  by  the  introduction  of  another,  —  that  of  a  state 
of  existence  out  of  time  contemporaneous  with  one  in  time. 

NOTE  XIII.,  p.  100. 

In  Joann.  Evang.  Tract.  XXXVIII.  10.  "  Discuss  the  changes  of  things, 
and  you  will  find  a  past  and  a  future;  think  of  God,  and  you  will  find  a 
present,  in  which  neither  past  nor  future  is  possible." — Compare  Confess. 
XI.  c.  ii.;  Enarr.  in  Ps.  II.  7;  De  Civ.  Dei,  XI.  21.  See  also  Cudworth, 
vol.  II.  p.  529,  ed.  Harrison;  Herder,  Gott,  Werke,  VIII.  p.  139. 

1  See  Timaiis,  p  49 — 53.    Plato's  opinion  however  has  been  variously  repre 
sented.    For  some  account  of  the  controversies   on  this  point,  see  Mosheim's 
Dissertation,  De  Creatione  ex  Nihilo,  translated  in  Harrison's  edition  of  Ciulworth, 
vol.  III.  p.  140;  Brucker,  Historia  Pkilosophicr,  vol.  p.  676.     Compare  also  Profes 
sor  Thompson's  note,  in  Butler's  Lectures  on  the  History  of  Ancient  Philosophy,  vol. 
II.  p.  189. 

2  See  Mosheim's  note  in  Harrison's  CuJworth.  vol.  II.  p.  551. 

24* 


282  NOTES.  LECT.  III. 


NOTE  XIV.,  p.  100. 

De  Consol.  Pliilos.  L.  V.  Pr.  6.  "  Eternity,  therefore,  is  at  once  the  entire 
and  the  perfect  possession  of  interminable  life." 


NOTE  XV.,  p.  100. 

Summa,  P.  I.  Qu.  X.  Art.  1.  "In  this  way,  therefore,  eternity  is  made 
known  by  two  things.  First,  by  this,  that  what  is  in  eternity  is  intermi 
nable,  i.  e.,  without  beginning  and  without  end.  Second  by  this,  that 
eternity  is  without  succession,  existing  at  once  in  totality." — Compare 

Plotinus,  Enn.  III.  1.  viii.  c.  2 "  Always  having  the  whole  present, 

but  not  this  thing  now,  and  then  another,  but  all  at  once." — Proclus  lust., 
TheoL  c.  52.  "All  which  is  eternal  exists  at  once  in  totality."  Several 
historical  notices  relating  to  this  theory  are  given  by  Petavius,  Theologica 
Dogmata,  De  Deo,  1.  III.  c.  4. 


NOTE  XVI.,  p.  101. 

.  .  .  .  "  Nor  can  eternity  be  denned  by  time,  or  have  any  relation  to 
time." — Spinoza,  Ethica,  P.  V.  Prop.  23.  "Eternity,  in  the  pure  sense  of 
the  word,  can  be  explained  by  no  duration  of  time,  even  supposing  we 
take  this  as  endless  (indefinite').  Duration  is  an  undetermined  continua 
tion  of  existence,  which  in  every  moment  bears  with  it  a  measure  of 
transientness,  of  the  future  as  of  the  past."— Herder,  Gott  ( Werke,  VIII. 
p.  140).  "  In  so  far  as  the  J  is  eternal,  it  has  no  duration  at  all.  For 
duration  is  thinkable  only  in  relation  to  objects.  We  speak  of  an  eternity 
[sempiternity]  of  duration  (ajviternitas)  i.  e.  of  an  existence  in  all  time, 
but  eternity  in  the  pure  sense  of  the  word  (aeternitas)  is  Being  in  no  time." 
Schelling,  Vom'Ich,^  15.  Cognate  to,  or  rather  identical  with,  these 
speculations,  is  the  theory  advocated  by  Mr.  Maurice  ( Theological  Essays, 
p.  422  sqq.),  "that  eternity  is  not  a  lengthening  out  or  continuation  of 
time;  that  they  are  generically  different." 


NOTE  XVIL,  p.  101. 

In  the  acute  and  decisive  criticism  of  Schelling  by  Sir  W.  Hamilton, 
this  objection  is  urged  with  gi-eat  effect.  "  We  cannot,  at  the  same 
moment,  be  in  the  intellectual  intuition  and  in  common  consciousness; 
we  must  therefore  be  able  to  connect  them  by  an  act  of  memory  —  of 


LECT.  III.  NOTES.  283 

recollection.  But  how  can  there  be  a  remembrance  of  the  Absolute  and  its 
Intuition?  As  out  of  time,  and  space,  and  relation,  and  difference,  it  is 
admitted  that  the  Absolute  cannot  be  construed  to  the  understanding.  But 
as  remembrance  is  only  possible  under  the  conditions  of  the  understand 
ing,  it  is  consequently  impossible  to  remember  anything  anterior  to  the 
moment  when  we  awaken  into  consciousness;  and  the  clairvoyance  of  the 
Absolute,  even  granting  its  reality,  is  thus,  after  the  crisis,  as  if  it  had 
never  been." — Discussions,  p.  23. 

NOTE  X VIII.,  p.  101. 

See  Augustine,  In  Joann.  Eoang.  Tract.  XXXVIII.  10.  "  Think  of  God, 
you  will  find  a  present  (an  Is)  in  which  the  past  and  future  cannot  be.  In 
order,  therefore,  that  you  also  may  be,  transcend  time.  But  who  shall 
transcend  time  by  his  own  powers  ?  He  will  raise  you  to  it,  who  said  to 
the  Father,  " I  will  that  they  also  be  with  me  where  I  am."  This  precept  has 
found  great  favor  with  mystical  theologians.  Thus  Eckart,  in  a  sermon 
published  among  those  of  Tauler,  says,  "  Nothing  hinders  the  soul  so 
much  in  its  knowledge  of  God  as  time  and  place.  Time  and  place  are 
parts,  and  God  is  one;  therefore,  if  our  soul  is  to  know  God,  it  must  know 
him  above  time  and  place." 1  And  the  author  of  the  Theologia  Germanica, 
c.l :  "  If  the  soul  shall  see  with  the  right  eye  into  eternity,  then  the  left 
eye  must  close  itself  and  refrain  from  working,  and  be  as  though  it  were 
dead.  For  if  the  left  eye  be  fulfilling  its  office  towards  outward  things; 
that  is,  holding  converse  with  time  and  its  creatures;  then  must  the  right 
eye  be  hindered  in  its  working;  that  is,  in  its  contemplation."2  So  too 
Swedenborg,  in  his  Angelic  Wisdom  concerning  Divine  Providence,  §  48: 
"  What  is  infinite  in  itself  and  eternal  in  itself  is  divine,  can  be  seen,  and 
yet  cannot  be  seen  by  men :  it  can  be  seen  by  those  who  think  of  infinite 
not  from  space,  and  of  eternal  not  from  time ;  but  cannot  be  seen  by  those 
who  think  of  infinite  and  eternal  from  space  and  time."  3  In  the  same 
spirit  sings  Angelus  Silesius : 

"Mensch,  wo  du  deinen  Geist  schwingst  uber  Ort  tmd  Zeit, 
So  kannst  du  jeden  Blick  sein  in  der  Ewigkeit."  4 

The  modern  German  mysticism  is  in  this  respect  nowise  behind  the 
earlier.  Schelling  says  of  his  intuition  of  the  Absolute,  "  The  pure  self- 

1  Life  and  Sermons  of  Dr.  John  Tauler,  translated  by  Susanna  Winkwortli,  p.  190. 

2  Theologia  Germanica,  translated  by  Susanna  Wiukworth,  p.  20. 

3  English  translation,  p.  27. 

4  Chenibinisc/ier  Warulersmann,  1. 12.     Quoted  by  Strauss,  Glaubenslekre ,  II.  p  738- 


284  NOTES.  LECT.  III. 

consciousness  is  an  act  which  lies  beyond  all  time,  and  posits  all  time." l 
And  again,  "  But  since  in  the  Absolute  thinking  is  entirely  one  with  the 
intuition,  so  will  all  things  not  merely  as  endless,  by  their  conceptions, 
but  eternal  by  their  ideas,  and  without  any  relation,  even  of  opposition,  to 
time,  and  with  absolute  unity  of  potentiality  and  actuality,  be  expressed 
in  it,  as  the  highest  unity  of  thought  and  intuition."  2  Schlciermacher 
(Christliclie  Glaiibc,  §  52)  endeavors  to  find  something  analogous  to  the 
Divine  Eternity,  in  the  timeless  existence  of  the  personal  self,  as  the  per 
manent  subject  of  successive  modes  of  consciousness.  The  analogy,  how 
ever,  fails  in  two  respects;  first,  because  the  permanent  self  cannot  be 
contemplated  apart  from  its  successive  modes,  but  is  discerned  only  in 
relation  to  them;  and,  secondly,  because,  though  not  itself  subject  to  the 
condition  of  succession,  it  is  still  in  time  under  that  of  duration.  Kant 
truly  remarks  on  all  such  mystical  efforts  to  transcend  time  :  "  All  solely 
on  this  account,  that  men  may  at  last  rejoice  over  an  eternal  rest,  which 
makes  out  their  imagined  happy  end  of  all  things;  properly  an  idea,  along 
with  which  their  understanding  is  gone,  and  all  thinking  itself  comes  to 
an  end."3 

NOTE  XIX.,  p.  101. 

This  is  directly  admitted  by  Fichte,  who  says,  in  his  earliest  work, 
"  How  the  infinite  Mind  may  contemplate  its  existence  and  its  attributes, 
we  cannot  know,  without  being  the  infinite  Mind  ourselves.''4  But  of  the 
two  alternatives  which  this  important  admission  offers,  Fichte  himself,  in 
his  subsequent  writings,  as  well  as  his  successors  in  philosophy,  chose  the 
wrong  one.  See  above,  Lecture  I.  note  29. 


NOTE  XX.,  p.  102. 

"  Look  into  the  dictionaries  for  the  usage  of  the  words  Person,  person 
ality,  etc.,  ....  all  say,  that  these  words  designate  something  peculiar  or 
special  under  a  certain  appearance ;  a  subordinate  idea,  which  does  not  be 
long  to  the  Infinite."  ....  Herder,  Gott  (WerTce,  VIII.  p.  199).  "What 
then  do  you  call  personality  and  consciousness  ?  that  certainly  which  you 
have  found  in  yourselves,  which  you  have  become  acquainted  with  in 
yourselves,  and  have  designated  with  this  name.  But  the  least  attention 

1  System  des  Transcendentalen  Idealismus,  p.  59  (  Werke,  III.  p.  375). 

2  Bruno,  p.  58. 

3  Das  Ende  alter  Dlnge  (  Werke,  VII.  p.  422). 

4  Versuch  einer  Kritik  aller  Offeribarung  (  Werke,  V.  p.  42). 


LECT.  IE.  NOTES.  285 

to  your  construction  of  this  notion  can  teach  you,  that  you  absolutely  do 
not  and  cannot  have  this  thought  Avithout  limitation  and  finiteness." 
Fichte,  Utber  gottliche  Wdtreyiemng  (  Werke,  V.  p.  187).  Schleierniacher, 
in  like  manner,  in  his  second  Discourse  on  Religion,  offers  a  half  apology 
for  Pantheism,  on  the  ground  of  the  limitation  implied  in  the  notions  of 
personality  and  consciousness.1  And  Strauss  remarks :  "  As  persons,  AVC 
know  ourselves  only  in  distinction  from  other  persons  of  the  same  kind, 
from  Avhom  AAre  distinguish  ourselves,  and  of  course,  too,  as  finite;  it  ap 
pears,  consequently,  that  the  notion  of  personality  loses  all  significance 
beyond  this  province  of  the  finite,  and  that  a  being,  Avho  has  no  other  be 
sides  himself  of  his  own  kind,  cannot  be  a  person  at  all." — Christliche 
Glaubenslelire,  I.  p.  504. 

NOTE  XXL,  p.  103. 

De  Trinitate,  XV.  c.  5.  "  Therefore  if  AVO  say,  eternal,  immortal,  incor 
ruptible,  Avise,  powerful,  just,  good,  happy,  spirit;  of  all  these,  the  last 
only  seems  to  be  significant  of  substance,  but  the  others  qualities  of  this 
substance ;  but  not  so  is  it  in  that  ineffable  and  simple  nature.  For  Avhat 
there  seems  to  be  said  of  qualities  must  be  understood  of  substance  or 
essence.  For  God  is  far  from  being  called  Spirit  as  to  substance,  and  good 
as  to  quality ;  but  both  of  these  as  to  substance  ....  although  in  God 
justice  is  one  Avith  goodness,  Avith  happiness,  and  the  being  Spirit  is  one 
with  being  just  and  good  and  happy." — Ibid.  VI.  c.  4.  Compare  Aquinas, 
Summa,  P.  I.  Qu.  XL.  Art.  i:  .  .  .  .  "Because  the  divine  simplicity  ex 
cludes  the  composition  of  form  and  matter,  it  folloAvs,  that  in  divine 
things,  the  abstract  and  the  concrete  is  one  Avith  the  Deity  and  God.  And 
because  the  divine  simplicity  excludes  the  composition  of  subject  and 
accident,  it  folloAvs  that  the  attributes  of  God  are  one  Avith  his  essential 
being;  and  therefore  Avisdom  and  virtue  are  identical  in  God,  because 
both  are  in  the  divine  essence."  See  also  above,  Lecture  II.  note  27. 


NOTE  XXIL,  p.  103. 

Plotinus,  Enn.  VII.  1.  ix.  c.  6.  "  Whatever  may  be  said  to  be  wanting, 
is  wanting  in  "the  Well"  (i.  e.,  in  perfectness  of  condition);  .  .  .  . 
so  that  goodness,  so  that  will,  is  not  predicable  of  the  One;  for  the  One 
transcends  goodness ;  ....  nor  intelligence  .  .  nor  motion,  for  it  is  prior 
to  intelligence,  to  motion."  ....  Spinoza,  Eth.  P.  I.  Prop.  17.  Schol.  "  If 
intelligence  belongs  to  the  divine  nature,  it  cannot  be,  as  our  intelligence, 

1  Werke,  I.  pp.  269,  280. 


286  NOTES.  LECT.  III. 

posterior  to  or  coexistent  with  the  objects  of  intelligence,  since  God  is 
in  causality  prior  to  all  things ;  but  on  the  contrary  reality  and  the  formal 
essence  of  things  is  on  that  account  such,  because  as  such  it  exists  objec 
tively  in  the  Divine  Mind Since,  therefore,  the  Divine  Intelligence  is 

the  one  and  the  only  cause  of  things,  indeed  (as  we  have  shown)  as  much 
of  their  essence  as  of  their  existence,  He  Himself  ought  necessarily  to  differ 

from  them  as  much  in  respect  to  essence  as  to  existence And  yet 

the  Intelligence  of  God  is  the  cause  both  of  the  essence  and  of  the  exist 
ence  of  our  intelligence;  therefore  the  Intelligence  of  God,  so  far  as  it  is 
conceived  to  constitute  the  divine  essence,  differs  from  our  intelligence,  in 
respect  alike  to  essence  and  to  existence."  ....  Compare  P.  I.  Prop.  32. 
Cor.  1,  2,  and  P.  II.  Prop.  n.  Cor.,  where*  Spinoza  maintains  that  God  is 
not  conscious  in  so  far  as  he  is  infinite,  but  becomes  conscious  in  man;  — 
a  conclusion  identical  with  that  of  the  extreme  Hegelian  school,  and,  in 
deed,  substantially  the  same  with  that  of  Hegel  himself.  See  above,  Lec 
ture  I,  notes  29,  32. 

NOTE  XXIII.,  p.  104. 

Anselm,  Monolog.  c.  66.  "  Without  doubt,  in  all  investigations  into  the 
essential  being. of  the  Creator,  the  deeper  knowledge  is  reached,  the  greater 
the  likeness  to  Him  of  the  created  thing,  by  which  the  investigation  is 

made Manifestly,  therefore,  as  the  rational  mind  alone  among  all 

created  things  can  rise  to  the  investigation  of  this  essential  being,  this  alone 
can  avail  to  the  discovery  of  it."  Compare  Aquinas,  Summa,  P.  I.  Qu. 
XXIX.  Art.  3.  "  Person  signifies  that  which  is  most  perfect  in  all  nature, 
or  a  subsistence  in  a  rational  nature.  Hence,  since  all  which  belongs  to 
perfection,  must  be  attributed  to  God  because  his  essence  contains  in  itself 
all  perfection,  —  it  is  fitting  that  this  name  person,  be  used  of  God,  yet  not 
in  the  same  way  in  which  it  is  used  of  creatures,  but  in  a  more  excellent 
way;  just  as  other  names  arc  ascribed  to  God,  which  are  put  by  us  upon 
created  beings."  And  Jacobi,  at  the  conclusion  of  an  eloquent  denuncia 
tion  of  the  Pantheism  of  his  own  day,  truly  observes,  "A  being  without 
self-being  is  entirely  and  universally  impossible.  But  a  self-being  without 
consciousness,  and  again  a  consciousness  without  self-consciousness,  with 
out  substantiality  and  at  least  an  implied  personality,  is  just  as  impossi 
ble;  the  one  as  well  as  the  other  is  but  empty  words.  And  so  God  is  not 
in  being,  He  is,  in  the  highest  sense,  the  Not-being,  if  He  is  not  a  Spirit; 
and  He  is  not  a  Spirit,  if  he  is  wanting  in  the  fundamental  quality  of 
Spirit,  self-consciousness,  substantiality  and  personality."  *  In  the  same 

1  Veber  eine  Weissagung  Lichtenberg-s  ( Werke,  III.  p.  240).  Compare  also  the  Pref 
ace  to  Vol.  IV.  p.  xlv. 


LECT.  IE.  NOTES.  287 

spirit,  and  with  a  just  recognition  of  the  limits  of  human  thought,  M. 
Bartholmess  says,  "  He  who  refuses  to  take  some  traits  of  resemblance 
from  the  moral  part  of  the  world  will  be  forced  to  take  them  from  the 
physical  part,  the  mathematical,  the  logical ;  he  will  make  God  after  the 
image  of  the  material  world,  —  after  the  image  of  a  geometrical  magnitude 
or  arithmetical,  —  after  the  image  of  a  logical  abstraction.  Always,  in  lift 
ing  himself  to  the  Creator,  he  will  rest  upon  some  part  or  other  of  the  crea 
tion."1  To  the  same  effect,  a  distinguished  living  writer  of  our  own 
country  observes,  "  The  worshipper  carried  through  the  long  avenues  of 
columns  and  statues,  and  the  splendid  halls  of  the  ancient  temple  of 
Egyptian  Thebes,  was  not  conducted  at  last  to  a  more  miserable  termina 
tion,  when  in  the  inner  shrine  he  found  one  of  the  lower  animals,  than  the 
follower  of  a  modern  philosopher,  when  conducted  through  processes, 
laws,  and  developments,  to  a  divinity  who  has  less  of  separate  sensation, 
consciousness,  and  life,  than  the  very  brutes  which  Egypt  declared  to  be 
its  gods."  2 

NOTE  XXIV.,  p.  104. 

Pens&s,  P.  I.  Art.  IV.  §  6.  In  like  manner,  in  another  passage,  Pascal 
says,  "  All  bodies,  the  firmament,  the  stars,  the  earth,  kingdoms,  —  are 
not  equal  to  the  most  insignificant  spirit;  for  such  a  spirit  knows  all  these, 
and  itself;  but  the  body,  nothing."3 

The  following  spirited  translation  of  Jacobi4  is  from  the  pen  of  Sir  W. 
Hamilton,  and  occurs  in  the  second  of  his  Lectures  on  Metaphysics,  just 
published.  The  entire  Lecture  from  which  it  is  taken  constitutes  a  forci 
ble  and  admirably  illustrated  argument  to  the  same  effect.  ''Nature  con 
ceals  God :  for  through  her  whole  domain  Nature  reveals  only  fate,  only 
an  indissoluble  chain  of  mere  efficient  causes  without  beginning  and  with 
out  end,  excluding,  with  equal  necessity,  both  providence  and  chance. 
An  independent  agency,  a  free  original  commencement,  within  her  sphere 
and  proceeding  from  her  powers,  is  absolutely  impossible.  "Working 
without  will,  she  takes  counsel  neither  of  the  good  nor  of  the  beautiful ; 
creating  nothing,  she  casts  off  from  her  dark  abyss  only  eternal  trans 
formations  of  herself,  unconsciously  and  without  an  end;  furthering  with 
the  same  ceaseless  industry  decline  and  increase,  death  and  life,  —  never 
producing  what  alone  is  of  God  and  what  supposes  liberty,  —  the  virtuous, 
the  immortal.  Man  reveals  God:  for  Man  by  his  intelligence  rises  above 
nature,  and  in  virtue  of  this  intelligence  is  conscious  of  himself,  as  a 

1  Histoire  des  doctrines  religieuf.es  de  la  PJiilosophie  Morlerne,  Introduction,  p.  xli. 

2  McCosh,  Mnhod  of  the  Divine  Government  p.  461  (4th  edition). 

3  Pensees  P.  II.  Art  X.  §  1. 

4  Van  den  gottlichen  Dhig'n  (  Werke,  III.  p.  425). 


288  NOTES.  LECT.  III. 

power  not  only  independent  of,  but  opposed  to,  nature,  and  capable  of  re 
sisting,  conquering,  and  controlling  her.  As  man  has  a  living  faith  in  this 
power,  superior  to  nature,  which  dwells  in  him,  so  has  he  a  belief  in  God; 
a  feeling,  an  experience  of  his  existence.  As  he  does  not  believe  in  this 
power,  so  does  he  not  believe  in  God :  he  sees,  he  experiences  naught  in 
existence  but  nature,  —  necessity,  —  fate."— Hamilton's  Lectures  on  Meta 
physics,  Am.  Edition,  p.  29. 

NOTE  XXV.,  p.  105. 

Descartes,  Discours  de  la  Mtftl\ode,  P.  IV.,  Principia,  P.  I.  §  7.  That  the 
Cartesian  cogjto,  ergo  sum,  is  not  intended  as  a  syllogism,  in  which  thought 
and  existence  are  two  distinct  attributes,  but  as  a  statement  of  the  fact, 
that  personal  existence  consists  in  consciousness,  has  been  sufficiently 
shown  by  M.  Cousin,  in  his  Essay  "  Sur  le  vrai  sens  du  cogito,  ergo  sum." 
The  same  view  has  been  well  stated  by  Mr.  Veitch,  in  the  introduction  to 
his  translation  of  the  Discours  de  la  Me'thode,  p.  xxii.  M.  Bartholmess 
(Histoire  des  doctrines  rdigieuses,  I.  p.  23)  happily  renders  ergo  by  c'est-h- 
dire.  It  must  be  remembered,  however,  that  the  cogito  of  Descartes  is  not 
designed  to  express  the  phenomena  of  reflection  alone,  but  is  coextensive 
with  the  entire  consciousness.  This  is  expressly  affirmed  in  the  Principia, 
P.  I.  §  9.  "By  the  word  cogitatio  I  understand  all  the  objects  of  our  con 
sciousness.  And  so  not  only  to  understand,  to  will,  to  imagine,  but  also  to 
perceive,  —  all  are  meant  by  cogitare."  The  dictum,  thus  extended,  may 
perhaps  be  advantageously  modified  by  disengaging  the  essential  from  the 
accidental  features  of  consciousness;  but  its  main  principle  remains  un 
shaken;  namely,  that  our  conception  of  real  existence,  as  distinguished 
from  appearance,  is  derived  from,  and  depends  upon,  the  distinction  be 
tween  the  one  conscious  subject  and  the  several  objects  of  which  he  is 
conscious.  The  rejection  of  consciousness,  as  the  primary  constituent  of 
substantive  existence,  constitutes  Spinoza's  point  of  departure  from  the 
principles  of  Descartes,  and,  at  the  same  time,  the  fundamental  error  of 
his  system.  Spinoza  in  fact  transfers  the  notion  of  substance,  which  is 
originally  derived  from  the  consciousness  of  personality,  and  has  no  posi 
tive  significance  out  of  that  consciousness,  to  the  absolute,  which  exists 
and  is  conceived  by  itself,  —  an  object  to  whose  existence  consciousness 
bears  no  direct  testimony,  and  whose  conception  involves  a  self-contra 
diction. 

NOTE  XXVI.,  p.  105. 

"  I  am,  that  I  am.  This  decisive  utterance  establishes  all.  Its  echo  in 
the  human  soul  is  the  revelation  of  God  in  it.  What  makes  man  man,  i.  e., 


LECT.  HI.  NOTES.  289 

makes  him  the  image  of  God,  is  called  Reason.    This  begins  with  the  —  I 

am Reason  without  personality  is  non-entity,  the  like  non-entity 

with  that  original  cause,  —  which  is  All  and  not  One,  or  One  and  None, 
the  perfection  of  the  imperfect,  the  absolutely  Undetermined  —  called 
God  by  those  who  will  have  no  knowledge  of  the  true  God,  but  yet  shrink 
from  denying  Him  — with  the  lips."— Jacobi,  Von  den  gottlichen  Dingen 
( Werke,  III.  p.  418). 

NOTE  XXVII.,  p.  106. 

For  notices  of  Schelling's  philosophy  in  this  respect,  see  Bartholmess 
Histoire  des  doctrines  rdigieuses,  II.  p.  116,  and  Willrn,  Histoire  de  la  Philoso- 
phie  AUemande,  III.  p.  318.  "  The  school  of  Schelling,"  says  Mm«  de  Stael, 
"  supposes  that  the  individual  perishes  in  us,  but  that  the  inward  qualities, 
which  we  possess,  reenter  into  the  grand  whole  of  the  eternal  creation. 
This  immortality  has  a  terrible  resemblance  to  death."  *  Schelling's  views 
on  this  point  are  more  completely  developed  by  his  disciple  Blasche,  in  his 
Philosophische  UnsterblichkeitleJire,  especially  §§  18,  55,  56,  72.  The  tendency 
of  Hegel's  teaching  is  in  the  same  direction;  the  individual  being  with  him 
only  an  imperfect  and  insignificant  phase  of  the  universal : 2  and  a  personal 
immortality,  though  not  openly  denied,  seems  excluded  by  inference;  an 
inference  which  his  successors  have  not  hesitated  to  make.3  Schleier- 
macher  concludes  his  Second  Discourse  on  Religion  with  these  remarkable 
words :  "  The  final  aim  of  a  religious  life  is  not  the  immortality,  which 

1  De  P  Allemagne,  Partie  III.  ch.  7. 

2  Phdnomenologie  des  Geistes,  Vorrede  ( Werke,  II.  p.  22). 

3  See  Michelet,  Geschichte  der  letzten  Systeme  der  Pkilosophie,  II.  p.  638.     Strauss, 
in  his  Christliche  Glaubenslekre,  §  106 — 110,  gives  an  instructive  account  of  some  of 
the  speculations  of  recent  German  writers  on  this  question ;  bis  own  commentary 
being  not  the  least  significant  portion.  "  Thereby  indeed,"  he  says  "  the  Ego  makes 
known  its  will  to  carry  on  to  all  eternity  (i.  e.  not  to  take  a  step  out  from  its  own 
finiteness)  not  only  its  subjectivity  in  general,  but  the  particular  relations  of  this 
subjectivity."    And  again  :  "  Only  the  nature  of  the  species  is  infinite  and  inex 
haustible;  that  of  the  individual  can  be  only  finite."    His  inquiry  concludes  with 
the  well-known  words,  "  The  other  world  is,  in  all  forms,  the  one  foe,  but  in  its 
form  as  the  world  to  come,  the  last  foe,  which  speculative  criticism  has  to  com 
bat  and  if  possible  to  overcome."    And  Feuerbach,  another  "  advanced  "  disciple 
of  the  Hegelian  school,  has  written  an  essay  on  Death  and  Immortality,  for  the 
purpose  of  showing  that  a  belief  in  personal  annihilation  is  indispensable  to 
sound  morality  and  true  religion;  that  the  opposite  belief  is  connected  with  all 
that  is  "  satanic"  and  "bestial ;"  and  that  temporal  death  is  but  au  image  of  God, 
the  "  great  objective  negation :"  and  has  indicated  significantly,  in  another  work, 
the  philosophical  basis  of  his  theory,  by  an  aphorism  the  direct  contradictory  to 
that  of  Descartes,  "  Cogitans  nemo  sum.    Cogito,  ergo  omnes  sum  homines." 


290  NOTES.  LECT.  III. 

many  wish  for  and  believe  in,  or  only  pretend  to  believe  in  ....  not  that 
beyond  time  or  rather  after  this  time,  but  yet  in  time,  but  the  immortality, 
which  we  can  have  immediate  in  this  temporal  life,  —  and  which  is  a 
problem  in  the  solution  of  which  we  are  ever  employed.  In  the  midst  of 
the  finite  to  be  one  with  the  infinite,  and  be  eternal  in  every  instant,  —  thai 
is  the  immortality  of  religion."  And  later,  in  his  Christliche  Glaiibe,  §  158, 
while  admitting  that  the  belief  in  a  personal  immortality  follows  naturally 
from  the  doctrine  of  the  twofold  nature  of  Christ,  he  notwithstanding 
thinks  it  necessary  to  apologize  for  those  who  reject  this  belief  on  panthe 
istic  principles :  "  For  from  this  point  of  view,  it  may  be  alike  maintained, 
on  the  one  hand,  that  the  consciousness  of  God  makes  up  the  essential 
nature  of  every  life  which  in  the  higher  sense  is  self-conscious  or  rational, 
on  the  other  hand,  however,  that,  while  the  Spirit  in  this  productivity  is 
essentially  immortal,  yet  the  individual  soul  is  only  a  transient  action  ol 

this  productivity,  and  so  is  also  essentially  perishable With  such  a 

renunciation  of  the  continuation  of  personality,  would  a  supremacy  of  the 
consciousness  of  God  perfectly  agree."  Mr.  Atkinson,  from  the  side  ol 
materialism,  arrives  at  a  similar  conclusion :  "  What  more  noble  and  glo 
rious  than  a  calm  and  joyful  indifference  about  self  and  the  future,  ir 
merging  the  individual  in  the  general  good,  —  the  general  good  in  universal 
nature."1  And  M.  Comte  comes  forward  with  his  substitute  of  "subjec 
tive  immortality,"  i.  e.,  being  remembered  by  other  people,  as  a  far  noblei 
and  truer  conception  of  a  future  life  than  that  held  by  theologians.2  Bui 
the  most  systematic  and  thoroughgoing  exponent  of  this  philosophy  h 
Schopenhauer.  With  him,  the  species  is  the  exhibition  in  time  of  the  ider 
or  real  being,  of  which  the  individual  is  but  the  finite  and  transient  expres 
sion.3  In  the  same  sense  in  which  the  individual  was  generated  froir 
nothing,  he  returns  to  nothing  by  death.4  To  desire  a  personal  immor 
tality  is  to  desire  to  perpetuate  an  error  to  infinity ;  for  individual  existence 
is  the  error  from  which  it  should  be  the  aim  of  life  to  extricate  ourselves/ 
Judaism,  which  teaches  a  creation  out  of  nothing,  consistently  asserts  thai 
death  is  annihilation ;  while  Christianity  has  borrowed  its  belief  in  immor 
tality  from  India,  and  inconsistently  engrafted  it  on  a  Jewish  stem.6  The 
true  doctrine  however  is  not  to  be  found  in  these,  but  in  the  Indian  Yedas 
whose  superior  wisdom  can  only  be  ascribed  to  the  fact,  that  their  authors. 


1  Letters  on  the  Laws  of  Man's  Nature  and  Development,  p. 

2  Catechisme  Positiviste,  p.  169. 

3  Die  Welt  als  Wille  und  Vorstellung,  II.  p.  484,  487,  511. 

4  Ibid.,  p.  482,  498. 

5  Ibid.,  p.  494. 

6  Ibid.,  p.  489,  617. 


LECT.  HI.  NOTES.  291 

living  nearer,  in  point  of  time,  to  the  origin  of  the  human  race,  compre 
hended  more  clearly  and  profoundly  the  true  nature  of  things.1  As  a  relief 
from  this  desolating  pantheism,  it  is  refreshing  to  turn  to  the  opposite 
language  of  Xeander.  "  Man  could  not  become  conscious  of  God  as  his 
God,  if  he  were  not  a  personal  spirit,  divinely  allied,  and  destined  for 
eternity,  an  eternal  object  (as  an  individual)  of  God;  and  thereby  far  above 
all  natural  and  perishable  beings,  whose  perpetuity  is  that  of  the  species, 
not  the  individual.2 


NOTE  XXVIII.,  p.  100. 

We  have  great  reason  to  find  fault  with  the  strange  manner  of  some 
men,  who  are  ever  \exing  themselves  with  the  discussion  of  ill-conceived 
matters.  They  seek  for  that  which  they  know,  and  know  not  that  for 
which  they  seek."— Leibnitz,  Nouveaax  Essais,  L.  II.  Ch.  21.  §  14. 


NOTE   XXIX.,  p.  106. 

See  the  acute  criticism  of  the  Kantian  distinction  between  things  and 
phenomena,  by  M.  Willm,  in  his  Histoire  de  la  Philosophic  Allemande,  Vol.  I. 
p.  177.  "  It  is  not  necessary  to  admit,  that  what  interposes  between  the 
objects  and  the  reason  alters  and  falsifies,  so  to  say,  the  view  of  the 
objects;  and  it  may  be  that  the  laws  of  the  mind  are  at  the  same  time  the 
laws  of  things  as  they  are.  Hegel  has  justly  said,  that  it  were  quite  pos 
sible,  that  after  having  penetrated  behind  the  scene,  which  is  open  before 
us,  we  should  find  nothing  there;  we  may  add,  that  it  is  possible,  that 
this  veil  —  which  seems  to  cover  the  picture,  and  which  we  are  striving 
to  lift  —  may  be  the  picture  itself."  Kant  unquestionably  went  too  far, 
in  asserting  that  things  in  themselves  are  not  as  they  appear  to  our  facul 
ties  :  the  utmost  that  his  premises  could  warrant  him  in  asserting  is,  that 
we  cannot  tell  whether  they  are  so  or  not.  And  even  this  degree  of  skep 
ticism,  though  tenable  as  far  as  external  objects  are  concerned,  cannot 
legitimately  be  extended  to  the  personal  self.  I  exist  as  I  am  conscious 
of  existing;  and  this  conscious  self  is  itself  the  Ding  an  sich,  the  standard 
by  which  all  representations  of  personality  must  be  judged,  and  from 
which  our  notion  of  reality,  as  distinguished  from  appearance,  is  originally 
derived.  To  this  extent  Jacobi's  criticism  of  Kant  is  just  and  decisive. 
"  All  our  philosophizing  is  a  struggle  to  get  behind  the  form  of  the  thing; 
i.  e.,  to  get  to  the  thing  itself;  but  how  is  this  possible,  since  then  we 

1  Ibid.,  p.  487.  2  JJfe  of  Jesus  Christ,  p.  399.  (Bohu's  edition.) 


292  NOTES.  LECT.  III. 

must  get  behind  ourselves,  behind  all  nature,  —  things,  behind  their 
origin?"! 

NOTE  XXX.,  p.  108. 

The  Intellectual  Intuition  of  Schelling  has  been  noticed  above.  See 
notes  16,  17,  18,  pp.  77  sqq.  The  method  of  Hegel,  in  its  aim  identical 
with  that  of  Schelling,  differs  from  it  chiefly  in  making  thought,  instead 
of  intuition,  the  instrument  of  reaching  the  Absolute.  As  Schelling 
assumes  the  possibility  of  an  intuition  superior  to  time  and  difference,  so 
Hegel  postulates  the  existence  of  a  logical  process  emancipated  from  the 
laws  of  identity  and  contradiction.  The  Understanding  and  the  Reason 
are  placed  in  sharp  antagonism  to  each  other.  The  one  is  a  faculty  of 
finite  thinking,  subject  to  the  ordinary  laws  of  thought :  the  other  is  a 
faculty  of  infinite  thinking,  to  which  those  laws  are  inapplicable.  Hence 
the  principles  of  Identity,  of  Contradiction,  and  of  Excluded  Middle  arc 
declared  to  be  valid  merely  for  the  abstract  understanding,  from  which 
reason  is  distinguished  by  the  principle  of  the  Identity  of  Contradictories.  - 
But  this  assertion,  indispensable  as  it  is  to  Hegel's  system,  involves  more 
consequences  than  the  author  himself  would  be  willing  to  admit.  The 
important  admission,  that  an  infinite  object  of  thought  can  only  be 
apprehended  by  an  infinite  act  of  thinking,  involves  the  conclusion,  that 
the  understanding  and  the  reason  have  no  common  ground  on  which 
either  can  make  itself  intelligible  to  the  other;  for  the  very  principles 
which  to  the  one  are  a  criterion  of  truth,  are  to  the  other  an  evidence 
of  falsehood.  Moreover,  the  philosophy  which  regards  the  union  of  con 
tradictories  as  essential  to  the  conceptions  of  the  reason,  is  bound  in  con 
sistency  to  extend  the  same  condition  to  its  judgments  and  deductions; 
for  whatever  is  one-sided  and  partial  in  the  analysis  of  a  notion,  must  be 
equally  so  in  those  more  complex  forms  of  thought  into  which  notions 
enter.  The  logic  of  the  understanding  must  be  banished  entirely,  or  nol 
at  all.  Hence  the  philosopher  may  neither  defend  his  own  system,  nor 
refute  his  adversary,  by  arguments  reducible  to  the  ordinary  logical  forms ; 
for  these  forms  rest  on  the  very  laws  of  thought  which  the  higher  philos 
ophy  is  supposed  to  repudiate.  Hegel's  own  polemic  is  thus  self-con- 

1  Ueber  das  Unternehmen  des  Kriticismus,  (  Werke  III.  p.  176). 

2  See  Logik,  B.  II.  c.  2;  EneyMop'ddie,  §  28,  115,  119,  Geschrchte  der  Philosophie, 
Werke,  XV.  p.  598.     See  also  his  attempt  to  rescue  speculative  philosophy  from 
the  assaults  of  skepticism,  Werke,  XIV.  p.  oil,  512.    He  charges  the  skeptic  with 
first  making  reason  finite,  in  order  to  overthrow  it  by  the  principles  of  finite 
thought.    The  defence  amounts  to  no  more  than  this :  "The  laws  of. thought  are 
against  me;  but  I  refuse  to  be  bound  by  their  authority." 


LECT.  III.  NOTES.  293 

dcmned ;  and  his  attempted  refutation  of  the  older  metaphysicians,  is  a 
virtual  acknowledgment  of  the  validity  of  their  fundamental  principles. 
If  the  so-called  infinite  thinking  is  a  process  of  thought  at  all,  it  must  be 
a  process  entirely  sui  generis,  isolated  and  unapproachable,  as  incapable  as 
the  intuition  of  Schelling  of  being  expressed  in  ordinary  language,  or 
compared,  even  in  antagonism,  with  the  processes  of  ordinary  reason 
ing.  The  very  attempt  to  expound  it  thus,  necessarily  postulates  its  own 
failure. 

But  this  great  thinker  has  rendered  one  invaluable  service  to  philos 
ophy.  He  has  shown  clearly  what  are  the  only  conditions  under  which  a 
philosophy  of  the  Absolute  could  be  realized;  and  his  attempt  has  done 
much  to  facilitate  the  conclusion,  to  which  philosophy  must  finally  come, 
that  the  Absolute  is  beyond  the  reach  of  human  thought.  If  such  a  phi 
losophy  were  possible  at  all,  it  would  be  in  the  form  of  the  philosophy  of 
Hegel.  And  Hegel's  failure  points  to  one  inevitable  moral.  All  the  above 
inconsistency  and  division  of  the  human  mind  against  itself,  might  be 
avoided  by  acknowledging  the  supreme  authority  of  the  laws  of  thought 
over  all  human  speculation ;  and  by  recognizing  the  consequent  distinc 
tion  between  positive  and  negative  thinking,  —  between  the  lawful  exer 
cise  of  the  reason  within  its  own  province,  and  its  abortive  efforts  to  pass 
beyond  it.  But  such  an  acknowledgment  amounts  to  a  confession  that 
thought  and  being  are  not  identical,  and  that  reason  itself  requires  us  to 
believe  in  truths  that  are  beyond  reason.  And  to  this  conclusion  specu 
lative  philosophy  itself  leads  us,  if  in  no  other  way,  at  least  by  the  whole 
some  warning  of  its  own  pretensions  and  failures. 

NOTE  XXXI.,  p.  108. 

Tertullian,  De  Carne  Christi,  c.  5.  "The  Son  of  God  was  born;  that 
awakens  no  shame,  precisely  because  it  is  shameful ;  and  the  Son  of  God 
died;  it  is  thoroughly  credible,  because  it  is  absurd;  He  was  buried  and 
then  rose  again;  it  is  certain,  because  it  is  impossible." 

NOTE  XXXII.,  p.  110. 
See  above,  Lecture  II.,  note  37. 

NOTE  XXXHL,  p.  113. 

Hooker,  E.  P.  B.  I.  ch.  ii.  §  2.  Compare  the  words  of  Jacobi,  An 
FicUe  (Werke,  III.,  p.  7).  "A  God,  who  could  be  known,  were  no  God 
at  all." 

25* 


294  NOTES.  LECT.  IV. 


LECTURE    IV. 

NOTE  I.,  p.  114. 

Thus  Wegscheider,  after  expressly  admitting  (Instit.  Theol.  §  52)  that 
the  infinite  cannot  be  comprehended  by  the  finite,  and  that  its  idea  can 
only  be  represented  by  analogy  and  symbol,  proceeds  to  assert,  with 
the  utmost  confidence,  that  the  attributes  of  omnipotence  and  omniscience 
do  not  truly  represent  the  internal  nature  of  God  (§  69);  that  a  plurality 
of  persons  in  the  Godhead  is  manifestly  repugnant  to  reason,  and  that  the 
infinite  God  cannot  assume  the  nature  of  finite  man  (§  92);  that  the  fall 
of  man  is  inconsistent  with  the  divine  attributes  (§  117);  that  repentance 
is  the  only  mode  of  expiating  sin  reconcilable  with  the  moral  nature  of 
God  (§  138);  that  the  doctrine  of  Christ's  intercession  is  repugnant  to  the 
divine  nature  (§  143). 

By  a  somewhat  similar  inconsistency,  Mr.  Newman,  while  fully  acknowl 
edging  that  we  cannot  have  any  perfect  knowledge  of  an  infinite  mind, 
and  that  infinity  itself  is  but  a  negative  idea,  yet  thinks  it  necessary  to 
regard  the  soul  as  a  separate  organ  of  specific  information,  by  which  we 
are  in  contact  with  the  infinite;  and  dogmatizes  concerning  the  similarity 
of  divine  and  human  attributes,  in  a  manner  which  nothing  short  of  abso 
lute  knowledge  can  justify.  (See  The  Soul,  pp.  1,  3,  34,  54,  58.)  He  com 
pares  the  infinite  to  the  "  illimitable  haziness  "  which  bounds  the  sphere 
of  distinct  vision.  The  analogy  would  be  serviceable  to  his  argument,  if 
we  possessed  two  sets  of  eyes,  one  for  clearness  and  one  for  haziness ;  one 
to  be  limited,  and  the  other  to  discern  the  limitation.  The  hypothesis  of 
a  separate  faculty  of  consciousness,  whether  called  soul,  reason,  or  intel 
lectual  intuition,  to  take  cognizance  of  the  infinite,  is  only  needed  for 
those  philosophers  who  undertake  to  develop  a  complete  philosophy  of 
the  infinite  as  such.  But  the  success  of  the  various  attempts  in  this  prov 
ince  has  not  been  such  as  to  give  any  trustworthy  evidence  of  the  exist 
ence  of  such  a  faculty. 

NOTE  II.,  p.  115. 
See  above,  Lecture  I.,  note  3. 

NOTE  III.,  p.  115. 

See  Mr.  Rose's  remarks  on  the  reaction  against  the  "Wolfian  demonstra 
tive  method.  State  of  Protestantism  in  Germany,  p.  206  (second  edition). 


LECT.  IV.  NOTES.  295 


NOTE  IV.,  p.  116. 

See  Kant,  Kritik  der  reinen  Vernunft,  p.  497.  ed.  Rosenkranz.  This 
admission,  rightly  understood,  need  not  be  considered  as  detracting  from 
the  value  of  the  speculative  arguments  as  auxiliaries.  All  that  is  con 
tended  for  is,  that  the  foundation  must  be  laid  elsewhere,  before  their 
assistance,  valuable  as  it  is,  can  be  made  available.  Thus  understood, 
this  view  coincides  with  that  expressed  by  Sir  W.  Hamilton,  in  the 
second  of  the  Lectures  on  Metaphysics,  shortly  to  be  published,  "  that 
the  phenomena  of  matter,  taken  by  themselves  (you  will  observe  the 
qualification,  taken  by  themselves),  so  far  from  warranting  any  infer 
ence  to  the  existence  of  a  God,  would,  on  the  contrary,  ground  even  an 
argument  to  his  negation,  —  that  the  study  of  the  external  world,  taken 
with  and  in  subordination  to  that  of  the  internal,  not  only  loses  its 
atheistic  tendency,  but,  under  such  subservience,  may  be  rendered  con 
ducive  to  the  great  conclusion,  from  which,  if  left  to  itself,  it  would 
dissuade  us."  The  atheistic  tendency  is  perhaps  too  strongly  stated; 
as  the  same  phenomena  may  be  surveyed,  by  different  individuals,  in 
different  spirits  and  with  different  results ;  but  the  main  position,  that 
the  belief  in  God  is  primarily  based  on  mental,  and  not  on  material 
phenomena,  accords  with  the  view  taken  in  the  text. 


NOTE  V.,  p.  116. 

Kant,  Kritik  der  r.  V.,  p.  488.  Compare  Hume,  Dialogues  concerning 
Natural  Religion,  Part  V.  Kant's  argument  is  approved  by  Hegel, 
Philosophic  der  Religion  (Werke,  XII.  p.  37).  The  objection  which  it 
urges  is  of  no  value,  unless  we  admit  that  man  possesses  an  adequate 
notion  of  the  infinite,  as  such.  Otherwise  the  notion  of  power  indefinitely 
great,  which  the  phenomena  certainly  suggest,  is,  both  theoretically 
and  practically,  undistinguishable  from  the  infinite  itself.  This  has 
been  well  remarked  by  a  recent  writer.  See  Selections  from  the  Corre 
spondence  of  B.  E.  H.  Greyson,  Am.  Ed.,  p.  550. 


NOTE  VI.,  p.  116. 

Jowett,  Epistles  of  St.  Paul,  Vol.  II.  p.  406.  Professor  Jowett  considers 
the  comparison  between  the  -works  of  nature  and  those  of  art  as  not 
merely  inadequate,  but  positively  erroneous.  He  says,  "As  cei'tainly 
as  the  man  who  found  a  watch  or  piece  of  mechanism  on  the  sea 
shore  would  conclude,  '  here  are  marks  of  design,  indications  of  an 


296  NOTES.  LECT.  IV. 

intelligent  artist/  so  certainly,  if  he  came  across  the  meanest  or  the 
highest  of  the  works  of  nature,  would  he  infer,  '  this  was  not  made  by 
man,  nor  by  any  human  art  and  skill.'  He  sees  at  first  sight  that  the  sea 
weed  beneath  his  feet  is  something  different  in  kind  from  the  productions 
of  man." l  But  surely  the  force  of  the  ideological  argument  does  not 
turn  upon  the  similarity  of  the  objects,  but  upon  their  analogy.  The 
point  of  comparison  is,  that  in  the  works  of  nature,  as  well  as  in  those 
of  art,  there  is  an  adaptation  of  means  to  ends,  which  indicates  an 
intelligent  author.  And  such  an  adaptation  may  exist  in  an  organized 
body,  no  less  than  in  a  machine,  notwithstanding  numerous  differences 
in  the  details  of  their  structure.  The  evidence  of  this  general  analogy 
is  in  nowise  weakened  by  Professor  Jowctt's  special  exceptions. 

NOTE  VII.,  p.  116. 

"When  the  spiritual  man  (as  such)  cannot  judge,  the  question  is 
removed  into  a  totally  different  court  from  that  of  the  Soul,  the  court 
of  the  critical  understanding.  .  .The  processes  of  thought  have  nothing 
to  quicken  the  conscience  or  affect  the  soul."  F.  W.  Newman,  The 
Soul,  p.  245  (second  edition). —  Yet  he  allows  in  another  place  (not  quite 
consistently)  that  "  pure  intellectual  error,  depending  on  causes  wholly 
unmoral,  may  and  does  perpetuate  moral  illusions,  which  are  of  the 
deepest  injury  to  spiritual  life."  p.  169.  Similar  in  principle,  though 
not  pushed  to  the  same  extreme  consequences,  is  the  theory  of  Mr. 
Morell,  who  says,  "Reason  up  to  a  God,  and  the  best  you  can  do  is 
to  hypostatize  and  deify  the  final  product  of  your  own  faculties;  but 
admit  the  reality  of  an  intellectual  intuition  (as  the  mass  of  mankind 
virtually  do),  and  the  absolute  stands  before  us  in  all  its  living  reality."  2 
This  distinction  he  carries  so  far  as  to  assert  that  "  to  speak  of  logic, 
as  such,  being  inspired,  is  a  sheer  absurdity;"  because  "the  process 
either  of  defining  or  of  reasoning  requires  simply  the  employment  of 
the  formal  laws  of  thought,  the  accuracy  of  which  can  be  in  no  way 
affected  by  any  amount  of  inspiration  whatever:"3  and  in  another  pas 
sage  he  maintains,  to  the  same  effect,  that  "  the  essential  elements  of 
religion  in  general,  as  of  Christianity  in  particular,  appertain  strictly 

1  This  argument  is  substantially  the  same  with  that  of  Hume,  Dialogues  con 
cerning  Natural  Religion,  Part  II.    "  If  we  see  a  house,  we  conclude,  with  the  great 
est  certainty,  that  it  had  an  architect  or  builder  .  .  .  But  surely  you  will  not 
affirm  that  the  universe  bears  such  a  resemblance  to  a  house,  that  we  can  with  the 
same  certainty  infer  a  similar  cause." 

2  Philosophy  of  Religion,  p.  39. 

3  Ibid.,  p.  173, 174. 


LECT.  IV  NOTES.  297 

to  the  intuitional  portion  of  our  nature,  and  may  be  realized  in  all 
their  varied  influence  without  the  cooperation  of  any  purely  reflective 
processes."1  Here  he  apparently  overlooks  the  fact  that  the  intuitive 
and  reflective  faculties  invariably  act  in  conjunction;  that  both  are 
equally  necessary  to  the  existence  of  consciousness  as  such;  and  that 
logical  forms  are  never  called  into  operation,  except  in  conjunction 
with  the  matter  on  which  they  are  exercised. 


NOTE  VIIL,  p.  119. 

In  acknowledging  Expiation  as  well  as  Prayer  to  be  prompted  by 
the  natural  feelings  of  men,  I  have  no  intention  of  controverting  the 
opinion,  so  ably  maintained  by  Archbishop  Magee  and  Mr.  Faber,  of 
the  divine  origin  of  the  actual  rite  of  sacrifice.  That  the  religious 
instincts  of  men  should  indicate  the  need  of  supplication  and  expiation, 
is  perfectly  consistent  with  the  belief  that  the  particular  mode  of  both 
may  have  been  first  taught  by  a  primitive  revelation.  That  religion, 
in  both  its  constituent  elements,  was  communicated  to  the  parents  of 
the  human  race  by  positive  revelation,  seems  the  most  natural  inference 
from  the  Mosaic  narrative.2  Yet  we  may  admit  that  the  positive  institu 
tion  must  from  the  first  have  been  adapted  to  some  corresponding  instinct 
of  human  nature;  without  which  it  would  be  scarcely  possible  to  account 
for  its  continuance  and  universal  diffusion,  as  well  as  for  its  various 
corruptions.  We  may  thus  combine  the  view  of  Archbishop  Magee  with 
that  exhibited  by  Dr.  Thomson.  Bampton  Lectures,  pp.  30,  48. 


NOTE  IX.,  p.  121. 

That  the  mere  feeling  of  dependence  by  itself  is  not  necessarily  religion, 
is  shown  by  Hegel,  Philosophic  der  Religion  (  Werke  XII.  p.  173).  Speak 
ing  of  the  Roman  worship  of  evil  influences,  Angerona,  Fames,  Robigo, 
etc.,  he  rightly  remarks  that  in  such  representations  all  conception  of 
Deity  is  lost,  though  the  feeling  of  fear  and  dependence  remains.  To  the 
same  effect  is  his  sarcastic  remark  that,  according  to  Schleiermacher's 
theory,  the  dog  is  the  best  Christian.3  Mr.  Parker  (Discourse  of  Religion, 

1  Philosophy  of  Religion,  p.  193. 

2  Even  Mr.  Davison,  who  contends  for  the  human  origin  of  the  patriarchal 
sacrifices,  which  he  regards  as  merely  eucharistic  and  penitentiary,  expressly 
admits  the  divine  appointment  of  expiatory  offerings.    See  his  Inquiry  into  the 
Origin  of  Primitive  Sacrifice  (Remains,  p.  121). 

3  See  Eosenkranz,  He§eVs  Leben,  p.  346. 


298  NOTES.  LECT.  IV. 

Ch.  1.)  agrees  with  Sclileiermacher  in  resolving  the  religious  sentiment 
into  a  mere  sense  of  dependence;  though  he  admits  that  this  sentiment 
does  not,  itself,  disclose  the  character  of  the  object  on  which  it  depends. 
Referred  to  this  principle  alone,  it  is  impossible  to  regard  religious  wor 
ship  as  a  moral  duty. 

NOTE  X.,  p.  121. 

See  Kant,  MetapTiysik  der  Sitten,  Abschn.  II.  (pp.  61,  71.  ed.  Rosen- 
kranz.)  His  theory  has  been  combated  by  Julius  M tiller,  Christliche 
Lehre  von  der  Siinde,  B.  I.  c.  2.  Compare  also  Hooker,  E.  P.  I.  ix.  2. 
Some  excellent  remarks  to  the  same  effect  will  be  found  in  McCosh's 
Method  of  the  Divine  Government,  p.  298  (fourth  edition),  and  in  Barthol- 
mess,  Histoire  des  doctrines  reliyieuses  de  la  philosophic  moderne,  vol.  i.  p.  405. 

NOTE  XL,  p.  122. 

The  theory  which  regards  absolute  morality  as  based  on  the  immutable 
nature  of  God,  must  not  be  confounded  with  that  which  places  it  in  his  arbi 
trary  will.  The  latter  view,  which  was  maintained  by  Scotus,  Occam,  and 
others  among  the  schoolmen,  is  severely  criticized  by  Sir  James  Mackin 
tosh,  Dissertation  on  the  Progress  of  Ethical  Philosophy,  section  III.,  and  by 
Miiller,  Christliche  Lehre  von  der  Siinde,  B.  I.  c.  3.  The  former  principle 
is  adopted  by  Cudworth  as  the  basis  of  his  treatise  on  Eternal  and  Im 
mutable  Morality.  See  B.  I.  c.  3.  B.  IV.  c.  4. 

NOTE  XII.,  p.  122. 

On  the  universality  of  expiatory  rites,  see  Magee  on  the  Atonement, 
note  V.  On  their  origin,  see  the  same  work,  notes  XLL,  XLVI.  to  LI., 
LIV.  to  LVIIL,  and  Mr.  Faber's  Treatise  on  the  Origin  of  Expiatory  Sac 
rifice. 

NOTE  XIII.,  p.  123. 
Schleiermacher,  Christliche  Glaube,  §  4. 

NOTE  XIV.,  p.  124. 

Morell,  Philosophy  of  Religion,  p.  75.  Mr.  Morell  here  goes  beyond  the 
theory  of  his  master,  Schleiermacher.  The  latter  ( Christliche  Glaube,  §  4) 
admits  that  this  supposed  feeling  of  absolute  dependence  can  never  be 


LECT.  IV.  NOTES.  299 

completely  attained  in  any  single  act  of  consciousness,  but  is  generally 
suggested  by  the  whole.  Mr.  Morell  speaks  as  if  we  could  be  immediately 
conscious  of  our  own  annihilation,  by  a  direct  intuition  of  the  infinite. 
Both  theories  are  inadequate  to  prove  the  intended  conclusion.  That  of 
Schleiermacher  virtually  amounts  to  a  confession  that  the  infinite  is  not  a 
positive  object  of  consciousness,  but  a  mere  negation  suggested  by  the 
direct  presence  of  the  finite.  That  of  Mr.  Morell  saves  the  intuition  of 
the  infinite,  but  annihilates  itself;  for  if  in  any  act  of  consciousness  the 
subject  becomes  absolutely  nothing,  the  consciousness  must  vanish  with 
it;  and  if  it  stops  at  any  point  short  of  nothing,  the  object  is  not  infinite. 

NOTE  XV.,  p.  125. 

That  this  is  the  legitimate  result  of  Schleiermacher's  theory,  may  be 
gathered  from  a  remarkable  passage  in  the  Christtiche  Glaube,  §  8,  in 
which  the  polytheistic  and  monotheistic  feelings  of  piety  are  compared 
together.  The  former,  he  says,  is  always  accompanied  by  a  sensible  rep 
resentation  of  its  object,  in  which  there  is  contained  a  germ  of  multi 
plicity;  but  in  the  latter,  the  higher  consciousness  is  so  separated  from 
the -sensible,  that  the  pious  emotions  admit  of  no  greater  difference  than 
that  of  the  elevating  or  depressing  tone  of  the  feeling.  This  seems  to 
imply  that,  in  Schleiermacher's  opinion,  to  worship  a  God  of  many  attri 
butes,  is  equivalent  to  worshipping  a  plurality  of  Gods.  And  to  those 
philosophers  who  make  the  Infinite  in  itself  a  direct  object  of  religious 
worship,  this  identification  is  natural ;  for  a  God  of  many  attributes  can 
not  be  conceived  as  infinite,  and  therefore  in  one  sense  partakes  of  the 
limited  divinity  of  Polytheism.  But,  on  the  other  hand,  a  God  of  no 
attributes  is  no  God  at  all;  and  the  so-called  monotheistic  piety  is  nothing 
but  an  abortive  attempt  at  mystical  self-annihilation.  Some  acute  stric 
tures  on  Schleiermacher's  theory  from  this  point  of  view  will  be  found  in 
Drobisch,  Grundlehren  der  Rdigionsphilosophie,  p.  84. 

NOTE  XVI.,  p.  126. 

Schleiermacher  himself  admits  (Christtiche  Glaube,  §  33)  that  the  theory 
of  absolute  dependence  is  incompatible  with  the  belief  that  God  can  be 
moved  by  any  human  action.  He  endeavors,  however,  to  reconcile 
this  admission  with  the  duty  of  prayer,  by  maintaining  (§  147)  that  the 
true  Christian  will  pray  for  nothing  but  that  which  it  comes  within  God's 
absolute  purpose  to  grant.  This  implies  something  like  omniscience  in 
the  true  Christian,  and  something  like  hypocrisy  in  every  act  of  prayer. 


300  NOTES.  LECT.  IV. 

NOTE  XVIL,  p.  126. 

Schleiermacher  (Chr.  Glaube,  §  49)  attempts,  not  very  successfully,  to 
meet  this' objection,  by  maintaining  that  even  our  free  acts  are  dependent 
upon  the  will  of  God.  This  is  doubtless  true ;  but  it  is  true  as  an  article 
of  faith,  not  as  a  theory  of  philosophy :  it  may  be  believed,  but  cannot  be 
conceived,  nor  represented  in  any  act  of  human  consciousness.  The 
apparent  contradiction  implied  in  the  coexistence  of  an  infinite  and  a 
finite,  will  remain  unsolved;  and  is  most  glaring  in  the  theories  of  those 
philosophers,  who,  like  Schleiermacher  (§  54),  maintain  that  God  actually 
does  all  that  he  can  do.  The  only  solution  is  to  confess  that  we  have  no 
true  conception  of  the  infinite  at  all.  Schleiermacher  himself  is  unable  to 
avoid  the  logical  consequence  of  his  position.  He  admits  (§  80)  that  God's 
omnipotence  is  limited  if  we  do  not  allow  him  to  be  the  author  of  sin; 
though  he  endeavors  to  soften  this  monstrous  admission  by  taking  it  in 
conjunction  with  the  fact  that  God  is  also  the  author  of  grace. 

NOTE  XVIII.,  p.  128. 

De  Augment! s  Scientiarum,  L.  III.  c.  1.  Compare  Theophilus  of  Antioch, 
Ad  Arttolycnm,  I.  5.  "  As  the  soul  in  the  human  body  is  not  seen,  being 
invisible  to  men,  but  is  made  known  through  the  movement  of  the  body, 
so  God  cannot  be  seen  by  human  and  bodily  eyes,  but  is  discovered  to 
human  intelligence  by  His  providence  and  His  works."  *  And  Athanasius, 
Contra  Gentes,  c.  35.  "  For  often  the  workman  is  recognized  in  his  works; 
as  they  say  of  the  sculptor  Phidias,  that  the  symmetry  and  nice  propor 
tions  of  his  works  revealed  him  to  the  beholders,  even  when  he  was  not 
present  himself,  so  the  order  of  the  universe  necessarily  reveals  the  divine 
Creator,  though  He  is  invisible  to  mortal  eyes."  On  the  other  hand, 
Hegel,  Philosophic  der  Religion  ( Werke,  XII.  p.  395),  insists  on  the  neces 
sity  of  knowing  God  as  He  is,  as  an  indispensable  condition  of  all  The 
ology. 

NOTE  XIX.,  p.  128. 

Justin.  Mart.  Apol.  I.  c.  6.  "Indeed,  Father,  and  God,  and  Lord,  and 
Master,  are  not  names,  but  only  appellatives,  derivatives  from  His  benefits 
and  His  works." —  Basil.  Adv.  Eunom.  I.  12.  "  As  to  the  conceit  of  having 
found  out  the  very  essential  being  of  God,  —  what  arrogance  and  pride 

l  Compare  a  similar  argument  in  Bishop  Berkeley,  Minute  Philosopher,  Dial. 
IV.  j  4. 


LECT.  IV.  NOTES.  801 

does  it  display!  ...  for  let  us  inquire  of  him,  by  what  method  he  boasts 
of  having  made  such  a  discovery?  is  it  from  the  common  conception? 
But  this  only  suggests  that  God  exists,  not  what  is  His  essence." —  Gregor. 
Nyssen.  Cuntr.  Eunom.  Orat.  XII.  "Thus  also  of  the  maker  of  the 
world,  —  we  know  that  He  is,  but  we  do  not  deny  that  we  are  ignorant  of 
the  mode  of  his  being."— Cyril.  Hieros.  Catech.  VI.  2.  "For  we  do  not 
point  out  what  God  is;  but  we  candidly  confess  that  we  have  no  accurate 
knowledge  of  Him,  for  in  things  pertaining  to  God,  it  is  great  knowledge, 
to  confess  our  ignorance." — Pascal,  Pensees,  Partie  II.  Art.  III.  §  5.  "We 
know  that  there  is  an  infinite,  and  we  are  ignorant  of  its  nature.  For 
example,  we  know  that  it  is  false,  that  numbers  are  finite;  then  it  is  true 
that  there  is  an  infinite  in  numbers.  But  we  do  not  know  what  it  is.  It  is 
false  that  it  is  even;  equally  so  that  it  is  uneven;  for,  in  adding  the  unit, 

it  does  not  change  its  nature;  nevertheless  it  is  a  number We  may, 

then,  well  know  that  there  is  a  God,  without  knowing,  what  He  is."  The 
distinction  is  strongly  repudiated  by  Hegel,  Werke,  XII.  p.  390.  Cf.  IX. 
p.  19.  XIV.  p.  219.  In  the  last  of  these  passages,  he  goes  so  far  as  to 
say,  that  to  deny  to  man  a  knowledge  of  the  infinite  is  the  sin  against  the 
Holy  Ghost.  The  ground  of  this  awful  charge  is  little  more  than  the  rep 
etition  of  an  observation  in  Aristotle's  Metaphysics,  that  God  is  not  envi 
ous,  and  therefore  cannot  withhold  from  us  absolute  knowledge. 

NOTE  XX.,  p.  129. 

Advancement  of  Learning,  p.  128.  cd.  Montagu.  Compare  De  Augmentis, 
III.  2. 

NOTE  XXI.,  p.  130. 

This  argument  is  excellently  drawn  out  in  Sir  W.  Hamilton's  forthcom 
ing  Lectures  on  Metaphysics,  Lectiu-e  II.  So  Mr.  F.  W.  Newman  observes, 
acutely  and  truly,  "  Nothing  but  a  consciousness  of  active  originating 
Will  in  ourselves  suggests,  or  can  justify,  the  idea  of  a  mighty  Will  per 
vading  Nature;  and  to  merge  the  former  in  the  latter,  is  to  sacrifice  the 
Premise  to  the  glory  of  the  Conclusion."  The  Soul,  p.  40  (second 
edition). 

NOTE  XXII.,  p.  130, 

Arist.  Metaph.  1.  5.  "Xenophanes  was  the  first  .  .  .  who,  on  surveying 
the  universe,  said  that  the  One  was  God." —  Cicero,  Acad.  Qucest.  IV.  37. 
"  Xenophanes  said  that  the  One  was  All,  and  that  that  was  not  change- 

26 


302  NOTES.  LECT.  IV. 

able,  and  was  God."— Apuleius,  Asdepius  Herm.  Trimeg.  c.  20.  "  For  I  do 
not  expect  that  the  Maker  of  all  majesty,  and  the  Father  or  Lord  of  all 
things  can  be  called  by  one  name,  though  that  were  made  up  of  many; 
but  that  He  be  unnamed  or  rather  all-named,  since  indeed  he  is  One  and 
All,  so  that  necessarily,  either  all  things  be  designated  by  his  name,  or 
He  himself  by  the  mimes  of  all  things." — Lessing,  as  quoted  by  Jacobi, 
Werke,  IV.  p.  54.  "  The  orthodox  notions  of  the  Deity  are  no  more  for 
me;  I  cannot  enjoy  them,  —  One  and  All.  I  know  nothing  else." —  Schel- 
ling,  Bruno,  p.  18-5.  "  So  the  All  is  One,  the  One  is  All,  both  the  same, 
not  different." 

NOTE  XXIIL,  p.  132. 

Clemens  Alex.  Stromata,  V.  11.  "If  therefore  ....  we  should  in  some 
way  draw  nigh  to  the  intelligence  of  the  Omnipotent,  we  should  come  to 
know,  not  what  He  is,  but  what  He  is  not."  —  Augustin.  Encur.  in  Psalm 
Ixxxv.  12.  "God  is  ineffable;  we  more  easily  say  what  He  is  not,  than 
what  He  is."—  Fichte,  Bestimmuny  des  Menschen  (  Werke,  II.  p.  305).  "  Thou 
wiliest,  —  for  thou  wilt,  that  my  free  obedience  have  consequences  unto  all 
eternity ;  the  act  of  Thy  Will  I  do  not  apprehend,  and  only  know,  that  it  is 
not  like  my  own." 

NOTE  XXIV.,  p.  132. 

The  distinction  between  speculative  and  regulative  knowledge  holds  an  im 
portant  place  in  the  philosophy  of  Kant;  but  his  mode  of  applying  it  is 
the  exact  reverse  of  that  adopted  in  the  text.  According  to  Kant,  the  idea 
of  the  absolute  or  unconditioned  has  a  regulative,  but  not  a  speculative 
value :  it  cannot  be  positively  apprehended  by  act  of  thought;  but  it  serves 
to  give  unity  and  direction  to  the  lower  conceptions  of  the  understanding; 
indicating  the  point  to  which  they  tend,  though  they  never  actually  reach  it. 
But  the  regulative  character  thus  paradoxically  assigned,  not  to  thought, 
but  to  its  negation,  in  truth  belongs  to  the  finite  conceptions  as  actually 
apprehended,  not  to  any  unapprehended  idea  of  the  infinite  beyond  them. 
Every  object  of  positive  thought,  being  conceived  as  finite,  is  necessarily 
regarded  as  limited  by  something  beyond  itself;  though  this  something  is 
not  itself  actually  conceived.  The  true  purpose  of  this  manifest  incom 
pleteness  of  all  human  thought,  is  to  point  out  the  limits  which  we  cannot 
pass;  not,  as  Kant  maintains,  to  seduce  us  into  vain  attempts  to  pass 
them.  If  there  is  but  one  faculty  of  thought,  that  which  Kant  calls  the 
Understanding,  occupied  with  the  finite  only,  there  is  an  obvious  end  to  be 
answered  in  making  us  aware  of  its  limits,  and  warning  us  that  the 


LECT.  IV.  NOTES.  303 

boundaries  of  thought  are  not  those  of  existence.  But  if,  with  Kant,  we 
distinguish  the  Understanding  from  the  Reason,  and  attribute  to  the  latter 
the  delusions  necessarily  arising  from  the  idea  of  tho  unconditioned,  we 
must  believe  in  the  existence  of  a  special  faculty  of  lies,  created  for  the  ex 
press  purpose  of  deceiving  those  who  trust  to  it.  In  the  philosophy  of  re 
ligion,  the  true  regulative  ideas,  which  arc  intended  to  guide  our  thoughts, 
are  the  finite  forms  under  which  alone  we  can  think  of  the  infinite  God; 
though  these,  while  we  employ  them,  betray  their  own  speculative  insuf 
ficiency  and  the  limited  character  of  all  human  knowledge. 

NOTE  XXV.,  p.  132. 

"  The  purport  of  these  remarks  is  only  this  ....  that,  in  the  further 
progress  of  the  investigations,  the  question  cannot  be,  what  and  how  God 
is  constituted  in  Himself,  but  only  how  we  have  to  think  of  Him  in  relation  to 
ourselves  and  the  ivhole  morally-natural  icorld.  For  by  our  faith  it  is  not  that 
the  being  of  God  is  theoretically  known,  but  only  His  existence,  in  the  special 
relation  to  the  moral  design  of  the  icorld,  is  revealed  for  us,  as  morally  constituted 
beings ;  and  this  is  in  a  double  sense  a  purely  relative  knowledge,  first  by 
being  limited  to  a  determined  nature  of  the  subject  that  knows,  and  sec 
ondly  by  the  determined  relation  of  the  object  that  is  known.  Hence  it 
follows,  that  there  is  nothing  to  be  said  here  of  the  knowledge  of  the 
essence,  the  quality  of  a  Being,  but  only  of  a  nearer  determination  of  the 
idea  of  God,  as  we  have  to  form  it,  from  our  point  of  view;  in  other  words, 
we  are  to  think  of  God  only  by  means  of  relations."  Drobisch,  Grundlehren 
der  Religionsphilosophie,  p.  189.  —  "The  Scripture  intimates  to  us  certain 
facts  concerning  the  Divine  Being :  but  conveying  them  to  us  by  the  me 
dium  of  language,  it  only  brings  them  before  us  darkly,  under  the  signs 
appropriate  to  the  thoughts  of  the  human  mind.  And  though  this  kind  of 
knowledge  is  abundantly  instructive  to  us  in  point  of  sentiment  and 
action ;  teaches  us,  that  is,  both  how  to  feel,  and  how  to  act,  towards  God ; 
—  for  it  is  the  language  that  we  understand,  the  language  formed  by  our 
own  experience  and  practice;  —  it  is  altogether  inadequate  in  point  of 
Science."  Hampden,  Bampton  Lectures,  p.  54  (second  edition).  —  "We 
should  rather  point  out  to  objectors  that  what  is  revealed  is  practical,  and 
not  speculative;  —  that  what  the  Scriptures  are  concerned  with  is,  not  the 
philosophy  of  the  Human  Mind  in  itself,  nor  yet  the  philosophy  of  the 
Divine  Nature  in  itself,  but  (that  which  is  properly  Religion)  the  relation 
and  connection  of  the  two  Beings;  —  what  God  is  to  us,  —  what  He  has 
done  and  will  do  for  us,  —  and  what  we  are  to  be  and  to  do,  in  regard  to 
Him."  Whately,  Sermons,  p.  56  (third  edition).  — Compare  Berkeley, 
Minute  Philosophy  Dial.  VII.  §  II. 


304  NOTES.  LECT.  V. 

LECTURE    Y. 

NOTE  I.,  p.  136. 
Analogy,  Part  I.  Ch.  VI. 

NOTE  II.,  p.  137. 

"When  he  (the  Skeptic)  awakes  from  his  dream,  he  will  be  the  first  to 
join  in  the  laugh  against  himself;  and  to  confess,  that  all  his  objections 
are  mere  amusement,  and  can  have  no  other  tendency  than  to  show  the 
whimsical  condition  of  mankind,  who  must  act,  and  reason,  and  believe; 
though  they  are  not  able,  by  their  most  diligent  inquiry,  to  satisfy  them 
selves  concerning  the  foundation  of  these  operations,  or  to  remove  the  ob 
jections  which  may  be  raised  against  them."  Hume,  Essay  on  the  Academ 
ical  Philosophy,  Part  II. 


NOTE   III.,  p.  137. 

See  Plato,  Parmenides,  p.  129,  Philebus,  p.  14,  Sophistes,  p.  251,  Republic, 
VII.  p.  524.  The  mystery  is  insoluble,  because  thought  cannot  explain  its 
own  laws ;  for  the  laws  must  necessarily  be  assumed  in  the  act  of  explana 
tion.  Every  object  of  thought,  as  being  one  object,  and  one  out  of  many, 
all  being  related  to  a  common  consciousness,  must  contain  in  itself  a  com 
mon  and  a  distinctive  feature ;  and  the  relation  between  these  two  consti 
tutes  that  very  diversity  in  unity,  without  which  no  thought  is  possible. 


NOTE  IV.,  p.  138. 

"  The  commerce  between  soul  and  body  is  a  reciprocal  dependence  of  de 
termination.  Accordingly  we  ask  in  the  first  place,  how  is  such  a  commerce 
possible  between  a  thinking  being  and  a  body?  .  .  .  The  foundation  of 
the  difficulty  seems  to  lie  here :  The  soul  is  an  object  of  the  inward  sensej 

and  the  body  an  object  of  the  outward Now  by  no  reason  do  we 

come  to  understand,  how  that  which  is  an  object  of  the  internal  sense,  is  to 
be  a  cause  of  that  which  is  an  object  of  the  outward."  Kant's  Vorlesungen 
tiber  die  Metaphysik,  (1821),  p.  224. 


LECT.  V.  NOTES.  305 

NOTE  V.,  p.  139. 

"  When  we  examine  the  idea  which  we  have  of  all  finite  minds,  we  see 
no  necessary  connection  between  their  volition  and  the  movement  of  any 
body  whatsoever;  we  see,  on  the  contrary,  that  there  is  none  at  all,  and 
can  be  none." — Malebranche,  Recherche  de  la  Ve'rite,  L.VI.  Part  II.  Ch.  3. 
"Man  is,  to  himself,  the  most  astonishing  object  of  nature;  for  he  cannot 
conceive  what  body  is,  and  still  less  what  is  spirit,  and  least  of  all  can  he 
conceive  how  a  body  can  be  united  with  a  spirit.  That  is  the  acme  of  his 
difficulties;  .and  yet  that  is  his  own  being."— Pascal,  Pensees,  Partie  I.  Art 
vi.  §  26.  "  I  am,  to  be  sure,  compelled  to  believe,  —  that  is,  to  act  as  if  I 
thought,  that  my  tongue,  my  hand,  my  foot,  can  be  put  in  motion  by  my 
will;  but  how  a  mere  breath,  a  pressure  of  the  intelligence  upon  itself, 
such  as  the  will  is,  can  be  the  principle  of  motion  in  the  heavy  earthly 
mass, —  of  that  not  only  can  I  have  no  conception,  but  the  mere  assertion 
is,  before  the  tribunal  of  the  reflecting  intelligence,  nothing  but  sheer 
unintelligence."— Fichte,  Bestimmung  des  Menschen,  (Werke,  II.  p.  290.)  — 
Spino/a,  Ethica,  III.  2,  denies  positively  that  such  commerce  can  take 
place.  "  Neither  can  the  body  determine  the  mind  to  thought,  nor  the 
mind  the  body  to  motion,  or  to  quiet,  or  to  anything  else." 


NOTE  VI.,  p.  139. 

The  theory  of  Divine  Assistance  and  Occasional  Causes  was  partially 
hinted  at  by  Descartes,  and  more  completely  elaborated  by  his  followers, 
De  La  Forge  and  Malebranche.  See  Descartes,  Principia,  L.  II.  §  3G.  De 
La  Forge,  Trait  e  de  I' esprit  de  I'homme,  Ch.  XVI.  Malebranche,  Recherche 
de  la  Ve'rite',  L.  VI.  P.  II.  Ch.  3;  Entretiens  sur  la  Metaphysiqm,  Ent.  VII. 
Cf.  Hegel,  Geschichte  der  Phil  ( Werke,  XV.  p.  330.)  For  Leibnitz's  theory 
of  a  Preestablished  Harmony,  see  his  Systeme  nouveau  de  la  Nature,  §12  — 
15,  Opera,  ed.  Erdmann,  p.  127;  Troisieine  Eclair cissement,  Ibid.  p.  134; 
Theodice'e,  §  61,  Ibid.  p.  520.  A  brief  account  of  these  two  systems,  to 
gether  with  that  of  Physical  Influx,  which  is  rather  a  statement  of  the 
phenomenon,  than  a  theory  to  account  for  it,  is  given  by  Euler,  Lettres  a 
une  Princesse  d'Allemagne,  Partie  II.  Lettre  14.  ed.  Cournot;  and  by  Krug, 
Philos.  Lexikon ;  Art.  Gemeinschaft  der  Seele  und  des  Leibes.  The  hypothe 
sis,  that  the  commerce  of  soul  and  body  is  effected  by  means  of  a  Plastic 
Nature  in  the  soul  itself,  is  suggested  by  Cudworth,  Intellectual  System,  B.  I. 
Ch.  III.  §  37,  and  further  developed  by  Leclerc,  Bibliotheque  Clioisie,  II.  p. 
113,  who  supposes  this  plastic  nature  to  be  an  intermediate  principle,  dis 
tinct  from  both  soul  and  body.  See  Mosheim's  note  in  Harrison's  edition 
26* 


306  NOTES.  LECT.  V. 

of  Cudworth,  Vol.  1.  p.  248.  See  also  Leibnitz,  Sur  le  Principe  de  Vie, 
Opera,  ed.  Erdmann,  p.  429;  Laromiguiere,  Lemons  de  Philosophic,  P.  II. 
1.9. 

NOTE  VII.,  p.  139. 

These  two  analogies  between  our  natural  and  spiritual  knowledge  are 
adduced  in  a  remarkable  passage  of  Gregory  of  Nyssa,  Contra  Eunomium, 
Orat.  XII.  Of  the  soul,  and  its  relation  to  the  body,  he  says :...."  We 
live  in  ignorance  of  all  things,  of  ourselves  first  of  all,  and  then  of  all  other 
things.  For  who  is  there,  that  has  come  to  a  comprehension  of  his  own 
soul?  Who  has  a  knowledge  of  its  essence?  whether  it  is  material  or  im 
material?  Whether  purely  incorporeal,  or  whether  there  be  something 
corporeal  in  it  ?  how  it  comes  into  being,  how  it  is  regulated  ?  whence  it 
enters  the  body,  how  it  departs?"  etc.  (Opera,  Paris.  1615.  Vol.  II.  p. 
321.)  Of  body  as  distinguished  from  its  attributes,  he  says:  "For  if 
any  one  were  to  analyze,  into  its  component  parts,  what  appears  to  the 
senses,  and,  having  stripped  the  subject  of  all  its  attributes,  should  strive 
to  get  a  knowledge  of  it,  as  it  is  in  itself,  I  do  not  see  what  would  be  left 
for  the  mind  to  contemplate  at  all.  For  once  take  away  color,  figure, 
weight,  size,  motion,  relativity,  each  one  of  which  is  not  of  itself  the 
body,  and  yet  all  of  them  belong  to  the  body,  —  what  will  be  left  to  stand 
for  the  body  ?  Whoever,  therefore,  is  ignorant  of  himself,  how  is  he  to 
have  knowledge  of  things  above  himself?  "  Ibid.  p.  322. 


NOTE  VIII.,  p.  139. 

Essay  on  the  Academical  Philosophy,  (Philosophical  Works,  Vol.  IV.  p. 
182.) 


NOTE  IX.,  p.  140. 

The  difficulty  is  ingeniously  stated  by  Pascal,  Penstes,  Partie  I.  Art  II. 
"  For  is  there  anything  more  absurd,  than  to  pretend,  that  in  dividing  ever 
a  space,  we  come  finally  to  such  a  division,  that  in  dividing  it  in  two,  each 
of  the  halves  remains  invisible,  and  without  any  extension?  I  would  ask 
those,  who  have  this  idea,  if  they  clearly  conceive  how  two  invisibles 
touch  each  other;  if  everywhere,  then  they  are  only  one  thing,  and  con 
sequently  the  two  together  are  indivisible;  and  if  not  everywhere,  then  it  is 
only  in  a  part  that  they  come  in  contact;  then  they  have  parts,  and  there 
fore  thev  are  not  indivisible." 


LECT.  V.  NOTES.  307 


NOTE  X.,  p.  142. 

Kant's  theory,  that  we  know  phenomena  only,  not  things  in  themselves, 
is  severely  criticized  by  Dr.  McCosh,  Method  of  the  Divine  Government,  p. 
536  (4th  edition).  I  have  before  observed  that  Kant  has,  in  two  points  at 
least,  extended  his  doctrine  beyond  its  legitimate  place;  first,  in  maintain 
ing  that  our  knowledge  of  the  personal  self  is  equally  phenomenal  with 
that  of  external  objects;  and  secondly,  in  dogmatically  asserting  that  the 
thing  in  itself  does  not  resemble  the  phenomenon  of  which  we  are  conscious, 
Against  the  first  of  these  statements  it  may  be  fairly  objected,  that  my 
personal  existence  is  identical  with  my  consciousness  of  that  existence; 
and  that  any  other  aspect  of  my  personality,  if  such  exists  in  relation  to 
any  other  intelligence,  is  in  this  case  the  phenomenon  to  which  my  per 
sonal  consciousness  furnishes  the  real  counterpart.  Against  the  second,  it 
may  be  objected,  that  if,  upon  Kant's  own  hypothesis,  we  arc  never  di 
rectly  conscious  of  the  thing  in  itself,  we  have  no  ground  for  saying  that 
it  is  unlike,  any  more  than  that  it  is  like,  the  object  of  which  we  are  con 
scious;  and  that,  in  the  absence  of  all  other  evidence,  the  probability  is  in 
favor  of  that  aspect  which  is  at  least  subjectively  true.  But  when  these 
deductions  are  made,  the  hypothesis  of  Kant,  in  its  fundamental  position, 
remains  unshaken.  It  then  amounts  to  no  more  than  this ;  that  we  can 
see  things  only  as  our  faculties  present  them  to  us ;  and  that  we  can  never 
be  sure  that  the  mode  of  operation  of  our  faculties  is  identical  with  that  of 
other  intelligences,  embodied  or  spiritual.  Within  these  limits,  the  theory 
more  nearly  resembles  a  truism  than  a  paradox,  and  contains  nothing 
that  can  be  regarded  as  formidable,  either  by  the  philosopher  or  by  the 
theologian. 

In  the  same  article,  Dr.  McCosh  criticizes  Sir  William  Hamilton's  cog 
nate  theory  of  the  relativity  of  all  knowledge.  With  the  highest  respect 
for  Dr.  McCosh's  philosophical  ability,  I  cannot  help  thinking  that  he  has 
mistaken  the  character  of  the  theory  which  he  censures,  and  that  the  ob 
jection  which  he  urges  is  hardly  applicable.  He  attempts  to  avail  himself 
of  Sir  W.  Hamilton's  own  theory  of  the  veracity  of  consciousness.  He 
asks,  "  Does  not  the  mind  in  sense-perception  hold  the  object  to  be  a  real 
object?"  Undoubtedly;  but  reality  in  this  sense  is  not  identical  with  ab 
solute  existence  unmodified  by  the  laws  of  the  percipient  mind.  Man  can 
conceive  reality,  as  he  conceives  other  objects,  only  as  the  laws  of  his 
faculties  permit;  and  in  distinguishing  reality  from  appearance,  he  is  not 
distinguishing  the  related  from  the  unrelated.  Both  appearance  and  re 
ality  must  be  given  in  consciousness,  to  be  apprehended  at  all;  and  the 
distinction  is  only  between  some  modes  of  consciousness,  such  as  those  of 
a  dream,  which  are  regarded  as  delusive,  and  others,  as  in  a  waking  state, 


308  NOTES.  LECT.  V. 

which  are  regarded  as  veracious.  But  consciousness,  whatever  may  be  its 
veracity,  can  tell  us  nothing  concerning  the  identity  of  its  objects  with 
those  of  which  we  are  not  conscious. 

Dr  McCosh,  in  the  above  criticism,  also  classes  Professor  Ferricr  as  a 
representative  of  the  same  school  with  Kant  and  Hamilton.    This  classifi 
cation  is  at  least,  questionable.    Professor  Terrier's  system  more  nearly 
approaches  to  the  Philosophy  of  the  Absolute  than  to  that  of  the  Relative. 
He  himself  distinctly  announces  that  he  undertakes  "to  lay  down  the 
laws  not  only  of  our  thinking  and  knowing,  but  of  all  possible  thinking 
and  knowing."!    Such  an  undertaking,  whether  it  be  successful  or  not, 
is,  in  its  conception,  the  very  opposite  of  the  system  which  maintains  t 
our  knowledge  is  relative  to  our  faculties. 

NOTE  XL,  p.  143. 
See  above,  Lecture  IV.  note  25. 

NOTE  XIL,  p.  143. 

"  It  is  the  same  with  other  mysteries,  where,  for  well  regulated  minds, 
there  is  always  to  be  found  an  explanation,  sufficient  for  faith,  but  never 
as  much  as  is  necessary  for  comprehension.  The  what  it  is  (rl  fen) 
is  sufficient  for  us;  but  the  how  (™s)  is  beyond  our  comprehension,  and 
is  not  at  all  necessary  for  us. "-Leibnitz,  Theodicfe,  Discours  de  la  con- 
formiU  de  la  Foi  avec  la  Raison,  §  56. 

NOTE  XIIL,  p.  144. 

"  It  is  plain,  that,  in  any  communication  from  an  Infinite  Being  to 
creatures  of  finite  capacities,  one  of  two  things  must  happen.  Either  the 
former  must  raise  the  latter  almost  to  His  own  level;  or  else  He  must 

the  form  of  His  communication  to  their  powers  of  apprehension If  we 

turn  to  Scripture,  however,  we  shall  see  how  this  matter  is  decided.  In 
God's  dealings  with  men  we  find  '  wrath/  'jealousy,'  '  repentance,'  and 
other  affections,  ascribed  to  the  Divine  Being.  He  is  described  as  '  sitting 
on  a  throne ; '  His  «  eyes  '  are  said  <  to  behold  the  children  of  men ; '  not 
to  mention  other  instances,  which  must  suggest  themselves  to  every  one, 
in  which  God  condescends  to  convey  to  us,  not  the  very  reality  indeed,  but 
something  as  near  the  reality  as  He  sees  it  expedient  for  us  to  know.' 
Professor  Lee,  The  Inspiration  of -Holy  Scripture,  pp.  63, 61  (second  edition). 

1  Institutes  of  Metaphysic,  p.  55. 


LECT.  V.  NOTES.  309 


NOTE  XIV.,  p.  146. 

Plato,  Sophist es,  p.  242.  "  But  our  Elcatic  sect,  from  Xenophanes,  and 
yet  earlier,  go  through  with  their  views,  as  if  what  we  call  all  were  in 
reality  only  one."  —  Sextus  Empiricus,  Pyrrh.  Hyp.  I.  225.  "  Xenophanes 
laid  down  the  doctrine  ....  that  the  All  was  One."  —  Arist.  Metaph.  II.  4. 
30.  "  For  whatever  is  different  from  that  which  is,  (entity),  is  not;  so 
that,  according  to  the  view  of  Parmenides,  it  must  of  necessity  be  the 
case,  that  all  things  that  are,  arc  one,  and  that  this  is  that  which  is 
(entity)."  — Plato,  Parmenides,  p.  127.  "How  is  it,  Zeno,  did  you  mean 
this,  that  if  the  things  in  being  are  many,  then  that  these  many  must  be 

like  and  unlike,  and  that  this  is  impossible did  you  not  say  so? 

Exactly  so,  said  Zeno."  —  Arist.  Soph.  Elench.  10.  2.  .  .'.  .  "Zeno  thought 
that  all  things  are  one  .  .  .  . "  —  Arist.  De  Colo  III.  1.  5.  "For  some  of 
these  did  away  altogether  with  the  idea  of  generation  and  of  dissolution; 
for  they  maintained  that  none  of  the  things  in  existence  really  came  into 
being,  and  perished,  but  that  all  this  only  appeared  so  to  us."  —  Diog. 
Laert.  ix.  24  (De  Melisso).  "It  seemed  to  him,  that  the  All  was  infinite, 
and  unchangeable,  and  immovable,  and  one,  like  itself,  and  complete; 
and  that  motion  was  not  real,  but  only  apparent."  Cf.  Plato,  Thecet-etus, 
p.  183.  Compare  Karsten,  Parmenidis  Reliquiae,  p.  157,  194.  Brandis, 
Commcntationes  Eleatia?.,  p.  213,  214. 

NOTE  XV.,  p.  146. 

Plato,  Thecet.  p.  152.  "I  will  tell  you,  — and  this  is  no  trifling  talk,— 
that  nothing  is  an  independent  unity,  and  that  you  can  rightly  attribute  to 
nothing  any  quality  whatsoever ;  but  if  you  call  a  thing  great,  it  will  at 
once  appear  small,  if  heavy,  light,  and  so  in  like  manner  of  all,  so  that 
nothing  is  one  or  somewhat  or  of  any  quality  soever;  but,  that  by  motion, 
change,  mixture,  all  things  together  are  only  becoming,  while  we  say 
wrongly  that  they  are;  for  nothing  ever  really  is,  but  all  things  are  ever 
becoming;  and  herein  are  the  philosophers  agreed,  Parmenides  excepted." 
—Diogenes  Laert.  ix.  51.  "  He  said  (Protagoras)  that  the  soul  was  nothing 
but  perceptions." — Aristot.  De  Xenophane,  Zenone  et  Gorgia,  c.  5.  (De  Gor- 
gia.)  "  He  said  that  there  was  nothing  in  existence;  and  if  there  were  any 
thing,  that  it  was  not  an  object  of  knowledge;  and  that  if  there  were  any 
thing  in  existence  and  an  object  of  knowledge,  it  could  not  be  made  known 
to  others."  .  .  .  .  "  What  we  call  a  mind,  is  nothing  but  a  heap  or  collection 
of  different  perceptions,  united  together  by  certain  relations,  and  supposed, 
though  falsely,  to  be  endowed  writh  a  perfect  simplicity  and  identity." 
Hume,  Treatise  of  Human  Nature,  Part  IV.  sect.  2.  — "  'Tis  confessed  by  the 


310  NOTES.  LECT.  V. 

most  judicious  philosophers,  that  our  ideas  of  bodies  are  nothing  but  col 
lections  formed  by  the  mind  of  the  ideas  of  the  several  distinct  sensible 
qualities,  of  which  objects  are  composed,  and  which  we  find  to  have  a 

constant  union  with  each  other The  smooth  and  uninterrupted 

progress  of  the  thought  ....  readily  deceives  the  mind,  and  makes  us 
ascribe  an  identity  to  the  changeable  succession  of  connected  qualities." 
Ibid.  sect.  3. 

NOTE  XVI.,  p.  146. 

"  We  must  come  now  to  the  great  question,  which  M.  Bayle  has  lately 
brought  upon  the  tapis,  —  namely,  whether  a  truth,  and  especially  a  truth 

of  faith,  can  be  subject  to  insolvable  objections lie  thinks  that,  in 

Theology,  the  doctrine  of  Predestination  is  of  this  nature,  and  in  Philoso 
phy  that  of  Continuity  (the  Continuum')  in  space.  These  are  in  fact  the 
two  labyrinths,  which  have  tried  theologians  and  philosophers  of  all  times. 
Libertus  Fromodus,  a  theologian  of  Louvain,  who  has  studied  much  the 
subject  of  Grace,  and  has  also  written  a  book,  entitled  Labyrintlius  da  com- 
posilione  Continui,  has  well  expressed  the  difficulties  of  each;  and  the 
famous  Ochin  has  well  represented  what  he  calls  the  Labyrinths  of  Predes 
tination."  Leibnitz,  The'odicee,  Discours  de  la  conformity  de  la  Foi  avec  la 
liaison,  §  24.  Compare  Sir  W.  Hamilton's  Discussions,  p.  632. 


NOTE  XVII.,  p.  147. 

See  Bishop  Browne's  criticism  of  Archbishop  King,  Procedure  of  the 
Understanding,  p.  15.  "  He  hath  unwarily  dropped  some  such  shocking 
expressions  as  these,  The  best  representations  we  can  make  of  God  are  infinitely 
short  of  Truth.  Which  God  forbid,  in  the  sense  his  adversaries  take  it;  for 
then  all  our  reasonings  concerning  Him  would  be  groundless  and  false. 
But  the  saying  is  evidently  true  in  a  favorable  and  qualified  sense  and 
meaning;  namely,  that  they  are  infinitely  short  of  the  real,  true,  internal 
Nature  of  God  as  He  is  in  Himself."  Compare  Divine  Analogy,  p.  57. 
"Though  all  the  Revelations  of  God  are  true,  as  coming  from  Him  who  is 
Truth  itself;  yet  the  truth  and  substance  of  them  doth  not  consist  in  this, 
that  they  give  us  any  new  set  of  ideas,  and  express  them  in  a  language 
altogether  unknown  before;  or  that  both  the  conceptions  and  terms  are 
so  immediately  and  properly  adapted  to  the  true  and  real  nature  of  the 
things  revealed,  that  they  could  not  without  great  impropriety  and  even 
profaneness  be  ever  applied  to  the  things  of  this  world.  But  the  truth  of 
them  consists  in  this;  that  whereas  the  terms  and  conceptions  made  use  of 
in  those  Revelations  are  strictly  proper  to  things  worldly  and  obvious ; 


LECT.  V.  NOTES.  oil 

they  are  from  thence  transferred  analogically  to  the  correspondent  objects 
of  another  world  with  as  much  truth  and  reality,  as  when  they  are  made 
use  of  in  their  first  and  most  literal  propriety;  and  this  is  a  solid  foundation 
both  of  a  dear  and  certain  knowledge,  and  of  a  firm  and  well  grounded 
Faith," 

NOTE  XVIIL,  p.  147. 

Augustin.  Confess.  1.  XIII.  c.  10.  "For  as  Thou  altogether  art,  so  Thou 
alone  knowest,  —  Thou,  who  art  unchangeably,  and  knowest  unchange 
ably,  and  wiliest  unchangeably.  And  Thy  essence  knoweth  and  willeth 
unchangeably,  and  Thy  knowledge  is  and  willeth  unchangeably,  and  Thy 
will  is,  and  knoweth  unchangeably.  Nor  doth  it  seem  right  in  Thy  sight, 
that,  as  the  Light  unchangeable  knoweth  itself,  so  It  be  known  by  the 
changeable  being,  that  is  enlightened  by  It." 


NOTE  XIX.,  p.  148. 

See  Hegel,  Philosophic  der  Geschichte,  Werke,  IX.  pp.  238,  298;  Philosophie 
der  Religion,  Werke,  XI.  p.  3*6,  XII.  p.  119.  Schleiermacher  substantially 
admits  the  same  facts,  though  he  attempts  to  connect  them  with  a  different 
theory .1  He  considers  that  there  is  a  pantheistic  and  a  personal  element 
united  in  all  religions :  and  this  is  perhaps  true  of  heathen  religions  sub 
jected  to  the  philosophical  analysis  of  a  later  age;  though  it  may  be 
doubted  whether  both  elements  are  distinctly  recognized  by  the  worship 
per  himself.  But  even  from  this  point  of  view,  the  Jewish  religion  stands 
in  marked  contrast  to  both  Eastern  and  Western  heathenism.  In  the 
latter  forms  of  religion,  the  elements  of  personality  and  infinity,  so  far  as 
they  are  manifested  at  all,  are  manifested  in  different  beings :  this  is  ob 
servable  both  in  the  subordinate  emanations  which  give  a  kind  of  second 
ary  personality  to  the  Indian  Pantheism,  and  in  the  philosophical  abstrac 
tion  of  a  supreme  principle  of  good,  which  connects  a  secondary  notion  of 
the  infinite  with  the  Grecian  Mythology.  The  Jewish  religion  still  remains 
distinct  and  unique,  in  so  far  as  in  it  the  attributes  of  personality  and  in 
finity  are  united  in  one  and  the  same  living  and  only  God. 


NOTE  XX.,  p.  150. 

"  And  the  Father,  who,  indeed,  in  respect  of  us,  is  invisible  and  indeter 
minable,  is  known  by  His  own  Word ;  and  being  indeclarable,  is  declared 

1  Reden  ilber  Religion,  (  Werke,  I.  pp.  401,  441.) 


312  NOTES.  LECT.  V. 

to  us  by  the  Word  Himself.  Again,  it  is  only  the  Father  that  knoweth  His 
Word;  and  that  both  these  things  are  so  hath  the  Lord  manifested.  And 
on  this  account  the  Son  revealeth  the  knowledge  of  the  Father  by  His  own 
manifestation.  For  the  knowledge  of  the  Father  is  the  manifestation  of 
the  Son ;  for  all  things  are  manifested  by  the  Word.  That  therefore  we 
might  know,  that  it  is  the  Son  himself  who  hath  come,  that  maketh  known 
the  Father  to  them  that  believe  on  Him,  he  said  to  his  disciples :  '  No 
man  knoweth  the  Son  but  the  Father,  neither  knoweth  any  man  the 
Father  but  the  Son,  and  he  to  whomsoever  the  Son  will  reveal  Him.'  " 
Irenaeus,  Contr.  Hveres.IV.  6,  3.  "Accordingly,  therefore,  the  Word  of 
God  became  incarnate,  and  lived  in  human  form,  that  He  might  quicken 
the  body,  and  that,  as  in  the  creation,  He  is  known  by  His  works,  so  also 
He  might  work  in  man,  and  manifest  Himself  everywhere,  leaving  nothing 
void  of  His  divine  nature  and  knowledge."  Athanasius,  De  Incarn.  Verbi 

c.  45 "  The  Son  of  God  became  incarnate  ....  in  order  that  man 

might  have  a  way  to  the  God  of  man  through  the  man-God.  For  He  is 
the  Mediator  of  God  and  man,  the  man  Christ  Jesus."  .  .  .  Augustin.  De 
Civ.  Dei,  XL  2. 


NOTE  XXL,  p.  150. 

"  We  who  believe  that  God  lived  upon  the  earth,  and  that  He  took  upon 
Him  the  lowliness  of  human  form  for  the  sake  of  man's  salvation,  arc  far 
from  the  opinion  of  those  who  think  that  God  has  no  care  for  anything." 
Tertullian,  Adv.  Marc.  II.  16. 


NOTE  XXII. ,  p.  150. 

It  is  only  a  natural  consequence  of  their  own  principles,  when  the  advo 
cates  of  a  philosophy  of  the  Absolute  maintain  that  the  Incarnation  of 
Christ  has  no  relation  to  time.  Thus  Schelling  says :  "  The  theologians 
also  expound,  in  like  empiric  manner,  the  Incarnation  of  God  in  Christ,  — 
that  God  took  upon  Him  human  nature  in  a  definite  momentum  of  time,  a 
thing  impossible  of  conception,  as  God  is  eternally  out  of  all  time.  The 
Incarnation  of  God  is  therefore  an  incarnation  from  eternity  (a  becoming 
'manifest  in  the  flesh' from  all  eternity)  .  .  .  .  "l  Hegel,  in  his  Lectures 
on  the  Philosophy  of  History,2  thus  comments  on  the  language  of  St. 
Paul :  "  When  the  fulness  of  time  was  come,  God  sent  forth  his  Son ;  such  is 

1  Yorlesungen  uber  die  Methode  des  Academischen  Studium,  p.  192.     Fitche  speaks 
to  the  same  effect,  Anweisung  zum  seligen  Leben  ( Werke,  V.  p.  482). 

2  Werke,IX.\t.S86. 


LECT.  V.  NOTES.  313 

the  language  of  the  Bible.  That  means  nothing  else  than  this :  the  self- 
consciousness  had  risen  up  to  those  momenta,  which  belong  to  the  con 
ception  of  the  Spirit,  and  to  the  necessity  of  apprehending  these  momenta 
after  an  absolute  method."  This  marvellous  elucidation  of  the  sacred  text 
may  perhaps  receive  some  further  light,  or  darkness,  from  the  obscure 
passages  of  the  same  author,  quoted  subsequently  in  the  text  of  this  Lec 
ture  :  and  such  is  the  explanation  of  his  theory  given  by  Baur,  Christliche 
Gnosis,  p.  715 :  "  From  the  stand-point  of  speculative  thought,  the  Incarna 
tion  is  no  single  historical  fact,  once  taken  place,  but  an  eternal  deter 
mination  of  the  essential  nature  of  God,  by  virtue  of  which  God  only  so 
far  becomes  man  (in  every  individual  man)  as  He  is  man  from  eternity.  The 
sorrowful  humiliation  to  which  Christ  made  Himself  subject  as  God-man, 
God  bears  at  all  times  as  man.  The  atonement  achieved  by  Christ  is  not 
a  fact  which  has  come  to  pass  in  time,  but  an  eternal  reconciliation  of  God 
with  Himself,  arid  the  resurrection  and  exaltation  of  Christ  is  only  the  re 
gress  of  the  Spirit  to  itself.  Christ  as  man,  as  God-man,  is  man  in  his 
universality,  not  a  particular  individual,  but  the  universal  individual."  It 
is  no  wonder  that,  to  a  philosophy  of  these  lofty  pretensions,  the  personal 
existence  of  Christ  should  be  a  question  of  perfect  indifference.1  From  a 
similar  point  of  view,  Marheineke  says :  "  The  incarnation  of  God,  appre 
hended  in  its  possibility,  is  the  real  incarnation  of  divine  truth,  which  is 
not  only  the  thought  of  God,  but  also  his  very  essence;  and  Divine  and 
Human,  though  still  different,  are  yet  no  longer  separate."  Grundlehren 
der  Christlichen  Dogmatik,  §  312.  It  is  difficult  to  see  what  distinction  can 
be  made,  in  these  theories,  between  the  Incarnation  of  Christ  as  Man,  and 
His  eternal  Generation  as  the  Son  of  God;  and  indeed  these  passages,  and 
those  subsequently  quoted  from  Hegel,  appear  intentionally  to  identify 
the  two. 

NOTE  XXIII.,  p.  151. 

Encyklopddie,  §§  564,  566.  For  the  benefit  of  any  reader  who  may  be 
disposed  to  play  the  part  of  CEclipus,  I  subjoin  the  entire  passage  in  the 
original.  The  meaning  may  perhaps,  as  Professor  Ferrier  observes  of 
Hegel's  philosophy  in  general,  be  extracted  by  distillation,  but  certainly 
not  by  literal  translation. 

"Was  Gott  als  Geist  ist,  —Dies  richtig  und  bestimmt  im  Gedanken  zu 
fassen,  dazu  wird  griindliche  Speculation  erfordert.  Es  sind  zunachst  die 

1  For  a  criticism  of  these  pantheistic  perversions  of  Christianity,  see  Drobisch, 
Grundlehren  der  ReMgionspliilosophie,  p.  247.  The  consummation  of  the  pantheistic 
view  may  be  found  in  Blasche,  Philosophiscke  Unsterblichkeitlehre,  §  51-53.  Here 
the  eternal  Incarnation  of  God  is  exhibited  as  the  perpetual  production  of  men, 
a«  phenomenal  manifestations  of  the  absolute  unity. 

27 


314  NOTES.  LECT.  V. 

Siitze  darin  enthalten :  Gott  ist  Gott  nur  in  sofern  er  sich  selber  weiss;  sein 
sich  Sich-wissen  ist  ferner  sein  Selbstbewusstseyn  im  Menschen,  und  das 
Wissen  des  Menschen  von  Gott,  das  fortgeht  zura  Sich-wissen  des  Men 
schen  in  Gott. 

Der  absolute  Geist  in  dcr  aufgehobenen  Unmittelbarkeit  und  Sinnlichkeit 
der  Gestalt  und  des  Wissens,  ist  dem  Inhalte  nach  der  an-und-fiir-sich- 
seyende  Geist  der  Natur  und  des  Geistes,  der  Form  nach  ist  er  zunachst 
fiir  das  subjective  Wissen  der  Vorstdlung.  Diese  giebt  den  Momenten 
seines  Inhalts  einerseits  Selbststandigkeit  und  macht  sie  gegen  einander  zu 
Voraussetzungen,  and  zu  einander  folgenden  Erscheinungen  und  zu  eineni 
Zusammenhang  des  Geschehens  nach  endlichen  Refiexionsbestimmungen ;  ander- 
seits  wird  solche  Form  endlicher  Vorstcllungsweise  in  dcm  Glauben  an 
den  Einen  Geist  und  in  der  Andacht  des  Cultus  aufgehoben. 

In  diesem  Trenncn  scheidet  sich  die  Form  von  dem  Inhidte,  und  in  jener 
die  unterschiedenen  Momente  des  Begriffs  zu  besondern  Spharcn  oder  Ele- 
menten  ab,  in  deren  jedem  sich  der  absolute  Inhalt  darstellt,  —  a)  als  in 
seiner  Manifestation  bei  sich  selbst  bleibender,  Ewiger  Inhalt;  —  ft)  als 
Unterscheidung  des  ewigen  Wesens  von  seiner  Manifestation,  welche  durch 
diesen  Unterschicd  die  Erscheinungswelt  wird,  in  die  der  Inhalt  tritt; — 7) 
als  unendliche  Riickkehr  und  Versohnung  der  entausserten  Welt  mit  dem 
ewigen  Wesen,  das  Zuriickgehen  desselben  aus  der  Erscheinung  in  die 
Einhcit  seiner  Fiille." 

The  passage  which,  though  perhaps  bearing  more  directly  on  my  argu 
ment,  I  have  not  ventured  to  attempt  to  translate,1  is  the  following,  §  568. 

"  Im  Momente  der  Besonderheit  aber  des  Urtheils,  ist  dies  concrete  ewige 
Wesen  das  Vorausgesetzte,  und  seine  Bewegung  die  Erschaffung  der 
Erscheinung,  das  Zerfallen.  des  ewigen  Moments  der  Vermittlung,  des 
einigen  Sohnes,  in  den  selbststandigen  Gcgensatz,  einerseits 'des  Himmcls 
und  der  Erde,  der  elementarischen  und  concreten  Natur,  andererseits  des 
Geistes  als  mit  ihr  im  Verhdltniss  stehenden,  somit  endlichen  Geistes, 
welcher  als  das  Extrem  der  in  sich  seyenden  Negativitat  sich  zum  Bosen 
verselbststandigt,  solches  Extrem  durch  seine  Beziehung  auf  eine  gegen- 
iiberstehende  Natur  und  durch  seine  damit  gesetzte  eigene  Natiirlichkeit 
ist,  in  dieser  als  denkend  zugleich  auf  das  Ewige  gerichtet,  aber  damit  in 
ausserlicher  Beziehung  steht." 

Gorres,  in  the  preface  to  the  second  edition  of  his  Aihanasius,  p.  ix.,  ex 
hibits  a  specimen  of  a  new  Creed  on  Hegelian  principles,  to  be  drawn  up 
by  a  general  council  composed  of  the  more  advanced  theologians  of  the 
day.  The  qualifications  for  a  seat  in  the  council  are  humorously  described, 

1  [After  what  has  been  said  by  the  author,  both  here  and  in  the  Lecture,  on 
page  152,  it  were  certainly  unbecoming  to  attempt  a  translation  for  the  American 
edition.—  Trans!.] 


LKCT.  V.  NOTES.  315 

and  the  creed  itself  contains  much  just  and  pointed  satire.  It  will  hardly, 
however,  bear  quotation;  for  a  caricature  on  such  a  subject,  however 
well  intended,  almost  unavoidably  carries  with  it  a  painful  air  of  irrever 
ence. 

NOTE  XXIV.,  p.  152. 

See  especially  Phdnomenologie  des  Geistes,  Werke,  II.  p.  557;  Philosophic 
der  Geschichte,  Werke,  IX.  p.  387;  Philosophic  der  Religion,  Werke,  XII.  p. 
247;  Geschichte  der  Philosophic,  Werke,  XIV.  p.  222,  XV.  p.  88. 


NOTE  XXV.,  p.  152. 

The  indecision  of  Hegel  upon  this  vital  question  is  satisfactorily  ac 
counted  for  by  his  disciple,  Strauss.  To  a  philosophy  which  professes  to 
exhibit  the  universal  relations  of  necessary  ideas,  it  is  indifferent  whether 
they  have  actually  been  realized  in  an  individual  case  or  not.  This  ques 
tion  is  reserved  for  the  Critic  of  History.  See  Streitschriften,  Heft  III.  p. 
68.  Dorner  too,  while  pointing  out  the  merits  of  Hegel's  Christology,  ad 
mits  that  the  belief  in  a  historical  Christ  has  no  significance  in  his  system; 
and  that  those  disciples  who  reject  it  carry  out  that  system  most  fully. 
See  Lehre  von  der  Person  Christi,  p.  409. 


NOTE  XXVI.,  p.  153. 

Philosophic  der  Religion,  Werke,  XII.  p.  286.  In  another  passage  of  the 
same  work,  p.  281,  the  Atonement  is  explained  in  the  following  language: 
"Therein  only  is  the  possibility  of  the  atonement  —  that  the  essential  one 
ness  of  the  divine  and  the  h.uman  nature  becomes  known ;  that  is  the  nec 
essary  basis ;  man  can  know  himself  taken  up  into  God,  so  far  as  God  is 
not  somewhat  foreign  to  him,  somewhat  external,  accidental,  but  when 
he,  according  to  his  essential  being,  his  freedom  and  subjectivity,  is  taken 
up  into  God;  but  this  is  possible,  only  in  so  far  as  this  subjectivity  of  human 
nature  is  in  God  Himself."  Compare  also  p.  330,  and  Phdnomenologie  des 
Geistes,  Werke,  II.  pp.  544,  572.  Philosophic  der  Geschichte,  Werke,  IX.  p. 
405.  Geschichte  der  Philosophic,  Werke,  XV.  p.  100. 


NOTE  XXVII.,  p.  153. 
Grnndlehren  der  Cliristlichen  Dogmatik,  §  319,  320. 


316  NOTES.  LECT.  VI. 


NOTE  XXVIIL,  p.  154. 

Ibid.  §§  325,  326.  A  similar  theory  is  maintained,  almost  in  the  same 
language,  by  Rose'nkranz,  Encyklopddie  der  theoloyischen  Wissenschaften,  § 
26,  27.  The  substance  of  this  view  is  given  by  Hegel  himself,  Werke,  IX. 
pp.  394,  457;  XV.  p.  89.  Some  valuable  criticisms  on  the  principle  of  it 
may  be  found  in  Dr.  Mill's  Observations  on  the  application  of  Pantheistic 
Principles  to  the  Criticism  of  the  Gospd,  pp.  16,  42. 


NOTE  XXIX.,  p.  155. 

Leben  Jesu,  §  151.  English  Translation,  Vol.  III.  p.  437.  The  passage 
has  also  been  translated  by  Dr.  Mill  in  his  Observations  on  the  application  of 
Pantheistic  Principles,  etc.  p.  50.  I  have  slightly  corrected  the  former 
version  by  the  aid  of  the  latter.  A  sort  of  anticipation  of  the  theory  may 
be  found  in  Hegel's  Phiinomenologie  des  Geistes,  Werke,  II.  p.  569. 


NOTE  XXX.,  p.  155. 

"  Only  the  Metaphysical,  but  in  nowise  the  Historical,  makes  our  salva 
tion."  Fichte,  Anweisung  zum  seligen  Leben,  (  Werke,  V.  p.  485).  With  this 
may  be  compared  the  language  of  Spinoza,  Ep.  XXI.  "  I  say  that  it  is 
not  at  all  necessary  to  salvation  to  know  Christ  after  the  flesh ;  but  of  that 
eternal  Son  of  God,  the  eternal  Wisdom  of  God,  which  has  manifested  it 
self  in  all  things,  and  especially  in  the  human  mind,  and  most  of  all  in 
Christ  Jesus,  we  must  have  a  far  different  opinion." 


LECTURE    VI. 

NOTE  I.,  p.  161. 
See  above,  Lecture  IV.  p.  104  and  note  19. 

NOTE  II.,  p.  162. 

Christliche  Lenre  von  der  Siinde,  II.  p.  156,  third  edition,  (English  Trans 
lation,  II.  p.  126.)  The  doctrine  that  the  Divine  Essence  is  speculatively 
made  known  through  Christ,  is  a  common  ground  on  which  theologians 


LECT.  VI.  NOTES.  317 

of  the  most  opposite  schools  have  met,  to  diverge  again  into  most  adverse 
conclusions.  It  is  substantially  the  opinion  of  Eunomius ;  1  and  it  has  been 
maintained  in  modern  times  by  Hegel  and  his  disciple  Marheineke,  in  a 
sense  very  different  from  that  which  is  adopted  by  Miiller.  See  Hegel, 
Philosophic  der  Geschichte,  Werke,  IX.  p.  19.  Philosophic  der  Religion, 
Werke,  XII.  p.  204,  and  Marheineke,  Grundlelirender  Christlichen  Dogmatik, 
§69. 

NOTE  III.,  p.  162. 

See  L.  Ancillon,  in  the  Memoir  es  de  I' Academic  de  Berlin,  quoted  toy  Bar- 
tholmess,  Histaire  des  Doctrines  relicjieuses,  I.  p.  268.  On  the  parallel  be 
tween  the  mystery  of  Causation  and  those  of  Christian  doctrines,  compare 
Magee  on  the  Atonement,  Note  XIX.  See  also  Mozley,  Augustinian  Doc- 
tiine  of  Predestination,  p.  19,  and  the  review  of  the  same  work,  by  Professor 
Fraser,  Essays  in  Philosophy,  p.  274. 


NOTE  IV.,  p.  162. 

Seven  different  theories  of  the  causal  nexus,  and  of  the  mode  of  our  ap 
prehension  of  it,  are  enumerated  and  refuted  by  Sir  W.  Hamilton,  Discus 
sions,  p.  611.  His  own,  which  is  the  eighth,  can  hardly  be  regarded  as 
more  satisfactory.  For  he  resolves  the  causal  judgment  itself  into  the  ina 
bility  to  conceive  an  absolute  commencement  of  phenomena,  and  the  con 
sequent  necessity  of  thinking  that  what  appears  to  us  under  a  new  form 
had  previously  existed  under  others.  But  surely  a  cause  is  as  much  re 
quired  to  account  for  the  change  from  an  old  form  to  a  new,  as  to  account 
for  an  absolute  beginning.  On  the  defects  of  this  theory  I  have  remarked 
elsewhere.  See  Encyclopaedia  Britannica,  eighth  edition,  vol.  XIV.  p.  601. 
It  has  also  been  criticized  by  Dr.  McCosh,  Method  of  the  Divine  Government, 
p.  529,  fourth  edition;  by  Professor  Fraser,  Essays  in  Philosophy,  p.  170 
sqq. ;  and  by  Mr.  Calderwood,  Philosophy  of  the  Infinite,  p.  139  sqq. 


NOTE  V.  p.  163. 

That  Causation  implies  something  more  than  invariable  sequence,  though 
what  that  something  is  we  are  unable  to  determine,  is  maintained,  among 
others,  by  M.  Cousin,  in  his  eloquent  Lectures  on  the  Philosophy  of  Locke. 
"  Solely  because  one  phenomenon  succeeds  another,  and  succeeds  it  con 
stantly,  —  is  it  the  cause  of  it  ?  Is  this  tiie  whole  idea,  which  you  form  to 
yourself,  of  cause?  When  you  say,  when  you  think  that  the  fire  is  the 

1  See  Neander,  vol.  iv.  p.  60.  ed.  Bonn. 

27* 


318  NOTES.  LECT.  VI. 

cause  of  the  fluid  state  of  the  wax,  I  ask  you,  if  you  do  not  believe,  if  the 
whole  human  race  do  not  believe,  that  there  is  in  the  fire  a  certain  something, 
an  unknown  property,  —  the  determination  of  which  is  no  point  in  question 
here,  — to  which  you  refer  the  production  of  the  fluid  state  of  the  wax?" 
Histoire  de  la  Philosophic  au  XVIII*.  siecle,  Le^on  xix.  Engel  speaks  to 
the  same  effect  in  almost  the  same  words.  "  In  what  we  call,  for  example, 
force  of  attraction,  of  affinity,  or  of  impulsion,  the  only  thing  known 
(that  is  to  say,  represented  to  the  imagination  and  the  senses)  is  the  effect 
produced,  namely,  the  bringing  together  of  the  two  bodies  attracted  and 
attractipg.  No  language  has  a  word  to  express  that  certain  something, 
(effort,  conatus,  nisus)  which  remains  absolutely  concealed,  but  which  all 
minds  necessarily  conceive  of  as  added  to  the  phenomenal  representa 
tion."!  Dr.  McCosh  (Method  of  the  Divine  Government,  p.  525,)  professes  to 
discover  this  certain  something,  in  a  substance  acting  according  to  its  powers  cr 
properties.  But,  apart  from  the  conscious  exercise  of  free  will,  we  know 
nothing  of  power,  or  property,  save  as  manifested  in  its  effects.  Compare 
Berkeley,  Minute  Philosopher,  Dial.  VII.  §  9.  Herder,  Gott,  Werke,  VIII. 
p.  224. 

NOTE  VI.,  p.  163. 

That  the  first  idea  of  Causation  is  derived  from  the  consciousness  of  the 
exercise  of  power  in  our  own  volitions,  is  established,  after  a  hint  from 
Locke,2  by  Maine  de  Biran,  and  accepted  by  M.  Cousin.3  To  explain  the 
manner  in  which  we  transcend  our  own  personal  consciousness,  and  at 
tribute  a  cause  to  all  changes  in  the  material  world,  the  latter  philosopher 
has  recourse  to  the  hypothesis  of  a  necessary  law  of  the  reason,  by  virtue 
of  which  it  disengages,  in  the  fact  of  consciousness,  the  necessary  element 
of  causal  relation  from  the  contingent  element  of  our  personal  production 
of  this  or  that  particular  movement.  This  Law,  the  Principle  of  Causality, 
compels  the  reason  to  suppose  a  cause,  whenever  the  senses  present  a 
new  phenomenon.  But  this  Principle  of  Causality,  even  granting  it  to 
be  true  as  far  as  it  goes,  does  not  explain  what  the  idea  of  a  Cause,  thus 
extended,  contains  as  its  constituent  feature:  it  merely  transcends  per 
sonal  causation,  and  substitutes  an  unknown  something  in  its  room.  We 
do  not  attribute  to  the  fire  a  consciousness  of  its  power  to  melt  the  wax : 

1  Memoires  de  VAcademie  de  Berlin,  quoted  by  Maine  de  Biran,  Nouvelles  Con 
siderations,  p.  23. 

2  Essay,  B.  II.  Ch.  21   §§  4,  5.    A  similar  view  is  taken  by  Jacobi,  David  Hume, 
oder  Idealismus  vnd  Realismus,  ( Werke,  II.  p.  201.) 

3  See  De  Biran,  Oeuvres  P/dlosop/dques,  IV.  p.  241,  273,  Cousin,  Cours  de  V  His 
toire  de  la  Philosophie,  Deuxieme  Serie,  Le<jon  19.     Fragments  Philosop/iiques,  vol. 
IV. ;  Preface  ds  la  Premier*  Edition, 


LECT.  VI.  NOTES.  319 

and  in  denying  consciousness,  we  deny  the  only  positive  conception  of 
power  which  can  be  added  to  the  mere  juxtaposition  of  phenomena.  The 
cause,  in  all  sensible  changes,  thus  remains  a  certain  something.  On  this 
subject  I  have  treated  more  at  length  in  another  place.  See  Prolegomena 
Logica,  pp.  135,  309. 

And  even  within  the  sphere  of  our  OAvn  volitions,  though  we  are  imme 
diately  conscious  of  the  exercise  of  power,  yet  the  analysis  of  the  concep 
tion  thus  presented  to  us,  carries  us  at  once  into  the  region  of  the  incom 
prehensible.  The  finite  power  of  man,  as  an  originating  cause  within  his 
own  sphere,  seems  to  come  into  collision  with  the  infinite  power  of  God, 
as  the  originating  Cause  of  all  things.  Finite  power  is  itself  created  by 
and  dependent  upon  God;  yet,  at  the  same  time,  it  seems  to  be  manifested 
as  originating  and  independent.  Power  itself  acts  only  on  the  solicitation 
of  motives;  and  this  raises  the  question,  which  is  prior?  does  the  motive 
bring  about  the  state  of  the  will  which  inclines  to  it ;  or  does  the  state  of 
the  will  convert  the  coincident  circumstances  into  motives?  Am  I  moved 
to  will,  or  do  I  will  to  be  moved  ?  Here  we  are  involved  in  the  mystery  of 
endless  succession.  On  this  mystery  there  are  some  able  remarks  in  Mr. 
Mozley's  Augustinian  theory  of  Predestination,  p.  2,  and  in  Professor  Eraser's 
Essays  in  Philosophy,  p.  275. 

NOTE  VII.,  p.  163. 

De  Ordine,  II.  18.  Compare  Ibid.  II.  16.  "  of  that  Supreme  God,  who 
is  better  known  by  not  knowing." 

NOTE  VIII.,  p.  163. 
Enarratio  in  Psalmum  LXXXV.  12.    Compare  De  Trinitate,  VIII.  c.  2. 

NOTE  IX.,  p.  164. 

F.  Socinus,  Tractatus  de  Deo,  Christo,  et  Spiritu  Sancto.  ( Opera,  1656,  vol. 
I.  p.  811).  "  But  even  from  that  alone,  that  God  is  openly  taught  to  be 
one,  it  can  justly  be  concluded,  that  he  can  be  neither  three  nor  two.  For 
the  One  and  the  Three,  or  the  One  and  the  Two  are  opposed  to  each 
other.  So  that  if  God  be  three  or  two,  he  cannot  be  one."— Priestley, 
Tracts  in  Controversy  with  Bishop  Horsley,^.  78.  "They  are  therefore  both 
one  and  many  in  the  same  respect,  viz.,  in  each  being  perfect  God.  This  is 
certainly  as  much  a  contradiction  as  to  say  that  Peter,  James,  and  John, 
having  each  of  them  every  thing  that  is  requisite  to  constitute  a  complete 
man,  are  yet,  all  together,  not  three  men,  but  only  one  man." — F.  W.  New- 


320  NOTES.  LECT.  VI. 

man,  Phases  of  Faith,  p.  48.  "  If  any  one  speaks  of  three  men,  all  that  he 
means  is,  'three  objects  of  thought,  of  whom  each  separately  may  be 
called  man.'  So  also,  all  that  could  possibly  be  meant  by  three  Gods,  is 
'three  objects  of  thought,  of  whom  each  separately  may  be  called  God.' 
To  avow  the  last  statement,  as  the  Creed  does,  and  yet  repudiate  Three 
Gods,  is  to  object  to  the  phrase,  yet  confess  to  the  only  meaning  which 
the  phrase  can  convey." 

NOTE  X.,  p.  164. 

Schleiermacher  (Christliche  Glaube,  §  171),  has  some  objections  against 
the  Catholic  Doctrine  of  the  Holy  Trinity,  conceived  in  the  thorough 
spirit  of  Rationalism.  In  the  same  spirit  Strauss  observes  ( Glaubenslehre, 
I.  p.  460),  "  Whoever  has  sworn  to  the  Symbolum  Quicunque  has  forsworn 
the  laws  of  human  thought."  The  sarcasm  comes  inconsistently  enough 
from  a  disciple  of  Hegel,  whose  entire  philosophy  is  based  on  an  abjura 
tion  of  the  laws  of  thought.  In  one  respect,  indeed,  Hegel  is  right; 
namely,  in  maintaining  that  the  laws  of  thought  are  not  applicable  to  the 
Infinite.  But  the  true  conclusion  from  this  concession  is  not,  as  the 
Hegelians  maintain,  that  a  philosophy  can  be  constructed  independently 
of  those  laws;  but  that  the  Infinite  is  not  an  object  of  human  philosophy 
at  all. 

NOTE  XL,  p.  165. 
Paradise  Lost,  B.  II.  667. 

NOTE  XII.,  p.  166. 

Compare  Anselm,  De  Fide  Trinitatis,  c.  7.    "But  if  he  denies  that  three 

can  be  predicated  of  one,  and  one  of  three, let  him  allow  that 

there  is  something  in  God,  which  his  intellect  cannot  penetrate,  and  let 
him  not  compare  the  nature  of  God,  which  is  above  all  things,  free  from 
all  condition  of  place  and  time  and  composition  of  parts,  with  things, 
which  are  confined  to  place  and  time,  or  composed  of  parts ;  but  let  him 
believe  that  there  is  something,  in  that  nature,  which  cannot  be  in  those 
things,  and  let  him  acquiesce  in  Christian  authority,  and  not  dispute 
against  it." 

NOTE  XIII.,  p.  166. 

See  the  objections  raised  against  this  doctrine  by  Mr.  F.  W.  Newman, 
Phases  of  Faith,  p.  84.  "  The  very  form  of  our  past  participle  (begotten)," 
he  tells  us,  "  is  invented  to  indicate  an  event  in  the  past  time."  The  true 


LECT.  VI.  NOTES.  321 

difficulty  is  not  grammatical,  but  metaphysical.  If  ordinary  language  is 
primarily  accommodated  to  the  ordinary  laws  of  thought,  it  is  a  mere 
verbal  quibble  to  press  its  literal  application  to  the  Infinite,  which  is 
above  thought. 

NOTE  XIV.,  p.  166. 
<• 

The  parallel  here  pointed  out  may  be  exhibited  more  fully  by  consult 
ing  Bishop  Pearson's  Exposition  of  this  Doctrine,  On  the  Creed,  Art.  I.,  and 
the  authorities  cited  in  his  notes. 

NOTE  XV.,  p.  166. 

On  this  ground  is  established  a  profound  and  decisive  criticism  of 
Hegel's  System,  by  Trendelenburg,  Logische  Untersuchungen,  c.  2.  "  Pure 
being,"  he  says,  "  is  quiescence;  so  also  is  the  Nothing  (das  Nichts);  how 
is  the  active  Becoming  (active  reality)  the  result  of  the  union  of  two  qui 
escent  conceptions  ?  "  M.  Bartholmess  in  like  manner  remarks,  "  In  turn 
ing  thus  the  abstraction  to  reality,  this  system  tacitly  ascribes  to  abstract 
being  virtues  and  qualities  which  belong  only  to  a  concrete  and  individual 
being;  that  is,  to  a  simple  being  capable  of  spontaneous  and  deliberate 
action,  of  intelligence  and  of  will.  It  accords  all  this  to  it,  at  the  same 
time  that  it  represents  it,  and  with  reason,  as  an  impersonal  being.  This 
abstract  being  produces  concrete  beings,  this  impersonal  being  produces 
persons ;  it  produces  the  one  and  the  other,  because  thus  the  system  di 
rects  I  "  Histoire  des  Doctrines  jRdigieuses,  II  p.  277. 


NOTE  XVI.,  p.  167. 

Schelling,  Bruno,  p.  168.  "In  the  Absolute,  all  is  absolute;  if,  there 
fore,  the  perfection  of  His  Nature  appears  in  the  real  as  infinite  Being, 
and  in  the  ideal  as  infinite  Knowing,  the  Being  in  the  absolute  is,  even  as 
the  Knowing,  absolute ;  and  each,  being  absolute,  has  not,  out  of  itself, 
an  opposite  in  the  other,  but  the  absolute  Knowing  is  the  absolute  Nature, 
and  the  absolute  Nature  the  absolute  Knowing." 


NOTE  XVII.,  p.  167. 

Aquinas,  Summa,  P.  I.  Qu.  XXXH.  Art.  1.  "It  is  impossible,  by  means 
of  natural  reason,  to  reach  the  knowledge  of  the  Trinity  of  the  Divine 
Persons.  For  it  has  been  shown  above,  that  a  man  can,  by  natural  rea- 


322  NOTES.  LECT.  VI. 

son,  arrive  at  the  knowledge  of  God,  only  from  what  is  created 

But  the  creative  power  of  God  is  common  to  the  whole  Trinity;  whence 
it  pertains  to  the  unity  of  the  essence,  not  to  the  distinction  of  the  Per 
sons.  By  natural  reason,  therefore,  only  those  things  can  be  known  con 
cerning  God,  which  belong  to  the  Unity  of  the  Divine  essence,  not  to 
the  distinction  of  the  Divine  Persons."  This  wise  and  sound  limitation 
should  be  borne  in  mind,  as  a  testimony  against  that  neoplatonizing  spirit 
of  modern  times,  which  seeks  to  strengthen  the  evidence  of  the  Christian 
Doctrine  of  the  Trinity,  by  distorting  it  into  conformity  with  the  specula 
tions  of  Heathen  Philosophy.  The  Hegelian  Theory  of  the  Trinity  is  a 
remarkable  instance  of  this  kind.  Indeed,  Hegel  himself  expressly  re 
gards  coincidence  with  neoplatonism  as  an  evidence  in  favor  of  an  ideal 
ist  interpretation  of  Christian  doctrines.1  A  similar  spirit  occasionally 
appears  in  influential  writers  among  ourselves. 


NOTE  XVIII.,  p.  168. 

For  the  objection,  see  Catech.  Racov.  De  Persona  Christi,  Cap.  1.  (Ed. 
1609.  p.  43.)  "  It  is  repugnant  to  sound  reason.  In  the  first  place,  because 
two  substances,  opposite  in  their  properties,  cannot  unite  so  as  to  form 
one  person;  ....  then,  too,  because  two  natures,  each  constituting  a 
person,  cannot  come  together  so  as  to  constitute  one  person." —  Spinoza, 
Epist.  XXI.  "  As  to  the  additional  view,  given  by  some  churches,  that 
God  assumed  human  nature,  I  have  expressly  declared,  that  I  know  not 
what  they  say;  nay,  to  confess  the  truth,  they  seem  to  me  to  talk  no  less 
absurdly  than  if  any  one  should  say  that  a  circle  has  assumed  the  nature 
of  a  square."  Similar  objections  are  urged  by  F.  W.  Newman,  The  Soul, 
p.  116,  and  by  Theodore  Parker,  Critical  and  Miscellaneous  Writings,  p.  320, 
Discourse  of  Matters  pertaining  to  Religion,  p.  234. 


NOTE  XIX.,  p.  169. 

One  half  of  this  dilemma  has  been  exhibited  by  Sir  W.  Hamilton,  Dis 
cussions,  p.  609.  sqq.  It  is  strange  however  that  this  great  thinker  should 
not  have  seen  that  the  second  alternative  is  equally  inconceivable;  that  it 
is  as  impossible  to  conceive  the  creation  as  a  process  of  evolution  from  the 
being  of  the  Creator,  as  it  is  to  conceive  it  as  a  production  out  of  nothing. 
This  double  impossibility  is  much  more  in  harmony  with  the  philosophy 
of  the  conditioned,  than  the  hypothesis  which  Sir  W.  Hamilton  adopts. 

1  Philosophic  der  Geschichte,  Werke,  IX.  p.  402. 


LECT.  VI.  NOTES.  323 

Indeed,  his  admirable  criticism  of  Cousin's  theory  (Discussions,  p.  36,) 
contains  in  substance  the  same  dilemma  as  that  exhibited  in  the  text. 
For  some  additional  remarks  on  this  point,  see  above,  Lecture  II.  note  33. 

NOTE  XX.,  p.  169. 
Pensfcs,  Partie  II.  Art.  I.  §  1- 

NOTE  XXL,  p.  171. 

Greg,  Creed  of  Christendom,  p.  2-18.  sqq.  Compare  the  cognate  passages 
from  other  Authors,  quoted  above,  Lecture  I.  note  21. 

NOTE  XXII.,  p.  172. 

For  some  remarks  connected  with  this  and  cognate  theories,  see  above, 
Lecture  I.  notes  21,  22,  23,  Lecture  III.  notes  16,  18. 

NOTE  XXIII.,  p.  173. 

"  For  since  in  general  it  is  one  thing  to  understand  the  impossibility  of  a 
thing,  and  a  far  different  thing  not  to  understand  its  possibility ;  so  espec 
ially  in  those  matters  of  which  we  are  utterly  ignorant,  such  as  those  which 
are  not  exposed  to  sense,  the  things  are  by  no  means  forthwith  impossi 
ble,  the  possibility  of  which  we  do  not  thoroughly  understand.  Therefore 
it  does  not  become  the  philosopher  to  deny  universally  Divine  efficiency 
in  the  created  world,  or  to  maintain  as  certain,  that  God  Himself  contrib 
utes  nothing  (immediately)  either  to  the  consecutive  order  of  natural 
things,  —  as  for  instance  the  keeping  up  of  each  part  or  species,  embraced 
in  a  genus  of  animals  or  of  plants,  —  or  to  moral  changes,  —  as  for  in 
stance,  the  improvement  of  the  human  soul,  —  or  to  assert  that  it  is  alto 
gether  impossible  for  a  revelation  or  any  other  extraordinary  event  to  be 
brought  about  by  Divine  agency."  Storr,  Annotationes  qucedam  Theolo- 
yicce,  p.  5. 

NOTE  XXIV.,  p.  173. 

"  For  since  the  force  and  power  of  nature,  is  the  very  force  and  power 
of  God,  and  its  laws  and  rules  are  the  very  decrees  of  God,  it  is  in  general 
a  thing  to  be  believed,  that  the  power  of  nature  is  infinite,  and  that  its 
laws  are  so  made,  as  to  extend  to  all  things  which  are  conceived  by  the 


324  NOTES.  LECT.  VI. 

Divine  mind.  For,  otherwise,  what  else  is  determined,  than  that  God 
made  nature  so  impotent,  and  appointed  for  it  laws  and  rules  so  unpro 
ductive,  that  he  is  often  to  come  anew  to  its  aid,  if  He  will  have  it  so 
preserved  that  things  may  succeed  according  to  wish;  a  thing  which  I 
conceive  to  be  indeed  most  foreign  to  reason."  Spinoza,  Tractatus  Theo- 
logico-Politicus,  cap.  VI.  —  "The  latter,  indeed  (Supernaturalists),  assume 
that  God  governs  human  affairs  in  general  by  a  natural  order,  and  that 
when  this  natural  order  can  no  longer  satisfy  His  will,  He  comes  in  with 
remedial  aid  by  the  working  of  miracles;  the  former  (Rationalists)  decide 
that  God,  from  eternity,  so  wisely  arranged  that  all  things  should  follow  in 
a  continuous  series,  that  the  things  which  occurred  many  ages  ago,  pre 
pared  and  brought  about  what  is  occurring  now,  and  that  there  should 
be  no  need  of  certain  miracles,  as  a  kind  of  intercalations."  Wegscheidcr, 
Instit.  Theol.  §  12.  From  an  opposite  point  of  view  to  that  of  Spinoza, 
Ilerbart  arrives  at  a  similar  conclusion.  "  Religion  requires  the  view,  that 
He  who,  as  Father,  has  made  provision  for  men,  now  in  deepest  silence 
leaves  the  race  to  itself,  as  having  no  part  in  it;  without  trace  of  any  such 
feeling  as  might  be  likened  to  human  sympathy,  and  indeed  to  egotism."1 
The  simile  of  the  calculating  engine,  acting  by  its  own  laws,  is  adduced 
by  Mr.  Babbage  (Ninth  Bridgewater  Treatise,  ch.  2),  "to  illustrate  the 
distinction  between  a  system  to  which  the  restoring  hand  of  its  contriver 
is  applied,  cither  frequently  or  at  distant  intervals,  and  one  which  had 
received  at  its  first  formation  the  impress  of  the  will  of  its  author,  fore 
seeing  the  varied  but  yet  necessary  laws  of  its  action  throughout  the 
whole  of  its  existence;  "  and  to  show  "  that  that  for  which,  after  its  origi 
nal  adjustment,  no  superintendence  is  acquired,  displays  far  greater  inge 
nuity  than  that  which  demands,  at  every  change  in  its  law,  the  direct 
intervention  of  its  contriver."  Mr.  Jowett,  though  rejecting  the  analogy 
of  the  machine,  uses  similar  language:  "The  directing  power  that  is  able 
to  foresee  all  things,  and  provide  against  them  by  simple  and  general 
rules,  is  a  worthier  image  of  the  Divine  intelligence  than  the  handicrafts 
man  '  putting  his  hand  to  the  hammer/  detaching  and  isolating  portions 
of  matter  from  the  laws  by  which  he  has  himself  put  them  together."  2 


NOTE  XXV.,  p.  174. 

"  The  reason  why,  among  men,  an  artificer  is  justly  esteemed  so  much 
the  more  skilful,  as  the  machine  of  his  composing  Avill  continue  longer  to 
move  regularly  without  any  further  interposition  of  the  workman,  is 

1  Lfhrbuch  zur  Einleitung  in  die  Philosophic,  §  155  (  Werke ,  I.  p.  278). 

2  Epistles  of  St.  Paul,  vol  II.  p.  412. 


LECT.  VI.  NOTES.  325 

because  the  skill  of  all  human  artificers  consists  only  in  composing;,  ad 
justing,  or  putting  together  certain  movements,  the  principles  of  whose 

motion  are  altogether  independent  upon  the  artificer But  with 

regard  to  God,  the  case  is  quite  different;  because  He  not  only  composes 
or  puts  things  together,  but  is  himself  the  Author  and  continual  Preserver 
of  their  original  forces  or  moving  powers.  And  consequently  it  is  not  a 
diminution,  but  the  true  glory  of  his  workmanship,  that  nothing  is  done 
without  his  continual  government  and  inspection."  Clarke,  First  Reply  to 
Leibnitz,  p.  15. 

NOTE  XXVI.,  p.  174. 

"  I  do  not  believe,"  says  Theodore  Parker,  "  there  ever  was  a  miracle, 
or  ever  will  be;  every  where  I  find  law,  —  the  constant  mode  of  operation 
of  the  infinite  God." — Some  account  of  my  Ministry,  appended  to  Theism, 
Atheism,  and  the  Popular  Theology,  p.  203.  Compare  the  same  work,  pp. 
113,  188;  and  Atkinson,  Man's  Nature  and  Development,  p.  241.  The  state 
ment  is  not  at  present  true,  even  as  regards  the  material  world :  it  is  false 
as  regards  the  world  of  mind :  and  were  it  true  in  both,  it  would  prove 
nothing  regarding  the  "  infinite  God."  For  the  conception  of  law  is,  to 
say  the  least,  quite  as  finite  as  that  of  miraculous  interposition.  Professor 
Powell,  in  his  latest  work,  though  not  absolutely  rejecting  miracles,  yet 
adopts  a  tone  which,  compared  with  such  passages  as  the  above,  is  at 
least  painfully  suggestive.  "  It  is  now  perceived  by  all  inquiring  minds, 
that  the  advance  of  true  scientific  principles,  and  the  grand  inductive  con 
clusions  of  universal  and  eternal  law  and  order,  are  at  once  the  basis  of  all 
rational  theology,  and  give  the  death-blow  to  superstition."  Christianity 
without  Judaism,  p.  11. 

NOTE  XXVII.,  p.  174. 

This  point  has  been  treated  by  the  author  at  greater  length  in  the  Pro 
legomena  Logica,  p.  135,  and  in  the  article  Metaphysics,  in  the  eighth  edition 
of  the  Encyclopaedia  Britannica,  vol.  XIV.  p.  600. 

NOTE  XXVIII.,  p.  176. 

See  McCosh,  Method  of  the  Divine  Government,  pp.  162,  166.  The  quota- 
tations  which  the  author  brings  forward  in  support  of  this  remark,  from 
Humboldt  and  Comte,  are  valuable  as  showing  the  concurrence  of  the 
highest  scientific  authorities  as  to  the  facts  stated.  The  religious  applica- 

28 


326  NOTES.  LECT.  VI. 

tion  of  these  facts  is  Dr.  McCosh's  own,  and  constitutes  one  of  the  most 
instructive  portions  of  his  valuable  work.  The  fact  itself  has  been  noticed 
and  commented  on  with  his  usual  sagacity  by  Bishop  Butler,  Analogy, 
Part  II.  c.  3.  "  Would  it  not  have  been  thought  highly  improbable,  that 
men  should  have  been  so  much  more  capable  of  discovering,  even  to  cer 
tainty,  the  general  laws  of  matter,  and  the  magnitudes,  paths,  and  revolu 
tions  of  the  heavenly  bodies,  than  the  occasions  and  cures  of  distempers, 
and  many  other  things,  in  which  human  life  seems  so  much  more  nearly 
concerned,  than  in  astronomy  ?  " 


NOTE  XXIX.,  p.  176. 

"  There  are  domains  of  nature  in  which  man's  foresight  is  considerably 
extended  and  accurate,  and  other  domains  in  which  it  is  very  limited, 
or  very  dim  and  confused.  Again,  there  are  departments  of  nature  in 
which  man's  influence  is  considerable,  and  others  which  lie  altogether  be 
yond  his  control,  directly  or  indirectly.  Now,  on  comparing  these  classes 
of  objects,  we  find  them  to  have  a  cross  or  converse  relation  to  one  another. 
Where  man's  foreknowledge  is  extensive,  either  he  has  no  power,  or  his 
power  is  limited ;  and  where  his  power  might  be  exerted,  his  foresight  is 

contracted He  can  tell  in  what  position  a  satellite  of  Saturn  will  be 

a  hundred  years  after  this  present  time,  but  he  cannot  say  in  what  state 
his  bodily  health  may  be  an  hour  hence We  are  now  in  circum 
stances  to  discover  the  advantages  arising  from  the  mixture  of  uniformity 
and  uncertainty  in  the  operations  of  nature.  Both  serve  most  important 
ends  in  the  government  of  God.  The  one  renders  nature  steady  and 
stable,  the  other  active  and  accommodating.  Without  the  certainty,  man 
would  waver  as  in  a  dream,  and  wander  as  in  a  trackless  desert;  without 
the  unexpected  changes,  he  would  make  his  rounds  like  the  gin-horse  in 
its  circuit,  or  the  prisoner  on  his  wheel.  Were  nature  altogether  capri 
cious,  man  would  likewise  become  altogether  capricious,  for  he  could  have 
no  motive  to  steadfast  action:  again,  were  nature  altogether  fixed,  it 
would  make  man's  character  as  cold  and  formal  as  itself."  McCosh, 
Method  of  the  Divine  Government,  pp.  172,  174  (fourth  edition). 


NOTE  XXX.,  p.  177. 

The  solution  usually  given  by  Christian  writers  of  the  difficulty  of 
reconciling  the  efficacy  of  prayer  with  the  infinite  power  and  wisdom  of 
God,  I  cannot  help  regarding,  while  thoroughly  sympathizing  with  the 
purpose  of  its  advocates,  as  unsatisfactory.  That  solution  may  be  given 


LECT.  VI.  NOTES.  327 

in  the  language  of  Euler.  "  When  a  Christian  addresses  to  God,  at  this 
present  moment,  a  prayer  worthy  of  being  granted,  we  must  not  imagine 
that  this  prayer  reaches  now,  for  the  first  time,  the  knowledge  of  God. 
He  has  already  heard  that  prayer  from  all  eternity ;  and  since  this  com 
passionate  Father  has  judged  it  worthy  of  being  granted,  He  has  arranged 
the  world  expressly  in  favor  of  this  prayer  in  such  manner,  that  its  ac 
complishment  may  be  a  consequence  of  the  natural  course  of  events." *  In 
other  Avords,  the  prayer  is  foreseen  and  foreordained,  as  well  as  the  an 
swer.  This  solution  appears  to  assume  that  the  conception  of  law  and 
necessity  adequately  represents  the  absolute  nature  of  God,  while  that  of 
contingence  and  special  interposition  is  to  be  subordinated  to  it.  The  ar 
rangements  of  God  in  the  government  of  the  world  are  fixed  from  all 
eternity,  and  if  the  prayer  is  part  of  those  arrangements,  it  becomes  a 
necessary  act  likewise.  It  is  surely  a  more  reverent,  and  probably  a  truer 
solution,  to  say  that  the  conception  of  general  law  and  that  of  special  in 
terposition  are  equally  human.  Neither  probably  represents,  as  a  specu 
lative  truth,  the  absolute  manner  in  which  God  works  in  His  Providence; 
both  are  equally  necessary,  as  regulative  truths,  to  govern  man's  conduct 
in  this  life.  In  neither  aspect  are  we  warranted  in  making  the  one  con 
ception  subordinate  to  the  other.  A  similar  objection  may  be  urged 
against  the  theory  which  represents  a  miracle  as  the  possible  manifesta 
tion  of  a  higher  and  unknown  law.  There  is  nothing  in  the  conception  of 
law  which  entitles  it  to  this  preeminence  over  other  human  modes  of  repre 
sentation. 

NOTE  XXXI.,  p.  177. 

Kant,  though  he  attaches  no  value  to  miracles  as  evidences  of  a  moral 
religion,  yet  distinctly  allows  that  there  is  no  sufficient  reason  for  denying 
their  possibility  as  facts  or  their  utility  at  certain  periods  of  the  history  of 
religion.2  This  moderation  is  not  imitated  by  his  disciple,  Wegscheider, 
who  says :  "  The  belief  in  a  supernatural  and  miraculous,  and  that  too,  an 
immediate  revelation  of  God  seems  not  well  reconcilable  with  the  ideas  of 
a  God  eternal,  always  constant  to  Himself,  omnipotent,  omniscient  and 
most  wise."3  Strauss,  in  like  manner,  assumes  that  the  absolute  cause 
never  disturbs  the  chain  of  secondary  causes  by  arbitrary  acts  of  interpo 
sition  ;  and  therefore  lays  it  down  as  a  canon,  that  whatever  is  miracu 
lous  is  unhistorical.4 

1  Lettres  d  une.   Princesse  (V  Attemagne,  vol.  I.  p.  857,  ed.  Cournot.     Compare 
McCosh,  Method  of  the  Divine  Government,  p  222. 

2  Religion  innerhalb  der  Grenzen  der  blossen  Vernunft,  p.  99,  edit.  Kosenkranz. 

3  Instit.  Theol.  §  12. 

4  Leben  Jesu,  §  16. 


328  NOTES.  LECT.  VII. 


NOTE    XXXIL,  p.  178. 

See,  on  the  one  side,  Babbage,  Ninth  Bridgeioater  Treatise,  ch.  8;  Hitch 
cock,  Religion  of  Geology,  p.  290.  The  same  view  is  also  suggested  as 
probable  by  Butler,  Analogy,  Part  II.  ch.  4,  On  the  other  side,  as  regards 
the  limitations  within  which  the  idea  of  law  should  be  applied  to  the  course 
of  God's  Providence,  see  McCosh,  Method  of  Divine  Government,  p.  155. 
Kant,  Religion  innerhalb,  u.  s.  w.  p.  102,  maintains,  with  reason,  that  from 
a  human  point  of  view,  a  law  of  miracles  is  unattainable. 


NOTE  XXXIII.,  p.  180. 
Sir  William  Hamilton,  Discussions,  p.  625. 


LECTURE    VII. 


NOTE  I.,  p.  182. 

THE  Moral  and  Religious  Philosophy  of  Kant,  which  is  here  referred 
to,  is  chiefly  contained  in  his  Metaphysik  der  Sitten,  first  published  in  1785, 
his  Kritik  der  praktischen  Vernunft,  in  1788,  and  his  Religion  innerhalb  der 
Grenzen  der  blossen  Vernunft,  in  1793.  For  Kant's  influence  on  the  ration 
alist  theology  of  Germany,  see  Rosenkranz,  Geschichte  der  Kant'schen  Phi 
losophic,  p.  323.  sqq.  Amand  Saintes,  Histoire  du  Rationalisme  en  Alle- 
magne,  L.  II.  ch.  xi.  Rose,  State  of  Protestantism  in  Germany,  p.  183  (2nd 
edition),  Kahnis,  History  of  German  Protestantism,  pp.  88,  167  (Meyer's 
Translation). 

NOTE  II.,  p.  183. 

See  Metaphysik  der  Sitten,  pp.  5,  31,  52,  87,  92;  Kritik  der  praktischen 
Vernunft,  p.  224  (ed.  Rosenkranz). 


NOTE  III.,  p.  183. 

A  similar  view  of  the  superiority  of  the  moral  consciousness  over  other 
phenomena  of  the  human  mind,  as  regards  absolute  certainty,  seems  to 


LECT.  VII.  NOTES.  329 

be  held  by  Mr.  Jowett.  In  reference  to  certain  doubts  connected  with  the 
Doctrine  of  the  Atonement,  he  observes,  "  It  is  not  the  pride  of  human 
reason  which  suggests  these  questions,  but  the  moral  sense  which  He  him 
self  has  implanted  in  the  breast  of  each  one  of  us."  1  It  is  difficult  to  see 
the  force  of  the  antithesis  here  suggested.  The  "moral  sense"  is  not 
more  the  gift  of  God  than  the  "human  reason;  "  and  the  decisions  of  the 
former,  to  be  represented  in  consciousness  at  all,  require  the  cooperation 
of  the  latter.  Even  as  regards  our  own  personal  acts,  the  intellectual  con 
ception  must  be  united  with  the  moral  sense  in  passing  judgment;  and  in 
all  general  theories  concerning  the  moral  nature  of  God  or  of  man,  the 
rational  faculty  will  necessarily  have  the  larger  share. 


NOTE  IV.,  p.  183. 

Kritik  der  rdnen  Vernunft,  p.  631.  ed.  Rosenkranz.    Metaphysik  der  Sit- 
ten,  p.  31.    Religion  innerJialb  u.  s.  w.  p.  123. 


NOTE  V.,  p.  183. 
Religion  u.  s.  w.p.  123. 

NOTE  VI.,  p.  183. 
Ibid.  pp.  122, 184. 

NOTE  VII.,  p.  183. 
.Ibid.  pp.  123,  133.    Compare  Strdt  der  Facultdten,  p.  304. 

NOTE  VIIL,  p.  184. 
See  above,  Lecture  III,  p.  74. 

NOTE  IX.,  p.  185. 

On  the  existence  of  necessary  truths  in  morals,  comparable  to  those  of 
mathematics,  see  Reid,  Intellectual  Powers,  Essay  VI.  ch.  6  (pp.  453,  454. 
ed.  Hamilton). 

1  Epistls  ofSt   Pmil.  Vol.  II.  p.  468. 

28* 


380  NOTES.  LECT.  VII. 


NOTE  X.,  p.  186. 

Compare  Jacobi,  An  Fichte,  Werke,  III.  pp.  35,  37.  "Just  as  certainly 
as  I  possess  reason,  so  certainly  do  I  not  possess  along  with  it  the  perfec 
tion  of  life,  I  do  not  possess  the  fulness  of  the  good  and  the  true;  and  just 
as  certainly  as  I  do  not  possess  this,  and  know  it,  just  so  certainly  do  I 
know  there  is  a  higher  Being,  and  in  Him  I  have  my  origin I  ac 
knowledge,  then,  that  I  do  not  know  the  Good  in  itself,  the  True  in  itself, 
also  that  I  have  only  a  remote  foreboding  of  it."  That  the  moral  provi 
dence  of  God  cannot  be  judged  by  the  same  standard  as  the  actions  of 
men,  see  Leibnitz,  The'odicee,  De  la  Conformite',  etc.  §  32  (Opera,  ed.  Erd- 
mann,  p.  489). 

NOTE  XL,  p.  187. 

"  Wherefore,  inasmuch  as  our  actions  are  conversant  about  things  beset 
with  many  circumstances,  which  cause  men  of  sundry  wits  to  be  also  of 
sundry  judgments  concerning  that  which  ought  to  be  done;  requisite  it 
cannot  but  seem  the  rule  of  divine  law  should  herein  help  our  imbecility, 
that  we  might  the  more  infallibly  understand  what  is  good  and  what  evil. 
The  first  principles  of  the  Law  of  Nature  are  easy;  hard  it  were  to  find 
men  ignorant  of  them.  But  concerning  the  duty  which  Nature's  law 
doth  require  at  the  hands  of  men,  in  a  number  of  things  particular,  so  far 
hath  the  natural  understanding  even  of  sundry  whole  nations  been  "dark 
ened,  that  they  have  not  discerned,  no  not  gross  iniquity  to  be  sin. — 
Hooker,  E.  P.,  I.  xii.  2. 

NOTE  XII.,  p.  187. 

This  corresponds  to  the  distinction  drawn  by  Leibnitz,  between  eternal 
and  positive  truths  of  the  reason.  See  The'odicee,  Discours  de  la  Conformite', 
etc.  §  2  (Opera,  Erdmann,  p.  480).  The  latter  class  of  truths,  he  allows, 
may  be  subservient  to  Faith,  and  even  opposed  by  it,  but  not  the  former. 


NOTE  XIIL,  p.  189. 

That  it  is  impossible  to  conceive  the  Divine  "Will  as  absolutely  indiffer 
ent,  is  shown  by  Miiller,  ChristlicJie  Lehre  von  der  Sunde,  I.  p.  128.  But  on 
the  other  hand,  we  are  equally  unable  to  conceive  it  as  necessarily  deter 
mined  by  the  laws  of  the  Divine  Nature.  We  cannot  therefore  conceive 
absolute  morality  either  as  dependent  on,  or  as  independent  of,  the  Will  of 
God.  In  other  words,  we  are  unable  to  conceive  absolute  morality  at  all. 


LECT.  VII.  NOTE  S  .  831 

NOTE   XIV.,  p.  190. 
See  above,  Lecture  I,  note  14. 

NOTE  XV.,  p.  190. 

"  Sin  contains  its  own  retributive  penalty,  as  surely  and  as  naturally  as 

the  acorn  contains  the  oak It  is  ordained  to  follow  guilt  by  God  — 

not  as  a  Judge,  but  as  the  Creator  and  Legislator  of  the  universe.  .  .  .  We 
ean  be  redeemed  from  the  punishment  of  sin  only  by  being  redeemed 
from  its  commission.  Neither  can  there  be  any  such  thing  as  vicarious 
atonement  or  punishment.  ...  If  the  foregoing  reflections  are  sound,  the 
awful,  yet  wholesome  conviction  presses  on  our  minds,  that  there  can  be  no 
forgiveness  of  sins."— Greg,  Creed  of  Christendom,  p.  265.  "I  believe  God 
is  a  just  God,  rewarding  and  punishing  us  exactly  as  we  act  well  or  ill.  I 
believe  that  such  reward  and  punishment  follow  necessarily  from  His  will 
as  revealed  in  natural  law,  as  well  as  in  the  Bible.  I  believe  that  as  the 
highest  justice  is  the  highest  mercy,  so  He  is  a  merciful  God.  That  the 
guilty  should  suffer  the  measure  of  penalty  which  their  guilt  has  incurred, 
is  justice." —  Froude,  Nemesis  of  Faith,  p.  69. 

NOTE  XVI.,  p.  190. 
See  above,  Lecture  I,  note  13. 

NOTE  XVII.,  p.  190. 
See  above,  Lecture  I,  note  12. 

NOTE  XVIII.,  p.  190. 

See  Newman,  Phases  of  Faith,  p.  8.  Compare  Wegscheider,  Instit. 
Theol.  §  141. 

NOTE  XIX.,  p.  191. 

Mr.  Rigg  justly  observes  of  the  theory  of  immediate  forgiveness,  as  sub 
stituted  for  the  Christian  Atonement,  "  Let  all  men  be  told  that  '  God  can 
not  be  angry  with  any/  and  that  whatever  may  have  been  a  man's  sins, 
if  he  will  but  repent,  there  is  no  hindrance  to  God's  freely  forgiving  him 
all,  without  the  infliction  of  any  punishment  whatever,  and  without  the 


832  NOTES.  LECT.  VII. 

need  of  any  atonement  or  intercession.  What  would  be  the  effect  of  such 
a  proclamation ?  Would  it  make  sin  appear  'exceeding  sinful?'  Would 
it  enhance  our  idea  of  the  holiness  of  God  ?  Would  it  not  make  sin  ap 
pear  a  liii'ht  and  trivial  thing,  tolerated  too  easily  by  a  '  good-natured ' 
God,  to  be  held  as  of  much  account  by  man?"1  Wegscheider  indeed 
actually  urges  this  argument  against  the  Christian  doctrine,  which  it  suits 
his  purpose  to  represent  as  a  scheme  of  unconditional  forgiveness.  "  Ex 
perience  teaches,  that  the  belief,  that  even  the  most  wicked  man  can 
easily  obtain  absolute  remission  of  sins,  has  always  done  the  greatest  det 
riment  to  true  virtue  and  integrity."— Instil,  Theol  §  140. 


NOTE  XX.,  p.  191. 

Such  is,  in  fact,  the  theory  of  Kant.  See  Religion  innerJidlb  der  Grenzen 
der  blossen  Vernunft,  p.  84.  He  does  not,  however,  carry  his  principle  con 
sistently  out,  but  admits  a  kind  of  vicarious  suffering  in  a  symbolical 
sense;  the  penitent  being  morally  a  different  individual  from  the  sinner. 
Even  this  metaphorical  conceit  is  utterly  out  of  place  according  to  the 
main  principles  of  his  system. 


NOTE  XXL,  p.  192. 

Some  excellent  remarks  on  this  point  will  be  found  in  McCosh's  Method 
of  the  Divine  Government,  p.  475  (4th  edition). 


NOTE  XXII.,  p.  192. 

"This  natural  indignation  is  generally  moderate  and  low  enough  in 
mankind,  in  each  particular  man,  when  the  injury  which  excites  it  doth 
not  affect  himself,  or  one  whom  he  considers  as  himself.  Therefore  the 
precepts  to  forgive  and  to  love  our  enemies,  do  not  relate  to  that  general 
indignation  against  injury  and  the  authors  of  it,  but  to  this  feeling,  or 
resentment,  when  raised  by  private  or  personal  injury/' — Butler,  Sermon 
IX,  On  Forgiveness  of  Injuries. 


NOTE  XXIIL,  p.  193. 

Thus  Mr.  Froude  exclaims,  "  He !  to  have  created  mankind  liable  to  fail 
—  to  have  laid  them  in  the  way  of  a  temptation  under  which  He  knew 

1  Modern  Anglican  T/ieology,  p.  317. 


LECT.  VII.  NOTES.  333 

they  would  fall,  and  then  curse  them  and  all  who  were  to  come  of  them, 
and  all  the  world  for  their  sakes! " — Nemesis  of  Faith,  p.  11.  This  author 
omits  the  whole  doctrine  of  the  redemption,  and  treats  the  fall  and  the 
cui-se  as  if  they  were  the  sole  manner  of  God's  dealing  with  sinners.  His 
objection,  stripped  of  its  violent  language,  is  but  one  form  of  the  univer 
sal  riddle  —  the  existence  of  Evil.  A  similar  objection  is  urged  by  Mr. 
Parker,  Theism,  Atheism,  and  the  Popular  Theology,  p.  64 :  and  by  Mr. 
Atkinson,  Letters  on  the  Laivs  of  Man's  Nature  and  Development,  pp.  173, 
174. 

NOTE  XXIV.,  p.  193. 

Aristotle  Eth.  Nic.  V.  10.  "For  of  a  thing,  which  is  not  limited,  the 
rule  is  also  unlimited,  like  the  plumb-rule  of  Lesbian  house-building, 
changing  according  to  the  form  of  the  stone,  and  not  remaining  the  same 
rule." 

NOTE  XXV.,  p.  193. 

On  this  spirit  of  universal  criticism,  Augustine  remarks:  "But  they 
are  foolish,  who  say,  'Could  not  the  wisdom  of  God  otherwise  deliver 
men,  than  by  assuming  human  nature,  and  being  born  of  a  woman,  and 
suffering  all  those  things  from  sinners  ? '  To  whom,  we  say  He  could,  but 
if  He  were  to  do  otherwise,  He  would  in  like  manner  be  displeasing  to 
your  folly." — De  Agone  Cimstiano,  c.  11. 

The  following  passage  from  the  Eclipse  of  Faith,  p.  125,  is  an  excellent 
statement  of  the  versatility  of  the  "  moral  reason,"  or  "  spiritual  insight," 
when  set  up  as  a  criterion  of  religious  truth.  "  Even  as  to  that  funda 
mental  position, — the  existence  of  a  Being  of  unlimited  power  and  wis 
dom  (as  to  his  unlimited  goodness,  I  believe  that  nothing  6?^  an  external 
revelation  can  absolutely  certify  us),  I  feel  that  I  am  much  more  indebted 
to  those  inferences  from  design,  which  these  writers  make  so  light  of,  than 
to  any  clearness  in  the  imperfect  intuition ;  for  if  I  found  —  and  surely  this 
is  the  true  test — the  traces  of  design  less  conspicuous  in  the  external 
world,  confusion  there  as  in  the  moral,  and  in  both  greater  than  is  now 
found  in  either,  I  extremely  doubt  whether  the  faintest  surmise  of  such  a 
Being  would  have  suggested  itself  to  me.  But  be  that  as  it  may;  as  to 
their  other  cardinal  sentiments,  —  the  nature  of  my  relations  to  this  Being 
—  his  placability  if  offended,  —  the  terms  of  forgiveness,  if  any,  —  whether, 
as  these  gentlemen  affirm,  he  is  accessible  to  all,  without  any  atonement 
or  mediator :  —  as  to  all  this,  I  solemnly  declare,  that  apart  from  external 
instruction,  I  cannot  by  interrogating  my  racked  spirit,  catch  even  a  mur- 


334  NOTES.  LECT.  VII. 

mur.  That  it  must  be  faint  indeed,  in  other  men  —  so  faint  as  to  render  the 
pretensions  of  the  certitude  of  the  internal  revelation,  and  its  indepen 
dence  of  all  external  revelation,  perfectly  preposterous  —  I  infer  from  this, 
—  that  they  have,  for  the  most  part,  arrived  at  diametrically  opposite  con 
clusions  from  those  of  these  interpreters  of  the  spiritual  revelation.  As 
to  the  articles,  indeed,  of  man's  immortality  and  a  future  state,  it  would 
be  truly  difficult  for  my  'spiritual  insight'  to  verify  theirs;  for,  according 
to  Mr.  Parker,  his  '  insight '  affirms  that  man  is  immortal,  and  Mr.  New 
man's  'insight '  declares  nothing  about  the  matter!  Nor  is  my  conscious 
ness,  so  far  as  I  can  trace  it,  mine  only.  This  painful  uncertainty  has 
been  the  confession  of  multitudes  of  far  greater  minds;  they  have  been 
so  far  from  contending  that  we  have  naturally  a  clear  utterance  on  these 
great  questions,  that  they  have  acknowledged  the  necessity  of  an  external 
revelation ;  and  mankind  in  general,  so  far  from  thinking  or  feeling  such 
light  superfluous,  have  been  constantly  gaping  after  it,  and  adopted  almost 
any  thing  that  but  tore  the  name. 
What,  then,  am  I  to  think  of  this  all-sufficient  revelation  from  within  ?  " 


NOTE  XXVI.,  p.  193. 

For  the  Socinian  theory  of  a  limited  foreknowledge  in  God,  see  Mtiller, 
Christliche  Lehre  von  dcr  Stinde,  II.  pp.  276,  288;  Davison,  Discourses  on 
Prophecy,  pp.  360,  367.  A  similar  view  is  held  by  Rothe,  Theol.  Eihik, 
Vol.  I.  p.  118;  and  by  Drobisch,  Grundlehren  der  Relfgionsphilosophie,  p.  209. 
For  the  opposite  necessitarian  theory,  see  Calvin,  Inst.  L.  II.  ch.  4.  §  6; 
Edwards,  On  the  Freedom  of  the  Witt,  Part  II.  Sect.  xii.  quoted  above, 
Lect.  II.  note  7;  and  in  the  authorities  cited  by  Wegscheider,  Inst.  Theol., 
§  65. 


NOTE  XXVII.,  p.  193. 

That  God's  knowledge  is  not  properly  foreknowledge,  as  not  being  subject 
to  the  law  of  time,  is  maintained  by  Augustine,  De  Civ.  Dei,  XL  21,  De 
Div.  Qucest  ad  Simpl.  L.  II.  Qu.  2.  §  2,  and  by  Boethius,  De  Consol.  Phil 
L.  V.  Pr.  3-6.  A  similar  view  is  taken  by  Wegscheider,  Inst.  Theol.  §  65. 
As  a  speculative  theory,  this  view  is  as  untenable  as  the  opposite  hypo 
thesis  of  an  absolute  foreknowledge  and  predestination.  We  can  only  say 
that  we  do  not  know  that  the  Divine  Consciousness  is  subject  to  the  law 
of  succession ;  not  that  we  know  that  it  is  not.  As  a  means  of  saving  the 
infinity  of  God's  knowledge,  consistently  with  the  free  agency  of  man,  the 
hypothesis  becomes  unnecessary,  the  instant  we  admit  that  the  infinite  is 


LECT.  VII.  NOTES.  335 

not  an  object  of  human  conception  at  all.  If  this  is  once  conceded,  wo 
need  no  hypothesis  to  reconcile  truths  which  \ve  cannot  certainly  know  to 
be  in  antagonism  to  each  other.  We  cannot  assume  the  simultaneity  of 
the  divine  consciousness ;  for  we  know  nothing  of  the  infinite,  either  in 
itself  or  in  its  relation  to  time.  Nor,  on  the  other  hand,  could  we  deduce 
the  necessity  of  human  actions  from  the  fact  of  God's  foreknowledge, 
even  if  the  latter  could  be  assumed  as  absolutely  true;  for  we  know  not 
whether  the  conception  of  necessity  itself  implies  a  divine  reality,  or 
merely  a  human  mode  of  representation. 

NOTE  XXYIII.,  p.  194. 

Wegscheider  (Inst.  TJieol.  §  50)  denies  the  possibility  of  prophecy,  on  the 
ground  that  a  prediction  of  human  events  is  destructive  of  freedom.  In 
this  he  follows  Kant,  Anthropologie,  §  35. 

NOTE  XXIX.,  p.  194. 

"As  it  is  certain  that  prescience  does  not  destroy  the  liberty  of  man's 
will,  or  impose  any  necessity  upon  it,  men's  actions  being  not  therefore 
future,  because  they  are  foreknown,  but  therefore  foreknown,  because 
future;  and  were  a  thing  never  so  contingent,  yet  upon  supposition  that  it 
will  be  done,  it  must  needs  have  been  future  from  all  eternity :  so  is  it 
extreme  arrogance  for  men,  because  themselves  can  naturally  foreknow 
nothing  but  by  some  causes  antecedent,  as  an  eclipse  of  the  sun  or  moon, 
therefore  to  presume  to'  measure  the  knowledge  of  God  Almighty  according 
to  the  same  scantling,  and  to  deny  him  the  prescience  of  human  actions, 
not  considering  that,  as  his  nature  is  incomprehensible,  so  his  knowledge 
may  be  well  looked  upon  by  us  as  such  too ;  that  which  is  past  our  finding 
out,  and  too  wonderful  for  us." — Cudworth,  Intelkctual  System,  ch.  V. 
(Vol.  III.  p.  19.  ed.  Harrison).  "  We  may  be  unable  to  conceive  how  a 
thing  not  necessary  in  its  nature  can  be  foreknown  —  for  our  foreknowl 
edge  is  in  general  limited  by  that  circumstance,  and  is  more  or  less  per 
fect  in  proportion  to  the  fixed  or  necessary  nature  of  the  things  we  con 
template  :  .  .  .  but  to  subject  the  knowledge  of  God  to  any  such  limitation 
is  surely  absurd  and  unphilosophical,  as  well  as  impious."— Copies  ton, 
Enquiry  into  the  Doctrines  of  Necessity  and  Predestination,  p.  46. 

NOTE  XXX.,  p.  194. 

Origen.  apud  Euseb.  Prcep.  Evang.  VI.  1 1 .  36.  And  if  we  must  say,  that 
foreknowledge  is  not  the  cause  of  events,  we  will  say  what,  though  more 


386  NOTES.  LECT.  VII. 

paradoxical,  is  yet  true,  that  the  fact  that  the  thing  is  to  be,  is  the  cause 
of  its  foreknowledge." — Leibnitz,  Theodicee,  §  37.  "It  is  very  easy  to 
decide,  that  foreknowledge  in  itself  adds  nothing  to  the  determination 
of  the  reality  of  future  events,  except  that  this  determination  is  known;  a 
thing  -which  does  not  at  all  increase  the  determination,  or  the  futurition 
(as  it  is  called)  of  these  events." — Clarke,  Demonstration  of  the  Being  and 
Attributes  of  God,  p.  96.  "  The  certainty  of  Foreknowledge  does  not 
cause  the  certainty  of  things,  but  is  itself  founded  on  the  reality  of  their 
existence.  Whatever  now  is,  it  is  certain  that  it  is;  and  it  was  yester 
day  and  from  eternity  as  certainly  true,  that  the  thing  would  be  to-day,  as 
'tis  now  certain  that  it  is.  This  certainty  of  events  is  equally  the  same, 
whether  it  is  supposed  that  the  thing  could  be  foreknown  or  not." 


NOTE  XXXL,  p.  195. 
See  above,  Lecture  VI,  p.  150,  and  note  27. 

NOTE  XXXIL,  p.  196. 

This  question  is  discussed  at  some  length  by  Euler,  Lettres  d  une  Prin- 
cesse  d'Allemagne,  Vol.  I.  p.  360.  ed.,  Cournot. 

NOTE  XXXIIL,  p.  196. 

"Sins  are  finite;  between  the  finite  and  the  infinite  there  is  no  propor 
tion;  therefore  punishments  also  ought  to  be  finite." —  Sonerus  apud  Leib 
nitz.  Prcp/.i  The  same  argument  is  used  by  Blasche,  Philosophische  Unster- 
Uichkeitlehre,  §  4;  as  well  as  by  Mr.  Newman,  Phases  of  Faith,  p.  78,  and 
by  Mr.  Froude,  Nemesis  of  Faith,  p.  17.  The  latter  however  entirely  mis 
represents  Leibnitz's  reply  to  the  objection. 

NOTE  XXXIV.,  p.  197. 

Thus  Leibnitz  replies  to  the  objection  of  Sonerus:  "Even,  therefore,  if 
we  should  concede  that  no  sin  is  of  itself  infinite,  yet  it  can  with  truth  be 
said,  that  the  sins  of  the  damned  are  infinite  in  number;  for  they  persist 
in  sinning,  through  all  eternity."  The  same  argument  is  repeated  in  the 

1  Published  by  Lessing,  in  his  tract,  Leibnitz  von  den  ewigen  Strafen  (Leasing^ 
Schriften,  ed.  Lachmann,  Vol.  IX.  p.  154). 


LECT.  VII  NOTES.  337 

Theodicee,  §§  74,  133,  266.  The  reply  which  Mr.  Fronde  attributes  to  Leib 
nitz,  namely,  that  sin  against  an  Infinite  Being  contracts  a  character  of 
infinity,  is  merely  noticed  by  him  as  "  la  raison  vulgaire,"  urged,  among 
others,  by  Ursinus.  With  Leibnitz's  language  may  be  compared  that  of 
Miiller;  "And  since  experience  shows,  that  men  really  resist  the  holiest 
work  of  divine  love,  why  should  it  be  thought  impossible,  that  this  resist 
ance  against  God  may  also,  on  the  other  side  this  earthly  life,  be  ever 
again  renewed,  and  thus  carried  forward  into  endless  periods?" — Christ- 
liche  Lehre  von  der  Sunde,  II.  p.  601. 


NOTE  XXXV.,  p.  197. 

Thus  Mr.  Newman  says,  "  I  saw  that  the  current  orthodoxy  made  Satan 
eternal  conqueror  over  Christ.  In  vain  does  the  Son  of  God  come  from 
heaven  and  take  human  flesh  and  die  on  the  cross.  In  spite  of  him  the 
devil  carries  off  to  hell  the  vast  majority  of  mankind,  in  whom  not  misery 
only,  but  Sin,  is  triumphant  for  ever  and  ever."1  And  Mr.  Parker,  to  the 
same  effect,  remarks,  "I  can  never  believe  that  Evil  is  a  finality  with 
God."2  The  remarks  of  Miiller,  in  answer  to  similar  theories,  are  worthy 
of  consideration.  "  It  seems  incredible,  according  to  what  we  have  said, 
that  the  idea  of  the  world  is  to  reach  its  complete  development  with  an 
unsettled  discord,  that  opposition  to  the  Divine  will  is  to  maintain  itself  in 
the  will  of  any  creature  whatsoever.  This  difficulty,  however,  is  solved 
by  a  correct  conception  of  punishment.  The  opposition  to  the  Divine  will 
does  not  hold  its  ground,  but  is  absolutely  overcome,  when  the  entire  con 
dition  of  the  beings,  in  whom  it  is,  is  a  penal  condition ;  so  that  evil,  being 
in  restraint,  is  no  longer  able  to  disturb  the  pure  harmony  of  the  world 
glorified  and  transformed  to  the  kingdom  of  God."3 


NOTE  XXXVI.,  p.  197. 

See  a  short  treatise  by  Kant,  Ueber  das  Misslingen  oiler  Philosophischen 
Versuche  in  der  Thcodice'e  (Werke,  VII.  p.  385).  For  a  more  detailed  ac 
count  of  various  theories,  see  Miiller,  Christliche  Lehre  von  der  Sunde,  B.  II. 
An  able  review  of  the  difficulties  of  the  question  will  be  found  in  Mr. 
Mozley's  Augiistim'an  Doctrine  of  Predestination,  p.  262  seq. 

1  Phases  of  Faith,  p.  78. 

2  Some  Account  of  my  Ministry.    See  Theism)  Atheism,  etc.,  p.  261. 

3  Christliche  Lehrt  von  dtr  SUnde.  II.  p,  599. 

29 


338  NOTES.  LECT.  VII. 


NOTE  XXXVIL,  p.  197. 

The  theory  which  represents  evil  as  a  privation  or  a  negation  —  a  theory 
adopted  by  theologians  and  philosophers  of  almost  every  shade  of  opinion, 
in  order  to  reconcile  the  goodness  of  God  with  the  apparent  permission 
of  sin,  can  only  be  classed  among;  the  numerous  necessarily  fruitless  at 
tempts  of  metaphysicians  to  explain  the  primary  facts  of  consciousness, 
by  the  arbitrary  assumption  of  a  principle  of  which  we  are  not  and  can 
not  be  conscious,  and  of  whose  truth  or  falsehood  we  have  therefore  no 
possible  guarantee.  Moral  evil,  in  the  only  form  in  which  we  arc  con 
scious  of  it,  appears  as  the  direct  transgression  of  a  law  whose  obligation 
we  feel  within  us ;  and  thus  manifested,  it  is  an  act  as  real  and  as  positive 
as  any  performed  in  the  most  rigid  compliance  with  that  law.  And  this  is 
the  utmost  point  to  which  human  research  can  penetrate.  Whether,  in 
some  absolute  mode  of  existence,  out  of  all  relation  to  human  conscious 
ness,  the  phenomenon  of  moral  evil  is  ultimately  dependent  on  the  addi 
tion  or  the  subtraction  of  some  causative  principle,  is  a  question  the  solu 
tion  of  which  is  beyond  consciousness,  and  therefore  beyond  philosophy. 
To  us,  as  moral  agents,  capable  of  right  and  wrong  acts,  evil  is  a  reality, 
and  its  consequences  are  a  reality.  What  may  be  the  nature  of  the  cause 
which  produces  this  unquestionably  real  fact  of  human  consciousness,  is 
a  mystery  which  God  has  not  revealed,  and  which  man  cannot  discover. 

NOTE  XXXVIII.,  p.  199. 

Analogy,  Part  II.  ch.  5.  In  another  significant  passage  (Part  I.  ch.  2), 
Butler  exhibits  the  argument  from  analogy  as  bearing  on  the  final  char 
acter  of  punishment.  "  Though  after  men  have  been  guilty  of  folly  and 
extravagance  up  to  a  certain  degree,  it  is  often  in  their  power,  for  instance, 
to  retrieve  their  affairs,  to  recover  their  health  and  character;  at  least  in 
good  measure;  yet  real  reformation  is,  in  many  cases,  of  no  avail  at  all 
towards  preventing  the  miseries,  poverty,  sickness,  infamy,  naturally 
annexed  to  folly  and  extravagance  exceeding  that  degree.  ...  So  that 
many  natural  punishments  are  final  to  him  who  incurs  them,  if  consid 
ered  only  in  his  temporal  capacity." —  Compare  Bishop  Browne,  Procedure 
of  the  Understanding,  p.  351.  "The  difficulty  in  that  question,  What  pro 
portion  endless  torments  can  bear  to  momentary  sins  ?  is  quite  removed,  by 
considering  that  the  punishments  denounced  and  threatened  are  not  in 
themselves  sanctions  entirely  arbitrary,  as  it  is  in  punishments  annexed 
to  human  laws;  but  they  are  withal  so  many  previous  warnings  or  declar 
ations  of  the  inevitable  consequence  and  natural  tendency  of  Sin  in  itself, 
to  render  us  miserable  in  another  world." 


LECT.  VII.  NOTES.  339 


NOTE  XXXIX.,  p.  200. 

Kant  (Religion,  u.  s.  ic.,  Werke,  X.  p.  45)  objects  to  the  doctrine  of  in 
herited  corruption,  on  the  ground  that  a  man  cannot  be  responsible  for  any 
but  his  own  acts.  The  objection  is  carried  out  more  fully  by  Wegscheider, 
who  says,  "  Neither  can  the  goodness  of  God  allow,  that  by  one  man's  sin, 
universal  human  nature  be  corrupted  and  depraved ;  nor  can  His  wisdom 
suffer,  that  God's  work,  furnished  from  the  beginning  with  surpassing 
endowments,  be  transformed  in  a  little  while,  for  the  slightest  cause,  to 
quite  another  and  a  worse  condition." — lust.  TheoL  §  117.  The  learned 
critic  does  not  seem  to  be  aware  that  the  principle  of  one  of  these  argu 
ments  exactly  annihilates  that  of  the  other;  for  if  we  concede  to  the  first, 
that  every  man  is  born  in  the  state  of  pristine  innocence,  we  must  admit, 
in  opposition  to  the  second,  that  God's  work  is  destroyed  by  slight  causes, 
not  once  only,  but  millions  of  times,  in  every  man  that  sins.  The  only 
other  supposition  possible  is,  that  sin  itself  is  part  of  God's  purpose  —  in 
which  case  we  need  not  trouble  ourselves  to  establish  any  argument  on 
the  hypothesis  of  the  divine  wisdom  or  benevolence. 


NOTE  XL.,  p.  200. 

Aristotle,  Eth.  Nic.  VII.  2.  "  But  one  may  be  at  a  loss  to  understand 
how  a  person,  who  takes  a  right  estimate  of  things,  can  live  without 
moral  self-control.  Some,  therefore,  say  that  a  person,  who  had  knowl 
edge,  could  not  live  in  such  manner;  for  (as  Socrates  thought),  if  knowl 
edge  were  within  him,  he  could  not  be  controlled  by  something  else,  and 
dragged  about  by  it,  like  a  slave." 


NOTE  XLL,  p.  200. 

For  sundry  rationalist  objections  to  the  doctrine  of  Justification  by 
Faith,  see  Wegscheider,  §  154,  155.  He  declares  the  whole  doctrine  to  be 
the  result  of  the  anihropopaihic  notions  of  a  rude  age. 

NOTE  XLIL,  p.  201. 

"  Our  notion  of  freedom  does  not,  it  is  true,  exclude  motives  of  conscious 
action;  but  motives  are  not  compulsory,  but  are  always  effectual  only 
through  the  will;  motives  for  the  human  will  can  therefore  proceed 
from  God,  without  man's  being  thereby  forced,  without  his  losing  his  free 
dom,  and  becoming  a  blind  instrument  of  the  higher  power." —  Drobisch, 


340  NOTES.  LECT.  VII. 

Grundlehren  der  HeligionspWosophie,  p.  272.  In  like  manner,  Mr.  Mozley, 
in  his  learned  and  philosophical  work  on  the  Augustinian  Doctrine  of  Pre 
destination,  truly  says,  "  What  we  have  to  consider  in  this  question,  is 
not  what  is  the  abstract  idea  of  freewill,  but  what  is  the  freewill  which  we 
really  and  actually  have.  This  actual  freewill,  we  find,  is  not  a  simple 
but  a  complex  thing;  exhibiting  oppositions  and  inconsistencies;  appear 
ing  on  the  one  side  to  be  a  power  of  doing  anything  to  which  there  is  no 
physical  hindrance,  on  the  other  side  to  be  a  restricted  faculty"  (p.  102). 
Neither  the  Pelagian  theory  on  the  one  side,  nor  the  Augustinian  on  the 
other,  took  sufficient  account  of  the  actual  condition  of  the  human  will  in 
relation  to  external  influences.  The  question  was  argued  as  if  the  relation 
of  divine  grace  to  human  volition  must  consist  wholly  in  activity  on  the 
one  side  and  passivity  on  the  other;  —  in  the  will  of  its  own  motion  ac 
cepting  the  grace,  or  the  grace  by  its  irresistible  force  overpowering  the 
will.  The  controversy  thus  becomes  precisely  analogous  to  the  philosoph 
ical  dispute  between  the  advocates  of  freewill  and  determinism;  the  one 
proceeding  on  the  assumption  of  an  absolute  indifference  of  the  will;  the 
other  maintaining  its  necessary  determination  by  motives. 

Mr.  Mozley  has  thrown  considerable  light  on  the  true  bearings  of  the 
predestinarian  controversy ;  and  his  work  is  especially  valuable  as  vindica 
ting  the  supreme  right  of  Scripture  to  be  accepted  in  all  its  statements,  in 
stead  of  being  mutilated  to  suit  the  demands  of  human  logic.  But  it  can 
not  be  denied  that  his  own  theory,  however  satisfactory  in  this  respect, 
leaves  a  painful  void  on  the  philosophical  side,  and  apparently  vindicates 
the  authority  of  revelation  by  the  sacrifice  of  the  laws  of  human  thought. 
He  maintains  that  where  our  conception  of  an  object  is  indistinct,  conti'a- 
dictory  propositions  may  be  accepted  as  both  equally  true;  and  he  carries 
this  theory  so  far  as  to  assert  of  the  rival  doctrines  of  Pelagius  and  Au 
gustine,  "  Both  these  positions  are  true,  if  held  together,  and  both  false,  if 
held  apart." l 

Should  we  not  rather  say  that  the  very  indistinctness  of  conception  pre 
vents  the  existence  of  any  contradiction  at  all?  I  can  only  know  two 
ideas  to  be  contradictory  by  the  distinct  conception  of  both;  and,  where 

1  P.  77.  To  the  same  effect  are  his  criticisms  on  Aquinas,  p.  260,  in  which  he 
says,  "The  will  as  an  original  spring  of  action  is  irreconcilable  with  the  Divine 
Power,  a  second  first  cause  in  nature  being  inconsistent  with  there  being  only  one 
First  Cause."  This  assumes  that  we  have  a  sufficient  conception  of  the  nature  of 
Divine  Power  and  of  the  action  of  a  First  Cause ;  an  assumption  which  the 
author  himself  in  another  passage  repudiates,  acknowledging  that  "  As  an  un 
known  premiss,  the  Divine  Power  is  no  contradiction  to  the  fact  of  evil ;  for  we 
must  know  what  a  truth  is  before  we  see  a  contradiction  in  it  to  another  truth  " 
(p.  276).  This  latter  admission,  consistently  carried  out,  would  have  consider 
ably  modified  the  author's  whole  theory. 


LECT.  VII.  NOTES.  341 

such  a  conception  is  impossible,  there  is  no  evidence  of  contradiction. 
The  actual  declarations  of  Scripture,  so  far  as  they  deal  with  matters 
above  human  comprehension,  are  not  in  themselves  contradictory  to.  the 
facts  of  consciousness;  they  are  only  made  so  by  arbitrary  interpretation. 
It  is  nowhere  said  in  Scripture  that  God  so  predestines  man  as  to  take 
from  him  all  power  of  acting  by  his  own  will :  —  this  is  an  inference  from 
the  supposed  nature  of  predestination ;  an  inference  which,  if  our  concep 
tion  of  predestination  is  indistinct,  we  have  no  right  to  make.  Man  can 
not  foreknow  unless  the  event  is  certain ;  nor  predestine  without  coercing 
the  result.  Here  there  is  a  contradiction  between  freewill  and  predestina 
tion.  But  we  cannot  transfer  the  same  contradiction  to  Theology,  without 
assuming  that  God's  knowledge  and  acts  are  subject  to  the  same  condi 
tions  as  man's. 

The  contradictory  propositions  which  Mr.  Mozley  exhibits,  as  equally 
guaranteed  by  consciousness,  are  in  reality  by  no  means  homogeneous. 
In  each  pair  of  contradictories,  we  have  a  limited  and  individual  fact  of 
immediate  perception,  — such  as  the  power  of  originating  an  action,  —  op 
posed  to  a  universal  maxim,  not  perceived  immediately,  but  based  on 
some  process  of  general  thought,  —  such  as  that  every  event  must  have  a 
cause.  To  establish  these  two  as  contradictory  of  each  other,  it  should  be 
shown  that  in  every  single  act  we  have  a  direct  consciousness  of  being 
coerced,  as  well  as  of  being  free;  and  that  we  can  gather  from  each  fact 
a  clear  and  distinct  conception.  But  this  is  by  no  means  the  case.  The 
principle  of  causality,  whatever  may  be  its  true  import  and  extent,  is  not 
derived  from  the  immediate  consciousness  of  our  volition  being  deter 
mined  by  antecedent  causes  ;  and  therefore  it  may  not  be  applied  to 
human  actions,  until,  from  an  analysis  of  the  mode  in  which  this  maxim 
is  gained,  it  can  be  distinctly  shown  that  these  are  included  under  it.1 

By  applying  to  Mr.  Mozley's  theory  the  principles  advanced  in  the  pre 
ceding  Lectures,  it  may,  I  believe,  be  shown  that,  in  every  case,  the  con 
tradiction  is  not  real,  but  apparent;  and  that  it  arises  from  a  vain  attempt 
to  transcend  the  limits  of  human  thought. 


NOTE  XLIIl.,  p.  201. 

Analogy,  Introduction,  p.  10. 

1 1  am  happy  to  be  able  to  refer,  in  support  of  this  view,  to  the  able  criticism  of 
Professor  Fraser,  in  his  review  of  Mr.  Mozley's  work.  "The  coexistence,"  he 
says,  "  of  a  belief  in  causality  with  a  belief  in  moral  agency,  is  indeed  incom 
prehensible;  but  is  it  so  because  the  two  beliefs  are  known  to  be  contradictory, 
and  not  rather  because  causality  and  Divine  Power  cannot  be  fathomed  by  finite 
intelligence?"—  Essays  in  Philosophy,  p.  271. 

29* 


842  NOTES.  LECT.  VIII. 


LECTURE    VIII. 


NOTE  I.,  p.  206. 

F.  W.  Newman,  Phases  of  Faith,  p.  199;  Reply  to  the  Edipse  of  Faith,  p. 
11. 

NOTE  II.,  p.  206. 

"  Christianity  itself  has  thus  practically  confessed,  what  is  theoretically 
clear,  that  an  authoritative  external  revelation  of  moral  and  spiritual  truth 
is  essentially  impossible  to  man." —  F.  W.  Newman,  The  Soul,  p.  59. 


NOTE  III.,  p.  206. 

"In  teaching  about  God  and  Christ,  lay  aside  the  wisdom  of  the  wise; 
forswear  History  and  all  its  apparatus ;  hold  communion  with  the  Father 
and  the  Son  in  the  Spirit;  from  this  communion  learn  all  that  is  essential 
to  the  Gospel,  and  still  (if  possible)  retain  every  proposition  which  Paul 
believed  and  taught.  Propose  them  to  the  faith  of  others,  to  be  tested  by 
inward  and  spiritual  evidence  only;  and  you  will  at  least  be  in  the  true  apos 
tolic  track."— F.  W.  Newman,  The  Soul,  p.  250. 

NOTE  IV.,  p.  207. 

"  This  question  of  miracles,  whether  true  or  false,  is  of  no  religious  sig 
nificance.  When  Mr.  Locke  said  the  doctrine  proved  the  miracles,  not 
the  miracles  the  doctrine,  he  admitted  their  worthlessness.  They  can  be 
useful  only  to  such  as  deny  our  internal  power  of  discerning  truth." — Par 
ker,  Discourse  of  matters  pertaining  to  Religion,  p.  170.  Pascal,  with  far 
sounder  judgment,  says,  on  the  other  hand,  "we  must  judge  of  the  doc 
trine  by  the  miracles,  we  must  judge  of  miracles  by  the  doctrine.  The 
doctrine  shows  what  the  miracles  are,  and  the  miracles  show  what  the 

doctrine  is.    All  this  is  true,  and  not  contradictory Jesus  Christ 

cured  the  man  who  was  born  blind,  and  did  many  other  miracles  on  the 
sabbath  day;  whereby  he  blinded  the  Pharisees,  who  said,  that  it  was 

necessary  to  judge  of  miracles  by  the  doctrine The  Pharisees 

said :  This  man  is  not  of  God,  because  he  keepeth  not  the  sabbath  day.    The 
others  said :  How  can  a  man  that  is  a  sinner,  do  such  miracles  ?    Which  is  the 


LECT.  Vin.  NOTES.  343 

clearer?"1  In  like  manner  Clarke  observes,  "'Tis  indeed  the  miracles 
only,  that  prove  the  doctrine ;  and  not  the  doctrine  that  proves  the  mira- 
acles.  But  then  in  order  to  this  end,  that  the  miracles  may  prove  the  doc 
trine,  'tis  always  necessary  to  be  first  supposed  that  the  doctrine  be  such 
as  is  in  its  nature  capable  of  being  proved  by  miracles.  The  doctrine  must 
be  in  itself  possible  and  capable  to  be  proved,  and  then  miracles  will  prove  it 
to  be  actually  and  certainly  true.2  The  judicious  remarks  of  Dean  Trench 
are  to  the  same  effect,  "When  we  object  to  the  use  often  made  of  these 
works,  it  is  only  because  they  have  been  forcibly  severed  from  the  whole 
complex  of  Christ's  life  and  doctrine,  and  presented  to  the  contemplation 
of  men  apart  from  these ;  it  is  only  because,  when  on  his  head  are  '  many 
crowns,'  one  only  has  been  singled  out  in  proof  that  He  is  King  of  kings, 
and  Lord  of  lords.  The  miracles  have  been  spoken  of  as  though  they 
borrowed  nothing  from  the  truths  which  they  confirmed,  but  those  truths 
everything  from  the  miracles  by  which  they  were  confirmed;  when,  in 
deed,  the  true  relation  is  one  of  mutual  interdependence,  the  miracles 
proving  the  doctrines,  and  the  doctrines  approving  the  miracles,  and  both 
held  together  for  us  in  a  blessed  unity,  in  the  person  of  Him  who  spake 
the  words  and  did  the  works,  and  through  the  impress  of  highest  holiness 
and  of  absolute  truth  and  goodness,  which  that  person  leaves  stamped  on 
our  souls ;  —  so  that  it  may  be  more  truly  said  that  we  believe  the  mira 
cles  for  Christ's  sake,  than  Christ  for  the  miracles'  sake."3 


NOTE  V.,  p.  207. 

Foxton,  Popular  Christianity,  p.  105.  On  the  other  hand,  the  profound 
author  of  the  Restoration  of  Belief,  with  a  far  juster  estimate  of  the  value 
of  evidence,  observes,  "Remove  the  supernatural  from  the  Gospels,  or,  in 
other  words,  reduce  the  evangelical  histories,  by  aid  of  some  unintelligible 
hypothesis  (German-born),  to  the  level  of  an  inane  jumble  of  credulity, 
extravagance,  and  myth-power  (whatever  this  may  be),  and  then  Chris 
tianity  will  go  to  its  place,  as  to  any  effective  value,  in  relation  to  human 
izing  and  benevolent  influences  and  enterprises ;  —  a  place,  say,  a  few  de 
grees  above  the  level  of  some  passages  in  Epictetus  and  M.  Aurelius.  .  .  . 

1  Pensecs,  Partie  II.  Art.  xvi.  §  i.  5, 10.    Whatever  may  be  thought  of  the  evi 
dence  in  behalf  of  the  particular  miracle  on  the  occasion  of  which  these  remarks 
were  written,  the  article  itself  is  worthy  of  the  highest  praise,  as  a  judicious 
statement  of  the  religious  value  of  miracles,  supposing  their  actual  occurrence  to 
be  proved  by  sufficient  testimony. 

2  Evidence  of  Natural  and  Revealed  Religion,  Prop.  xiv. 

3  Notes  on  the  Miracles  of  our  Lord,  p.  94  (fifth  edition). 


844  NOTES.  LECT.  VIII. 

The  Gospel  is  a  FORCE  in  the  world,  it  is  a  force  available  for  the  good 
of  man,  not  because  it  is  Wisdom,  but  because  it  is  Power.  .  .  .  But  the 
momentum  supplied  by  the  Gospel  is  a  force  which  disappears  —  which 
is  utterly  gone,  gone  for  ever,  when  Belief  in  its  authority,  as  attested  by 
miracles,  is  destroyed." — Pp.  290,  291,  292.  To  the  same  effect  are  the 
excellent  remarks  with  which  Ncander  concludes  his  Life  of  Jesus  Christ. 
"The  end  of  Christ's  appearance  on  earth  coiTCsponds  to  its  beginning. 
No  link  in  its  chain  of  supernatural  facts  can  be  lost,  without  taking  away 
its  significance  as  a  whole.  Christianity  rests  upon  these  facts;  stands 
or  falls  with  them.  By  faith  in  them  has  the  Divine  life  been  generated 
from  the  beginning;  by  faith  in  them  has  that  life  in  all  ages  regenerated 
mankind,  raised  them  above  the  limits  of  earthly  life,  changed  them  from 
ylebm  adscripti  to  citizens  of  heaven,  and  formed  the  stage  of  transition 
from  an  existence  chained  to  nature,  to  a  free,  celestial  life,  far  raised 
above  it.  Were  this  faith  gone,  there  might,  indeed,  remain  many  of  the 
effects  of  what  Christianity  has  been;  but  as  for  Christianity  in  the  true 
sense,  as  for  a  Christian  Church,  there  could  be  none." — (English  Trans 
lation,  p.  487). 

NOTE  VI.,  p.  207. 

Parker,  Some  Account  of  my  Ministry,  appended  to  Theism,  Atheism,  and 
the  Popular  Theology,  p.  258. 

NOTE  VII.,  p.  207. 

"  All  these  criteria  are  the  moral  conditions  under  which  alone  it  were 
possible  for  such  a  manifestation  to  be  realized,  conformably  to  the  con 
ception  of  a  revelation ;  but  by  no  means  conversely  —  the  conditions  of 
an  effect  which  could  be  realized  only  by  God  conformably  to  such- a  con 
ception.  In  the  latter  case,  they  would  —  to  the  exclusion  of  the  causality 
of  all  other  beings — justify  the  conclusion,  that  is  revelation;  but,  as  it 
is,  only  this  conclusion  is  justified;  that  can  be  a  revelation." — Fichte, 
Versuch  einer  Kritik  aller  Qffenburuny  (  Werlce  V.  p.  146). 


NOTE  VIII.,  p.  208. 

"  These  .  .  .  were  the  outer  conditions  of  the  life  of  Christ,  under  which 
his  public  ministry  and  his  personal  character  reached  their  destined 
development.  It  is  not  in  that  development  alone,  but  in  that  develop 
ment  under  these  conditions,  that  the  evidence  will  be  found  of  his  True 


LECT.  VIII.  NOTES.  845 

Origin  and  of  his  Personal  Preeminence." — The  Christ  of  History,  by 
John  Young,  p.  33.  "But  this  character,  in  its  unapproachable  grandeur, 
must  be  viewed  in  connection  with  the  outward  circumstances  of  the 
Being  in  whom  it  was  realized,  —  in  connection  with  a  life  not  only  un 
privileged,  but  offering  numerous  positive  hindrances  to  the  origination, 
the  growth,  and,  most  of  all,  the  perfection  of  spiritual  excellence.  In 
a  Jew  of  Nazareth  —  a  young  man  —  an  uneducated  mechanic  —  moral 
perfection  was  realized.  Can  this  phenomenon  be  accounted  for?  There 
is  here,  without  doubt,  a  manifestation  of  humanity;  but  the  question  is, 
was  this  a  manifestation  of  mere  humanity  and  no  more  ?  " — Ibid.  p.  251.1 

NOTE  IX.,  p.  209. 
Newman,  The  Soul,  p.  58. 

NOTE  X.,  p.  211. 
Analogy,  Part  II.  ch.  3. 

NOTE  XI.,  p.  214. 

"Although  some  circumstances  in  the  description  of  God's  Firstborn 
and  Elect,  by  whom  this  change  is  to  be  accomplished,  may  primarily 
apply  to  collective  Israel  [many  others  will  admit  of  no  such  application. 
Israel  surely  was  not  the  child  whom  a  virgin  was  to  bear;  Israel  did  not 
make  his  grave  with  the  wicked,  and  with  the  rich  in  his  death;  Israel 
scarcely  reconciled  that  strangely  blended  variety  of  suffering  and  tri 
umph,  which  was  predicted  of  the  Messiah]."  —  R.  Williams,  Rational 
Godliness,  p.  56.  In  a  note  to  this  passage,  the  author  adds,  "  I  no  longer 
feel  confident  of  the  assertion  in  brackets ;  but  now  believe  that  all  the 
prophecies  have  primarily  an  application  nearly  contemporaneous."  As 
a  specimen  of  this  application,  we  may  cite  a  subsequent  passage  from 
the  same  volume,  p.  169.  "  The  same  Isaiah  sees  that  Israel,  whom  God 
had  called  out  of  Egypt,  and  whom  the  Eternal  had  denominated  his 
first-born,  trampled,  captive,  and  derided;  he  sees  the  beauty  of  the 

1  The  able  and  impressive  argument  of  this  little  work  is  well  worthy  of  the 
perusal  of  those  who  would  see  what  is  the  real  force  of  the  Christian  evidences, 
even  upon  the  lowest  ground  to  which  skepticism  can  attempt  to  reduce  them. 
Though  far  from  representing  the  whole  strength  of  the  case,  it  is  most  valuable 
as  showing  what  may  be  effected  in  behalf  of  Christianity,  on  the  principles  of 
its  opponents. 


340  NOTES.  LECT.  VIII. 

sanctuary  defiled,  and  the  anointed  priests  of  the  living  God  degraded 
from  their  office,  led  as  sheep  to  the  slaughter,  insulted  by  their  own 
countrymen,  as  men  smitten  of  God,  cast  off  by  Jehovah.  Ah !  he  says, 
it  is  through  the  wickedness  of  the  nations  that  Israel  is  thus  afflicted ;  it 
is  through  the  apostasy  of  the  people  that  the  priesthood  is  thus  smitten 
and  reviled;  they  hide  their  faces  from  the  Lord's  servant;  nevertheless, 
no  weapon  that  is  formed  against  him  shall  prosper.  It  is  a  little  thing 
that  He  should  merely  recover  Israel,  He  shall  also  be  a  light  to  the  Gen 
tiles,  and  a  salvation  to  the  ends  of  the  earth." 

There  are  few  unprejudiced  readers  who  will  not  think  the  author's  first 
thought  on  this  subject  preferable  to  his  second.  In  the  interpretation  of 
any  profane  author,  the  perverse  ingenuity  which  regards  the  Fifty-Third 
chapter  of  Isaiah  (to  say  nothing  of  the  other  portions  of  the  prophecy, 
which  Dr.  Williams  has  divorced  from  their  context),  as  a  description  of 
the  contemporaneous  state  of  the  Jewish  people  and  priesthood,  would  be 
considered  as  too  extravagant  to  need  refutation.  That  such  an  interpre 
tation  should  have  found  favor  with  thoroughgoing  rationalists,  deter 
mined  at  all  hazards  to  expel  the  supernatural  from  Scripture,  is  only  to 
be  expected ;  and  this  may  explain  the  adoption  of  this  and  similar  views 
by  a  considerable  school  of  expositors  in  Germany.  But  that  it  should 
have  been  received  by  those  who,  like  Dr.  Williams,  hold  fast  the  doctrine 
of  the  Incarnation  of  the  Son  of  God,  is  less  easily  to  be  accounted  for. 
If  this  greatest  of  all  miracles  be  once  conceded,  —  if  it  be  allowed  that 
"  when  the  fulness  of  the  time  was  come,  God  sent  forth  His  Son,  made 
of  a  woman;  "  —  what  marvel  is  it,  that,  while  the  time  was  still  incom 
plete,  a  prophet  should  have  been  divinely  inspired  to  proclaim  the  future 
redemption?  Once  concede  the  possibility  of  the  supernatural  at  all,  and 
the  Messianic  interpretation  is  the  only  one  reconcilable  with  the  facts  of 
history  and  the  plain  meaning  of  words.  The  fiction  of  a  contemporane 
ous  sense,  whether  with  or  without  a  subsequent  Messianic  application,  is 
only  needed  to  get  rid  of  direct  inspiration;  and  nothing  is  gained  by 
getting  rid  of  inspiration,  so  long  as  a  fragment  of  the  supernatural  is 
permitted  to  remain.  It  is  only  when  we  assume,  a  priori,  that  the  super 
natural  is  impossible,  that  anything  is  gained  by  forcing  the  prophetic 
language  into  a  different  meaning. 


NOTE  XII.,  p.  215. 

Of  this  Eclectic  Christianity,  of  which  Schleiermacher  may  be  considered 
as  the  chief  modern  representative,  a  late  gifted  and  lamented  writer  has 
truly  observed :  "  He  could  not  effect  the  rescue  of  Christianity  on  these 


LECT.  VIII.  NOTES.  347 

principles  without  serious  loss  to  the  object  of  his  care.  His  efforts  resem 
ble  the  benevolent  intervention  of  the  deities  of  the  classic  legends,  who, 
to  save  the  nymph  from  her  pursuer,  changed  her  into  a  river  or  a  tree. 
It  may  be  that  the  stream  and  the  foliage  have  their  music  and  their 
beauty,  that  AVO  may  think  we  hear  a  living  voice  still  in  the  whispers  of 
the  one  and  the  murmurs  of  the  other,  yet  the  beauty  of  divine  Truth,  our 
heavenly  visitant,  cannot  but  be  grievously  obscured  by  the  change,  for 
'  the  glory  of  the  celestial  is  one,  and  the  glory  of  the  terrestrial  is  another.' 
Such  ecclesiastical  doctrines  as  contain  what  he  regards  as  the  essence  of 
Christianity  are  received.  All  others,  as  being  feelings  embodied  in  the 
concrete  form  of  dogmas,  as  man's  objective  conceptions  of  the  divine,  he 

considers  as  open  to  criticism Schleiermacher  accounts  as  thus 

indifferent  the  doctrine  of  the  Trinity,  the  supernatural  conception  of  the 
Saviour,  many  of  his  miracles,  his  ascension  and  several  other  truths  of 
the  same  class.  This  one  reply,  '  That  doctrine  makes  no  necessary  part 
of  our  Christian  consciousness/  stands  solitary,  like  a  Codes  at  the  bridge, 
and  keeps  always  at  bay  the  whole  army  of  advancing  queries.  But 
surely  it  does  constitute  an  essential  part  of  our  Christian  consciousness, 
whether  we  regard  the  New  Testament  writers  as  trustworthy  or  other 
wise.  If  certain  parts  of  their  account  are  myths,  and  others  the  expres 
sion  of  Jewish  prejudice,  and  we  are  bidden  dismiss  them  accordingly  from 
our  faith,  how  are  we  sure  that  in  what  is  left  these  historians  were  faith 
ful,  or  these  expositors  true  representatives  of  the  mind  of  Christ  ?  Our 
Christian  consciousness  is  likely  to  become  a  consciousness  of  little  else 
than  doubt,  if  AVC  give  credit  to  the  assertion  —  Your  sole  informants  on 
matters  of  eternal  moment',  were,  every  here  and  there,  misled  by  prejudice 
and  imposed  upon  by  fable."  * 

NOTE  XIII.,  p.  216. 

For  the  objections  of  modern  Pantheism  against  the  immortality  of  the 
soul,  See  Lecture  III.,  note  27.  Of  the  resurrection  of  the  body  in  partic 
ular,  Wegscheider  observes :  "  The  resurrection  of  the  body  is  so  far  from 
being  reconcilable  with  the  precepts  of  sound  reason,  that  it  is  embarrassed 
with  very  many  and  the  gravest  difficulties.  For,  in  the  first  place,  it  can 
not  be  doubted  that  this  opinion  derived  its  origin  from  the  lame  and  im 
perfect  conceptions  of  men  of  defective  culture;  for  such  persons,  being 
destitute  of  a  just  idea  of  the  Divine  being,  are  wont  to  imagine  to  them 
selves  a  life  after  death,  solely  after  the  nature  of  the  earthly  life.  Hence 
it  comes  to  pass,  that,  among  barbarous  nations,  and  also  in  the  system  of 

1  Essays  and  Remains  of  the  Rev.  Robert  Alfred  Vaughan,  Vol.  I.  p.  93. 


348  NOTES.  LECT.  VIII. 

Zoroaster,  from  which  the  Jews  themselves  seem  to  have  drawn,  that 
same  doctrine  is  discovered.  Then,  too,  the  resurrection  of  the  body, 
taught  in  the  books  of  the  New  Testament,  which,  even  from  the  apostolic 
age,  was  condemned  by  not  a  few,  is  seen  to  be  so  closely  connected  with 
the  mythical  opinions  of  the  Messiah,  and  the  story  of  Jesus  restored  to 
life,  that  it  cannot  be  judged  of  and  explained  by  any  other  method  than 

those  myths  themselves Moreover,  the  idea  is  manifestly  not  in 

agreement  with  a  God  most  holy  and  good,  that  man,  who  cannot  pass  a 
real  life  without  the  body,  is  to  have  this  body  restored  to  him  after  many 

thousands  of  years Induced  by  these  reasons,  and  others  of 

scarcely  less  weight,  we  think  that  Jesus,  wherever  he  is  said  to  have 
taught  the  resurrection  of  the  body,  humored  the  opinions  of  his  country 
men  ;  or,  rather,  the  disciples  of  Jesus  ....  falsely  ascribed  to  Him  an 
opinion  of  their  own."1  Concerning  angels  and  spirits,  one  of  the  most 
significant  specimens  of  modern  Sadduceeism  may  be  found  in  Dr.  Don 
aldson's  "  Christian  Orthodoxy  Reconciled  with  the  Conclusions  of  Modem 
Biblical  Learning,"  p.  347,  sqq.  He  holds,  with  regard  to  intermediate 
Intelligences,  the  same  view  which  Wegscheider  suggests  with  regard  to 
the  Resurrection,  namely,  "  that  our  Lord,  in  his  dealings  with  the  Jews, 
rather  acquiesced  in  the  established  phraseology  than  sanctioned  the  prev 
alent  superstition."  2  He  adds  that,  "  in  many  respects,  our  Lord  seems  to 
have  approved  and  recommended "  the  views  of  the  Sadducees ;  though 
"  he  could  not  openly  adopt  a  speculative  truth,  which  was  saddled  with 
an  application  diametrically  opposed  to  the  cardinal  verity  of  his  re 
ligion."  3  It  is  obvious  that,  by  this  method  of  exposition,  "  Christian 
Orthodoxy"  may  mean  anything  or  nothing.  Any  doctrine  which  this  or 

1  Institittiones  Theologicce,  §  195. 

2  P.  363.    That  is  to  say,  it  is  boldly  maintained  that  our  Lord,  in  order  to 
humor  the  prejudices  of  the  Jews  of  that  day,  consented  to  lend  his  authority  to 
the  dissemination  of  a  religious  falsehood  for  the  deception  of  posterity.    This 
monstrous  assertion  is  stated  more  plainly  by  Spinoza,  Tractatus  The.ologico-Poiit. 
c.  2.    "  Indeed  He  accommodated  His  forms  of  thought  to  every  one's  principles 
and  opinions.    For  instance,  when  He  said  to  the  Pharisees,  Arid  if  Satan  cast  out 
Satan,  he  is  divided  against  himself,  how  then  can  his  kingdom  stand?  he  meant  only 
to  convict  the  Pharisees  on  their  own  principles,  not  to  teach  the  doctrine  of 
demons."    In  like  manner,  Schleiermacher  ( Christliche  Glaube,  §  42)  asserts  that 
Christ  and  his  Apostles  possibly  adopted  the  popular  representations,  as  we  speak 
of  fairies  and  ghosts.    On  the  other  side,  it  is  justly  urged  by  Storr  ( Doctrina 
Christiana,  §  52),  that  our  Lord  employed  the  same  language  privately  with  his 
disciples,  as  well  as  publicly  with  the  people;  e.  g.  Matt.  xiii.  39,  xxv.  41;  Mark 
iv.  15;  Luke  xxii.  31.    See  also  Mosheim's  note,  translated  in  Harrison's  edition 
of  Cudworth,  Vol.  II.  p.  661;  Neander,  Life  of  Christ,  p.  157  (Eng.  Tr.);  Lee,  In 
spiration  of  Holy  Scripture,  p.  69  (second  edition). 

3  Pp.  372,  373. 


LECT.  VIII.  NOTES.  349 

that  expositor  finds  it  convenient  to  reject,  may  be  set  aside  as  a  conces 
sion  to  popular  phraseology;  and  thus  the  teaching  of  Christ  may  be 
stripped  of  its  most  essential  doctrines  by  men  who  profess  all  the  while  to 
believe  in  His  immanent  Divinity  and  Omniscience.  Strauss  arrives  at  a 
similar  conclusion,  though,  of  course,  without  troubling  himself  about 
Scriptural  premises.  "  It  is,  therefore,  not  enough  to  leave  undecided, 
with  Schleiermacher,  the  possibility  of  such  beings  as  angels,  and  only  to 
fix  so  much  as  this,  that  we  have  neither  to  take  account  of  them  in  our 
conduct,  nor  to  expect  further  revelations  of  their  nature;  rather  is  it  the 
case,  chat,  if  the  modern  idea  of  God  and  the  world  is  correct,  there  can 
not  be  any  such  beings  any  where  at  all." 1  In  the  same  spirit  Mr.  Parker 
openly  maintains  that  "Jesus  shared  the  erroneous  notions  of  the  times 
respecting  devils,  possessions,  and  demotiology  in  general;  "2  —  a  conclu 
sion  which  is  at  least  more  logical  and  consistent  than  that  of  those  who 
acknowledge  the  divine  authority  of  the  Teacher,  yet  claim  a  right  to 
reject  as  much  as  they  please  of  his  teaching. 

NOTE  XIV.,  p.  216. 
Greg,  Creed  of  Christendom,  Preface,  p.  xii. 

NOTE  XV.,  p.  216. 

The  theory  which  represents  the  human  race  as  in  a  constant  state  of 
religious  progress,  and  the  various  religions  of  antiquity  as  successive 
steps  in  the  education  of  mankind,  has  been  a  favorite  with  various 
schools  of  modern  philosophy.  Hegel,  as  might  naturally  be  expected, 
propounds  a  theory  of  the  necessary  development  of  religious  ideas,  as 
determined  by  the  movements  of  the  universal  Spirit.3  It  is  true  that  he 
is  compelled  by  the  stern  necessities  of  chronology  to  represent  the  poly 
theism  of  Greece  and  Rome  as  an  advance  on  the  monotheism  of  Judea;4 

1  Christlicke  Glaubenslehre ,  §  49.    To  the  same  effect  are  his  remarks  on  Evil 
Spirits,  §  54.    Among  the  earlier  rationalists,  the  same  view  is  taken  by  Rohr, 
Briefe  uber  den  Rationalismus,  p.  35. 

2  Discourse  of  matters  pertaining  to  Religion,  p.  176. 

3  See  Philosophic  der  Geschichte,  Werke,  IX.  p.  14.     Philosophie  der  Religion,  Werke, 

XI.  p.  76,  78. 

4  See  his  Philosophie  der  Religion,  Werke,  XI.  p.  82.     XII.  p.  45.    The  superiority 
of  the  Greek  religion  appears  to  consist  in  its  greater  acknowledgment  of  human 
freedom,  and  perhaps  in  being  a  step  in  the  direction  of  Pantheism.     See  Werke, 

XII.  92,  125.    Of  the  Roman  religion,  he  says  that  it  contained  in  itself  all  the 
elements  of  Christianity,  and  was  a  necessary  step  to  the  latter.    Its  evile  sprang 

30 


350  NOTES.  LECT.  VIII. 

and  perhaps,  if  we  regard  the  Hegelian  philosophy  as  the  final  consum 
mation  of  all  religious  truth,  this  retrograde  progress  may  be  supported  by 
some  plausible  arguments.1  Another  form  of  the  same  theory  is  that  of 
Comte,  who  traces  the  progress  of  humanity  through  Fetichism,  Polythe 
ism,  and  Monotheism,  to  culminate  at  last  in  the  Positive  Religion,  which 
worships  the  idea  of  humanity,  including  therein  the  auxiliary  animals.2 
In  theories  of  this  kind,  the  distinction  between  progress  and  mere  fluctu 
ation  depends  upon  the  previous  question,  Whence,  and  Whither?  What 
was  the  original  state  of  religious  knowledge  in  mankind,  and  what  is  the 
end  to  which  it  is  advancing?  If  Pantheism  or  Atheism  is  the  highest 
form  of  religious  truth,  every  step  in  that  direction  is  unquestionably  pro 
gressive;  if  otherwise,  it  is  not  progress,  but  corruption. 

The  previous  question  is  clearly  stated  by  Theodore  Parker.  "From 
what  point  did  the  human  race  set  out,  —  from  civilization  and  the  true 
worship  of  one  God,  or  from  cannibalism  and  the  deification  of  nature? 
Has  the  human  race  fallen  or  risen?  The  question  is  purely  historical, 
and  to  be  answered  by  historical  witnesses.  But  in  the  presence,  and  still 
more  in  the  absence,  of  such  witnesses,  the  a  priori  doctrines  of  the  man's 
philosophy  affect  his  decision.  Reasoning  with  no  facts  is  as  easy  as  all 
motion  in  vacua.  The  analogy  of  the  geological  formation  of  the  earth  — 
its  gradual  preparation,  so  to  say,  for  the  reception  of  plants  and  animals, 
the  ruder  first,  and  then  the  more  complex  and  beautiful,  till  at  last  she 
opens  her  bosom  to  man,  —  this,  in  connection  with  many  similar  analo 
gies,  would  tend  to  show  that  a  similar  order  was  to  be  expected  in  the 
affairs  of  men  —  development  from  the  lower  to  the  higher,  and  not  the 

from  the  depth  of  its  spirit  (XII.  pp.  181,  184).  The  best  commentary  on  this 
assertion  may  be  found  in  Augustine,  De  Civ.  Dei,  Lib.  VI. 

1  Among  the  imperfections  of  Judaism,  Hegel  includes  the  fact  that  "  it  did  not 
make  men  conscious  of  the  identity  of  the  human  soul  with  the  Absolute,  and 
its  absorption  therein  (die  Anschauung  und  das  Bewusstseyn  von  der  Einheit  der 
Seele  mit  dem  Absoluten,  oder  von  der  Aufnaume  der  Seele  in  den  Schooss  des 
Absoluten  ist  noch  nicht  erwacht,  Werke,  XII.  p.  86).    In  another  place  (p.  161)  he 
speaks  of  it  as  the  religion  of  obstinate,  dead  understanding.    Vatke  (Biblische 
Theologie,  p.  115)  carries  the  absurdity  of  theory  to  its  climax,  by  boldly  main 
taining  that  the  later  Judaism  had  been  elevated  by  its  conflict  with  the  religions 
of  Greece  and  Rome,  and  thus  prepared  to  become  the  precursor  of  Christianity. 
The  Hegelian  theory  is  also  adopted  by  Baur,  as  representing  the  law  of  develop 
ment  of  Christian  doctrines.    The  historical   aspects  of  the  doctrine  are  to  be 
regarded  as  phases  of  a  process,  in  which  the  several  forms  are  determined  one 
by  another,  and  all  are  united  together  in  the  totality  of  the  idea.    See  especially 
his  Christliche  Lehre  von  der  Vers'dhnung,  p.  11,  and  the  preface  to  the  same  work, 
p.vi. 

2  Cours  de  Philosophic  Positive,  Lemons,  52, 53, 54.     Compare  Catechisme  Positiviste, 
pp.  31, 184,  243 


LECT.  VIII.  NOTES.  351 

reverse.  In  strict  accordance  with  this  analogy,  some  have  taught  that 
man  was  created  in  the  lowest  stage  of  savage  life;  his  Religion  the  rudest 
worship  of  nature;  his  Morality  that  of  the  cannibal;  that  all  of  the  civilized 
races  have  risen  from  this  point,  and  gradually  passed  through  Fetichism 
and  Polytheism,  before  they  reached  refinement  and  true  Religion.  The 
spiritual  man  is  the  gradual  development  of  germs  latent  in  the  natural 
man."1 

It  is  to  be  regretted  that  Professor  Jowett  has  partially  given  the  sanc 
tion  of  his  authority  to  a  theory  which  it  is  to  be  presumed  he  would  not 
advocate  to  the  full  extent  of  the  above  statement.  "  The  theory  of  a 
primitive  religion  common  to  all  mankind,"  he  tells  us,  "has  only  to  be 
placed  distinctly  before  the  mind,  to  make  us  aware  that  it  is  the  baseless 
fabric  of  a  vision;  there  is  one  stream  of  revelation  only  —  the  Jewish. 
But  even  if  it  were  conceivable,  it  would  be  inconsistent  with  facts.  The 
earliest  history  tells  nothing  of  a  general  religion,  but  of  particular  beliefs 
about  stocks  and  stones,  about  places  and  persons,  about  animal  life,  about 
the  sun,  moon,  and  stars,  about  the  divine  essence  permeating  the  world, 
about  gods  in  the  likeness  of  men  appearing  in  battles  and  directing  the 
course  of  states,  about  the  world  below,  about  sacrifices,  purifications, 
initiations,  magic,  mysteries.  These  were  the  true  religions  of  nature, 
varying  with  diiferent  degrees  of  mental  culture  or  civilization."  2  And  in 
an  earlier  part  of  the  same  Essay,  he  says,  "  No  one  who  looks  at  the  re 
ligions  of  the  world,  stretching  from  east  to  west,  through  so  many  cycles 
of  human  history,  can  avoid  seeing  in  them  a  sort  of  order  and  design. 
They  are  like  so  many  steps  in  the  education  of  mankind.  Those  count 
less  myriads  of  human  beings  who  know  no  other  truth  than  that  of  re 
ligions  coeval  with  the  days  of  the  Apostle,  or  even  of  Moses,  are  not 
wholly  uncared  for  in  the  sight  of  God."  3 

It  would  be  unfair  to  press  these  words  to  a  meaning  which  they  do  not 
necessarily  bear.  We  will  assume  that  by  the  "  earliest  history,"  profane 
history  alone  is  meant,  in  opposition  to  the  Jewish  Revelation ;  and  that 
the  author  docs  not  intend,  as  some  of  his  critics  have  supposed,  to  deny 
the  historical  character  of  the  Book  of  Genesis,  and  the  existence  of  a 
primitive  revelation  coeval  with  the  creation  of  man.  Even  with  this 


1  Discourse  of  Matters  pertaining  to  Religion,  p.  68,  69.    A  similar  view  is  advo 
cated  by  Mr.  Newman,  Phases  of  Faith,  p.  223,  and  by  Mr.  Greg,  Creed  of  Christen 
dom,  p.  71.    Mr.  Tarker  does  not  distinctly  adopt  this  view  as  his  own.  but  he 
appears   to  regard  it  as  preferable  to  the  antagonist  theory,  which  he  speaks  of 
as  supported   by  a  "  party  consisting  more  of  poets  and  dogmatists  than  of 
philosophers." 

2  Epistles  of  St.  Paul,  Vol.  II.  p.  395. 
8  Ibid.,  p.  386. 


352  NOTES.  LECT.  Vffl. 

limitation,  the  evidence  is  stated  far  too  absolutely.  But  the  words  last 
quoted  are,  to  say  the  least,  incautious,  and  suggest  coincidence  in  a 
favorite  theory  of  modern  philosophy,  equally  repugnant  to  Scripture  and 
to  natural  religion.  •  Two  very  opposite  views  may  be  taken  of  the  false 
religions  of  antiquity.  The  Scriptures  invariably  speak  of  them  as  cor 
ruptions  of  man's  natural  reason,  and  abominations  in  the  sight  of  God. 
Some  modern  writers  delight  to  represent  them  as  instruments  of  God's 
Providence,  and  steps  in  the  education  of  mankind.  This  view  naturally 
belongs  to  that  pantheistic  philosophy  which  recognizes  no  Deity  beyond 
the  actual  constitution  of  the  world,  which  acknowledges  all  that  exists  as 
equally  divine,  or,  which  is  the  same  thing,  equally  godless ;  but  it  is  ir 
reconcilable  with  the  belief  in  a  personal  God,nnd  in  a  distinction  between 
the  good  which  He  approves  and  the  evil  which  He  condemns.  But  men 
will  concede  much  to  philosophy  who  will  concede  nothing  to  Scripture. 
The  sickly  and  sentimental  morality  which  talks  of  the  "  ferocious  "  God 
of  the  popular  theology,1  which  is  indignant  at  the  faith  of  Abraham,2 
which  shudders  over  the  destruction  of  the  Canaanites,3  which  prides  itself 
in  discovering  imperfections  in  the  law  of  Moses,4  is  content  to  believe 
that  the  God  who  could  not  sanction  these  things,  could  yet  create  man 
with  the  morality  of  a  cannibal,  and  the  religion  of  a  fetish-worshipper, 
and  ordain  for  him  a  law  of  development  through  the  purifying  stages 
which  marked  the  civilization  of  Egypt  and  Babylon  and  Imperial  Rome. 
Verily  this  unbelieving  Reason  makes  heavy  demands  on  the  faith  of  its 
disciples.  It  will  not  tolerate  the  slightest  apparent  anomaly  in  the  moral 
government  of  God;  but  it  is  ready,  when  its  theories  require,  to  propound 
a  scheme  of  deified  iniquity,  which  it  is  hardly  exaggeration  to  designate 
as  the  moral  government  of  Satan. 

We  must  believe,  indeed,  that  in  the  darkest  ages  of  idolatry,  God  "  left 
not  himself  without  witness;"  we  must  believe  that  the  false  religions 
of  the  world,  like  its  other  evils,  are  overruled  by  God  to  the  purposes  of 
His  good  Providence.  But  this  does  not  make  them  the  less  evils  and 
abominations  in  the  sight  of  God,  Those  who  speak  of  the  human  race 
as  under  a  law  of  vegetable  development,  forget  that  man  has,  what  veget 
ables  have  not,  a  moral  sense  and  a  free  will.  It  is  indeed  impossible,  in 
our  present  state  of  knowledge,  to  draw  exactly  the  line  between  the  sins 
and  the  misfortunes  of  individuals,  to  decide  how  much  of  each  man's 
history  is  due  to  his  own  will,  and  how  much  to  the  circumstances  in 
which  he  is  placed.  But  though  Scripture,  like  philosophy,  offers  no  com- 

1  Parker,  Tfieism,  Atheism,  and  the  Popular  Theology,  p.  103,  104. 

2  Parker,  Discourse  of  Religion,  p.  214.     Newman,  Phases  of  Faith,  p.  150. 

3  Parker,  Discourse,- p.  87.     Newman,  Phases,  p.  151. 

4  Parker,  Discourse,  p.  204,  223.    Greg,  Creed  of  Christendom,  p.  75. 


LECT.  VIII.  NOTES.  353 

plete  solution  of  the  problem  of  the  existence  of  evil,  it  at  least  distinctly 
points  out  what  the  true  solution  is  not.  So  long  as  it  represents  the  sin  of 
man  as  a  fall  from  the  state  in  which  God  originally  placed  him,  and  as  a 
rebellion  against  a  divine  command;  so  long  as  it  represents  idolatry  as 
hateful  to  God,  and  false  religion  as  a  declension  towards  evil,  not  as 
a  progress  towards  good;  — so  long  it  emphatically  records  its  protest 
against  both  the  self-delusion  which  denies  that  evil  exists  at  all,  and  the 
blasphemy  which  asserts  that  it  exists  by  the  appointment  of  God. 


NOTE  XVI.,  p.  219. 

"  It  is  an  obvious  snare,  that  many,  out  of  such  abundance  of  knowl 
edge,  should  be  tempted  to  forget  at  times  this  grand  and  simple  point  — 
that  all  vital  truth  is  to  be  sought  from  Scripture  alone.  Hence  that  they 
should  be  tempted  rather  to  combine  systems  for  themselves  according  to 
some  proportion  and  fancy  of  their  own,  than  be  content  neither  to  add 
nor  diminish  anything  from  that  which  Christ  and  his  Apostles  have  en 
joined;  to  make  up,  as  it  were,  a  cento  of  doctrines  and  of  precepts;  to 
take  from  Christ  what  pleases  them,  and  from  other  stores  what  pleases 
them  (of  course  the  best  from  each,  as  it  appears  to  their  judgment,  so  as 
to  exhibit  the  most  perfect  whole) ;  taking  e.  g.  the  blessed  hope  of  everlast 
ing  life  from  JESUS  CHRIST,  but  rejecting  his  atonement;  or  honoring 
highly  his  example  of  humanity,  but  disrobing  Him  of  his  divinity;  or 
accepting  all  the  comfortable  things  of  the  dispensation  of  the  SPIRIT,  but 
refusing  its  strictness  and  self-denials ;  or  forming  any  other  combination 
whatsoever,  to  the  exclusion  of  the  entire  GOSPEL  :  thus  inviting  Christian 
hearers,  not  to  the  supper  of  the  king's  son,  but  to  a  sort  of  miscellaneous 
banquet  of  their  own ;  '  using  their  liberty/  in  short,  '  as  an  occasion '  to 
that  natural  disposition,  which  Christ  came  to  correct  and  to  repair. 

"  Now  that  by  such  methods,  enforced  by  education  and  strengthened  by 
the  best  of  secondary  motives,  men  may  attain  to  an  excellent  proficiency 
in  morals,  I  am  neither  prepared  nor  disposed  to  dispute.  I  am  not  desir 
ous  of  disputing  that  they  may  possess  therein  an  excellent  religion,  as 
opposed  to  Mahometanism  or  Paganism.  But  that  they  possess  the  true 
account  to  be  given  of  their  stewardship  of  that  one  talent,  THE  GOSPEL 
ITSELF,  I  do  doubt  in  sorrow  and  fear.  I  do  doubt  whether  they  '  live  the 
life  that  now  is/  as  St.  Paul  lived  it,  'by  the  faith  of  the  SON  OF  GOD;  ' 
by  true  apprehension  of  the  things  that  HE  suffered  for  us,  and  of  the 
right  which  HE  has  purchased  to  command  us  in  all  excellent  qualities 
and  actions;  and  further,  of  the  invisible  but  real  assistance  which  he 
gives  us  towards  the  performance  of  them."  Miller,  Bampton  Lectures,  p. 
169  (third  edition). 

30* 


354  NOTES.  LECT.  VIII. 


NOTE  XVIL,  p.  219. 

"Thus  in  the  great  variety  of  religious  situations  in  which  men  are 
placed,  what  constitutes,  what  chiefly  and  peculiarly  constitutes,  the  pro 
bation,  in  all  senses,  of  some  persons,  may  be  the  difficulties  in  which  the 
evidence  of  religion  is  involved :  and  their  principal  and  distinguished  trial 
may  be,  how  they  will  behave  under  and  with  respect  to  these  difficulties." 
Butler,  Analogy,  Part  II.  ch.  6. 


NOTE  XVIII.,  p.  221. 

I  do  not  mean  by  these  remarks  to  deny  the  possibility  of  any  progress 
whatever  in  Christian  Theology,  such  for  instance,  as  may  result  from  the 
better  interpretation  of  Holy  Writ,  or  the  refutation  of  unauthorized  infer 
ences  therefrom.  But  all  such  developments  of  doctrine  are  admissible 
only  when  confined  within  the  limits  so  carefull}7  laid  down  in  the  sixth 
Article  of  our  Church.  "  Holy  Scripture  containeth  all  things  necessary 
to  salvation :  so  that  whatsoever  is  not  read  therein,  nor  may  be  proved 
thereby,  is  not  to  be  required  of  any  man,  that  it  should  be  believed  as  an 
Article  of  the  Faith,  or  be  thought  requisite  or  necessary  to  salvation." 
Within  these  limits,  the  most  judicious  theologians  have  not  hesitated  to 
allow  the  possibility  of  progress,  as  regards  at  least  the  definite  statement 
of  Christian  doctrine.  Thus  Bishop  Butler  remarks:  "As  it  is  owned  the 
whole  scheme  of  Scripture  is  not  yet  understood;  so,  if  it  ever  comes  to  be 
understood,  before  the  restitution  of  all  things,  and  without  miraculous  in 
terpositions,  it  must  be  in  the  same  way  as  natural  knowledge  is  come  at : 
by  the  continuance  and  progress  of  learning  and  liberty ;  and  by  particu 
lar  persons  attending  to,  comparing,  and  pursuing  intimations  scattered 
up  and  down  it,  which  are  overlooked  and  disregarded  by  the  generality 
of  the  world." l  And  a  worthy  successor  to  the  name  has  pointed  out  the 
distinction  between  true  and  false  developments  of  doctrine,  in  language 
based  upon  the  same  principle:  "Are  there  admissible  developments  of  doc 
trine  in  Christianity?  Unquestionably  there  are.  But  let  the  term  be 
understood  in  its  legitimate  sense  or  senses  to  warrant  that  answer;  and 
let  it  be  carefully  observed  how  much,  and  how  little,  the  admission  really 
involves.  All  varieties  of  real  development,  so  far  as  this  argument  is 
concerned,  may  probably  be  reduced  to  two  general  heads,  intellectual  de 
velopments,  and  practical  developments,  of  Christian  doctrine.  By  '  intel 
lectual  developments/  I  understand  logical  inferences  (and  that  whether  for 

1  Analogy,  Part  II.  ch.  3. 


LECT.  VIII.  NOTES.  355 

belief  or  practical  discipline),  from  doctrines,  or  from  the  comparison  of 
doctrines ;  which,  in  virtue  of  the  gi-eat  dialectical  maxim,  must  be  true, 
if  legitimately  deduced  from  what  is  true.  '  Practical  developments  '  are 
the  living,  actual,  historical  results  of  those  true  doctrines  (original  or  infer 
ential),  when  considered  as  influential  on  all  the  infinite  varieties  of  human 
kind;  the  doctrines  embodied  inaction;  the  doctrines  modifying  human 
nature  in  ways  infinitely  various,  correspondent!?  to  the  infinite  variety  of 
subjects  on  whom  they  operate,  though  ever  strictly  preserving,  amid  all 
their  operations  for  eifectually  transforming  and  renewing  mankind,  their 
own  unchanged  identity.  ...  In  the  former  case,  revealed  doctrines  may 
be  compared  with  one  another,  or  with  the  doctrines  of  'natural  religion;' 
or  the  consequences  of  revealed  doctrines  may  be  compared  with  other 
doctrines,  or  with  their  consequences,  and  so  on  in  great  variety :  the  com 
bined  result  being  what  is  called  a  System  of  Theology.  What  the  first 
principles  of  Christian  truth  really  are,  or  how  obtained,  is  not  now  the 
question.  But  in  all  cases  equally,  no  doctrine  has  any  claim  whatever  to 
be  received  as  obligatory  on  belief,  unless  it  be  either  itself  some  duly 
authorized  principle,  or  a  logical  deduction,  through  whatever  number  of 
stages,  from  some  such  principle  of  religion.  Such  only  are  legitimate 
developments  of  doctrine  for  the  belief  of  man ;  and  such  alone  can  the 
Church  of  Christ  — the  Witness  and  Conservator  of  His  Truth— justly 
commend  to  the  consciences  of  her  members.  .  .  .  But  in  truth,  as  our 
own  liability  to  error  is  extreme,  especially  when  immersed  in  the  holy 
obscurity  ("the  cloud  on  the  mercy-seat")  of  such  mysteries  as  these,  we 
have  reason  to  thank  God  that  there  appear  to  be  few  doctrinal  develop 
ments  of  any  importance  which  are  not  from  the  first  drawn  out  and  de 
livered  on  divine  authority  to  our  acceptance."1 

It  is  impossible  not  to  regret  deeply  the  very  different  language,  on  this 
point,  of  a  writer  in  many  respects  worthy  of  better  things ;  but  who, 
while  retaining  the  essential  doctrines  of  Christianity,  has,  it  is  to  be 
feared,  done  much  to  unsettle  the  authority  on  which  they  rest.  "  If  the 
destined  course  of  the  world,"  says  Dr.  Williams,  "  be  really  one  of  provi 
dential  progress,  if  there  has  been  such  a  thing  as  a  childhood  of  humanity, 
and  if  God  has  been  educating  either  a  nation  or  a  Church  to  understand 
their  duty  to  Himself  and  to  mankind;  it  must  follow,  that  when  the  ful 
ness  of  light  is  come,  there  will  be  childish  things  to  put  away.  .  .  . 
Hence,  if  the  religious  records  represent  faithfully  the  inner  life  of  each 
generation,  whether  a  people  or  a  priesthood,  they  will  be,  in  St.  Paul's 
phrase,  divinely  animated,  or  with  a  divine  life  running  through  them ;  and 
every  writing,  divinely  animated,  will  be  useful ;  yet  they  may,  or  rather, 

1  W.  A.  Butler,  Letters  on  the  Development  of  Christian  Doctrine,  pp.  55—58. 


356  NOTES.  LECT.  VIII. 

they  must  be  cast  in  the  mould  of  the  generation  in  which  they  are  written; 
their  words,  if  they  are  true  words,  will  express  the  customs  of  their 
country,  the  conceptions  of  their  times,  the  feelings  or  aspirations  of  their 
writers;  and  the  measure  of  knowledge  or  of  faith  to  which  every  one,  in 
his  degree,  had  attained.  And  the  limitation,  thus  asserted,  of  their  range 
of  knowledge,  will  be  equally  true,  whether  we  suppose  the  shortcoming 
to  be,  on  an  idea  of  special  Providence,  from  a  particular  dictation  of  senti 
ment  in  each  case ;  or  whether,  on  the  more  reasonable  view  of  a  general 
Providence,  we  consider  such  things  permitted  rather  than  directed ;  the 
natural  result  of  a  grand  scheme,  rather  than  a  minute  arrangement  of 
thoughts  and  words  for  each  individual  man.  It  may  be,  that  the  Lord 
writes  the  Bible,  on  the  same  principle  as  the  Lord  builds  the  city;  or  that 
He  teaches  the  Psalmist  to  sing,  in  the  same  sense  as  He  teaches  his 
fingers  to  fight;  thus  that  the  composition  of  Scripture  is  attributed  to  the 
Almighty,  just  as  sowing  and  threshing  are  said  to  be  taught  by  Him;  for 
every  part  played  by  man  comes  from  the  Divine  Disposer  of  the  scene."  i 
It  is  the  misfortune  of  this  sort  of  language,  that  it  suggests  far  more 
than  it  directly  asserts,  and  probably  more  than  the  author  intends  to 
convey.  Dr.  Williams  probably  does  not  mean  to  imply  that  we  arc  no 
more  bound  by  the  authority  of  Scripture  in  matters  of  religion  than  by 
the  primitive  practice  in  sowing  and  threshing,  or  that  we  are  as  much  at 
liberty  to  invent  new  theological  doctrines  as  new  implements  of  husban 
dry.  But  if  lie  does  not  mean  this,  it  is  to  be  regretted  that  iie  has  not 
clearly  pointed  out  the  respects  in  which  his  comparison  does  not  hold 
good. 

NOTE  XIX.,  p.  222. 
Summa,  P.  I.  Qu.  H.  Art.  2. 

NOTE  XX.,  p.  222. 

See  Archbishop  King's  Discourse  on  Predestination,  edited  by  Archbishop 
"Whately,  p.  10.  A  different,  and  surely  a  more  judicious  view,  is  taken 
by  a  contemporary  Prelate  of  the  Irish  Church,  whose  earlier  exposition 
of  the  same  theory  2  probably  furnished  the  foundation  of  the  Archbish 
op's  discourse.  "Though/'  says  Bishop  Browne,  "there  are  literally 


1  Rational  Godliness,  pp.  291,  292.    A  similar  view  is  maintained  by  Mr.  Morell, 
Philosophy  of  Religion,  p.  183,  and  is  criticised  by  Professor  Lee,  Inspiration  of 
Holy  Scripture,  p.  147. 

2  In  his  Letter  in  answer  to  Toland's  Christianity  not  mysterious. 


LECT.  Yin.  NOTES.  357 

speaking  no  such  passions  in  God  as  Love  or  Hatred,  Joy  or  Anger,  or 
Pity ;  yet  there  ma)T  be  Inconceivable  Perfections  in  Him  some  way  answer 
able  to  what  those  passions  are  in  us,  under  a  due  regulation  and  subjec 
tion  to  reason.  It  is  sure  that  in  God  those  perfections  are  not  attended 
with  any  degree  of  natural  disturbance  or  moral  irregularity,  as  the  pas 
sions  are  in  us.  Nay,  Fear  and  Hope,  which  imply  something  future  for 
their  objects,  may  have  nothing  answerable  to  them  in  the  divine  Nature 
to  which  everything  is  present.  But  since  our  reasonable  affections  are 
real  dispositions  of  the  Soul,  which  is  composed  of  Spirit  as  well  as  Mat 
ter;  we  must  conclude  something  in  God  analogous  to  them,  as  well  as  to 
our  Knowledge  or  Power.  For  it  cannot  be  a  thought  unworthy  of  being 
transferred  to  him,  that  he  really  loves  a  virtuous  and  hates  a  vicious  agent ; 
that  he  is  angry  at  sinners ;  pities  their  moral  infirmities ;  is  pleased  with 
their  innocence  or  repentance,  and  displeased  with  their  transgressions; 
though  all  these  Perfections  are  in  Him  accompanied  with  the  utmost 
serenity,  and  never-failing  tranquillity ."i  With  this  may  be  compared  the 
language  of  Tertullian  (Adv.  Marc.  II.  16),  "All  which  He  suffers  after 
His  own  manner,  even  as  man  after  his." 

NOTE  XXI.,  p.  223. 

Compare  the  remarks  of  Hooker,  E.  P.  I.  3.  2.  "Moses,  in  describing 
the  work  of  creation,  attributeth  speech  unto  God.  ,  .  .  Was  this  only  the 
intent  of  Moses,  to  signify  the  infinite  greatness  of  God's  power  by  the 
easiness  of  his  accomplishing  such  effects,  without  travail,  pain,  or  labor  ? 
Surely  it  seemeth  that  Moses  had  herein  besides  this  a  further  purpose, 
namely,  first  to  teach  that  God  did  not  work  as  a  necessary  but  a  volun 
tary  agent,  intending  beforehand  and  decreeing  with  himself  that  which 
did  outwardly  proceed  from  him.  Secondly,  to  shew  that  God  did  then 
institute  a  law  natural  to  be  observed  by  creatures,  and  therefore  accord 
ing  to  the  manner  of  laws,  the  institution  thereof  is  described,  as  being 
established  by  solemn  injunction." 

NOTE  XXII.,  p.  224. 

"  But  they  urge,  there  can  be  no  proportion  or  similitude  between  Finite 
and  Infinite,  and  consequently  there  can  be  no  analogy.  That  there  can 

1  Divine  Analogy,  pp.  45,  46.  King's  Theory  is  also  criticized  more  directly  by 
the  same  author  in  the  Procedure  of  the  Understanding,  p.  11.  Mr.  Davison  ( Dis 
courses  on  Prophecy,  p.  513)  has  noticed  the  weak  points  in  King's  explanation; 
but  with  too  great  a  leaning  to  the  opposite  extreme,  which  reasons  concerning 
the  infinite  as  if  it  were  a  mere  expansion  of  the  finite. 


358  NOTES.  LECT.  VIII. 

be  no  such  proportion  or  similitude  as  there  is  between  finite  created  be 
ings  is  granted;  or  as  there  is  between  any  material  substance  and  its 
resemblance  in  the  glass;  and  therefore  wherein  the  real  ground  of  this 
analogy  consists,  and  what  the  degrees  of  it  are,  is  as  incomprehensible 
as  the  real  Nature  of  God.  But  it  is  such  an  analogy  as  he  himself  hath 
adapted  to  our  intellect,  and  made  use  of  in  his  Revelations ;  and  therefore 
we  are  sure  it  hath  such  a  foundation  in  the  nature  both  of  God  and  man, 
as  renders  our  moral  reasonings  concerning  him  and  his  attributes,  solid, 
and  just,  and  true." — Bp.  Browne,  Procedure  of  the  Understanding,  p,  31. 
The  practical  result  of  this  remark  is,  that  we  must  rest  satisfied  with  a 
belief  in  the  analogical  representation  itself,  without  seeking  to  rise  above 
it  by  substituting  an  explanation  of  its  ulterior  significance  or  real  ground. 


NOTE  XXIII.,  p.  224. 

I  am  glad  to  take  this  opportunity  of  expressing,  in  the  above  words, 
my  belief  in  the  purpose  and  authority  of  Holy  Scripture;  inasmuch  as  it 
enables  me  to  correct  a  serious  misunderstanding  into  which  a  distin 
guished  writer  has  fallen  in  a  criticism  of  my  supposed  views  —  a  criticism 
to  which  the  celebrity  of  the  author  will  probably  give  a  far  wider  circu 
lation  than  is  ever  likely  to  fall  to  the  lot  of  the  small  pamphlet  which 
called  it  forth.  Mr.  Maurice,  in  the  preface  to  the  second  edition  of  his 
"Patriarchs  and  Lawgivers  of  the  Old  Testament,"  comments  upon  the 
distinction  (maintained  in  the  present  Lectures  and  in  a  small  previous 
publication),  between  speculative  and  regulative  truths,  in  the  following 
terms.  "  The  notion  of  a  revelation  that  tells  us  things  which  are  not  in 
themselves  true,  but  which  it  is  right  for  us  to  believe  and  to  act  upon  as 
if  they  were  true,  has,  I  fear,  penetrated  very  deeply  into  the  heart  of  our 
English  schools,  and  of  our  English  world.  It  may  be  traced  among  per 
sons  who  are  apparently  most  unlike  each  other,  who  live  to  oppose  and 
confute  each  other.  .  .  .  But  their  differences  are  not  in  the  least  likely 
to  be  adjusted  by  the  discovery  of  this  common  ground.  How  the  atmos 
phere  is  to  be  regulated  by  the  regulative  Revelation ;  at  what  degree  of 
heat  or  cold  this  constitution  or  that  can  endure  it ;  who  must  fix  —  since 
the  language  of  the  Revelation  is  assumed  not  to  be  exact,  not  to  express 
the  very  lesson  which  we  are  to  derive  from  it  —  what  it  does  mean ;  by 
what  contrivances  its  phrases  arc  to  be  adapted  to  various  places  and 
times :  these  are  questions  which  must,  of  course,  give  rise  to  infinite  dis 
putations;  ever  new  schools  and  sects  must  be  called  into  existence  to  set 
tle  them;  there  is  scope  for  permissions,  prohibitions,  compromises,  perse 
cutions,  to  any  extent.  The  despair  which  these  must  cause  will  probably 


LECT.  VJII.  NOTES.  359 

drive  numbers  to  ask  for  an  infallible  human  voice,  which  shall  regulate 
for  each  period  that  which  the  Revelation  has  so  utterly  failed  to  regu 
late." 

Now  I  certainly  believed,  and  believe  still,  that  God  is  infinite,  and  that 
no  human  mode  of  thought,  nor  even  a  Revelation,  if  it  is  to  be  intelligi 
ble  by  the  human  mind,  can  represent  the  infinite,  save  under  finite  forms. 
And  it  is  a  legitimate  inference  from  this  position,  that  no  human  repre 
sentation,  whether  derived  from  without  or  from  within,  from  Revelation 
or  from  natural  Religion,  can  adequately  exhibit  the  absolute  nature  of 
God.  But  I  cannot  admit,  as  a  further  legitimate  inference,  that  therefore 
"  the  language  of  the  Revelation  does  not  express  the  very  lesson  which 
we  are  to  derive  from  it;  "  that  it  needs  any  regulation  to  adjust  it  to  "this 
constitution  or  that;  "  that  it  requires  "to  be  adapted  to  various  places 
and  times."  For  surely,  if  all  men  are  subject  to  the  same  limitations  of 
thought,  the  adaptation  to  their  constitutions  must  be  made  already,  be 
fore  human  interpretation  can  deal  with  the  Revelation  at  all.  It  is  not  to 
the  peculiarities  which  distinguish  "  this  "  constitution  from  "  that,"  that 
the  Revelation  has  to  be  adapted  by  man;  but,  as  it  is  given  by  God,  it  is 
adapted  already  to  the  general  conditions  which  are  common  to  all  human 
constitutions  alike,  which  are  equally  binding  in  all  places  and  at  all  times. 
I  have  said  nothing  of  a  revelation  adapted  to  one  man  more  than  to  an 
other;  nothing  of  limitations  which  any  amount  of  intellect  or  learning 
can  enable  a  man  to  overcome.  I  have  not  said  that  the  Bible  is  the 
teacher  of  the  peasant  rather  than  of  the  philosopher;  of  the  Asiatic 
rather  than  of  the  European;  of  the  first  century  rather  than  of  the  nine 
teenth.  I  have  said  only  that  it  is  the  teacher  of  man  as  man;  and  that 
this  is  compatible  with  the  possible  existence  of  a  more  absolute  truth  in 
relation  to  beings  of  a  higher  intelligence.  We  must  at  any  rate  admit 
that  man  does  not  know  God  as  God  knows  Himself;  and  hence  that  he 
does  not  know  Him  in  the  fulness  of  His  Absolute  Nature.  But  surely 
this  admission  is  so  far  from  implying  that  Revelation  does  not  teach  the 
very  lesson  which  we  are  to  derive  from  it,  that  it  makes  that  lesson  the 
more  universal  and  the  more  authoritative.  For  Revelation  is  subject  to 
no  other  limitations  than  those  which  encompass  all  human  thought. 
Man  gains  nothing  by  rejecting  or  perverting  its  testimony;  for  the  mys 
tery  of  Revelation  is  the  mystery  of  Reason  also. 

I  do  not  wish  to  extend  this  controversy  further;  for  I  am  willing  to 
believe  that,  on  this  question  at  least,  my  own  opinion  is  substantially  one 
with  that  of  my  antagonist.  At  any  rate,  I  approve  as  little  as  he  does 
of  allegorical,  or  metaphysical,  or  mythical  interpretations  of  Scripture : 
I  believe  that  he  is  generally  right  in  maintaining  that  "  the  most  literal 
meaning  of  Scripture  is  the  most  spiritual  meaning."  And  if  there  are 


360  NOTES.  LECT.  VIE. 

points  in  the  details  of  his  teaching  with  which  I  am  unable  to  agree,  I 
believe  that  they  are  not  such  as  legitimately  arise  from  the  consistent 
application  of  this  canon. 


NOTE  XXIV.,  p.  225. 

"  There  seems  no  possible  reason  to  be  given,  why  we  may  not  be  in  a 
state  of  moral  probation,  with  regard  to  the  exercise  of  our  understand 
ing  upon  the  subject  of  religion,  as  we  are  with  regard  to  our  behaviour  in 
common  affairs.  .  .  .  Thus,  that  religion  is  not  intuitively  true,  but  a 
matter  of  deduction  and  inference;  that  a  conviction  of  its  truth  is  not 
forced  upon  every  one,  but  left  to  be,  by  some,  collected  with  heedful 
attention  to  premises;  this  as  much  constitutes  religious  probation,  as 
much  affords  sphere,  scope,  opportunity,  for  right  and  wrong  behaviour, 
as  anything  whatever  does." — Butler,  Analogy,  Part  II.  en.  6. 


NOTE  XXV.,  p.  226. 

Plato,  Rep.  VI.  p.  486 :  "  And  this  also  it  is  necessary  to  consider,  when 
you  would  distinguish  between  a  nature  which  is  philosophical,  and  one 
which  is  not. — What  then  is  that?  —  That  it  takes  no  part,  even  unob 
served,  in  any  meanness ;  for  petty  littleness  is  every  way  most  contrary 
to  a  soul  that  is  ever  stretching  forward  in  desire  to  the  whole  and  the  all, 
to  divine  and  to  human."  —  Cicero,  De  Off.  II.  2 :  "  Nor  is  philosophy  any 
thing  else,  if  you  will  define  it,  than  the  study  of  wisdom.  But  wisdom 
(as  defined  by  ancient  philosophers)  is  the  knowledge  of  things  human 
and  divine,  and  of  the  causes  in  which  these  are  contained." 


NOTE  XXVI.,  p.  226. 

Plato,  Protag.  p.  343 :  "  And  these,  having  met  together  by  agreement, 
consecrated  to  Apollo,  in  his  temple  at  Delphi,  as  the  first  fruits  of  wis 
dom,  those  inscriptions  which  are  in  everybody's  mouth,  Know  thyself, 
and  Nothing  to  excess."  —  Compare  Jacobi,  Werke,  IV.;  Vorbericht,  p. 
xlii. :  "  Know  thyself  is,  according  to  the  Delphian  god  and  Socrates,  the 
highest  command,  and,  so  soon  as  it  becomes  practical,  man  is  made 
aware  of  this  truth :  without  the  Divine  Thou,  there  is  no  human  J,  and 
without  the  human  J,  there  is  no  Divine  Thou." 


LECT.  VIII.  NOTES.  361 


NOTE  XXVII.,  p.  22G. 

Clemens  Alex.  Pcedag.  III.  1:  "It  is,  then,  as  it  appears,  the  greatest 
of  all  lessons,  to  know  one's  self;  for,  if  any  one  knows  himself,  he  will 
know  God." 

NOTE  XXVIII.,  p.  227. 

"  It  is  plain  that  there  is  a  capacity  in  the  nature  of  man,  which  neither 
riches,  nor  honors,  nor  sensual  gratifications,  nor  anything  in  this  world, 
can  perfectly  fill  up  or  satisfy :  there  is  a  deeper  and  more  essential  want, 
than  any  of  these  things  can  be  the  supply  of.  Yet  surely  there  is  a  pos- 
sibility  of  somewhat,  which  may  fill  up  all  our  capacities  of  happiness; 
somewhat,  in  which  our  souls  may  find  rest;  somewhat,  which  may  be  to 
us  that  satisfactory  good  we  are  inquiring  after.  But  it  cannot  be  any 
thing  which  is  valuable  only  as  it  tends  to  some  further  end.  ...  As  our 
understanding  can  contemplate  itself,  and  our  affections  be  exercised  upon 
themselves  by  reflection,  so  may  each  be  employed  in  the  same  manner 
upon  any  other  mind.  And  since  the  Supreme  Mind,  the  Author  and 
Cause  of  all  things,  is  the  highest  possible  object  to  himself,  he  may  be 
an  adequate  supply  to  all  the  faculties  of  our  souls;  a  subject  to  our  un 
derstanding,  and  an  object  to  our  affections." — Butler,  Sermon  XIV. 

NOTE  XXIX.,  p.  227. 

"Christianity  is  not  a  religion  for  the  religious,  but  a  religion  for  man. 
I  do  not  accept  it  because  my  temperament  so  disposes  me,  and  because 
it  meets  my  individual  mood  of  mind,  or  my  tastes.  I  accept  it  as  it  is 
suited  to  that  moral  condition  in  respect  of  which  there  is  no  difference  of 
importance  between  me  and  the  man  I  may  next  encounter  on  my  path." 
The  Restoration  of  Belief,  p.  325. 

NOTE  XXX.,  p.  227.    ' 

"The  Scripture-arguments  are  arguments  of  inducement,  addressed  to 
the  whole  nature  of  man  —  not  merely  to  intellectual  man,  but  to  think 
ing  and  feeling  man,  living  among  his  fellow  men; — and  to  be  appre 
hended  therefore  in  their  effect  on  our  whole  nature." — Hampden,  Bampton 
Lectures,  p.  92. — "  There  are  persons  who  complain  of  the  Word,  because 
it  is  not  addressed  to  some  one  department  of  the  human  soul,  on  which 
they  set  a  high  value.  The  systematic  divine  wonders  that  it  is  not  a 

31 


362  NOTES.  LECT.  VIII. 

mere  scheme  of  dogmatic  theology,  forgetting  that  in  such  a  case  it  would 
address  itself  exclusively  to  the  understanding.  The  German  speculutists, 
on  the  other  hand,  complain  that  it  is  not  a  mere  exhibition  of  the  true 
and  the  good,  forgetting  that  in  such  a  case  it  would  have  little  or  no  in 
fluence  on  the  more  practical  faculties.  Others  seem  to  regret  that  it  is 
not  a  mere  code  of  morality,  while  a  fourth  class  would  wish  it  to  be  alto 
gether  an  appeal  to  the  feelings.  But  the  Word  is  inspired  by  the  same 
God  who  formed  man  at  first,  and  who  knows  what  is  in  man ;  and  he 
would  rectify  not  merely  the  understanding  or  intuitions,  not  merely  the 
conscience  or  affections,  but  the  whole  man  after  the  image  of  God." 
McCosh,  Method  of  the  Divine  Government,  p.  509. 


INDEX  OF  AUTHORS. 


Only  those  Authors  are  here  given  from  ichom  passages  are  quoted. 


ANGELUS   SILESIUS   (Johann     Schef- 

fler),  246,  283. 

ANSELM,  235,  236,  286,  320. 
APULEIUS,  302. 
AQUINAS,  76, 100,  282,  286,  321. 
ARISTOTLE,  257,  273,  301,  309,  333,  339. 
ATHANASIUS,  276,  300,  312. 
ATKINSON,  290. 
AUGUSTINE,  259,  261,  281,  283,  285,  302, 

311,  312,  333. 

BABBAGE,  324. 

BACON,  62, 128. 

BARTHOLMESS,  263,  287,  288,  289,  321. 

BAUER,  BRUNO,  246. 

BAUR,  313. 

BOETHIUS,  100,  282. 

BOLINGBROKE,  251. 

BRAMHALL,  273,  274. 

BROWNE  (Bishop),  250,  275,  279,  310, 

338,356,358. 

BUTLER,  64, 136,  332,  338,  354,  360,  361. 
BUTLER  (W.  A.),  355. 

CALDERWOOD,  252,  278. 

CANZ,  232. 

CHEMNITZ,  236. 

CICERO,  301,  360. 

CLEMENS  ALEXANDRINUS,  248,  258, 

270,  302,  361. 
COLERIDGE,  264. 
COMTE,  247,  290,  350, 
COPLESTON,  335. 
COUSIN,  317. 
CUDWORTH,  278,  335. 


CYRIL,  301. 
DAMASCENUS,  276. 
DESCARTES,  272,  288. 
DE  STAEL,  289. 
DONALDSON,  348. 
DROBISCH,  303,  339. 

ECKART,  283. 
EDWARDS,  251. 
EMERSON  (R.  W.),  247. 
EMPIRICUS  (SEXTUS),  231,  277,  309. 
EULER,  327. 
EWERBECK,  271. 

FERRIER,  308. 

FEUERBACH,  87,  247. 

FICHTE,  62,  96,  239,  240,  243,  245,  250, 

257,  265,  272,  273,  275,  284,  285,  302, 
305,  316,  344. 

FRASER,  341. 
FROUDE,  237,  331,  332. 

GALEN,  231. 

GERHARD,  235. 

GREG,  236,  331. 

GREGORY,  of  Nissa,  301,  306. 

HAMILTON  (SiR  WILLIAM),  245,  256, 

258,  262,  265,  270,  282,  295. 
HAMPDEN,  303,  361. 

HEGEL,  65,  66,  76,  87,  95,  151,  152,  244, 
245,  246,  248,  249,  259,  265,  272,  273, 
312,313,314,315,349,350. 

HERDER,  282,  284. 

HOBBES,.273,  275. 


364 


IXDEX    OF   AUTHORS. 


HOOKER,  261.  330,  357. 
HUME,  139,  296,  304,  309. 

IRENAEUS,  311. 

JACOBI,  262,  275,  286,  287,  288,  291,  293, 

330,  360. 

JOWETT,  236,  237,  241,  295,  324,  329,  351. 
JUSTIN  MARTYR,  276,  300. 

KANT,  63,  233,  238,  239,  241,  284,  304. 

LAERTIUS,  DIOGENES,  309. 
LEE,  308. 

LEIBNITZ,  250,  254,  291,  308,  310,  336. 
LESSING,  302. 

MACKAT,  236. 

MALKBRANCIIE,  305. 

MARHEINEKE,  153,  244,  246,  248,  277, 

313. 

MAURICE,  282,  358. 
McCosn,  279,  287,  307,  326,  362. 
MILLER,  353. 
MILTON,  165. 
MOUELL,  124,  296. 
MOZLEY,  340. 

MULLER  (JULIUS),  161,  337. 

NEANDER,  257.  291,  344. 

NEWMAN  (F.  W.),  237,  249,  250,  251, 

252,  296,  301,  319,  320,  337,  342. 
NIEBUHR,  270. 

OCCAM,  53,  238. 
ORIGEN,  260,  261,  335. 

PARKER  (THEODORE),  242, 249, 251, 325, 

337,  342,  350. 
PASCAL,  104, 169,  254,  287,  301,  305,  306, 

342. 

PAULUS,  87. 
PEARSON,  271. 
PLATO,  261,  276,  309,  360. 
PLOTINUS,  246,  258,  259,  272,  276,  277, 

282,  285. 

POELITZ,  231. 


PORPHYRIUS,  258. 

I'OWELL,  242,  325. 
PRIESTLEY,  237,  319. 
PROCLUS,  259,  276,  282. 

RIGG,  331. 
ROGERS,  331. 
ROHR,  87,  267. 
ROSE,  231. 
ROTHE,  257. 

SCHELLING,  245,  249,  257,  276,  282,  283, 
312,  321. 

SCHLEGEL(F.),  263. 
SCHLEIERMACHER,  123,  284,  300. 

SOCINUS,  236,  237,  238,  319. 

SOUTH,  272. 

SPINOZA,  255,  256, 257,  258, 260, 261  272, 

282,  285,  316,  322,  323,  348. 
STORR,  241,  323. 
STRAUSS,  154,  246,  269,  285,  289,  290, 

320,  327,  349. 

SWEDENBOUG,  283. 

TERTULLIAN,  108,  293,  312,  357. 
THEOPHILUS,  of  Antioch,  300. 
TINDAL,  2">2. 
TiiKf-cii,  343. 
TRENDELENBURG,  274,  321. 

VATKE,  87,  268. 
VAUGHAN,  347. 

WARBURTON,  252. 

WEGSCIIEIDER,  87,  234,  250,  323,  327, 

332,  339,  347. 
WERENFELS,  253. 
WHATELY,  303. 

WlLBERFORCE,  53,  238. 

WILLIAMS  (R.),  345,  355. 
WILLM,  244,  291. 
WOLF,  231. 

XENOPHANES,  58,  243. 
YOUNG  (JOHN),  345. 


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BOOKS. 

MR.  GOLDWIN  SMITH  ON  MR.  HANSEL 

MR.  GOLDWIN  SMITH'S  native  element  appears  to  b 
few  Oxford  lectures  which  he  has  as  yet  published 
least,  two  considerable  controversies,  one  on  the  :ar- 
tory,  and  the  present  one  on  the  theology  which  aive. 
implies.     There  is  an  incisive  haughtiness  in  the  irolm 
lie  flings  aside  false  theories,  or  what  he  thinks  fah  a 
challenges  something  of  a  similar  spirit  in  others.  ^ 
Mr.  Froude  has  been  ungenerous  even  where  it  has'V 
most  defensible.     But  lie  treats   all  his   adversa*' 
those  with  whom  he  disagrees,  living  or  dead,  mucs8, 
Froude ;  and  even  poor  Spinoza  is  branded,  notref, 
pantheist,  which  he  was,  but   as  guilty  of  "  M 
guage,"  which  he  was  not — no  one  less.     This  hatha 
way,  sword  in  hand,  through  all  obstacles,  has  gain 
Smith  many  bitter  enemies,  and  some  deserved  re 
and  then  he  finds  a  victim  worthy  in  every  wa; 
sword-play,  and  we  cannot  but  admit  that  Mr.  jj" 
whom  we  do  not  in  the  least  grudge  to  Mr.  Goldw1  y 
rapier.     In  one  of  his  Oxford  lectures  on  history, 
occasion  to  assert  afresh  his  faith  that  human  hits 
harmony  with  the  true  principles   of  Divine  ju;an 
lature  is  capable  of  apprehending  and  receiving  giin» 
;he  moral  nature  of  God.     Mr.  Goldwin  Smith  asrut 
3ut  we  think  truly,  and  perhaps  also  characteristic 
.osophy  which  denies  this  to  man  contains  in  itself  th  jj 
itheism.  As  a  contrary  doctrine  had  been  developed^ 
Mr.  Mansel  in  his  Bampton  Lectures  for  1858,  that  ho 
'elt  called  upon  to  reply,  and  Mr.  Goldwin  Smith': 
•eply  fills  the  greater  part  of  the  present  volume.  lrn 
very  disjointed  and  rambling,  containing  passages  q.h 
jower,  and  other  passages  of  really  noble  and  hear4. 
.ittle  repetition  and  parade  of  dissection.     Mr.  Sir 
scalpel  with  as  much  pleasure  as  an  anatomical  lecnt 
;o  have  a  profound  conviction  that  ridicule  is  a  ;n 
truth."     Our  own  impression  is,  that  the  attitude  ™ 
•idieule  becomes  possible,  is  never  one  which  is  o:i" 


Rational  Religion,  and  the  Rationalistic  Objections  of  the 
1858.    By  Goldwin  Smith.    Whittaker. 


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1 1 


SEP    3  1968  2  0 


^_ 


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(B9311slO)476 


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